All their disads are non-unique – a Privatization’s inevitable internationally
ac – terrorism – tsa fails – at: empirics
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2ac – terrorism – tsa fails – at: empirics The only empirics flow affirmative La Corte 14 – Young Voices Advocate studying political science and economics at Hofstra University in NYC, serves as a member of the North American Executive Board of the international nonprofit Students for Liberty (Matthew La Corte, 7/28/14, “Summer Is the Season, Sanity the Reason to Privatize the TSA,” http://panampost.com/matthew-la-corte/2014/07/28/summer-is-the-season-sanity-the-reason-to-privatize-the-tsa/)//twemchen Despite TSA’s costs to government budgets, privacy, and traveling time, there is no empirical evidence that suggests the agency accomplishes its intended goals. In fact, there have been over 25,000 security breaches in the TSA’s first decade alone.+ It’s time to be honest about the state of US airline security. The TSA’s security theater undoubtedly dissuades some travelers from flying on airplanes and instead drive on more dangerous roads. Researchers at Cornell University have found that travelers switching from the skies to the roads has led to an increase of 242 driving deaths per month. The fact is that the TSA’s over-the-top security policies are killing travelers by pushing them away from airports.+ The TSA can not demonstrate any considerable difference between their security and that of private companies. One former TSA administrator reported, “There’s no question the private sector can handle security.” This summer, it’s time to reflect on the real costs of the TSA and the false benefits they claim to provide. More lawmakers and think tanks are pushing the need for TSA reform. Passengers should fasten their seat belts, because privatization is about to take off 2ac – terrorism – private solves – personal incentive Kravitz 10 – Washington Post Staff Writer (Derek Kravitz, 12/31/10, “As Outrage Grows, Airports Consider Ditching TSA,” http://www.cbsnews.com/news/as-outrage-grows-airports-consider-ditching-tsa/)//twemchen Every spring, private security officers at San Francisco International Airport compete in a workplace "March Madness"-style tournament for cash prizes, some as high as $1,500. The games: finding illegal items and explosives in carry-on bags; successfully picking locks on difficult-to-open luggage; and spotting a would-be terrorist (in this case Covenant Aviation Security's president, Gerald L. Berry) on security videos. "The bonuses are pretty handsome," Berry said. "We have to be good - equal or better than the feds. So we work at it, and we incentivize." Some of the nation's biggest airports are responding to recent public outrage over security screening by weighing whether they should hire private firms such as Covenant to replace the Transportation Security Administration. Sixteen airports, including San Francisco and Kansas City International Airport, have made the switch since 2002. One Orlando airport has approved the change but needs to select a contractor, and several others are seriously considering it. The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, which governs Dulles International and Reagan National airports, is studying the option, spokeswoman Tara Hamilton said. For airports, the change isn't about money. At issue, airport managers and security experts say, is the unwieldy size and bureaucracy of the federal aviation security system. Private firms may be able to do the job more efficiently and with a personal touch, they argue. 2ac – terrorism – private solves – corporate incentive Corporate incentive ensures the private sector’s more effective Perkins 14 – staff writer at Outset Magazine, citing the one and only Nate Silver (Stephen Perkins, 8/18/14, “Abolish the TSA? Here’s Why We Should,” http://outsetmagazine.com/2014/08/18/abolish-tsa-heres/)//twemchen In defense of her claim that we would be safer without the TSA, she writes “airline companies should be free to provide their own private security.” When a free market nerd like myself reads that, I automatically jump with joy inside because I know exactly where she is going with that. Just as she mentioned in her first point that I highlighted, the TSA has no incentive to improve the screening process because, that’s right, they have no competition. Make the airlines provide their own security screening, which of course they will, and you will suddenly have private security companies competing to the death to be the best, fastest, and the least creeptastic. What a beautiful world that would be! tsa-checkpoint Oh! And another reason we would be safer without the TSA is related to the fact that nobody gets fired in government anymore. Ask yourself this question: what currently happens if a bomber gets through security without a TSA agent catching them? Nothing. Nobody gets fired. Not the agents and certainly not any of the higher-ups. If we had private security companies take over, there would be incentive for