JDZ (S) Good Dispute Model

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Jelinski ’10 – MA Candidate at the University of British Columbia

(Cameron, “Diplomacy and the Lomonosov Ridge: Prospects for International Cooperation in the ¶ Arctic”, University of British Columbia, August, 2010, https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/28128/ubc_2010_fall_jelinski_cameron.pdf?sequence=1)

While this paper focuses on interim solutions that may help lead to final delimitation of ¶ boundaries, it is important to mention in brief the possibilities for alternative solutions. As ¶ noted in the discussion above, the more conventional approach is for countries to enter into ¶ bilateral or multilateral delimitation negotiations in order to determine the final boundaries ¶ between them. As Vivian Forbes asserts, ―[t]he settlement of boundary disputes involving ¶ resources has traditionally centred on the demarcation of specific lines ... dividing the ¶ disputed resource area between the States involved.‖¶ xcvi¶ In addition to this approach, ¶ however, another option exists—one that has been adopted by several countries worldwide ¶ when faced with continental shelf delimitation disagreements. Specifically, it is possible for¶ two or more states to effectively share jurisdiction indefinitely, by enacting arrangements ¶ that are variously called joint development zones, areas, or regimes. Joint development has ¶ been defined as ―cooperation between States with regard to the exploration for and ¶ exploitation of certain deposits ... of non-living resources, which ... lie in an area of ¶ overlapping claims.‖¶ xcvii¶ It is informative to examine in brief several existing examples of ¶ joint development before discussing the prospects of such a regime in the central Arctic ¶ Ocean.¶ A number of joint development regimes exist in various situations of maritime or ¶ continental shelf delimitation disputes worldwide, such that Forbes posits that these regimes ¶ ―have gained universal acceptance.‖¶ xcviii¶ An oft-cited example concerns the overlapping ¶ claims to the continental shelf that existed between Australia and Indonesia, and now ¶ between Australia and East Timor.¶ xcix¶ After years of disagreement over control of the 29¶ resources in this area, Australia and Indonesia reached in 1989 ―an elaborate compromise: ¶ the two sides set aside the question of permanent boundaries and agreed, instead, to the ¶ establishment of a zone of joint development‖ under which any government revenues from ¶ petroleum exploitation were equally shared by the two countries.¶ c¶ Thus, while this agreement ¶ did not determine final areas of exclusive sovereignty, it did effectively neutralize a ¶ longstanding dispute by creating an arrangement that could be adhered to indefinitely. In ¶ other words, while final delimitation was not achieved, delimitation was no longer seen as a ¶ pressing matter as long as the joint development agreement was respected. When East Timor ¶ gained independence from Indonesia, it renegotiated the treaty in such a way that the concept ¶ of joint development was maintained, albeit in a manner far more beneficial to this small ¶ developing country.¶ ci¶ In another example, Thailand and Malaysia formally created a Joint Development Area ¶ (JDA) in 1990.¶ cii¶ Forbes points out that the two countries’ belief that hydrocarbon resources ¶ existed in the area made delimitation more difficult, but that the perceived ―economic ¶ benefits‖ of exploitation was a driving factor behind the states’ willingness to pursue a joint ¶ development arrangement.¶ ciii¶ This factor may be relevant in the case of the central Arctic ¶ Ocean, as discussed below. Finally, a third example of joint development may be mentioned ¶ – this one on the southern fringes of the Arctic. In 1980, when negotiations on a maritime ¶ boundary between Iceland and Jan Mayen (Norway) failed to delimit the continental shelf, a ¶ Conciliation Commission recommended the creation of a joint development zone for ―an ¶ area of the shelf which had the greatest resource potential.‖¶ civ¶ Since adopting the ¶ recommendations, cooperation between the two states typically ―takes the form of joint ¶ venture contracts.‖¶ cv¶ In short, then, the concept of joint development is well-established in 30¶ relations between countries, and in several cases has effectively removed from contention ¶ disputes over the continental shelf.¶ In light of these concrete examples, it is possible to discuss the feasibility of a joint ¶ development regime as a method of defusing any disputes in the central Arctic Ocean. On the ¶ one hand, some of the factors that seem to facilitate joint development are present in the ¶ central Arctic Ocean, including areas of potentially overlapping claims, belief that resources ¶ may be found in these areas, and a history of some cooperation. Therefore, if eventual ¶ delimitation negotiations are found to be intractable, a joint development regime in the Arctic ¶ could attain the benefits that such regimes have facilitated elsewhere, particularly by ¶ providing ―a management tool in situations which otherwise would lead to disputes and ¶ confrontations.‖¶ cvi¶ Such a regime could be established through a series of bilateral ¶ agreements, or through one multilateral agreement. ¶ On the other hand, however, it was noted above that the perceived economic benefits of ¶ joint exploitation were in at least one case a major factor behind the push for a joint ¶ development area.¶ cvii¶ Given that few oil and gas resources may exist in the area of potential ¶ overlap, and that their exploitation would be very costly, the drive for a joint development ¶ zone may be less urgent along the Lomonosov Ridge in the near term. It should be noted, ¶ however, that while resource exploitation is typically the main reason for joint development ¶ regimes of shared jurisdiction, other issues may be covered by such agreements. For ¶ example, Francisco Orrego Vicuna points out that some agreements on shared development ¶ jurisdiction ―have included clauses on cooperation regarding living resources, the ¶ environment, scientific research, search and rescue, and other issues.‖¶ cviii¶ Thus, even if 31¶ shared resource exploitation does not present an immediately compelling reason for pursuing ¶ a zone of joint jurisdiction, such an agreement could also increase the possibility of ¶ cooperation on other matters in the central Arctic Ocean. It should be noted as well that as in ¶ the case of a provisional delimitation arrangement, more information on the seabed may be ¶ needed in the central Arctic Ocean before the establishment of a joint development regime is ¶ feasible.¶ In short, then, several potential forms of political cooperation could be pursued in the ¶ central Arctic Ocean. In an assertion that addresses potential concerns about the difficulties ¶ of diplomatic relations, Riddell-Dixon argues that ―[t]he prospects of dealing with [probable ¶ overlaps] in an orderly manner appear promising in light of the high degree of cooperation ¶ evident in Canada’s relations with Denmark, the United States, and Russia in the ¶ preparations of their respective submissions.‖¶ cix While she does not advocate one form of ¶ cooperation or another, by formalizing such cooperation by means of a joint or coordinated ¶ submission, through a provisional delimitation agreement, or potentially through a joint ¶ development zone in the future, the concerned states could further enhance the prospects of ¶ dealing with overlaps peacefully and fairly.

