All their disads are non-unique – a Privatization’s inevitable internationally
ar – terrorism – i/l – at: gao ev
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1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: gao ev This ev is miscut – their ev is a summary of the TSA study – which the GAO found was flawed Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen TSA’s study comparing the cost and performance of screening services at SPP and non-SPP airports had some design strengths, such as recognizing that cost savings would be limited given the mandated structure of the SPP and assessing whether performance data were collected in a uniform manner. However, based on the criteria that we used, the design was limited because TSA did not: • Include the impact of potential overlapping administrative staff 1 on the costs of SPP airports. TSA is currently conducting a workforce analysis to identify unnecessary redundancies in its staffing, including overlapping administrative personnel; TSA officials stated that this effort is ongoing and has no completion date. • Account for workers compensation, general liability insurance, and some retirement costs paid by the federal government, as well as the lost corporate income tax revenue from private screening contractors, when replacing private with federal screening. • Call for an assessment of the reliability of the costs and performance data, as called for in federal accounting standards. 2 • Document the rationale for including the five performance measures reviewed in the study while excluding others. • Call for statistical analyses to determine the level of confidence in observed differences in performance between SPP and non-SPP airports. The TSA changed its mind and agreed with the GAO Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen We are recommending that if TSA plans to use its cost and performance study in future decision making regarding the SPP, it revise its study to address the methodological limitations that we have identified. TSA generally agreed with our findings and recommendation. It was too conservative anyway Poole 12 – Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow, Director of Transportation Policy at the Reason Foundation (Robert Poole, 12/18/12, “Airport Policy and Security News #85,” http://reason.org/news/show/airport-policy-and-security-news-85#a)//twemchen Earlier this month, the Government Accountability Office issued a new report on TSA's Screening Partnership Program (SPP), under which airports may exercise their right, under the 2001 legislation that created TSA, to opt out of TSA-provided screening. GAO-13-208, "TSA Should Issue More Guidance to Airports and Monitor Private versus Federal Screener Performance," sounds innocuous, and it is. It reviews previous studies that find performance by TSA-certified screeners now in operation at 16 airports is as good as or better than TSA screener performance at comparable airports. And it documents advantages to airports and TSA from SPP. Airports like the more customer-friendly service the contractors provide and their greater flexibility in matching staffing levels to passenger flows. And TSA's airport-based Federal Security Directors appreciate that at SPP airports, they don't have to be involved in deploying and managing screeners and are therefore better able to focus on security oversight. But that didn't stop long-time SPP foe Rep. Bennie Thompson (D, MS) from rushing out a news release calling on TSA to halt any further airport participation in the program until TSA gets a more detailed handle on SPP costs and benefits. Say what? Any fair reading of the GAO report will find it generally approving of SPP, but making minor recommendations for TSA to be more systematic in collecting and analyzing cost and performance data. Moreover, both the original ATSA legislation from 2001 and the FAA Modernization Act enacted in February 2012 mandate that TSA accept applications from airports wanting to opt out, and the 2012 law now requires TSA to approve them within 120 days unless the Administrator finds that such a change would either compromise airport security or reduce the cost-efficiency or effectiveness of screening at that airport. But the fact that Rep. Thompson could put out that statement with a straight face reflects two key flaws in the GAO report. First, in reviewing previous evidence about the cost-effectiveness of SPP, it ignores the well-done comparative analysis of screening at San Francisco International (SFO) and Los Angeles International (LAX), two major hubs classed by TSA as Category X (the largest and biggest targets), with screening at SFO by private security under SPP and screening at LAX done directly by TSA. This report, by the staff of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee, found that thanks to both the incentives of being a business and the flexibility that exists in the private sector, screening at SFO is dramatically more productive, with each screener handling 65% more passengers than TSA screeners at LAX. This comes from better matching workforce with passenger load, with far fewer screener-hours at SFO spent standing around between peaks. Screening also costs far less at SFO, thanks to: a much lower attrition rate (less recruiting and training cost), use of part-timers and split shifts to match staffing to passenger flow, and little or no need to use TSA's costly flying squad of fill-in screeners, the National Deployment Force. The second GAO omission is about the process airports have to go through to