All their disads are non-unique – a Privatization’s inevitable internationally



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Ybarra 13 – senior transportation policy analyst at the Reason Foundation, a nonprofit think tank (Shirley Ybarra, July 2013, “Overhauling U.S. Airport Security Screening,” Policy Brief 109, http://reason.org/files/overhauling_airport_security.pdf)//twemchen

Neither the outside study that TSA commissioned from Catapult Consultants in 2007 nor TSA’s own study that was sharply criticized by the GAO identified these major productivity differences.10 Both focused mostly on accounting costs, omitting various overhead costs and extras such as the cost of using the National Deployment Force. Those essentially “inside” studies created the misleading impression that it costs more, rather than less, to contract with qualified security firms for airport screening.
Secret TSA studies vote aff

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen

In 2007, USA Today uncovered covert TSA test results that showed significantly higher screener detection capabilities at SFO than at LAX: “investigators successfully smuggled 75 percent of fake bombs through checkpoints at Los Angeles International Airport … and 20 percent at San Francisco International Airport.”35 In December of 2007 Catapult Consultants also issued a report to TSA that found “private screeners performed at a level that was equal to or greater than that of federal TSOs [Transportation Security Officers].”36 Similarly, interviews with private sector screening companies and airport officials indicate that SPP airports have better screener detection capabilities and provide greater customer service, responsiveness, and flexibility at passenger checkpoints (see Appendix 12).



2ac – xt: yes privatization – at: it was frozen
Congress forcefully unfroze it

Ahlers 12 – staff writer at CNN (Mike Ahlers, 2/7/12, “Congress kick-starts program to privatize airport screeners,” http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/07/travel/montana-tsa-screeners/)//twemchen

One year after the TSA administrator brought efforts to privatize airport screening to a virtual standstill, Congress has kick-started the program, opening the door for other airports to "opt out" of TSA screening. A provision in the just-passed FAA reauthorization bill requires TSA chief John Pistole to approve airport requests to privatize their screeners unless he determines it would harm security. That is likely to open the doors to further privatization, since Pistole has said private screening and government screening is "comparable." Currently, 16 airports, the largest being San Francisco International Airport, have private screeners under the Transportation Security Administration's Screening Partnership Program. The screeners are overseen by TSA supervisors, use the same X-ray and scanning equipment and wear similar uniforms. But they work for private companies. One year ago, Pistole announced he was freezing the program, saying he believed airport screening to be a federal responsibility, and saying privatization hurt TSA flexibility and added to administrative costs. Pistole said he would approve additional airports only if there was a "clear and substantial" advantage to the federal government.


It’s reopened

Poole 13 – Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the Reason Foundation (Robert Poole, 11/12/13, “Airport Policy and Security News #95” http://reason.org/news/show/1013613.html#f)//twemchen

TSA Resumes Outsourced Screening Program. Late last month TSA issued a solicitation for approved airport screening companies to bid on four separate contracts to provide passenger and baggage screening at four Montana airports: Bert Mooney, Bozeman Yellowstone, Glacier Park, and Yellowstone Regional. This is the first solicitation since TSA was required by Congress in 2012 to resume taking applications and awarding screening contracts. Whether there will be bidders remains to be seen; the language in the solicitation says this procurement is a "100 percent small business set-aside."
Not a thing – Pistole did it, and he’s retired

Poole 2/3 – Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the Reason Foundation (Robert Poole, 2/3/15, “Airport Policy and Security News #104” http://reason.org/news/show/airport-policy-and-security-news-10)//twemchen

Just-retired TSA Administrator John Pistole deserves our thanks for finally implementing risk-based screening, more than a decade after Congress mandated it in the 2001 legislation creating TSA. The Aviation & Transportation Security Act of 2001 called for TSA to create "trusted passenger programs . . . to expedite the screening of passengers who participate in such programs, thereby allowing security screening personnel to focus on those passengers who should be subjected to more extensive screening." After the fiasco of "Registered Traveler" under Pistole's predecessor—which required participants to be fingerprinted and iris-scanned but did not provide expedited screening—it was Pistole who pushed hard to implement genuine risk-based screening in the form of PreCheck. As of the end of 2014, PreCheck has 600 lanes in place at 124 airports, with 802,000 passengers enrolled.