Joint development agreements are the best model for Arctic disputed jurisdictions

Hober ’11 – former professor of east European commercial law at Uppsala University

(Kaj, professor of international law at the Center for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, University of Dundee, in 2010, “Territorial disputes and natural resources: The melting of the ice and Arctic disputes”, Oil and Gas Journal, 2-6-2011, http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-109/issue-6/exploration-development/territorial-disputes-and-natural-resources.html)

Similar to the recent provisional agreement between Norway and Russia and the agreement between Iceland and Norway in 1981, one possible solution is for Arctic nations with competing claims to enter into joint development agreements. This may allow the full economic potential of the Arctic to be utilized, without awaiting a final resolution of all legal issues. This may be a sensible approach, especially since foreign capital and investment will in all likelihood be required. Joint development agreements are commonly defined as "intergovernmental arrangements of a provisional nature, designed for functional purposes of joint exploration for and-or exploitation of hydrocarbon resources of the seabed beyond the territorial sea." A development zone requires the pooling of the rights of the respective states, which rights are then exercised in common on a basis that should ideally be specified by the treaty in unambiguous terms. Rather than trying to delimit the borders, a joint development zone agreement is simply an agreement to work together in a disputed area.

Joint development is the only sustainable solution in the Arctic—multilateral arrangements won’t work

Sonntag and Luth ’11

(Marc Sonntag and Felix Luth, “Who Owns the Arctic? A Stocktaking of Territorial Disputes”, The Global Journal, 12-21-2011, http://theglobaljournal.net/article/view/439/)

Other Possible Solutions - For as long as the UNCLOS regime faces such difficulties, other possible ways of addressing the conflicting claims must be considered. Two possible solutions are delimitation through a multilateral agreement and mutual exploitation of the resources in the Arctic seabed by way of a joint development agreement. A multilateral agreement or an “Arctic treaty” could either be modelled after the already existing Antarctica treaty or established as an Arctic treaty sui generis. However, the situation in the Arctic today appears to be significantly different to the one in the Antarctic in 1961, when the treaty for its peaceful use entered into force; for example, the Antarctic Treaty is aimed at preventing exploration whereas Arctic States are eager to explore and exploit. Instead of a multilateral agreement aiming at the delimitation of boundaries, the Arctic States could also enter into so-called joint development agreements. Such agreements would enable them to mutually share the exclusive rights as regards natural resources in the contested areas without abandoning their claims and, thus, also without the need for a final resolution of all legal issues. Interestingly, joint development agreements might also just provide the necessary flexibility when facing such a multitude of very complex claims (they cannot only be divided into different categories, such as oil and gas, fisheries and navigation, but also be split unevenly between the parties within these categories).

JDZ (S) Arctic Leadership

Successful implementation of a joint development zone would set a model for other Arctic states

In a May 2008 speech, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, posed three key questions states should ask when confronted with a particular issue in the Arctic Ocean: (1) Are existing rules also applicable there? (2) Are these widely known, binding on relevant actors and actually being applied? (3) Are real needs still not met through effective regulation?416 The Beaufort Sea triangle is an ideal platform for Canada and the United States to think constructively, on a pilot basis and within defined physical parameters, about how to answer these questions for their own legal systems. Undertaken imaginatively and with a clear-eyed understanding of the hard work and ability to disagree that true cooperation requires, collaboration on joint or parallel implementation of international and regional norms can provide a working model for other Arctic states.

Plan solves governance leadership

Baker ’10 – associate professor and senior fellow for Oceans and Energy at the Institute for Energy and the Environment

(Betsy B. Baker, “Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea”, Vermont Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series,

Research Paper No. 10-37, 3-26-2010)

Complete harmonization of national approaches is neither possible nor desirable. Compatibility is.426 Experimenting with how to apply integrated, ecosystem-based management in the Beaufort Sea triangle can serve to facilitate coordination of best practices and information exchange at multiple governance levels. “Collective knowledge . . . will become more integrated into long-term ocean planning and more relevant to management and decision making if it is shared among all bodies (Arctic countries, governments, northern communities) and people (scientists, managers, stakeholders).”427 If the governments of Canada and the United States, as well as indigenous and other sub-national governments with an interest in the region, can apply their collective knowledge and experience to balancing multiple uses in this disputed area of the Beaufort Sea, they can close more gaps in Arctic governance.