them to be effective. Because if a security agent didn’t catch a terrorist with a bomb in his underwear, his ass is on the line… the unemployment line. 2ac – terrorism – airport terror – general Litany of vulnerabilities make attacks likely – resource reallocation is essential Brandt 11 – director at Lime, political risk consultancy based in the UAE, worked as a threat analyst for a major U.S. airline (Ben Brandt, 11/30/11, “TERRORIST THREATS TO COMMERCIAL AVIATION: A CONTEMPORARY ASSESSMENT,” https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/terrorist-threats-to-commercial-aviation-a-contemporary-assessment)//twemchen Despite the strenuous efforts by governments to harden commercial aviation in the post-9/11 era, the number of plots illustrates that al-Qa`ida core, its affiliates, and numerous other Islamist extremist groups and self-radicalized individuals maintain a high level of interest in attacking aviation. Despite the organizational disruptions caused by the deaths of numerous senior al-Qa`ida leaders in 2011, and the current preoccupation of several al-Qa`ida affiliates with local conflicts, this ongoing interest in attacking aviation is unlikely to dissipate in the long-term. Furthermore, the evolving tactics utilized in these various plots lend weight to AQAP’s contention that government regulators suffer from a lack of imagination in anticipating and mitigating emergent and existing threats. As indicated by numerous accounts, including the description of the cargo plot contained in Inspire, terrorists constantly seek to analyze existing aviation security measures to probe for weaknesses and develop countermeasures. Terrorists’ ongoing efforts to study and defeat security are further exemplified by the arrest of Rajib Karim, a former information technology employee at British Airways; prior to his arrest, Karim maintained an ongoing dialogue with AQAP operative Anwar al-`Awlaqi and attempted to provide al-`Awlaqi with information on aviation security procedures.[1] Therefore, despite government efforts to improve aviation security, a number of critical tactical threats remain. Insider Threats Rajib Karim sought to stage a terrorist attack on behalf of AQAP, seeking to become a flight attendant for British Airways to stage a suicide attack. He also attempted to recruit fellow Muslims (including a baggage handler at Heathrow Airport and an employee of airport security) to stage an attack.[2] Coupled with the aforementioned 2007 JFK airport plot, which involved at least one airport employee, and a reported 2009 plot by Indonesian terrorist Noordin Top to target commercial aviation at Jakarta’s main airport, which included assistance from a former mechanic for Garuda Indonesia,[3] this illustrates the primacy of the so-called “insider threat” to aviation. Although TSA and U.S. airports currently conduct criminal and terrorist database checks on potential airport, airline, and vendor employees who are to be granted access to secure areas, there are significant vulnerabilities in this approach,[4] which has proven notably unsuccessful at stopping members of street gangs from gaining employment and carrying out criminal activities such as narcotrafficking, baggage theft, and prostitution at airports nationwide. In 2010, an individual named Takuma Owuo-Hagood obtained employment as a baggage handler for Delta Airlines, then promptly traveled to Afghanistan where he made contact with the Taliban, reportedly providing advice on how to effectively engage U.S. troops.[5] The magnitude of this vulnerability is compounded because most airport employees working in secure areas do not undergo security screening prior to entering their workspace due to practical constraints. Additional measures, such as random screening and security probes, are unable to effectively mitigate this threat. The insider threat becomes markedly worse at non-Western airports in regions such as West Africa or South Asia, where local authorities’ ability to effectively screen prospective airport employees is frequently negligible due to incomplete or poorly structured terrorist and criminal intelligence databases. Threats from Ranged Weapons MANPADS, or man-portable air defense systems, have been described as a growing threat to commercial aviation following the outbreak of Libya’s civil war in early 2011 and subsequent news reports claiming that al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has obtained surface-to-air missiles.[6] Some reports suggest that missiles stolen from Libyan arsenals have spread as far as Niger, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula. In addition to AQIM, al-Shabab has been known to possess advanced MANPADS, allegedly provided by Eritrea.