Arctic Oil/Gas Aff Inherency
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- Only the concession of the plan solves ---- key to compromise
- It’d be a mutual win for both the U.S. and Canada—now is the time for compromise
Solvency- CoopImmediacy key ---- delay leads to further changes in position by the U.S. and CanadaBaker and Byers ’12 – professors of political science at the University of British Columbia (James S. Baker and Michael Byers, also experts on Artic affairs and international law, Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, “Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary Dispute”, Ocean Development & International Law, 43:1, 70-95) The curious situation outlined above—that the legal positions of both Canada and the United States within 200 nautical miles might, if extended beyond the EEZ, actually favor the other party—could lead to an immediate solution to the dispute. Either state could unilaterally recognize the other’s position, on the explicit basis that it applied both within and beyond 200 nautical miles. Such a move would preempt any change in position by the other party, and perhaps discourage it from arguing that different methods of delimitation should apply to the two zones. It would, however, require the party making the move to accept a still uncertain trade-off between a loss (or gain) in the EEZ, and a gain (or loss) in the extended continental shelf. The uncertainty results from several factors. Better ice conditions, shallower water, and shorter distances to shore facilities suggest that the disputed triangle within 200 nautical miles may be more immediately valuable than the newly (and only apparently) disputed triangle beyond the EEZ. But until seismic surveys have been conducted and test wells sunk, the presence of hydrocarbons remains speculative. The same uncertainty applies in the outside triangle, plus one important additional uncertainty: namely, how far offshore the continental shelf actually extends. In these circumstances, the cooperation between Canada and the United States on seabed mapping takes on new importance. A more detailed scientific understanding of the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles will, along with the newly-appreciated importance of the extended continental shelf, likely lead to a reformulation of each country’s legal position as a precursor to serious negotiations. Alternatively, each party might maintain its position within the EEZ and advance a claim to the extended continental shelf that is grounded on a different legal argument. That said, Canada’s existing position does not lend itself to this kind of distinction, given that the 1825 Treaty predated the concept of a 200-nautical-mile limit by one and a half centuries. Thus, if it was designed to delimit a maritime boundary, it has no logical endpoint other than the ultimate limits of national jurisdiction. Only the concession of the plan solves ---- key to compromisePetkunaite ’11 – master’s candidate at CUNY (Dovile, “Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic? UNCLOS and the Barents and Beaufort Sea Disputes”, The City College of New York, June 2011, http://digital-archives.ccny.cuny.edu/gallery/thesis/2011SpSs13.pdf) It is common in maritime boundary disputes for both parties to advocate the use of completely different methods regarding division of the area. It complicates the dispute settlement process, as both parties are unwilling to accept each other’s proposals. Therefore, a need for alternative delimitation criteria arises. This thesis claims that the United States and Canada would benefit the most by settling the dispute bilaterally. The case of the Gulf of the Maine proved that relying on the third party to resolve the dispute can result in an outcome that is not totally satisfactory for either party. Taking into consideration the uncertainty about the techniques that the ICJ or an arbitrator might use in dividing a resource rich area, it is highly unlikely that both parties would leave the final say on the Beaufort Sea boundary to an adjudication process. As a result, the United States and Canada should analyze the negotiations that led Russia and Norway to cooperate and finally sign an agreement. Parties have to realize that without making concessions, it is impossible to reap benefits. A flexible approach and concessions made by both countries are needed when the issue of the natural resources is at stake. One possible solution to end the dispute is to adopt a modified equidistance line, which will be based on a “median line” but adjusted so that an equitable result would be reached. 266 It would acknowledge both parties‟ claims: the equidistance line favored by the United States and the nature of Canada‟s coastline as a “special circumstance” preferred by Canada. Both countries will be neither clear beneficiaries nor significant losers. This type of delimitation was used solving the Barents Sea dispute, where both parties were granted approximately equal areas. It’d be a mutual win for both the U.S. and Canada—now is the time for compromiseEdmonton Journal ’10 (Randy Boswell, staff writer for Canwest News Service, “‘Win-win’ solution seen in Beaufort dispute”, 3-9-2010, http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=8c2b3885-a849-4a0e-8cd0-61d107250df0) But at a weekend conference in Anchorage, Alaska, where U.S. and Canadian experts in Arctic sovereignty and international law met to discuss the long-simmering dispute, they emerged with a fresh understanding of the boundary battle that turns the whole business upside down. They concluded that as the two countries pursue new seabed claims under a UN treaty beyond the disputed area -- in the central and northern parts of the Beaufort Sea -- the U.S. would actually benefit from Canada's interpretation of the offshore boundary, and Canada would gain a greater share of undersea territory using the American approach. The reason, says University of British Columbia professor Michael Byers, is that the farther north the disputed boundary runs, the more Canada's Banks Island comes into play under the U.S. formula for drawing the demarcation line. Until recently, the focus of the dispute was on potential oil and gas resources in the southern wedge of overlapping ocean, which covers about 21,500 square kilometres. According to the U.S. position, Alaska's northward-sloping coastline means the sea's southern maritime boundary veers slightly eastward of the Yukon-Alaska land boundary, giving the U.S. a greater amount of marine jurisdiction. But the overlap in the northerly expanse of the Beaufort would be much larger -- and reversed, with the boundary under the U.S. formula swinging far to the west because of Banks Island, giving Canada a greater share of the potentially oil-rich seabed. "The curiosity of this is that, in terms of sheer amount of seabed, the U.S. position ends up being better for Canada, and the Canadian position ends up being better for the United States," says Byers. "All of a sudden, we have this almost perfect opportunity for a win-win, negotiated solution," he adds. "Regardless of which method you use (to determine the boundary), each country is going to get a substantial amount of what is the new disputed sector -- the perfect recipe for a negotiated compromise." Byers points out that the near-shore part of the Beaufort may still be considered more valuable because, for example, undersea oil deposits could be more readily exploited close to the coast. 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