Joint development could be used by other Arctic states if successfully demonstrated

Baker ’10 – associate professor and senior fellow for Oceans and Energy at the Institute for Energy and the Environment

(Betsy B. Baker, “Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea”, Vermont Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series,

Research Paper No. 10-37, 3-26-2010)

The bi-national approach to oversight developed in this article is proposed to be applied first to the disputed Beaufort Sea area within the 200 nm line, but could potentially be relevant to any overlapping (or adjacent, if resolved) continental shelf in the Beaufort Sea beyond that line.74 States that are continental shelf neighbors may combine their submissions to the Commission, but it remains to be seen whether the joint mapping by Canada and the U.S. will lead to an actual joint submission. As Ron Macnab explores elsewhere in this volume,75 the combined continental shelves of those states beyond the 200 nm line have the potential to place all but a very small portion of the arctic shelf under national jurisdiction of one of the five arctic littoral states. Given that Canada, Denmark (with respect to Greenland), Norway, and the Russian Federation are all State Parties to the Convention, and that the United States abides by its provisions as customary international law,76 opportunities exist, however unlikely, for joint oversight of all or parts of the Arctic continental shelf. Such oversight could be based on sound science, and on the principles of cooperation, preservation of the marine environment, and the sharing of scientific information, as found in the Convention and other instruments of international and domestic law.

Sectorial Approach (S) Good Dispute Model

Operating along a clear border line cooperatively is a good model

Petkunaite ’11 – master’s candidate at CUNY

(Dovile, “Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic? UNCLOS and the Barents and Beaufort Sea Disputes”, The City College of New York, June 2011, http://digital-archives.ccny.cuny.edu/gallery/thesis/2011SpSs13.pdf)

This thesis states that if countries are interested in preserving their interests and ¶ positions by deciding upon the future border of the Beaufort Sea, bilateral negotiations ¶ are the best option. The Barents Sea case demonstrated that satisfactory results can be ¶ enjoyed only through comprehensive negotiations that consider both parties‟¶ preferences. As was indicated by both parties‟ Arctic strategies, willingness to ¶ cooperate, while defending their national interest, may be the key to the negotiations ¶ that would benefit both their individual and regional goals. Drawing a clear maritime ¶ border line, will promote and ensure stability in the Arctic region. In addition, it ¶ would oppose realists‟ claims that the benefits of cooperation can be easily overcome ¶ by each country‟s desire to preserve its presence and dominance in the region.

Jurisdiction Fights/Conflict Inevitable

Jurisdiction fights will break out in the Arctic—conflict is inevitable¶

Lewendon ’12 – MA candidate in Terrorism, Security and Society at King’s College London

(Samuel, BA in Political Science from Huron University College at the University of Western Ontario in Canada, “Security Implications of Arctic Sovereignty”, The Risky Shift, 10-23-2012, http://theriskyshift.com/2012/10/the-security-implications-of-arctic-sovereignty/)

Arctic sovereignty has long been the subject of intense debate and dispute between Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States. Each country claims ownership of part of the Arctic. In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) countries have ten years to make claims for sovereignty over extended shelf areas. The ten year period begins when each country ratifies the UNCLOS. The deadlines for Norway and Russia have already passed while those of Canada and Denmark are approaching quickly (2013 and 2014 respectively.) While the United States claims sovereignty over parts of the arctic due to its northern territory of Alaska it has yet to ratify UNCLOS.¶ There have already been disputes for sovereignty over particular areas of the Arctic. Disputed areas include the Northwest Passage, the Beaufort Sea, Hans Island and the North Pole. Canada considers the Northwest Passage to be internal waters which entitles Canada to the right to enact fishing and environmental laws, to enforce taxation and import restrictions. The United States and others consider the Northwest Passage international waters. This would entitle ships to a right of passage and limit Canadian authority over the area.¶ The Beaufort Sea covers the boundary between the Yukon (in Canada) and Alaska (in the United States.) Canada maintains that sovereignty should be distributed based on extensions of the land border while the United States disagrees. The United States has leased land under the sea that Canada considers to be its own to search for oil. The issue has yet to be resolved but would probably be settled by a tribunal if the United States ratifies UNCLOS.¶ Denmark and Canada are currently negotiating the division of Hans Island. The island is small and uninhabited but has received significant attention from both governments. The maps originally used in 1967 to determine ownership of the island showed the island to be in Canadian waters but recent satellite imagery has revealed that the boundary between the countries falls directly in the middle of the island. In 1984, 1988, 1995 and 2003 the Danish government planted flags on the island. In 2005 the Canadian defence minister stopped on the island during a trip to the Arctic which resulted in another dispute between the governments.¶ Perhaps the most intense dispute in the Arctic has been and will be over the North Pole. The North Pole has been claimed by many countries but it is yet to be determined which shelf it is attached to. In 2007 a Russian submarine planted a Russian flag at the seabed of the North Pole and sparked a major international controversy. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay criticized the Russians for planting the flag as though it entitled them to sovereignty over the North Pole. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov responded that it was merely a celebration of national accomplishment akin to putting the American flag on the moon. Despite this Russia’s Natural Resources Ministry claims that results from samples taken on the expedition indicate that the North Pole is an extension of Russia’s continental shelf and that Russia is entitled to the vast natural resources that it may hold.¶ The outcome of the battle for Arctic sovereignty could have a significant impact on global security. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change the shipping industry could begin to use the Arctic as a major shipping route as the ice cap continues to melt. This has consequences for border protection and the rights to charge levees on shipments. Beyond that the Arctic is believed to have vast reserves of natural gas and oil. With the impending deadlines and high economic incentives to gain sovereignty there is little doubt that conflict will arise.