[7] Given that AQAP maintains ties to al-Shabab and has reportedly taken over multiple military depots in Yemen following the outbreak of civil unrest there,[8] it is not implausible to assume that AQAP could acquire additional MANPADS. There are also reports that the Taliban acquired MANPADS from Iran,[9] making it conceivable that elements of the group sympathetic to al-Qa`ida’s aims could provide al-Qa`ida with MANPADS for a future attack. Although MANPADS are unable to target aircraft at cruising altitudes, commercial aircraft would become vulnerable for several miles while ascending and descending, particularly due to their lack of countermeasure systems. In addition to the MANPAD threat, a significant variety of ranged weapons could be used to target commercial aircraft, particularly when taxiing prior to takeoff or after landing. Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), for example, are inaccurate at extended ranges; however, they have been used to shoot down rotary wing aircraft in combat zones, and have been used in at least one plot against El Al aircraft.[10] The Irish Republican Army (IRA) used homemade mortars to attack Heathrow Airport in the 1990s, while heavy anti-material sniper rifles such as the Barrett M82 fire .50 caliber rounds to a range of more than one mile and have been previously used by non-state actors, such as the IRA and the Los Zetas drug cartel.[11] Evolving Threats from Explosive Devices Terrorist groups, particularly AQAP, have continuously refined their ability to conceal improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from security screening equipment, as shown by the 2009 Christmas Day plot, where a would-be suicide bomber concealed explosives in his underwear, and the 2010 cargo bomb plot, where bombmakers hid explosives in printer cartridges. Following the 2009 plot in particular, TSA, foreign regulatory agencies, and some airlines sought to increase safeguards against passenger- or cargo-borne IEDs by the deployment of AIT and ETD equipment. IEDs, however, are likely to remain a significant threat to commercial aviation due to limitations in current screening technology. AIT can be defeated by concealing IEDs internally, either by the frequently discussed stratagem of surgically implanting devices in a would-be suicide bomber or by the simpler route of secreting the device within a body cavity. Alternately, IEDs concealed within complex electronic devices are likely to defeat all but the most thorough visual inspection, as illustrated by explosives experts’ initial failure to detect the devices used in the 2010 cargo plot.[12] AQAP has shown itself to be particularly adept at concealing IEDs within electronic devices such as printers and radios, which it will likely continue to use in the future. ETDs and explosives detection dogs, meanwhile, can be defeated by numerous countermeasures. For example, many (though not all) ETD devices detect only two popular explosive compounds. ETD equipment is also not designed to detect the components of improvised incendiary devices (IIDs), making the use of these correspondingly attractive to terrorists. Lastly, IEDs can be sealed and cleaned to degrade the ability of ETD equipment to detect explosive vapors or particles.[13] Nor is behavioral profiling likely to provide the solution to passenger-borne IEDs and IIDs. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab underwent two interviews by security staff prior to staging his attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 in 2009. Similarly, a GAO report examining the TSA’s use of BDOs noted that the scientific community is divided as to whether behavioral detection of terrorists is viable.[14] Threats Against Airline Facilities and Airports One aspect of aviation security that is not frequently addressed is the potential for terrorists to strike other aspects of aviation infrastructure beyond aircraft. Commercial airlines are highly reliant upon information technology systems to handle critical functions such as reservations and crew check-in, a fact not lost upon Rajib Karim when he suggested in correspondence with Anwar al-`Awlaqi that he could erase data from British Airways’ servers, thus disabling the airline’s website.[15] Such an approach would mesh closely with al-Qa`ida core’s and AQAP’s stated aims of waging economic jihad against the West. The operational control centers operated by air carriers are another significant point of vulnerability, which conduct the airlines’ flight control, meteorology, and emergency management functions. Despite their criticality to flight operations, these control centers are rarely heavily guarded, meaning that a team of attackers equipped with inside knowledge could temporarily shut down the global operations of a major air carrier, particularly if backup facilities were to be targeted as well. Another threat to commercial aviation is the increasing number of plots and attacks targeting airports themselves rather than aircraft. There have been two significant attacks staged at international airports thus far in 2011 in Frankfurt and Moscow. Attacks against airports have been planned or executed using a variety of tactics, such as firearms, car bombs, suicide bombers, and hijacked aircraft. The targets have included airport facilities such as fuel lines, arrival halls, and curbside drop-off points. Terrorists could also breach perimeter fencing and assault aircraft on runways, taxiing areas, and at gates. This tactic was used during the 2001 Bandaranaike airport attack in Sri Lanka, when a team of Black Tigers[16] used rocket-propelled grenades and antitank weapons to destroy half of Sri Lankan Airlines’ fleet of aircraft.