All their disads are non-unique – a Privatization’s inevitable internationally
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Source: House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure, TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model (Washington, D.C.: 2011), Endnote 8 Plus, security performance turns costs – liabilities prove – makes the relative cost debate irrelevant Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen TSA’s design did not include an analysis to determine how changes in underlying assumptions would affect the size of the estimate, and its cost comparison did not account for differences in screening performance. Specifically, the TSA comparison did not analyze the amount of costs associated with a particular level of performance. According to OMB guidance, analyzing uncertainty is consistent with best practices for preparing benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects.1 TSA stated that analyzing the amount of costs associated with a particular level of performance would be difficult and was not the purpose of the study. However, if quantifiable performance measures are in place, TSA should be in a position to compare the costs per performance measure across different airports to determine how the costs per each performance measure vary across airports. For example, performance measures, such as wait times and threat image projection detection rates, are quantifiable. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: costs more – ndf They ignore the national deployment force Mitchell 11 – staff writer @ AvStop (Mike Mitchell, 3/14/11, “TSA Cooked The Books For Years On Costs, Federal Vs Private Screening,” http://avstop.com/march_2011/tsa_cooked_the_books_on_costs_federal_vs_private_screening.htm)//twemchen TSA has only accounted for a fraction of their personnel located at privatized airports, which result in duplicative costs that still have not been factored into estimates. Mica also said the federal-private screening model, through previous GAO evaluations, has performed significantly better than or equal to the all-government model. Additional unaccounted-for TSA costs are incurred each time the costly National Deployment Force, TSA?s mobile screening unit, is used to fill staffing gaps at airports. TSA cannot keep employees at some locations, so expensive screening personnel are deployed to fill in. This unit was first created to help TSA federalize aviation security for passenger screening in 2002. The mobile screening unit is staffed by TSA screeners and is now responsible for supporting airports during special circumstances such as seasonal demands and emergencies. Each time the unit is deployed TSA must pay costs related to per diem lodging and meals, travel to and from the airport in need, as well as other incentives. ?This mobile screening unit is grossly misused today, mostly filling staffing gaps caused by low attendance and high attrition,? Mica continued. ?Incredibly, of the five airports that were recently denied their applications to the federal-private screening model, at least three were staffed by the mobile screening unit either permanently or for months at a time. With our limited security resources, it is simply irresponsible to pass these costs on to taxpayers when there is a viable, more cost-effective alternative.? 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: chassey and amey Their ev is inconclusive Chassey and Amey 11 – Paul Chassy, Dr. Paul Chassy, Ph.D., J.D., focuses on oversight of federal contracting, researcher at POGO AND Scott H. Amey, J.D., General Counsel at POGO (Paul Chassy, Scott Amey, 9/13/11, “Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring Contractors,” http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2011/co-gp-20110913.html#TSA's Screening Partnership Program)//twemchen Another comparative cost analysis, however, arrived at a different conclusion. The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure issued an analysis in June 2011 finding that: 1) taxpayers would save $1 billion over five years if the nation’s top 35 airports operated as efficiently as the San Francisco International airport under the SPP program, and 2) SPP screeners are 65 percent more efficient than their TSA federal counterparts.[176] All of these government study examples illustrate the difficulty in comparing costs, and the contradictory results that can result from disparate methodologies. Until the government creates a system to accurately estimate the cost of performing commercial services, the public will never know the actual savings that could have been realized. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: ev = privatization Efficiency reforms are sufficient – that’s the plan Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen Taxpayers would save $1 billion over five years if the Nation’s top 35 airports operated as efficiently as SFO does under the SPP model. 35 airports account for 75 percent of commercial passengers in the United States.1 34 of these airports operate under the federal model, while SFO operates under the SPP model. If federal screeners at each of these airports were able to process the same number of passengers that private screeners screen at SFO, then 7,601 screeners could be cut from the Federal workforce, resulting in at least $1 billion in savings from salaries alone. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: tsa study Their ev ignores higher overtime and injury rates under the federal system Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen Taxpayers would save more than $38.6 million a year if LAX joined the SPP (see Table 1). A reduction of 867 FTEs at LAX would result in approximately $33.3 million in savings from salary alone. 