All their disads are non-unique – a Privatization’s inevitable internationally
Our studies are better – competition solves their arguments
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Our studies are better – competition solves their arguments Hernandez 5 – senior associate with the Washington law firm of Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, former prosecutor for the FAA (David Hernandez, Sept 2005, “A Logical End: Private Screening,” Lexis)//twemchen AB: What makes you say that opt-out is "the next big thing?" Hernandez: I think they, the TSA and Congress, are going to realize that the money just isn't there. They have to incentivize it in some way to get more airports to join. Something has to give, and I think the first thing will be the liability, something that relieves the airports and security companies from liability, essentially putting them into a government contractor's position. It has to because there is so much data there from the pilot program that suggests they can do it more efficiently. I think a big problem with the TSA now, but they don't want to admit it, is they've probably doubled their human relations attorneys just dealing with the HR issues. They didn't expect the huge problems they're having. I think the private sector is more efficient dealing with those HR issues. AB: I recently heard some Congressional staffers suggest that by putting an in-line screening system in place at an airport you pretty much eliminate two screener positions and the system pays for itself within the first year. Have we gotten to the point that this instant bureaucracy we've created is proving to be an obstacle to getting this accomplished? Hernandez: I think the biggest thing, without pointing fingers, is that when this all came about in 2001, the total cost was grossly underestimated. Projections were based on pre-9/11 numbers when the airlines were responsible for screening and were paying dirt wages. AB: In the final analysis, it would seem that you think private screening is ultimately the direction this thing is headed. Hernandez: We have to; there are just too many inefficiencies. You may see gradual changes; perhaps you'll see a quarter of the airports switching over to a private security model and, once efficiencies are realized there, it will expand. Run it like a business instead of a bureaucracy. I wouldn't be surprised if you were to see Lockheed Martin and Covenant just come roaring down and overnight taking it over at airports. That's going to be a huge revenue-generating stream. Competition, in its pure form, is good. The TSA sucks – contracting is key Lasky 14 – editorial director of security technology @ Security Info Watch Magazine (Steve Lasky, 1/24/14, “Sentiment grows for privatizing airport screening – again!,” http://www.securityinfowatch.com/blog/11299735/tsa-screeners-under-attack)//twemchen The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has to be the most maligned federal agency in history. Everyone who flies seems to have their own version of TSA hell, spanning the security line purgatory of incidental groping and rude behavior to theft and intrusive scanning. I do fly on a regular basis, and I will say that my negative experiences with TSA agents have been minimal. Except for the metal rods and plates in my surgically repaired left leg, my groping experiences hardly raise a red flag. However, it is interesting to assess the level of professionalism (or lack thereof) of TSA staff when doing the security line shuffle in airports across the country. Certain cities have earned a well-deserved reputation for shabby performances and lethargic TSA screeners, while a lesser number receive high praise for professional conduct. As frustration with TSA screening practices and perceived security lapses continue to grow not only with the general flying public, but with political heavyweights in Washington D.C., the cry for the return to private security screeners in our nation’s airports is reaching an audible pitch. Certainly no one is saying the job TSA faces is an easy one. In 2013, the agency screened 638,706,790 passengers, which was almost 1.5 million more than the previous year. Close to 2,000 firearms were confiscated from carry-on bags at checkpoints across the country, with 81 percent of those being loaded. My home base – Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International – had the distinction of topping the list in 2013 for most firearms intercepted with 111. The TSA also suffered its first fatality this past year when TSA officer Gerardo Hernandez was killed in the line of duty at LAX by a gunman specifically targeting a TSA agent. Yet the pressure mounts for either the return to privatization or for major overhauls in how the TSA operates. The $1.1 trillion spending bill that was recently passed by the U.S. Congress has renewed the privatization discussion since new appropriation measures will prevent the TSA from using federal funds to hire additional screeners if they exceed the cap of 46,000 employees now on the payroll. When you combine this new budget restraint with a vocal campaign by several lawmakers to return to private security in our airports, along with a scathing government aviation study released last November by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that