2ac – at: flexibility now – laundry list
Flexibility is low now – laundry list

Lungren 5 – Representative from California (Dan Lungren, 7/28/5, “U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DAN LUNGREN (R-CA) HOLDS HEARING ON AVIATION SCREENING WORKFORCE,” PTW, Lexis)//twemchen

The subcommittee today is meeting to hear testimony on improving the management of aviation screening workforce. I'd like to welcome everybody to today's hearing. When Congress directed TSA to take over responsibility for airline security screening, we sought a system that would produce better trained screeners, thus increasing security. Directly following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, Transportation Secretary Norm Mineta set forth a goal of processing passengers within 10 minutes or less. Yet by all accounts TSA has not met this goal. Instead, according to the DHS inspector general, we have a multibillion dollar enterprise that inefficiently targets and burdens children and the elderly. I might add, on the positive side, that TSA has recently changed its standard operating procedures effective July 14th to allow TSA supervisors at screening checkpoints the decision-making capability and authority to waive secondary screenings on passengers that are clearly under the age of 12. I appreciate that particular change. I'm glad it is coming. And while I applaud TSA for this step forward, it is indicative of the overall problem that we ever had such a contrary position or policy in the first place and that it took so long and so many bad stories and hearings to force such common-sense action. There is, obviously, always room for more improvement. TSA screening operations have been plagued by high attrition rates, high injury rates, high absenteeism, screener shortages and other problems that are indicative of a problematic structure. Furthermore, the role of security director at airports is extremely important. This individual must be able to handle crowds in such a way that manages the length of security lines. He or she needs to understand when flights are departing and when travelers are arriving in order to open an efficient number of screening lanes at different points throughout the day. And so it begs the question: Can the federal government itself effectively run screening operations at 440 airports of different sizes across the country from its location in Washington, D.C.? Some believe the answer is no. As I see it, TSA problems may be rooted in a rigid centralized control which gives less weight than it should to airport diversity and shows a lack of initiative. TSA often has little firsthand knowledge of local airport conditions, job markets and other market anomalies. The result, I fear, leaves airports short of screeners and passengers stuck in long lines. TSA would be better served shifting workforce decision-making to the local level and providing flexibility and incentives to improve operations while focusing on setting overall training and performance standards at the national level. I might just add that I have been informed that there is a dispute between the House and the Senate conferees in the appropriations realm as to what the proper level of screeners should be; even a suggestion on the Senate side that there ought to be a cut in the overall number of screeners. It just goes to show, as far as I'm concerned, that we ought to be a little more original in our thinking and a little more flexible in how we try and solve this problem.

2ac – at: flexibility now – oversight
Tons of oversight now

Ahlers 12 – staff writer at CNN (Mike Ahlers, 2/7/12, “Congress kick-starts program to privatize airport screeners,” http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/07/travel/montana-tsa-screeners/)//twemchen

Republicans depicted the current system as inefficient, and said the bloat extends to the TSA oversight of privatized airports. "There are certain airports where contractors do screening and TSA is just there to oversee the screen(ing) process; there are upwards of 50 TSA employees on the payroll," said subcommittee chairman Rep. Mike Rogers of Alabama. "Having 50-plus TSA officials in a single airport where they are not responsible for conducting screening is just plain overkill and it's costing the taxpayer huge amounts of money," he said.

2ac – at: flexibility now – at: authority
The TSA isn’t using its authority

Menendez 4 – US House of Representatives from New Jersey (Robert Menendez, 4/22/4, “ HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON AIRPORT SCREENER PRIVATIZATION,” Aviation Subcommittee, Lexis)//twemchen