[17] More recently, Afghan authorities announced the discovery of arms caches belonging to the Haqqani network near Kabul Airport and claimed that the group had planned to use the caches to stage an assault on the airport.[18] The actions of activist groups—such as Plane Stupid, which has breached perimeter fencing at UK airports so that activists could handcuff themselves to aircraft in a protest against the airline industry’s carbon emissions[19]—demonstrate the viability of such an attack in the West as well.[20] The trend toward attacking airports rather than aircraft has likely been driven by a number of factors, particularly increased checkpoint screening measures and terrorists’ growing emphasis on decentralized, small-scale attacks on targets of opportunity. Firearms will likely prove to be a key component of future attacks, given their relative ease of use compared to explosives, as well as their wide availability in the United States and many other countries. This trend was exemplified by the 2011 Frankfurt attack, which was conducted by Arid Uka, an employee at the airport’s postal facility, who shot and killed two U.S. soldiers at a bus at the terminal. Although deployment of plainclothes security personnel and quick reaction teams can help ameliorate the impact of attacks on airports, their ease of execution and the impossibility of eliminating all airport queues (be they for drop-off, check-in, security screening, baggage claim, or car rentals) make this tactic a persistent threat. Most recent ev AP 15 – (6/16/15, “TSA deputy says that none of the 73 airport workers with alleged ties to terrorism are actually security threats,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3126688/TSA-Airport-workers-alleged-terror-ties-arent-threats.html)//twemchen 'The reality is, in this post-9/11 world, that the terrorist threat is metastasizing, and we as a nation must remain responsive to any holes in the security of our transportation systems and ensure that the protocols keep pace with the ever-evolving threat landscape,' he said. High risk of airport terror – making TSA surveillance effective is key Herrige 14 (Catherine Herridge, Chief Intelligence correspondent for FOX News Channel, cites Former Head of TSA, John Pistole; Dec. 17, 2014; “TSA head: Threat from terrorism worse now but US better able to combat it”; http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/12/17/tsa-head-threat-from-terrorism-worse-now-but-us-better-able-to-combat-it/)//JPM The outgoing and longest-serving head of the Transportation Security Administration says the threat from terrorism is worse now than when he took the job four years ago, but the U.S. is better positioned to combat foreign plots.¶ "The threat today is unfortunately more expansive than what it was four-and-a-half years ago," John Pistole told Fox News during an interview before he leaves at the end of the month, concluding 31 years of government service -- including 27 at the FBI, where he rose to the rank of deputy director.¶ "With that being said, we also have better insights into who the potential bombers are," he added.¶ From Pistole’s unique position at the TSA and FBI, he watched Al Qaeda's strategy evolve from the 9/11 attacks that murdered nearly 3,000 Americans, to the failed underwear bomb plot to bring down a jet on Christmas Day 2009 and the non-metallic explosive devices buried in cargo a year later.¶ Although Al Qaeda experimented in 2012 with surgically implanted bombs before apparently abandoning the idea as impractical, Pistole suggested they are now focused on devices held close or strapped to the body.¶ "That is one of things that concerns us, how well do they design, construct and then conceal," he said.¶ Pistole will become president of his alma mater, Anderson University in Anderson, Ind., this spring.¶ Fox News asked Pistole whether the threat to American aviation had diminished since August, when the U.S. launched a bombing campaign against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and the Al Qaeda-led "Khorasan" group. ¶ Khorasan contains long-time associates of Usama bin Laden, including Sanafi al-Nasr and Muhsin al-Fadhli, as well as a handful of operatives trained by the Yemeni bomb maker Ibrahim al-Asiri, who specializes in non-metallic bombs that traditional airport screening can miss.¶ "Without going into details about what that may look like from a classified intelligence perspective, we do remain concerned that there is active plotting going on," Pistole said.¶ And with new information that the French bomb maker David Drugeon likely survived a U.S. air strike last month, Pistole added, "there is concern that there are still individuals out there who have not only the ability to do that, but also the intent to use that [bomb] on a flight to Europe or the US."