proposes the elimination of the TSA’s flawed SPOT security program -- Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, 2014 could prove to be a contentious year for the agency. The most damning aspect of the GAO’s findings was it called for the elimination of the expensive SPOT program because it finds no “scientifically validated evidence” for the $200 million annual expenditure, and that it was deployed without the TSA conducting any cost-benefit analysis. Since its creation following the events of 9/11, the TSA has ballooned into largest DHS employer and has been mired in bad press with its air marshal program, the intrusive full-body scanning machine debacle and now the SPOT program. Many critics claim the TSA has underperformed and has been no more effective than the previous system using the private sector. Now that 16 U.S. airports have been given the green light to return private security contractors (albeit the majority are smaller airports), the comparison between TSA and the private sector are increasing. In fact, a report released by the House in 2011 said that San Francisco International’s private screeners actually performed better than TSA at LAX. In a recent article written by Chris Edwards, editor of www.DownsizingGovernment.org at the Cato Institute, and author of the study Privatizing the Transportation Security Administration, he states that the government has an important oversight role to play in aviation security, but the TSA’s near-monopoly on screening has resulted in it getting “bogged down in managing its bloated federal workforce,” as one congressional report concluded. Edwards continued that Congress should abolish TSA. Activities that have not shown substantial benefits -- such as SPOT -- should be eliminated. Airport screening -- which represents about two-thirds of TSA’s budget -- should be moved to the control of airports and opened to competitive contracting. And the remaining parts of TSA should be moved to other federal agencies. Gerry Connelly, a House Democrat from Virginia has been among the most vocal political critics of the TSA in recent months. During a committee hearing on the TSA's Screening Partnership Program, Connelly said he didn’t appreciate agents "barking orders" at people in airports, adding the less polite an agent is, the more likely they are to encounter resistance from the public Connelly went on to say that there was no excuse for someone barking orders continuously at the public at any airport in America who is an employee of the federal government, or a contractor for the federal government. Connelly said he’d lose his job if I treated the public that way. Rep. John Mica, R-Fla, who is head of the Oversight and Government Reform subcommittee on government operations, said last week he plans legislation "one way or the other" to privatize all federal screeners within two years. Like many critics of the agency who want to take the screening process away, Mica is in favor of leaving TSA in charge of gathering intelligence, setting standards and running audits. "If you come to Orlando airport or Sanford airport, what is going on is almost criminal to American citizens, the way they are treated," said Mica. "This is the mess we've created." 2ac – empirics Empirically solves Mica 4 – US House of Representatives from Florida (John Mica, 4/22/4, “HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON AIRPORT SCREENER PRIVATIZATION,” Aviation Subcommittee, Lexis)//twemchen Let me say also that this is clearly not a proposal to return to pre-September 11 security. No one proposes giving screening responsibilities back to the airlines. No one proposes lowering federal standards one iota. Rather, this is an approach that all federal facilities across the country employ today where the private sector, under federal guidelines, provide high-quality security functions with strong federal oversight. For years, the public/private security model has worked successfully at nuclear power plants and military bases, and we see that also as an evolutionary progression in the European model. To further improve the performance of our national screening system, we must develop and deploy new screening technologies, and we must reform the current bureaucracy so that we are even more responsive to local needs and aviation security requirements. I believe the testimony this morning will confirm that with even greater federal standards and greater federal oversight, we can better utilize both federal and private security personnel to channel our scarce resources and enhance our post-9/11 aviation security. 