Sovereignty fights in the Arctic are inevitable

Case ’12

(Brian, “Sovereignty issues loom as Arctic sea ice shrinks”, CBC News, 9-12-2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2012/09/12/f-franklin-who-owns-the-arctic.html)

With rapidly shrinking Arctic ice and expanding interest in northern shipping and resource exploitation, issues of sovereignty loom ever larger over the northern landscape.¶ The Arctic region is incredibly vast. While land boundaries between the Arctic nations are, for the most part, clearly established, ownership of more than 14 million square kilometres of Arctic Ocean — an area equal to the size of Russia — is not quite as clear.¶ But one thing is certain. As Arctic ice disappears — a factor that is also at play in this summer's search for the lost ships of Sir John Franklin's 1845 mission — the world focus on the region's resources intensifies, and the question of who owns the Arctic becomes much more than an academic discussion. "The Arctic is a rapidly changing region," says Charles Emmerson, author of The Future History of the Arctic.¶ "Access to some parts of the Arctic, particularly coastal areas of interest to oil and gas companies and to shippers, is expected to increase as a function of climate change and improved technologies."¶ Recent estimates put Arctic undersea oil reserves at 13 per cent of the global total of undiscovered oil, and natural gas at 30 per cent of the total.

Jurisdiction battles are inevitable

Conley et al 12 – director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

(Heather A., Terry Toland, Jamie Kraut, research associate for the Europe Program at CSIS, currently pursing a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School, “A New Security Architecture

for the Arctic an American Perspective”, CSIS Europe, January 2012)

The need to assert sovereignty and protect borders has not prevented Arctic coastal states from working to resolve long-standing border disputes, however. In fact, there is newfound motivation for resolving these disputes among the Arctic coastal states, since resolution can produce commercial and strategic value. The signing in September 2010 and ratification in June 2011 of the Norwegian-Russian Delimitation Treaty is an example of the resolution of a 40-year dispute that allowed for immediate seismic study and potential oil and gas exploration by both Norway and Russia. Nevertheless, not all Arctic border disputes have been resolved. The United States currently has a dispute with Canada over territory in the Beaufort Sea and the status of the Northwest Passage, and the Russian Duma has yet to ratify the Bering Sea Maritime Boundary Agreement from 1990 with the United States.35 Despite Norway and Russia’s resolution of a major border dispute in the Arctic, several disputed claims over extensions of the national continental shelves through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) still remain, particularly the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain chain crossing through the geographic North Pole. Proving the rights to the Lomonosov Ridge has been identified as one of Russia’s top strategic priorities, because it would grant exclusive access to potentially vast stores of oil and natural gas and increase Russia’s EEZ¶ by 1.2 million square kilometers. The Russian Federation has laid claim to the ridge on the basis that rock samples match the soil of the Siberian coast. Russian divers even went so far as to plant¶ a Russian flag underwater during their exploratory mission.36 In addition, Russia has extended its sea-bed mining efforts and has had an application approved by the International Seabed Authority to conduct further mining in the Atlantic.37 Canada, Denmark, and Norway have also submitted claims that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of each country’s sovereign territory.¶ Claims of extended continental shelves that could reach the North Pole are issues highly rel- evant to the Arctic security environment. After its initial continental shelf submission to UNCLOS was rejected in 2002 because of insufficient evidence, Russia has been the most assertive in its claims for extending its continental shelf and, subsequently, its access to natural resources. The top-secret findings of Russia’s “Shelf-2010,” a three-month expedition in which 100 scientists were tasked with gathering data to support Russia’s claim to the Lomonosov Ridge, have emboldened Russia to announce publicly its “confidence” in its next application, which it intends to submit to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2012.38 Some concern has been expressed that if Russia is unsuccessful at the United Nations (UN), the Russian Duma could unilaterally approve national legislation claiming the Lomonosov Ridge as its extended continental shelf.39 Individuals such as Viktor Posyolov of the Russian Institute of Ocean Geol- ogy have downplayed the idea of unilateral annexation by Russia as “impossible,”40 and fears have decreased as the Russian leadership has focused on negotiated solutions to territorial disputes in the region. Nevertheless, should Moscow pursue this territory by force, the only recourse of the coastal states with competing claims would be to take matters before the International Court of Justice for resolution. Both Canada and Denmark are expected to put in claims of their own for the ridge in 201341 and 2014,42 respectively.