participate in SPP. Until the 2012 legislation, an airport applied to TSA to opt out, and if via some inscrutable process TSA decided to say yes, then the agency itself would go through its list of certified screening firms and assign one of them to the airport. The 2012 law allows an applicant to work with its preferred screening firm in preparing the application and to request that TSA assign that firm to be its screening provider. But that's a far cry from how competitive contracting is carried out by other government agencies—federal, state, and local. As I pointed out in my testimony before the transportation subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee in July, standard practice is for the agency that seeks to contract out a service to define its requirements and its selection criteria in a request for proposals (RFP) which it sends out to all qualified providers. The providers that think they are a good fit submit proposals, and the agency applies its selection criteria to select the best value bidder. GAO never made this comparison, and its recommendations about improving the process were all penny-ante: TSA should provide guidance on how it will assess proposals dealing with the cost-efficiency and screening effectiveness; it should explain to airports how it evaluates proposals, etc. And TSA agreed with these very minor changes: it will explain its selection process, and it posted 12 rather general pages about this on its website last month. That leaves it to Congress to meaningfully reform the Screening Partnership Program. And that is what the chairman of the Transportation Subcommittee, who chaired the hearing at which I testified, plans to do next year. Rep. Mike Rogers (R, AL) told Bloomberg Businessweek in September that after 22 hearings on TSA over the past 18 months, he will offer a comprehensive reform proposal in 2013. According to the article, it "would give airports more power to hire private contractors for screening and make it [even] tougher for TSA to refuse." The article also quotes Debby McElroy of Airport Council International-North America saying airports would support such an approach: "We strongly believe that airports should make the decision. If the airports decide to do it, there shouldn't be barriers." The modest reform of SPP in 2012 originated in the House but passed in both chambers. Let's hope its successor can do likewise. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: cox ev Cox is making shit up Kosatka 14 – staff writer at Aviation Pros (Art Kosatka, 12/10/14, “Airport Screening Privatization Continues To Be A Better Option,” http://www.aviationpros.com/blog/12026516/airport-screening-privatization-continues-to-be-a-better-option)//twemchen The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) union’s National President, J. David Cox, recently told a House of Representative subcommittee his union opposes the TSA Screening Partnership Program (SPP), an initiative that allows airports to replace TSA screeners by contracting for privatized screening operators. Cox’s blatantly unsubtle scare tactic claimed private screening was poor security and put the traveling public at risk, stating that “the only group who stands to gain from privatizing airport security are security contractors themselves.” Yes, they are for-profit businesses, but his statement is carelessly flawed. The private screeners perform precisely the same important security role as the TSA screeners, and if they are doing so at a profit, perhaps there is no heresy in suggesting that Federal screening costs may be bloated. I’ll gladly renew Mr. Cox’s subscription to any major newspaper in the country, most of which regularly report on the broad range of troublesome misadventures of TSOs at the checkpoint, few of which, if any, originate at any of the current 18 airports with privatized screening. There’s a lesson in there somewhere. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: schneier ev Schneier’s wrong about this misplaced economics argument Henry 12 – (6/22/12, “Schneier on TSA vs. Private Security: Flaws, Faults & Assumptions,” http://snallabolaget.com/?p=2256)//twemchen This is wrong. Well, it’s both wrong and right, in fact – the airlines and the passengers aren’t the customers (not even “technically”), but neither is the US government. The airport is the customer. The airport selects the company, and the DHS approves the choice. This means that the “magical” market solution actually works – the customer of the security company (i.e. the airport) can pick and choose which security company they want, based on several criteria, and the company that can deliver the best service at the best price will prevail. There’s nothing magical about it – it’s just how any market works. Schneier, it seems is not all that well schooled in economics, either. We have to remember that the airport needs the passengers to be happy, as much as possible. A happy passenger is more likely to spend money in the terminal, making revenue for the shops that are there and the airport itself. If the Hicksville Airport, Hair Care and Tire Center has a bunch of happy passengers that made it through security in good time due to the efficient and service minded security company, they’ve got time for half an hour in the barber’s chair. A strapped-for-time, angry passenger will just stew at the gate for whatever amount of time he/she has. Makes sense, don’t it? Schneier’s also wrong about empirics Henry 12 – (6/22/12, “Schneier on TSA vs. Private Security: Flaws, Faults & Assumptions,” http://snallabolaget.com/?p=2256)//twemchen Bruce writes: “It doesn’t matter if an airport screener receives a paycheck signed by the Department of the Treasury or Private Airport Screening Services, Inc. As long as a terrorized government — one that needs to be seen by voters as “tough on terror,” wants to stop every terrorist attack regardless of the cost, and is willing to sacrifice all for the illusion of security — gets to set the security standards, we’re going to get TSA-style security.” That’s just ridiculous. Any government in the western world today wants to be seen as “tough on terror”. That, however, does not automatically translate to TSA, or TSA-style security. Looking at airport security in other countries, specifically European countries, the government will control the making of regulations for airport / air travel security, and private security companies will carry out the tasks. In most cases, the regulations will be international, adhere to standards that are world wide (or as close as they come), and in many cases, they will even be made to conform to the excessive US regulations, while still avoiding the TSA-style security. There are few similarities between walking through a European checkpoint and the TSA checkpoints. Taking a look around the internet, you’ll find thousands upon thousands of horror stories involving the TSA, but only a few from other places – there are even some stories about the “very professional and pleasant” Scandinavian checkpoints… The conclusion that a government determined set of regulations always will result in “TSA-style security” is just plain uninformed and silly. We’re sorry – there’s just no other word for it. Airlines obvi have an incentive to secure Henry 12 – (6/22/12, “Schneier on TSA vs. Private Security: Flaws, Faults & Assumptions,” http://snallabolaget.com/?p=2256)//twemchen Bruce writes: “We can put the airlines, either directly or via airport fees, in charge of security,, but that has problems in the other direction. Airlines don’t really care about terrorism; it’s rare, the costs to the airline are relatively small (remember that the government bailed the industry out after 9/11), and the rest of the costs are externalities and are borne by other people. So if airlines are in charge, we’re likely to get less security than makes sense.” This is just strange. Why would you put one of the airport’s customers in charge of the airport’s security? That would be akin to making Starbucks in charge of the airport security, simply because they have a couple of franchises in the terminal. It doesn’t make much sense. This is also why it’s the airport that’s in charge of the security, and the airline expects the security to go without a hitch. The airport provides a service to the airline, and the airline provides a service to the passengers. Schneier needs to try and wrap his head around that one before setting out on a wild goose chase. Again. This is also one of the reasons why the “magic” (see above) called a “market” works – the airline expects the airport to have security, so that it can provide a service to its customer – the passenger. If the airport can’t provide that service in a sensible manner, then, as in all other places, the customer will take its business elsewhere. Remember – the airline is the airport’s customer, and the passenger is the airline’s customer. It’s pretty neat, yeah? Also, saying that airlines don’t care about terrorism is a bit…how shall we put it… ignorant. The cost of terrorism to the individual airline on an annual basis is perhaps “small”, but is Schneier really unaware that avoiding terrorism is also in the best economical interest of the airlines? He’s not even qualified to talk about this stuff Henry 12 – (6/22/12, “Schneier on TSA vs. Private Security: Flaws, Faults & Assumptions,” http://snallabolaget.com/?p=2256)//twemchen Bruce Schneier is a self-proclaimed security guru who has been very outspoken on the topic of airport security, and his disdain of how it’s been done over the past decade or so. That is a good thing – if there are no critics, then there won’t be any improvement. However: – Bruce Schneier is not certified in anything but IT security and cryptography. He is not a CPP, a PSP or any other kind of physical security certification. He is not a member of ASIS. He has not worked in airport security. He is not law enforcement. In short, please look up “self-proclaimed”. He claims to have coined the term “security theatre”, in the sense that it is security only for “show” without any real impact or effect. “Security theatre” has in fact been used as a term for years by security professionals. It is also known as a “deterrent”. It seems that Schneier just wants to be negative about this – on one hand, he wants the TSA to change, he wants lawmakers to pressure the agency and the government, and he wants security to be sensible. On the other hand, he bashes whoever tries to do just that, as Rand Paul is doing right now. Schneier needs to keep in mind that Rome was neither built nor burnt in one day, and while changing the TSA, the regulations and methods is necessary, that will too take time. Rand Paul‘s proposed legislation is, however, a giant leap in the right direction. 