2ac – empirics – kci KCI proves it’ll work Garrett 10 – staff writer at Airport Improvement Magazine (Ronnie L. Garrett, March-April 2010, “Airports Across the Nation Make Passenger Screening a Private Matter,” http://www.airportimprovement.com/content/story.php?article=00157)//twemchen Kansas City International Airport (KCI) was one of five airports that participated in the original SPP pilot - a program TSA was required to establish by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001. After a positive introduction to the alternative method, the airport remains with private screeners to this day. According to director of aviation Mark VanLoh, the program works well at KCI because it addresses the unique circumstances of its 12 checkpoints in three separate circular terminals. The airport's "drive to your gate" layout and the fact that some of its airlines run limited schedules while others launch 70 to 80 flights per day necessitate greater flexibility in staffing checkpoints, explains VanLoh. "With private screeners, we are able to move personnel around within all three terminals at a moment's notice," he notes. FirstLine, a certified aviation security company headquartered in Cleveland, operates KCI's screening program. The airport, which averages 200 flights per day, appreciates that FirstLine schedules screeners around its morning and evening rushes, and adjusts staffing on the fly. For example, if Frontier Airlines has a plane departing in one area with 150 people on it, screeners move to that checkpoint. As soon as those passengers are screened, FirstLine dispatches employees to the checkpoint facing the next large departure. "During the day, when there are not as many flights, they can move people to where the action is," VanLoh says. "It's really fluid, and that's what we like about it." Similar reports come from San Francisco International Airport (SFO), which has used private contractors since the TSA program's inception. Currently, the airport moves 37.4 million passengers annually and uses Covenant Aviation Security for passenger and baggage screening. Michael McCarron, SFO director of community affairs, notes that wait times at any of the airport's eight checkpoints average seven to nine minutes. Covenant's security control center, where dispatchers monitor cameras placed at security checkpoints, helps the company direct more employees to areas that need them. "It's been a really great way to keep screening lines moving and provide outstanding security to our travelers," says McCarron. 2ac – empirics – international Canada and the EU prove we solve better Ybarra 13 – senior transportation policy analyst at the Reason Foundation, a nonprofit think tank (Shirley Ybarra, July 2013, “Overhauling U.S. Airport Security Screening,” Policy Brief 109, http://reason.org/files/overhauling_airport_security.pdf)//twemchen The United States stands alone in combining aviation security regulation and screening operations in the same entity. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) International Transport Forum commissioned a study in 2008 that compared and contrasted aviation security in the United States, Canada and the European Union. The research showed that a conflict of interest similar to the TSA situation does not exist in Canada or the EU countries. In those countries, airport screening looks similar to what travelers experience at U.S. airports, but the way in which this service is provided and regulated is quite different. In all these cases, the policy and regulatory function is carried out by an agency of the national government, as in the United States. But actual airport screening is carried out either by the airport itself, by a government-certified private security firm or in a few cases by a government police agency. Legally, airport security in Europe is the responsibility of the airport operator. Whether the screening is carried out by the airport or by a security company varies from country to country. Table 1 details the airport screening arrangements in 31 European countries. In Canada, post-9/11 legislation created an aviation security agency—the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA). Transport Canada remains responsible for airport security policy and regulation, while CATSA is responsible for the mechanics of airport security, such as development of biometric ID cards and implementation of an airport screening system. But rather than providing the screening function itself, CATSA certifies private security companies and contracts with them to provide screening services at the 89 airports where such services are provided. Separation of aviation security regulation from the provision of security services is called for by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to which the United States (along with 188 other countries) is a signatory. This policy is found in ICAO Annex 17, Standard 3.4.7. Under the Chicago Convention which created ICAO, “contracting states are required to notify [ICAO] of any differences between their national regulations and practices” and ICAO’s international standards. The United States has failed to notify ICAO that it does not comply. 2ac – empirics – HTIC 2011 study The best data concludes the private sector’s drastically more productive Ybarra 13 – senior transportation policy analyst at the Reason Foundation, a nonprofit think tank (Shirley Ybarra, July 2013, “Overhauling U.S. Airport Security Screening,” Policy Brief 109, http://reason.org/files/overhauling_airport_security.pdf)//twemchen Observers such as the GAO have noted how little flexibility private screening contractors have over the variables involved in providing this service, given the narrow confines of ATSA and TSA’s highly centralized way of implementing SPP contracts.8 Yet the limited available information suggests that even within those constraints, the private sector is more flexible and delivers more cost-effective screening. The most dramatic data come from a study carried out by the staff of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in 2011.9 They obtained data on screening at two major airports, LAX with TSA screening and SFO with contractor screening. Both are major hub airports, as classified by the FAA, and both are Category X airports, the highest security level in TSA’s categorization of airports. The study found that the company at SFO is dramatically more productive, processing an average of 65% more passengers per screener than TSA screeners at LAX (Table 2). We’ll insert this table into the debate –