Arctic Drilling Inevitable

Arctic drilling is unavoidable

O’Keefe ’12 – CEO at the George C. Marshall Institute

(William, “Decision Isn't America's Alone To Make”, 7-23-2012, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php)

The decision on whether Arctic oil drilling is ready for prime time is not the federal government’s to make. The United States does not have a monopoly on exploration and production in the Arctic Ocean.¶ Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russia, and the United States all have economic sovereignty in Arctic waters. The Arctic Ocean’s large resource potential, about 22 percent of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil and natural gas resources based on the US Geological Survey (USGS), ensures that it will be explored. Since the USGS believes that gas is the predominant resource there the rate of exploration is likely to be slow and deliberate because of the abundance of on-shore gas production and its current affordable price. But, in the end, the US can either be a leader or laggard in realizing the economic benefits of exploration.¶ The oil and gas industry has been drilling in hostile environments for decades and in the North Slope of Alaska since the late 1970s. Exploration there as well as in the North Sea and “Iceberg Alley” off the coast of Nova Scotia has provided the experience, knowledge, and technology for drilling in the Arctic Ocean.¶ Companies like Shell, Chevron, and ExxonMobil, just to name a few, are engineering technology companies. They have the talent, expertise, and the commitment to operating integrity and excellence to meet the challenges of the Arctic Ocean. Of course, much of the attention being given to the Arctic Ocean is a result of the government continuing to prohibit exploration in Alaska’s coastal plain, which might hold more oil and gas than Prudhoe Bay where over 11 billion barrels have been produced safely.¶ As we have seen over the past few years, domestic oil and gas development brings about important economic benefits. While the overall economy has been struggling to create jobs, the oil and gas industry has been creating them, 150,000 last year according to the energy consulting firm CERA. Those jobs and the investments that make them possible produce federal and state tax benefits. And, as has been said over and over, a barrel of oil produced here is a barrel that is not imported from unstable regions of the world.¶ It should be remembered that the oil industry has an excellent record in offshore exploration and production. Thousands of offshore wells, including deep-water ones, have been safely drilled around the world. From 1969 to 2010 when the Deepwater Horizon accident occurred, there were no major accidents. That is an impressive record. Environmental opposition to any energy development in Alaska, the Deep Horizon accident, and the general hostility of the Obama Administration to oil and gas development are factors that ensure that exploration will be done carefully and with an abundance of caution. Shell has no doubt demonstrated more than reasonable prudence in its engineering and operating plans to reduce risks as much as practical.¶ We do not live in a risk free world and no one or company can guarantee otherwise. Our advances in technology and innovation are the result of risk taking and our standard of living is better because of it. The point made at the beginning is worth repeating. Arctic Ocean oil resources will be developed. The only open question is by whom?

Arctic exploitation is inevitable

Smith ’10 – associate with Covington & Burling L.L.P.

(Angelle C. Smith, J.D. from George Washington Law School, “Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 41, 2010)

Rich mineral deposits and the Arctic’s changing environmental conditions make the issue of seabed jurisdiction ripe. States want access to the Arctic’s minerals, but the frozen landscape currently precludes access. Yet, global warming is melting the Arctic ice and accelerating access to the minerals. While the Arctic and its seabed could be lucrative for numerous industries, including maritime transportation, fisheries, and tourism, 43 the industry that stands to benefit the most is oil and gas. 44 “With gas and oil prices near historic highs and with scant prospect of any decrease in world demand for energy, it is only prudent to get a sense of what resources lie below the newly accessible [Arctic] sea.” 45 Though researchers are working to find sustainable alternative fuels, the world’s oil and gas consumption is increasing. 46 The need for energy is a global issue. As energy demands increase in the developing world—particularly in the People’s Republic of China and India—the demand and search for the world’s limited oil and gas supply intensifies; and more countries become interested in the Arctic’s resources. 47 Despite their distance from the Arctic, China and India are poised to become key players in the Arctic oil and gas regime, and not merely as consumers. 48 China, India, and other nations have already approached Norway in an effort to explore options in the Barents Sea to both secure their own energy needs and financially exploit the Arctic’s resources. 49 In addition to national governments, private industries and entrepreneurs also want to exploit the Arctic’s abundant natural resources as global warming melts the Arctic’s natural environment. “It’s the positive side of global warming,” confessed a Canadian official. 50 The New York Times and BBC headlines hail the Arctic as the land of “Big-Dollar Deals,” 51 “The New Gold Rush,” 52 and “Dreams of Treasure.” 53 Put simply, there is money to be made in the Arctic.

It’s inevitable—too much drilling in the Arctic

Seeking Alpha ‘12

What is Total giving up by not pursuing development opportunities in the Arctic? Well, the ability to tap into the enormous resource potential of the area, for one thing. According to the United States Geological Survey (source):¶ There could be up to 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil in the Arctic, an amount that represents approximately 13% of the world's undiscovered oil reserves. More than half of these estimated resources are located in just three areas: Arctic Alaska, the Canada basin, and Greenland.¶ There could be 47.3 trillion cubic meters (1,670 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas located in the Arctic. This natural gas is concentrated in the West Siberian Basin, Arctic Alaska, and the Eastern Barents Sea. This represents approximately 30% of the world's estimated undiscovered natural gas reserves.¶ There are believed to be approximately 44 billion barrels of liquefied petroleum gas located in the Arctic. This represents approximately 20% of the world's estimated undiscovered LPG reserves.¶ It is believed that approximately 2.41 trillion cubic meters (85 trillion cubic feet) of gas could be extracted in the form of methane hydrates.¶ The resource wealth of this area is clearly substantial, and given the world's rising demand for energy, it is almost inevitable that development of these resources will occur in order to feed this demand. In a recent presentation, Sevan Drilling (SDRNF.OB) stated that all potential sources of supply must be exploited if we are to meet our energy demand going forward. While eventually new sources of energy will emerge that will reduce or even reverse the demand growth of oil, that is still twenty years away, according to Statoil (STO). Even after that, Statoil does not see demand for oil going away anytime soon. So, the world needs the resources and the Arctic has a lot of them. Total is willingly cutting itself off from this opportunity.

