Afghanistan wave 4
***Iran advantage answers
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***Iran advantage answersPlan => Iran EmboldenmentTheir advantage is backwards – US presence makes Iran aggression impossible Caroll, 9 – assistant director at the Heritage Foundation’s Strategic Communications, editor of The Foundry (12/2/2009, Conn, “19 Reasons To Win In Afghanistan”, http://blog.heritage.org/?p=16195) Loss of Superior Force and Infrastructure Posture against Iran. If Iran is truly one of the most likely and most dangerous near-term adversaries of the United States, it makes little sense to abandon a mature base infrastructure and a means for a Second Front against a potential War with Iran. Multiple Lines of Communications complicates Iranian defense planning, splits their leadership focus, undermines soldier morale, and can lead to a much shorter Iran war with superior U.S. force posture. 15. Strategic rhetoric of an early withdrawal prolongs any conflict. During later phases of a war (Phases 4 and 5), one of the greatest challenges is to cause the mid-level managerial “fence sitters” to choose sides. The Fence sitters are the local leaders who will eventually make a support decision, encourage the reporting of concealed identification of Taliban adversaries, and buttress a regime when it becomes apparent that the presence is for the long term. The irony is that public indecision and senior official debate weakens the U.S. position. A firm strategic communications plan to express long-term presence will speed the commitment of mid-level managerial fence-sitters to align with U.S. supporters. 16 Empirically, Iran is threatening and aggressive – only sustained positive influence in Afghanistan deters them Rubin, 8 -- Director of Studies at the Center for International Cooperation (CIC), New York University. He has written widely on Afghanistan and the region, was an advisor to Ambassador Brahimi during the Bonn conference, and consulted on the writing of Afghanistan’s constitution (8/15, Barnett R, “The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry”) There is, however, a major strategic judgment to be revisited. The military and intelligence agencies of both Pakistan and Iran have systematically used asymmetrical warfare, including terrorism, as a tool of their security policy. Which of them poses a greater threat to U.S. national interest and international peace and security? How should responses to these two threats be balanced? Since the Iranian revolution, the U.S. has overreacted to the Iranian threat and engaged in systematic appeasement of Pakistan, which is now home to the leadership of both al-Qaida and the Taliban (both Afghan and Pakistani). These countries are rivals for influence in Afghanistan and are sponsoring competing infrastructure projects for road transport and energy trade. Iran and India are building a combined rail and road link from the Iranian port of Chah Bahar to Afghanistan’s major high- way. Pakistan, with Chinese aid, is building the port of Gwadar in Baluchistan, aiming at a north-south route to Central Asia. “Taliban” regularly attack Indian road building crews in southwest Afghanistan, and Pakistan charges that India is supporting Baluch insurgents from its consulates in Afghanistan. A reevaluation of the threats originating in Iran and Pakistan should lead to a recalibration of U.S. policy in Afghanistan to tilt away from Pakistan and more toward Iran. Yet it would be wrong and destructive to treat Pakistan with the type of enmity now reserved for Iran. Like Iran, Pakistan’s policy is motivated by a combination of genuine security threats, ideological aspirations, and institution- al interest. In Pakistan’s more open political system, it is far easier for the U.S. to engage with allies inside the country against the security services whose covert policies the U.S. finds threatening. Ultimately, U.S. interests would be best served by supporting efforts to extend and improve governance and security in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, thereby depriving al-Qaida and its epigones of refuge on either side of the border. Plan => Iran EmboldenmentIran’s intentions aren’t friendly – they will pocket the concession and use it to regain dominance in the Middle East Haaretz.com, 9 -- Yuval Azoulay and Yossi Melman, reporters (6/16, “Mossad head: Iran riots won't escalate into revolution,” http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/mossad-head-iran-riots-won-t-escalate-into-revolution-1.278204) Dagan also told the committee the Mossad believed that Iran would have its first nuclear bomb ready for action in 2014, "If the project continues at the present rate and is not interrupted." The Mossad chief said that Western sanctions affect Iran but do not stop its nuclear aspirations, and that the Iranians were trying to evade these sanctions. "The international community must enforce the sanctions and continue this policy." Dagan said that if the sanctions were sufficiently harsh they could stop Iran's nuclear program. With regard to Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas, a senior Mossad official told the committee Tuesday that Iran was continuing to fund and control Hezbollah, but its control of Hamas was limited for now. The official explained that Hamas is maintaining its independence because of its extensive relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, defense officials also say that relations between Hamas and Iran will grow stronger in the future. "The reason for the strengthening of these ties is money and arms, both of which Hamas needs and Iran is willing to give." According to the senior official, Iran wants to strengthen its position in the region and reach the hegemony Egypt enjoyed in the 1960s and '70s. These aspirations are a cause of great tension in and concern among moderate states in the region such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Withdrawal would prompt renewed Iranian support for cross-border terrorist groups, risking civil war Valley, 7/31 -- Major General (USA/Ret.) is an author, military strategist and Chairman of Stand Up America and Save Our Democracy Projects (2010, Paul, “The Iran-Afghanistan Connection: A Threat to US Plans?” http://nwodaily.com/2010/07/the-iran-afghanistan-connection-a-threat-to-us-plans/) Iran is concerned that the United States’ interest in fostering sufficient stability in Afghanistan for long enough to allow U.S. troops to begin leaving next year will lead Washington to drop the “red lines” it has imposed on Taliban participation in a political process. Iran is concerned that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will be able to use the Taliban’s unchecked involvement in a power-sharing arrangement as a proxy to expand their influence in Afghanistan at Tehran’s expense and to threaten the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, Iran will intensify its support for key players among the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek groups, just as it did during the civil war that broke out after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and after the Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996. These dynamics raise the risks of renewed civil war in Afghanistan—a civil war that would simultaneously be a proxy war among Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, the country’s most powerful external players. These were precisely the conditions under which al-Qaeda found sanctuary and thrived in Afghanistan during the 1990s.” Withdrawal emboldens Iran and Pakistan - wrecks the perception of commitment to the region The Washington Times, 6/22 (2010, Editorials, “Obama’s Vietnam Moment; Democrats Plan to Cut and Run in Afghanistan,” lexis) A recent study by Anthony H. Cordesman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies delves into the problems presented by this arbitrary "begin the withdrawal" date. The study advises against "timelines based on national politics, exaggerated expectations, and past failures [which] can lose the war before it can be won." Setting unrealistic timelines will pressure the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) into "trying to do too much, too quickly," "undermine faith in the U.S. and ISAF commitment to stay in Afghanistan," "embolden insurgents in their war of political attrition" and "pressure Afghans and others in the region to hedge against U.S. departure and compromise with insurgents." Attempts to get results before the deadline will lead to wasting Afghan troops by throwing them into the fight unprepared and generating a climate of risk aversion elsewhere in the government because no one will want to stick his neck out if America is going to abandon them. Meanwhile, Pakistan will begin to weigh its options for the post-U.S. regional environment, and Iran will be more active in expanding its influence. 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