Afghanistan wave 4
***Counterterrorism fails
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***Counterterrorism failsCounterterrorism BadCounter terrorism fails---increases terrorism, Pakistan instability, causes intelligence failure and increases drones O’Hanlon and Shejan, 10- Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues, and Hassina Sherjan, president of Aid Afghanistan for education, (2010, “Toughening it out in Afghanistan,” p. 5-7) The stakes, however, go beyond simply denying al Qaeda another sanctuary. Afghanistan has special importance in the minds of al Qaeda-and would-be recruits of al Qaeda-as a symbol of a successful attack against the West. Were we to lose there, al Qaeda would argue that its predictions about the West's weakness and lack of staying power were correct. It would claim momentum in its broader, global struggle against "infidels." That could help the terrorists find new followers who wanted to be on the winning side of history. It would also restore momentum to al Qaeda, momentum that it has lost across the globe from Iraq to Saudi Arabia to Indonesia and elsewhere. The head of the British armed forces, General Sir David Richards, stated that a NATO "failure [in Afghanistan] would have a catalytic effect on militant Islam around the world and in the region because the message would be that al-Qaeda and the Taliban have defeated the US and the British and NATO, the most powerful alliance in the world. So why wouldn't have an intoxicating effect on militants everywhere? The geo-strategic implications would be immense."8 Some say that the Taliban and other Afghan resistance movements are not our real enemies and that we should reach an accommodation with them. But many with firsthand experience of the Taliban in recent years would beg to differ. David Rohde of the New York Times, who was held captive in late 2008 and much of 2009 by the group, vividly described the extreme degrees of hatred for the United States, and support for al Qaeda's global agenda, among its members. As counterterrorism expert Bruce Riedel says, "Terrorists don't stay in their lanes." They tend to work together. That includes other groups in Afghanistan besides the Taliban, such as the Haqqani network.9 The goal of a large, growing fundamentalist movement that would attempt to create a caliphate throughout much of the Islamic world, and use extreme methods against American allies and interests as well as other dissenting groups and individuals in the process, is not confined to A1 Qaeda. A victory for the Afghan resistance is effectively victory, and a major one at that, for al Qaeda and associated movements with a global and anti-Western agenda. Another crucial reason to prevail in Afghanistan is to prevent Pakistani extremists from using Afghanistan . AS a sanctuary and training ground for launching attacks against their own country. A destabilized, nuclear-armed Pakistan, with up to 100 nuclear weapons and thousands of extremist fighters including al Qaeda partisans, would be an even greater threat to the United States and other states than would a failed state in Afghanistan itself. Afghanistan is not very far from central Pakistan, and the border regions between the two countries are so hard to police that it would be highly undesirable to allow extremists such a safe haven so close to a strategically crucial state. At precisely the moment when Pakistan is finally committing more of its resources to going after extremists in its own tribal regions, it would be an unfortunate moment to give them a sanctuary within Afghanistan. Moreover, there are growing reasons to fear that Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, and al Qaeda have developed more links and more forms of cooperation in recent years. This is not a conclusive argument in favor of winning in Afghanistan at all costs, but it is an important reason why defeat would be worrisome. Some argue that our core goals can be achieved through a more narrow counterterrorism agenda, rather than a full-scale counterinsurgency approach. That is they favor "CT, not COIN," to use the acronyms commonly employed for each concept. They believe that another 9/11 could be prevented, and major disruption to Pakistan averted, by a more limited approach. Under this strategy, special forces would periodically attack any cells that coalesced within Afghanistan, even in the absence of a stable central government. Drones, cruise missiles, and other forms of standoff attack would contribute as well, carrying out strikes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this way, these critics say, we would accomplish our core objectives without engaging in huge risks to American personnel or unrealistic aspirations about the possibility of helping. construct a functioning Afghan state. But it is the CT plan that is unrealistic. In essence, it is the plan that the Bush administration tried in its early years and that dearly failed, leaving us with the dilemma we have today . To be effective CT must have intelligence. but obtaining solid intelligence on the locations of terrorists is very difficult without a strong presence on the ground and the cooperation of friendly local actors. Such friendly local Afghans are much harder to find, and protect, in a chaotic, destabilized country. 10 At some point, if and when the Afghan resistance prevails in combat, as would likely happen under a CT approach, the air bases and other facilities we currently use to attack extremists in both Afghanistan and Pakistan could also be lost. Proponents of CT respond that the international community is trying a more minimal approach to countering al Qaeda in places such as Somalia and some of the tribal areas of Yemen-two additional places largely unpoliced by any effective government. If we can get by with such an approach in these places, why not Afghanistan too, one might ask? But Afghanistan is a more remote country than Somalia or Yemen, and a place with more tribal networks and political actors favorable to al Qaeda. As the Bush administration learned, air strikes and commando raids against suspected terror targets are much harder to pull off quickly and effectively in Afghanistan than they would be in other places. Afghanistan is therefore a safer, more convenient place for al Qaeda to operate. And al Qaeda has already proven its interest in operating from Afghanistan. Its leadership remains based nearby in the mountains of western Pakistan even today. There is currently considerable action against extremists in these regions, so we finally have a chance to execute a hammer and anvil approach against the major redoubts for al Qaeda and associated movements. To be sure, a CT approach may be our only fallback position if the counterinsurgency effort fails. But it is a poor substitute. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.66 Mb. Share with your friends:
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