3 $635,800 would be saved because the National Deployment Force would not need to be deployed to fill staffing gaps. 4 $4.6 million would be saved in reduced training and recruitment costs due to lower attrition rates. Total savings would exceed $38.6 million a year. This [TSA] assessment did not take into account higher overtime and injury rates that are unique to the federal model because TSA officials refused to provide that information to Committee staff. Savings will increase once these factors are also considered. It still concluded the aff is good Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen The contractor’s December 2007 report, which summarized the results of its SPP analysis, included the following recommendations to TSA to improve the operational effectiveness and cost efficiency of the SPP: 1. Explore reducing the redundant general and administrative and overhead costs at SPP airports. 2. Explore the use of the SPP model as a tool to improve performance at low-performing fully federal airports. 3. Explore the use of the SPP model at “hard-to-hire” airports and for airports with significant seasonal requirements. 4. Explore providing additional “degrees of freedom” to SPP contractors to foster innovation, superior performance, and cost controls The TSA’s hiding costs Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen TSA concealed significant cost factors unique to the federal screening model. Committee staff found that TSA dismissed significant cost factors unique to the all-federal model when conducting past cost comparisons of the SPP and federal models. 5 Specifically, TSA did not consider cost savings that would result from increased screener efficiencies or removing the need to deploy the NDF. In addition to these metrics, the Committee recommends that future cost comparisons also include an analysis of the rate of screener overtime charged due to poor scheduling, and costs paid out due to injury rates.6 Plus, they ignore overlapping administrative costs at SPP airports – a warrant the plan clearly solves Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen Furthermore, a 2009 GAO study found that TSA has “not consider[ed] the impact of overlapping administrative personnel on the costs of SPP airports.” 95 Despite claims by TSA officials that the agency has since addressed duplicative staffing, Committee staff found multiple instances of TSA employees holding similar or identical positions to those held by the private screening company at the airport.96 For example, the private screening company at SFO employs 60 behavioral detection officers (BDOs) along with one BDO Supervisor that manages the BDO workforce. TSA also employs eight behavioral detection supervisors; sources at the airport claim they are unnecessary and duplicative. TSA officials from the SPP Program Office were unaware of the overlapping staff at SFO and promised to look in to it during a meeting in March of 2011.9 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: tsa study – overlap Doesn’t account for overlap Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen TSA’s study design did not consider the impact of overlapping administrative personnel on the costs of SPP airports. TSA is currently conducting a workforce analysis to identify unnecessary redundancies in its staffing, including overlapping administrative personnel, in response to a Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG) recommendation. According to TSA officials, this analysis is an ongoing effort and has no completion date. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: tsa study – 1 year They only use a year of data – that’s not enough Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen TSA’s comparison of SPP and non-SPP airports’ costs was based on fiscal year 2007 data. However, it is unclear how representative the costs for 1 year may be. For example, in future years, TSA would likely incur workers compensation costs that TSA assumed would not be incurred the first year it took over responsibility for operating the SPP airports. According to GAO criteria for estimating and managing program costs,1 estimates are time phased because program costs usually span many years. Depending on the activities in the schedule, some years may have more costs than others. Furthermore, anomalies can be more easily discovered when the estimate is time phased. The Catapult study evaluated cost data for multiple years.2 However, in conducting its own study, the officials stated that TSA analyzed fiscal year 2007 data because they were the most complete information available for the SPP airports and that data from previous years were not consistent with current TSA policy or business practices. For example, according to the officials, the TSO workforce was structured differently in prior years, and a recent expansion in its part-time workforce has affected its operational costs. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: tsa study – too narrow The TSA study’s too narrow Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen TSA underestimated costs to the government for non-SPP airports because the agency did not include all of the costs associated with passenger and baggage screening services at non-SPP airports, such as workers compensation and general liability insurance, and did not reflect the income received by the government from corporate income taxes paid by SPP contractors. Furthermore, the estimate for non-SPP airports does not take into account the costs of certain retirement benefits to be paid by OPM to TSA retirees. These costs elements can impact the reliability of the cost estimate. According to Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No.4, Managerial Cost Accounting Concepts and Standards for the Federal Government, the full cost of programs is be reported to assist Congress and executives in making informed decisions on program resources and to ensure that programs get expected and efficient results.1 TSA acknowledged that its study was narrow in scope and stated that its purpose was to determine the impact of the SPP on TSA’s budget, rather than to determine the full cost of the program to the federal government or to assist Congress or executives in decision making. However, TSA stated that it had prepared several different versions of its cost comparison of SPP and non-SPP airports that were excluded from its final study report. At our request, TSA provided additional calculations to include some of the costs that would be incurred if SPP airports were federalized, as well as the income that private screening contractors pay in corporate taxes to the federal government when those same airports are operated by the contractors. These calculations showed that the cost gap between the SPP and non-SPP airports decreased from approximately 17.4 to 14.5 percent when the agency included some of these costs, such as workers compensation and general liability insurance, and offset tax revenues. If TSA had included the full cost of federal retirement in its cost comparison, the gap would decrease further. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: tsa study – they didn’t double check They didn’t double check their data Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen TSA’s study design did not call for conducting procedures needed to ensure that cost data collected were reliable and did not prepare documentation of its costing methodology called for in federal accounting standards. 1 Specific procedures and information used in the cost study were not described in sufficient detail to allow a knowledgeable person to carry out the procedures and to replicate the results in their entirety. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: tsa study – no documentation They didn’t even document their methodology Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen Key assumptions and methods used were also not documented in sufficient detail to justify the reasonableness of costs. According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, significant events, which can include key decisions about assumptions and methods underlying the assignment of costs, are to be clearly documented. 2 TSA officials stated that the assumptions in their study were reviewed by multiple parties within the agency and that they could verbally “walk someone through” the details of their analysis. However, without sufficient documentation, it will be difficult for TSA to justify its decisions about assumptions and methods used in its costing methodology 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: tsa study – at: 2011 was better Doesn’t solve our indicts – a) It’s literally comparing airports of different sizes Lord 11 – Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Stephen M. Lord, 3/4/11, “ Aviation Security: TSA’s Revised Cost Comparison Provides a More Reasonable Basis for Comparing the Costs of Private-Sector and TSA Screeners,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11375r.pdf)//twemchen In comparing the performance of SPP and non-SPP airports, TSA’s design did not control or otherwise account for other possible factors such as airport configuration or size that could contribute to performance differences between SPP and non-SPP airports. Generally not addressed TSA officials stated that they manage SPP airports with the same standards and performance metrics as non-SPP airports. TSA also stated that one of the performance measures, Threat Image Projection (TIP), is not affected by airport configuration or size. However, TSA did not provide any analysis that observed performance differences between SPP and nonSPP airports may reflect factors unrelated to the Screening Partnership Program, such as the possibility that SPP airports may be different than non-SPP airports in configuration or size. We will continue to monitor TSA’s efforts to develop additional documentation addressing this limitation. b) They haven’t statistically verified their data Lord 11 – Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Stephen M. Lord, 3/4/11, “ Aviation Security: TSA’s Revised Cost Comparison Provides a More Reasonable Basis for Comparing the Costs of Private-Sector and TSA Screeners,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11375r.pdf)//twemchen TSA’s study design did not provide any confidence levels for estimates related to screening performance, consistent with generally accepted statistical practices. The study also did not address the procedures needed to ensure data reliability. Generally not addressed TSA has not provided confidence levels for estimates related to screening performance or addressed the procedures needed to ensure data reliability. TSA noted that one of its performance measures uses an algorithm that promotes data reliability. However, TSA’s example does not directly address the limitation—that TSA needs to develop confidence intervals on its estimates of performance at SPP and non-SPP airports and also ensure the reliability of all data related to screening performance. We will continue to monitor TSA’s efforts to develop additional documentation addressing this limitation. – terrorism – i/l – at: tsa study – fyi TSA’s methodology Berrick 9 – Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues (Cathleen A. Berrick, 1/9/9, “Aviation Security: TSA’s Cost and Performance Study of Private-Sector Airport Screening,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf)//twemchen
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