Source: House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure, TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model (Washington, D.C.: 2011), Endnote 8 2ac – empirics – at: pp5 That failed cause the TSA was a helicopter mom Ervin 4 – Inspector General of Homeland Security (Clark Kent Ervin, 4/22/4, “ HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON AIRPORT SCREENER PRIVATIZATION,” Aviation Subcommittee, Lexis)//twemchen Based on our own work on this matter, the Office of Inspector General found that there is not a sufficient basis at this time to determine conclusively whether the pilot airport screeners performed at a level equal to or greater than that of federal screeners. TSA needs to develop measurable criteria to evaluate both contractor and federal screeners properly. Available data from limited covert testing suggests that they performed about the same, which is to say equally poorly, but the apparent consistency in performance was not unexpected considering the extraordinary degree of TSA involvement in screening, hiring, deploying, training, and promoting pilot screeners. TSA's tight controls over the pilot program restricted flexibility and innovation that the contractors might have implemented to perform at a level exceeding that of the federal workforce. For example, the inability to hire screeners independently left pilot program contractors totally dependent on TSA to obtain their initial workforce and to fill any vacancies caused by attrition or to meet peak period needs during the first year of the contract. As a consequence, the pilot program contractors said that they could not effectively and immediately address problems with high attrition levels, understaffing, excessive overtime, and employee morale. The staffing shortage at the Kansas City Airport, for example, was so severe that to meet the minimum staffing requirements and to ensure airport screening security, TSA temporarily deployed 68 federal screeners to two passenger checkpoints and three baggage-screening areas. The federal screeners were deployed to the Kansas City Airport for two months, costing TSA over $1 million. Applicant screening was also a problem. Covenant prescreened all the applicants prior to sending them to the TSA assessment center to increase the likelihood that TSA would agree that the prescreened applicants were qualified. However, only 31 percent of the prescreened applicants passed the TSA's assessment process, and that was about the same percentage as passed the TSA assessment center who were not prescreened. The contractor had to wait for future TSA-initiated assessment centers to be set up before it could attempt to fill the remaining vacant positions, and TSA refused to share its assessment criteria with the contractors so that future contractor prescreening could increase the likelihood of the pass rate. The pilot program contractors were also restricted in the overall number of screeners that they could hire and in how screeners were trained. For example, although the TSA pilot contract award press release and the pilot program contract stated a requirement for baggage screening, TSA did not include authorizations for baggage screeners in the initial hiring or staffing level. To attain staffing flexibility, pilot program contractors, with approval from local TSA, did cross-train passenger screeners in checked baggage screening on their own. TSA's management oversight of the pilot program was generally decentralized, and program and operational issues had to be routed through numerous divisions within TSA in order to be researched, discussed, and then finally approved. When contractors and local TSA officials needed decisions and/or direction, they often had difficulty getting headquarters officials to respond. Some local TSA and contractor officials found it easier to make their own decisions rather than seeking headquarters approval or guidance, leading to inconsistencies among pilot airport program management and, thereby, making comparisons between the federal workforce and the contractor workforce even harder to make. In conclusion, OIG believes that, in theory, pilot programs can be a useful tool in exploring program innovations and improvements, but, in this instance, TSA must develop meaningful performance measures and standards so that overall performance and the effects of new improvements can be measured and assessed, and contractors must be given the flexibility to determine what works best for their own situation. 2ac – empirics – at: tsa study/catapult Their study sucks – they forgot to count overhead costs and also didn’t count the NDF Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.61 Mb. Share with your friends:
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