Also, with reference to reviewing the prepared testimony from the GAO, the IG, and the private screening companies, it seems that everybody's unhappy with TSA's hiring and training procedures, and that includes even federal security directors. As someone who represents one of the busiest airports in the nation, Newark International Airport, I'll tell you -- it's the airport where one of the fatal flights on September 11 originated, an airport that still -- still -- has not met the 100 percent EDS baggage-screening requirement and where travelers frequently stand in security lines that exceed 45 minutes -- I share these concerns. You know, if I didn't know better -- and, Admiral, I understand you've only been on the job a few months -- I'd almost think the TSA is complicit in trying to ensure that we don't succeed so we can go to private security screening because the reality is that, notwithstanding all the management tools we have given to TSA -- the flexibility, the part-time ability, the configurations that would maximum abilities -- I see it at Newark, and I see that virtually none of those management flexibilities are in use. It's clearly a failure in terms of using the abilities that the Congress has given to the TSA to meet its obligation. We are now at nearly pre-September 11 and headed in the right direction for the purposes of the industry and the traveling public. We're heading in the right direction in terms of the numbers of passengers that are traveling this country. That's good news, good news for the industry, good news for the economy. It sends a confidence in being able to fly again, but we are going to choke that success and that confidence by the inability of TSA to meet the demand. So I certainly hope that we as part of this look at -- and I hope the committee looks at -- more intensively how we focus on improving these procedures at all airports, how we look at getting TSA to be responsive and use the management tools that Congress has given it as a starter. I understand the cap issue as well, but, when you don't even use the management tools you have to meet part of your challenge, the cap in and of itself is not a question. Finally, the BearingPoint study found little cost or security benefit in having the private security companies do this specifically, and, if that is the case and if we are looking for all these flexibilities, flexibilities that we are either not giving to TSA or flexibilities that TSA has and is not using, then we have a real problem on our hands. So I look, Admiral, for some responses to these questions generically, and I'm looking forward to engaging with you specifically at Newark because we cannot continue on the path that we're on. We're going to stifle the progress that we're going to make. That has an economic effect in the country, for our region and in the country, and God knows we need a more vibrant economy. So it's all interrelated with the security issue, and we look forward to your responses.

2ac – at: flexibility now – at: analysis now
The analysis hasn’t spurred action

Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen

TSA has taken actions to identify unnecessary redundancies in the duties of administrative staff assigned to SPP and non-SPP airports, but the agency has not completed these efforts. • According to identified effective practices,1 strategic workforce planning requires, among other things, that agencies develop strategies that are tailored to address gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies. • TSA is conducting a workforce analysis that is intended to identify any redundancies. TSA has collected and analyzed information, such as data on core functions, staffing levels, hub-spoke responsibilities, skill sets, and collateral duties. However, steps that have not yet been completed include implementing revised job analysis tools to provide federal security directors (FSD)2 with greater flexibility in staffing, and implementing organizational models to ensure that there is consistency in reporting relationships and utilization of positions. TSA officials said that the agency will be continuously updating its analysis. • TSA and SPP contractors at the airports we visited had mixed views about whether unnecessary redundancies at SPP airports exist.

2ac – at: airports say no
Say yes – laundry list

Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen

Various factors have contributed to airports’ decisions about whether to participate in the SPP. • Managers at two of the SPP airports we visited stated that TSA had strongly suggested that they apply to the SPP because of constraints on the number of TSOs that TSA had at that time. Another airport manager said that he applied to participate in the SPP so that he could gain screeners at another airport, which he also managed. He was reportedly told by TSA that the other airport would not be staffed with additional TSA screeners due to TSA resource constraints, so he applied to participate in the SPP at both airports. • Another airport manager stated that he decided to participate in the SPP because he believed that private screeners would provide better customer service. • Managers at the remaining two airports we visited stated that they had decided to continue using private screeners because of their satisfactory experience with participating in TSA’s 2-year pilot program that preceded the SPP.
We solve their say no warrants

Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen

In March 2007, the Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA) reported on the results of a survey it conducted to determine how to make the SPP more attractive to airports.1 The survey was sent to ACI-NA airport official representatives and Public Safety and Security Committee airport members. ACI-NA received a total of 31 survey responses.2 Twenty-two, or 71 percent, of the respondents said they were not interested in participating in the SPP. The most frequent reasons given for this lack of interest included • the airport was satisfied with TSA screening services, • screening is a federal government responsibility, and • the SPP does not allow airports to have managerial control. • The survey respondents reported that liability and contract control and oversight were also important issues with respect to SPP participation. • The most frequently cited advantages of the SPP were staffing flexibility and customer service.