Beaufort Sea (K) Arctic Disputes

Resolving the Beaufort Sea is critical to Arctic leadership

Bergh ’12 – Researcher with the SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme

(Kristofer, holds a master’s degree in social sciences with a major in peace and conflict studies from Uppsala University. “The Arctic Policies of Canada and the United States: Domestic Motives and International Context”, SIPRI Institute, Insights on Peace and Security, 2012)

While Canada has fairly comprehensive strategies to deal with its own Arctic areas as well as wider foreign policy in the region, the presidential directive that guides US policy is quite limited. However, the scope of the two policy documents also testifies to the importance of the Arctic as a political issue in both countries.¶ The Arctic has become a region of great political importance in Canada. However, the Canadian Government’s statements about identity and sov- ereignty may not be conducive to international cooperation. Although US public and political interest remains low and the USA’s capacity to operate in the region leaves much to be desired, changes are visible in terms of US foreign and defence policy.¶ While the USA has not particularly distinguished itself in the inter- national cooperation over the Arctic—although it seems that this is now changing—Canada has repeatedly made clear that it is seeking a leadership role. The lingering disagreements between the two countries may, however undermine their ability to pursue their interests in the region. The future of the Arctic will require close cooperation between Canada and the USA, not least if human activity in the area increases as it becomes more accessible. Increased traffic in the Northwest Passage will present a challenge to both Canadian and US capacity to operate in the region, not least if responsibili- ties in the area are unclear. The two countries’ inability to agree on key issues such as the legal status of the Northwest Passage and the maritime bound- ary in the Beaufort Sea is affecting not only their domestic abilities but also their abilities to exercise international leadership in the region. In terms of boundary issues, for example, Norway and Russia, rather than Canada and the USA, have set a positive example and created a model for future delimita- tions.¶ Canada and then the USA will chair the Arctic Council for two years each starting in 2013. Coordination between the two countries, along the lines of the common platform of the chairmanships of Norway, Denmark and Sweden, could be an attractive option for Canada and USA¶ that would strengthen their positions in Arctic cooperation¶ by formulating a North American Arctic policy. In order for¶ this to happen, the two countries would have to approach¶ each other on issues such as admitting observers to the¶ Council and the role of the five Arctic littoral states. Moreover, they would have to agree on a common set of priorities to pursue in the Council for the coming years.¶ The two countries’ abilities and willingness to address the challenges posed by the changing Arctic will depend on a range of circumstances, including geography and history; the shape of political systems; the presence of economic and strategic interests; and public engagement. The bilateral relationship between Canada and the USA will also be a key factor for the two countries’ abilities to meet the challenges in the rapidly changing region.

Failure to resolve the Beaufort Sea will undermine Arctic leadership

Bergh ’12 – Researcher with the SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme

