Alliance for Justice Report in Opposition to the Nomination of William H. Pryor to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit


Rights of the Accused and Criminal Punishment



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Rights of the Accused and Criminal Punishment

Pryor has been a longtime proponent of weakening the rights of the accused, and of harsh punishment for those convicted of crimes. In a speech before Federalist Society members, he criticized the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona as one of “the worst examples of judicial activism.”82 He has also displayed insensitivity to the racial disparities that exist in the criminal justice system. During the last two years, in three significant cases involving the rights of the accused, the U.S. Supreme Court has either refused to hear or ruled against positions Pryor has advanced.


Hope v. Pelzer.83 In 1995, then-Governor Fob James, as part of a “get tough program for criminals,” revived the practice of tying unruly prisoners to outdoor hitching posts, called “restraining” bars by corrections officials. Guards would handcuff unruly inmates to the chest-high horizontal bars, for as long as seven hours at a time.84 Inmate Larry Hope alleged that he was chained to a hitching post for seven hours in the hot sun with his shirt off. He was given water only once or twice and permitted no bathroom breaks.85 Hope sued for damages for violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.86
Attorney General Pryor defended the use of the hitching post as an effective method to prevent malingering: “We don’t want to reward the prisoner who refuses to work to just sit in a jail cell and watch television while all of his fellow inmates are out laboring in hot fields.”87 He also vigorously defended the actions of the prison officials: “We believe that front-line officers following the rules as they understand them are entitled to be free from liability from these kinds of lawsuits.”88 Pryor argued in Alabama's brief to the Supreme Court that because the prison guards did not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's health and safety, the prison guards should not be held liable for their actions.89
A 6-3 majority of the Court ruled that the Alabama corrections officers could be sued for money damages. The Court said that the officers did not have the protection from lawsuits normally given state employees because they should have known that handcuffing a prisoner to a restraining bar was a clear violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, said:
“Hope was treated in a way antithetical to human dignity -- he was hitched to a post for an extended period of time in a position that was painful and under circumstances that were both degrading and dangerous. The obvious cruelty of the practice should have put the guards on notice that they were violating the inmate's constitutional rights.”90
After the Supreme Court rejected the state’s arguments, Pryor complained that any money damages awarded to Hope and other inmates would pose great expense to Alabama’s taxpayers, since prison officers are covered by Alabama’ s self-insurance program.91
Alabama v. Shelton.92 Pryor sought to limit the constitutional right of the indigent to counsel. This case concerned the Sixth Amendment right of an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor that was punishable by imprisonment, fine, or both, to the assistance of court-appointed counsel. The defendant, tried without counsel, was convicted of third-degree assault, and was sentenced to a jail term of 30 days, which the trial court immediately suspended, placing Shelton on probation for two years. The question presented was whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to a defendant in this situation.
Pryor, who argued the case himself, insisted that the requirement that states provide attorneys to poor defendants accused of minor crimes would divert resources away from more important functions of the criminal justice system: “The principles of federalism strongly support the continued freedom of states to manage their scarce judicial resources, as they deem appropriate, in cases of misdemeanors where the defendants suffer only probation, not actual imprisonment”93 Pryor went on to argue that it was “reasonable then for [states] to preserve [their] own resources, just as a more affluent defendant would…preserve its resources [so as] not to incur the cost of counsel in this kind of circumstance.”94
The U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 margin, rejected Pryor’s argument, and found that because a suspended sentence may be revoked if a defendant fails to adhere to conditions of probation, it amounted to a “term of imprisonment” for which, under the Court’s precedents, the appointment of a lawyer is a constitutional prerequisite.95

Death Penalty. Over the course of his career, Pryor has demonstrated a particular obsession with the death penalty. He filed a brief in the Supreme Court supporting the execution of the mentally retarded. Pryor also zealously defended Alabama’s use of the electric chair, even though almost every other state in the nation had eliminated this practice. Pryor has defended the quality of representation afforded indigent capital inmates, despite compelling evidence to the contrary, and has fought against providing death row inmates more frequent access to counsel. He has displayed insensitivity towards the racial disparities that exist in the states’ administration of the death penalty and has strenuously resisted efforts to test physical evidence that may prove the innocence of convicted prisoners. Pryor even threatened the Alabama State Bar Association with suit to dissuade the bar from passing a resolution calling for a moratorium on executions.
Atkins v. Virginia.96 Pryor filed an amicus brief supporting Virginia’s position that executing the mentally retarded did not violate the Constitution.97 The Supreme Court, by a margin of 5-4, ruled that executing the mentally retarded violated the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Following the Court’s ruling, Pryor suggested that Alabama could take steps to evade the Court’s decision. He pointed out that states were still free to develop their own standards for determining whether a defendant’s mental retardation is sufficient to prevent execution. Pryor also warned that states need to be on guard against people pretending to be retarded in order to avoid execution.98
Penry v. Johnson.99 In this case, Pryor was the only state attorney general to file an amicus brief urging the Court to deny the habeas corpus petition of a defendant who had been sentenced to death by a jury that had not made fully aware of the fact that the defendant was severely abused as a child, and may have been mentally retarded.100
Electrocution. Pryor has vigorously defended Alabama’s use of the electric chair. In 2000, Alabama was one of only three states that used the electric chair as its sole method of execution. When the Supreme Court issued a stay of an Alabama death row inmate’s execution to consider whether death by electrocution constituted cruel and unusual punishment, Pryor told the press: “[T]his issue should not be decided by nine octogenarian lawyers who happen to sit on the Supreme Court.”101 Pryor also maintained that Alabama would not, as Florida had done, change its method of execution to lethal injection: “I do not support doing what the state of Florida did. I do not believe that we should be bullied by the fear that the Supreme Court could rule against us.”102
Capital representation. Pryor has repeatedly insisted that Alabama’s capital defense system does not have any problems. At a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Pryor testified: “Legislation aimed at setting national standards for defense counsel in capital cases, therefore, seeks to remedy a problem that, at least in my State, does not exist. . . . The legal representation received by those charged with capital murder is not, as a general matter, inadequate.”103 Pryor made this assertion despite known instances in Alabama of attorneys providing abysmal representation of capital defendants including sending a client sexually explicit correspondence during trial;104 being drunk at a client’s trial;105 and stealing money by cashing a client’s payroll check that was given to counsel for use as a court exhibit to show the client’s level of mental disturbance.106 Pryor also told the Committee that there were only two instances of ineffective assistance of counsel found in Alabama cases since 1990.107 However, at the time of his statement, ineffectiveness had been found in at least five Alabama capital cases in state and federal courts since 1990.108
Pryor also has defended Alabama’s severe restrictions on death row inmates’ access to counsel. In Barbour v. Haley,109 death row prisoners petitioned to ease prison restrictions on legal visits. The Alabama Department of Corrections permitted only one attorney in the prison at a time, and restricted legal visits to three days a week, ending each day at 2 p.m. These limits, in prisons where there were hundreds of prisoners, resulted in attorneys having to schedule visits weeks and sometimes a month in advance to see death row prisoners with rapidly approaching filing deadlines. Nevertheless, prior to his nomination, Pryor vigorously resisted any efforts to negotiate improved access to counsel for death row inmates.