¶ The TSA administrator also described classified procedures that track foreign fighters, based on their travel history, before they check in at overseas airports for U.S.-bound flights.¶ "There are individuals we are concerned about and we are again looking at if they make travel reservations, then they of course receive proper scrutiny," Pistole said.¶ The continued threat from groups like Khorasan explains why procedures, implemented in July, requiring passengers to turn on their phone and computers at some airports, remain in place. As the holiday travel season begins, TSA officials say they are not expecting big changes at the checkpoints, but if there are changes, they will be driven by new and specific intelligence.¶ Pistole said the transition from a one-size-fits-all approach after 9/11 to a risk-based strategy -- driven by intelligence -- is one of the TSA workforce's accomplishments.¶ "I think that's been one of the biggest changes. ...We're more efficient. Complaints are down. Wait times are down," he said.¶ Data provided by the TSA showed that over Thanksgiving, more than 12.5 million passengers were screened, a 1.3 percent increase from 2013, with nearly 50 percent of these passengers getting expedited screening.¶ Nationwide, TSA said 99.6 percent of passengers waited in a line for less than 20 minutes.¶ Pistole was in Australia days before the hostage situation unfolded in Sydney last weekend, telling Fox it fit the profile of a classic lone wolf attack. "I am not aware of any intelligence about it as of last week, there was no talk about something like that," he said.¶ But it’s not that kind of attack that keeps Pistole up at night.¶ "My greater concern, rather than just a lone wolf, is simultaneous attacks such as you saw on 9/11 ... with that being said, we also have better insights into who the potential bombers are," he said. 2ac – terrorism – airport terror – insider threats Vulnerability’s high McCaul 15 – Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security, representative from Texas (Michael McCaul, 2/3/15, “A REVIEW OF ACCESS CONTROL MEASURES AT OUR NATION'S AIRPORTS,” Political Transcript Wire, Lexis)//twemchen MCCAUL: Thank the chairman. I would want to first congratulate you and Ranking Member Rice on your new position on this committee, and by starting off this Congress with an important hearing that focuses on the importance of -- timely topic of access control and employee screening at our nation's airports. It is vital that agencies responsible for protecting our airports are doing all that they can to keep safe our aviation sector. This responsibility does not end at the passenger screening checkpoints. A robust system of vetting employees at airports is equally as important. This hearing is an important opportunity to examine security programs designed to mitigate potential insider threats from airport employees, airline employees, TSA personnel and others who have access to sterile areas of domestic airports. In addition to the most recent access control breaches at Atlanta Airport that have been mentioned, there have been a number of insider threats and employee issues at various other airports in recent years. For example, in December of 2013 the FBI arrested an avionic technician at Wichita Airport for plotting a suicide attack using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. The technician allegedly intended to use his airport clearance to gain access to the tarmac and detonate the vehicle near planes and the terminal during peak holiday travel in order to maximize casualties. He was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, and attempted to provide material assistance to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Additionally in September of 2013 a TSA screener at Los Angeles International Airport was arrested a few hours after resigning his position for making threats against the airport that cited the anniversary of 9/11, and for leaving a suspicious package at the airport. His actions resulted in the evacuation of several airport terminals. And finally in September of 2014 a former airline employee at Minneapolis Airport died in Syria fighting alongside the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. We know the individual had left employment with the airline several years prior to becoming a former fighter of ISIS. He did have access to areas of the airport during his employment, including the tarmac. There are significant lessons to be drawn from these and other incidents involving employees. The bottom line is that our aviation network remains a prime target for terrorism. We must be vigilant and constantly reevaluate our security posture according to the threats that we face. And that includes potential insider threats. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.61 Mb. Share with your friends:
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