The Arctic ice is melting. If current trends continue, there will be dramatic changes in the region, with far-reaching implications. At the same time, the receding ice opens the region to economic development, including through the exploitation of previously inaccessible hydrocarbons and minerals. In September 2011, both the Northern Sea Route (along Russia’s north coast, formerly known as the Northeast Passage) and the Northwest Passage (along the northern coasts of Alaska and Canada) were open for some time, potentially creating shorter shipping routes between Asia, Europe and North America.1 Increased human activity in the sparsely populated and inhospitable Arctic requires new initiatives to achieve safety and security for the region’s environment and its inhabitants and visitors.¶ The nature of international governance in the Arctic has also changed, mainly through the development of the Arctic Council. The Council, which includes the eight states with Arctic territory and representatives of the region’s indigenous populations, has evolved into a decision-making organization with a permanent secretariat and budget and it now attracts more attention from the rest of the world.2 Since 2006, three successive chairman- ships of the Council have been held by Nordic states—Norway (2006–2009), Denmark (2009–11) and Sweden (2011–13)—which agreed on a common set of priorities to pursue. From 2013 it will be chaired by Canada (2013–15) and then the United States (2015–17) and there is now an opportunity for these two states to formulate a coordinated North American agenda for the Arctic Council. However, this approach will be hindered by the two countries’ disagreements on several key Arctic issues. Many features of Canadian and US societies are intimately inter- twined. The two countries share the worlds longest international border; each is the other’s most important trading partners; and they work together militarily, both multilaterally through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilaterally through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).3 Their bilateral relationship has often been the defining factor in their respective Arctic policies, yet despite their apparent similarities, they have adopted substantially different approaches to the Arctic region. While the two countries’ different Arctic geographies account for many of the differences, other factors contribute to both differences and similarities. Among these, domestic factors should not be underestimated. The Arctic is a relatively low priority issue for the USA among the range of international challenges that it faces. The top levels of US leadership may pay attention to the region, but the Arctic is not in the minds of the US public and is thus not a politicized issue. Canada, in contrast, has made the Arctic a top national priority, closely linked to Canadian identity and sovereignty.¶ This paper explores how the domestic motives for the Arctic policies of Canada and the USA have an impact on their foreign policies and how their bilateral interaction shapes the wider context of Arctic relations. Section II describes the Arctic foreign policies of the two states with reference to three specific areas: security, governance and economic development. Section III outlines the complex relationship between domestic politics and Arctic for- eign policy in each country. Section IV discusses the effect of Canadian–US relations on their Arctic policies. Section V presents conclusions. US foreign policy on the Arctic region is set out in a presidential directive from 9 January 2009.4 This document, the final presidential directive issued by US President George W. Bush, has largely been accepted by the succeed ng administration of President Barack Obama and is considered largely bipartisan. The US policy emphasizes issues of national security in the changing and increasingly accessible Arctic region. Other issues highlighted in the document include the environment, economic development, govern- ance, indigenous communities and science.¶ Canada’s domestic policy for the Arctic, the Northern Strategy, was presented in 2009.5 It was published under the authority of the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (who is also Federal Inter- locutor for Métis and Non-status Indians) and focuses on four priority areas: (a) sovereignty; (b) social and economic development; (c) the environment; and (d) improved governance for the people of the north. Canada’s Arctic foreign policy, presented in a statement in August 2010, focuses on the inter- national dimensions of the same four pillars, with an emphasis on Arctic sovereignty.6¶ Security¶ Both the Canadian and US policies place heavy emphasis on sovereignty and security in the Arctic region. The US directive states that the USA ‘has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region’, while Canada’s policy states that ‘exercising sovereignty over Canada’s North . . . is our number one Arctic foreign policy priority’.7 Both countries acknowledge that increasing accessibility will lead to more human activity in the region, with positive and negative consequences. While the USA¶ mentions concerns about terrorist activities and maritime¶ law enforcement, Canada identifies concerns about organ-¶ ized crime and trafficking of drugs and people. The USA¶ names several military challenges with implications for¶ the Arctic, including ‘missile defense and early warning;¶ deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring free- dom of navigation and overflight’.8 Canada’s foreign policy strategy is less clear on the issue of military threats in the region. While acknowledging that ‘sovereignty is the foundation for realizing the full potential of Canada’s North’, it also states that ‘Canada does not anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic’.9¶ For both Canada and the USA the issue of sovereignty is closely related to the prospect of new resource discoveries in the Arctic region, and the extended continental shelf and boundary issues that may affect their access to these resources. The USA recognizes that several disputed areas in the Arctic may contain resources critical to its energy security, including in the Beaufort Sea, where Canada and the USA disagree on the maritime bound- ary. Canada regards this and other disputes as ‘discrete boundary issues’ that neither pose defence challenges nor have an impact on its ability to cooperate with other Arctic states. Another point of disagreement between Canada and the USA is the Northwest Passage, which the USA views as an international strait through which any ship has the right of free passage. Numerous US Government agencies acknowledge the status of both the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route as having implications for strategic straits anywhere in the world. Canada, in contrast, claims that it ‘controls all maritime navigation in its waters’ which, according to its own definition, includes the Northwest Passage.

Development of U.S.-Canadian arctic resources is critical to regional leadership

Higginbotham et al ’12 – senior ¶ distinguished fellow at Carleton ¶ University

(John, Andrea Charron, is assistant professor ¶ in political studies at the University ¶ of Manitoba. She is also a research ¶ associate at Carleton University’s Centre ¶ for Security and Defence Studies at the ¶ Norman Paterson School of International ¶ Affairs (NPSIA), where she was a postdoctoral fellow. and James Manicom, a research fellow at ¶ The Centre for International Governance ¶ Innovation (CIGI), contributing to the ¶ development of the global security ¶ program. Previously, he held fellowships ¶ at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation ¶ in Tokyo and the Balsillie School of ¶ International Affairs, “Canada-US Arctic Marine Corridors and Resource Development”, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Policy Brief, No. 24, November 2012, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no24v4.pdf)