2ac – terrorism – tsa fails – general TSA fails at life Edwards 13 – Director of Tax Policy Studies at Cato (Chris Edwards, 11/19/13, “Privatizing the Transportation Security Administration,” No. 742, Lexis)//twemchen TSA has had workforce management problems since its inception. The agency estimated that the hiring and training of its initial workforce in 2002 would cost $104 million, but those costs ended up soaring to $741 million.14 A huge amount of money, for example, was wasted on renting expensive hotel space during the hiring process. In 2004, the Inspector General for DHS assailed TSA for handing out excessive employee bonuses, throwing a lavish awards ceremony, and spending in other wasteful ways.15 In 2005, an Inspector General audit unearthed “unethical and possibly illegal activities” at the agency.16 These sorts of ongoing problems prompted the Washington Post to report, “TSA has been plagued by operational missteps, public relations blunders and criticism of its performance from the public and legislators.”17 Paul Light, an expert on the federal bureaucracy, noted at the time: “As memories of 9/11 have faded, TSA has begun to look like any other federal agency. It has lived an entire bureaucratic life in quick time, moving from urgency toward complacency in just three short years.”18 More recently, a House committee that oversees TSA reported in 2012 that the agency’s operations are “costly, counterintuitive, and poorly executed.”19 A separate House report the same year charged that TSA “suffers from bureaucratic morass and mismanagement.”20 And former TSA chief Kip Hawley noted that the agency is “hopelessly bureaucratic.”21 TSA’s performance at security screening has been mediocre at best. In the years following the federal takeover, auditors typically found that the government’s screening was no better than the previous private screening.22 There have been numerous disturbing incidents of screening failures. In 2006, screeners in Los Angeles and Chicago failed to catch 75 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of fake explosives in tests.23 There were 25,000 security breaches at U.S. airports during TSA’s first decade, despite the agency’s huge spending and all the inconveniences imposed on passengers.24 The safety of travelers in recent years may have more to do with the dearth of terrorists in the United States and other security layers around aviation, than with the performance of TSA airport screeners. TSA workforces at numerous airports have been subject to “meltdowns,” as Representative Mica calls them. In 2011, the TSA sought to fire 12 baggage screeners for botching security procedures at the Charlotte airport.25 The same year at the Honolulu airport, 28 employees were fired and 15 were suspended for violating screening rules.26 In 2012, TSA proposed firing 25 workers because of screening failures at the Newark airport, although only 4 were eventually removed.27 And at the Fort Myers airport, 38 screeners were suspended and 5 were fired.28 Everything sucks Washington Examiner 6/8 – (6/8/15, “It's time to privatize U.S. airport security,” http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/its-time-to-privatize-u.s.-airport-security/article/2565460)//twemchen Chris Edwards for the Cato Institute: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has another failure on its hands. In recent tests, undercover investigators smuggled mock explosives and banned weapons through U.S. airport checkpoints 96 percent of the time. According to ABC, "In one case, agents failed to detect a fake explosive taped to an agent's back, even after performing a pat down that was prompted after the agent set off the magnetometer alarm." The unionized TSA has a history of inept management. Reports in 2012 by various House committees found that TSA operations are "costly, counterintuitive, and poorly executed," and the agency "suffers from bureaucratic morass and mismanagement." Former TSA chief Kip Hawley argued in an op-ed that the agency is "hopelessly bureaucratic." And in 2014, former acting TSA chief Kenneth Kaspirin said that TSA has "a toxic culture" with "terrible" morale. ... Perhaps most importantly, studies have found that TSA security performance is no better, and possibly worse, than private-sector screening, which is allowed at a handful of U.S. airports. The solution is to dismantle TSA and move responsibility for screening operations to the nation's airports. The government would continue to oversee aviation safety, but airports would be free to contract out screening to expert aviation security firms. Such a reform would end TSA's conflict of interest stemming from both operating airport screening and overseeing it. Literally passengers have saved more lives than the TSA Edwards 13 – Director of Tax Policy Studies at Cato (Chris Edwards, 11/19/13, “Privatizing the Transportation Security Administration,” No. 742, Lexis)//twemchen Perhaps the most effective countermeasure since 9/11 was not the result of any federal program. Rather, airline passengers and flight attendants have learned to be much more aware of potential attacks in the air, and they have thwarted terrorists on U.S.-bound flights, including shoe bomber Richard Reid in 2001 and underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in 2009. In both instances, passengers quickly tackled the would-be bombers when foul play was suspected. The benefits of heightened alertness in the post-9/11 world have also been evident in the many instances when passengers have subdued unruly or intoxicated travelers. In May 2013, for example, a passenger on a plane from Alaska to Oregon tried to open the emergency exit door during flight, but passengers who noticed his odd behavior quickly restrained him.92 Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.61 Mb. Share with your friends:
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