2ac – at: airports say no – midway
Midway incentives prove

AGB 10 – Air Guide Business (6/28/10, “Air Transport and Government News,” http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Air+Transport+%26+Government+News+-+North+America.-a0231764333)//twemchen

Chicago Midway Midway seen as crucial test of privatization. Experts say airport privatization continues to gain steam around the world, even as Chicago Midway approaches a July 30 deadline in its lengthy privatization effort. As the only hub airport in the FAA's privatization experiment, Midway won the required majority support of airlines by agreeing to freeze landing fees at current levels, then adjust them according to a formula pegged to the Consumer Price Index. "Even if the Midway deal dies, a precedent has been established in creating a deal structure that a bunch of airlines agreed to," says Robert Poole of the Reason Foundation. "That bodes well for other airport privatizations." Jun 21, 2010


Say yes

Brown 9 – staff writer at AOPA (Sarah Brown, 4/23/9, “Deal to privatize Midway Airport goes bust,” http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2009/April/23/Deal-to-privatize-Midway-Airport-goes-bust)//twemchen

Midway would have been the first major airport to privatize under an FAA pilot program that allows up to five public airport sponsors to sell or lease an airport. While the program began in 1997, it was met with little interest until recently, when some states saw the Midway privatization as a model for obtaining short-term injections of cash to address budget shortfalls.
Makes their unions warrant go away

Infrastructure Investor 11 – (11/1/11, “US: higher political risk than emerging markets,” PEI Media Ltd., Lexis)//twemchen

There is acknowledgement that any successful process needs to obtain buy-in from all relevant stakeholders right at the outset. The planned privatisation of Chicago's Midway Airport is cited as a "terrific case study in generating union consensus", and hence as a useful precedent, despite ultimately collapsing in 2009 due to a lack of debt finance in the wake of the Crisis.


It’s modeled

Infrastructure Investor 12 – (4/2/12, “Chicago redux,” PEI Media Ltd., Lexis)//twemchen

One year later, Chicago tried to conduct the first-ever airport privatisation in the US, attempting to lease Midway International to a consortium led by Citi Infrastructure Investors (CII) in a near-miss deal that helped to establish PPPs as unpredictable in terms of their outcomes. The recently created Chicago Infrastructure Trust (CIT) marks the latest PPP-related effort from a US city recognised industry-wide for its well-documented engagement (albeit poorly understood and wrongly maligned) with private investment in public infrastructure. Chicago's decade-old PPP rigmarole has seen the Windy City labeled as everything from failed test tube experiment to willfully complicit dupe. Regardless: in 2012, Chicago reinforced its legacy for groundbreaking privatisations in the US. This time, it's an industry-backed deal to establish PPPs as a politically and financially viable business. The CIT is effectively an infrastructure bank - something much-discussed at the national level in the US, but now delivered at the city level - that will seek will seek to channel over $1 billion in private capital to develop Chicago's infrastructure. The time has come "This is an idea whose time has come," enthuses James Hooke, speaking shortly after the March 1 city hall announcement about the launch of the CIT, which was made with support from former President Bill Clinton. Hooke is chief executive officer of Macquarie Infrastructure Company, and the Australia-based group has a long-running relationship with the Windy City. Macquarie steered the 2004 Chicago Skyway deal, while Macquarie District Energy Holdings is the leading chilled water service provider to the city. Significantly, Macquarie Infrastructure and Real Assets (MIRA) is a private investor in the CIT, committing a reported $200 million to a total $1 billion, alongside CII and JP Morgan Asset Management's (JPMAM) infrastructure investment group. Hooke praised Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel (a man with "a reputation for getting it done"). "Someone had to move first," notes Hooke. "No one has actually gone out and done it [before]. They've moved from the realm of abstract, theoretical discussion." Jason Zibarras echoed this sentiment. "That's the big difference here," says Zibarras, chief investment officer of JPMAM's infrastructure group. "Everything else is an idea; they're putting it into action". [is] Zibarras cited a "huge" market need for infrastructure investment in Chicago, while Emanuel has vowed to revisit a privatisation of Midway. Meanwhile, Holly Koeppel, co-head of CII and a veteran of energy infrastructure, said the first initiative for the CIT - a $225 million energy efficiency project - was "very sensible". "It can have a relatively quick turnaround," she notes. "It's not just socially responsible, it's economically attractive. They picked the right project." Colleague and CII co-head Felicity Gates agreed. "What they are doing is just the initial project. They have deliberately not announced more," Gates observes. "They are trying to get it right - start with a single project, move it through, prove up the model, then move on." Hooke described the energy efficiency project as "politically clever," and noted early success will prove crucial. As always, Chicago will be closely watched - both stateside and internationally. "A lot of the country is looking at this," Hooke says. "On the investment side, we think there will be pension fund interest, and I think internationally people are intrigued-the US has taken so long to develop a PPP culture." "This is clearly a very important development," Koeppel says. "On a scale of one to 10, its score will continue to go up as they achieve more. It's a model that can work. But it has to be implemented."

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