Racial bias. Pryor has also been critical of efforts to address evidence of racial bias in the administration of the death penalty. When asked what steps Alabama could take to ensure that the death penalty is fairly applied, regardless of the race of the offender, Pryor responded: “Fortunately, in the United States of America, we levy punishments in the criminal justice system based on the crimes committed, and not on the race of the defendants. And not on whether…there is a certain percentage of the population who’ve been convicted or not. I would hate for us to judge the criminal justice system in a way where we excuse people from committing crimes because “well we’ve imposed enough punishments on that group this year.’ And that’s precisely what you are being asked to think with that kind of analysis. It’s ridiculous.”110
Testing of physical evidence. Despite Pryor’s public stance that his “office will not deny DNA testing to any inmate who presents a valid claim of innocence,”111 he has vigorously resisted efforts to test physical evidence that may prove the innocence of convicted prisoners. In Bradley v. Pryor,112 Pryor fought against a death row inmate’s efforts to compel the State to produce certain physical and biological evidence gathered in the course of the capital prosecution. The State claimed that the evidence was lost, but resisted giving more information about the circumstances of its disappearance.113 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the State’s arguments and permitted Bradley to pursue a lawsuit against Pryor to obtain the DNA evidence for testing. Pryor has also been unwilling to consider forensic testing in another case in which three nationally renowned experts testified that the bullets recovered from a crime did not match the weapon taken from a capital defendant’s home.114 When asked if he would authorize the state forensic lab to retest the weapon, Pryor refused, maintaining that it would be “a waste of time”115 to have a hearing on the case.
Moratorium on executions. Pryor threatened the Alabama State Bar Commissioners with a lawsuit if the state bar adopted a resolution calling for a moratorium on executions in the state until reforms could be made in the way capital cases were handled. In 2000, the Alabama State Bar Association received a proposed resolution from one of its members to declare a moratorium on the death penalty. Pryor gave an address to the Bar’s Board of Bar Commissioners arguing against the proposal.116 In that address, Pryor presented what he termed “the best reason why [the Bar] should not get involved with the moratorium issue,” that adopting a moratorium resolution would “invite a federal lawsuit challenging the use of compelled dues to finance this organization, which would be departing from its purpose:”
If the Bar adopts the proposed resolution in favor of a moratorium, you will declare that you believe the system is flawed and that we run a grave risk of executing an innocent person. That declaration would imply that you believe that the district attorneys, their assistants, my assistant attorneys general and I would violate our duty to see justice done if we sought or allowed an execution to proceed. You cannot expect the prosecutors of Alabama to be forced to join an organization that impugns our integrity. You will invite a challenge by those who wish no longer to be forced to associate and contribute financially to a group that insults our professional work. Such a challenge might well succeed.117
Second Amendment
Pryor has championed the Second Amendment rights of gun owners, and fought against reasonable regulation of gun purchases. He received the National Rifle Association’s 2001 Harlon B. Carter Legislative Achievement Award.118 At its award presentation ceremony, the NRA congratulated Pryor for fighting “frivolous” lawsuits against the gun industry, “[defending] the Second Amendment in the courts,” helping to draft Alabama laws that immunized the gun industry from municipal lawsuits, and repealing the two-day waiting period for handgun purchases.119 Upon receipt of the NRA’s award, Pryor said: “In a republic that promotes a free society, as opposed to a police state, one of the basic organizing principles is that individuals have a right of self-defense and a right to acquire the means for that defense.”120
Pryor has sharply criticized lawsuits against the gun industry. At a 1999 news conference of the American Shooting Sports Council, Pryor said: “These types of lawsuits threaten the entire business community. The free market and the cause of human liberty cannot survive much more of this litigation madness...[Gun suits] are a clear and present danger to the rule of law in our nation.”121
In 2001, Pryor drafted a letter of support for U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft’s decision to assert in a court filing that the Second Amendment protected individual gun rights. The letter, signed by seventeen state attorneys general, commended Ashcroft’s “position that the `text and the original intent of the Second Amendment clearly protect the right of individuals to keep and bear firearms.’”122 Pryor also filed an amicus brief challenging a Texas statute that prohibited the possession of firearms by individuals against whom temporary restraining orders for domestic violence had been entered,123 even though it is far from clear what legitimate interest Alabama had in Texas’ gun laws.124



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