As the Arctic Ocean’s sea ice continues to melt, ¶ developing the North American Arctic’s marine, ¶ resource and community potential is a clear imperative ¶ for both Canada and the United States. Such ¶ development will require an intense and focused effort ¶ in multi-level domestic and binational governance. ¶ At the same time, a dramatic gap in leadership and ¶ infrastructure is emerging between North America ¶ on one side, and Russia and Scandinavia on the other, ¶ in maritime transport facilitation, search and rescue ¶ facilities, port infrastructure and resource development ¶ priority in the Arctic Ocean. The lack of progress in ¶ developing public-private infrastructure in the North ¶ American Arctic is the product of a well-intended but ¶ complex and incoherent governance structure in the ¶ North American Arctic. The organizational structure of the two North American ¶ governments means that national responsibility for ¶ the Arctic is fragmented among numerous federal ¶ agencies and departments, all of which face budget ¶ pressures and are mostly preoccupied with southernbased issues. The economic development potential ¶ of the Canadian territories and Alaska is not yet fully ¶ understood by Ottawa and Washington. New business ¶ opportunities in the Canadian and American Arctic ¶ regions could contribute directly to local, regional and ¶ national economic growth. Leaders in both Alaska and the Canadian territories ¶ have expressed frustration with the lack of national ¶ strategic vision, resources and divided accountability ¶ in southern capitals. While northern governments have ¶ local knowledge and public trust, and are working to ¶ strengthen their capacities in the maritime field, they ¶ have limited authority and face complex jurisdictional ¶ issues. Given their budgetary and capability constraints, ¶ northern municipal governments, including Aboriginal ¶ communities, are struggling to provide adequate services ¶ to their people and need the solid economic development ¶ that comes with better public infrastructure, private ¶ investment and economic activity.¶ A coherent, multi-layered, binational Arctic governance ¶ strategy would not only accelerate resource and ¶ transportation development in the Arctic of each ¶ country, but would give greater substance to the work of ¶ international governance institutions such as the Arctic ¶ Council. Valuable work is already underway at several ¶ multilateral organizations: the Arctic Council, which ¶ Canada and the United States will sequentially chair ¶ beginning in 2013; the Inuit Circumpolar Council, which ¶ the Canadian chapter will chair beginning in 2014; and ¶ the United Nations’ International Maritime Organization. ¶ But multilateral diplomacy is complex: the players and ¶ interests are many, and progress is often slow.

U.S. Model (K) Arctic

U.S. leadership in Arctic dispute resolution is key to avoid conflict

Trent ’11 – Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy

(Packard C. Trent, “AN EVALUATION OF THE ARCTIC—WILL IT BECOME AN AREA OF ¶ COOPERATION OR CONFLICT?”, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2011, http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/March/11Mar_Trent.pdf)

As noted above, the views of experts on the future of the Arctic can be seen as ¶ different points on opposite ends of a spectrum. Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut present ¶ a view that lies somewhere in the middle of that spectrum. They too believe that the ¶ Arctic has the potential for cooperation, especially if the U.S. takes concrete steps over ¶ the next several years to improve its strategic posture in the Arctic. However, Conley ¶ and Kraut do not completely rule out the possibility of a militarized Arctic due to ¶ resource and territorial claims,¶ 35¶ which could result in conflict among the Arctic nations. ¶ These scholars believe that the Arctic nations are doing what is currently necessary with ¶ respect to building and the future plans of building Arctic forces. Likewise, Byers does ¶ not “see a military buildup that is directed at state threats in the Arctic. What I see is a ¶ perfectly logical response to the constabulary responsibilities that come with a newly ¶ opened coastline.”36¶ Also believing that the Arctic has the potential for competition as well as conflict ¶ is Admiral James G. Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. In a recent ¶ discussion at the Scott Polar Research Institute of the University of Cambridge, Admiral ¶ Stavridis stated that, ¶ …for now, the disputes in the north have been dealt with peacefully, but ¶ climate change could alter the equilibrium over the coming years in the ¶ race of temptation for exploitation of more readily accessible natural ¶ resources.” Adding further, “the cascading interests and broad ¶ implications stemming from the effects of climate change should cause ¶ today's global leaders to take stock, and unify their efforts to ensure the ¶ Arctic remains a zone of co-operation – rather than proceed down the icy ¶ slope towards a zone of competition, or worse a zone of conflict.37 Admiral Stavridis believes that the building of military forces in the Arctic is necessary ¶ and plays an important role when it comes to commercial assistance rather than ¶ conflict.38¶ ¶ It is important to point out that the two viewpoints on the ends of the spectrum ¶ that are mentioned above do not necessarily stand in stark opposition to one another. ¶ Authors in both camps point out that cooperation can be achieved if all of the Arctic ¶ nations act on their stated intention to cooperate.¶ 39¶ Also, most of these authors believe ¶ that in order for conflict to be avoided, the U.S. needs to play a broader role in the Arctic. ¶ For example, Conley and Kraut state that the U.S. “must take some very concrete steps ¶ over the next several years to improve its strategic posture in the Arctic so that over the ¶ next 40 years the region is a model of regional cooperation and not a zone of potential ¶ conflict.”40¶ Borgerson believes that “without U.S. leadership to help develop diplomatic ¶ solutions to competing claims and potential conflicts, the region could erupt in an armed ¶ mad dash for its resources."¶ 41¶ It appears that the future of the Arctic will likely be ¶ determined by the amount of attention and focus the U.S. deems necessary.

U.S. leadership in dispute resolution is critical to its broader Arctic leadership and strategic vision

Helmrich ’10 – Lieutenant Colonel of the Swedish Air Force

(Lieutenant Colonel Lars Helmrich of the Swedish Air Force, US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 87, Maxwell Paper Series, USAF, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/maxwell/mp53.pdf

The Arctic policy of the Obama administration should be shaped ¶ by overall US interests and the larger context for the policy. Although the new administration has yet to publish a national security strategy, US overall interests can be described as a combination ¶ of long and shortterm objectives. The longterm objectives concern ¶ the United States’ role in the world and its perception in the inter¶ national community. It is obvious that President Obama strives for ¶ a change in strategic leadership. The emphasis when interacting ¶ with other nations is on multilateral cooperation. The administra¶ tion’s preferred leadership style appears to be more persuasive than ¶ coercive and more inclusive than exclusive.¶ 58¶ Therefore, US Arctic ¶ policy must be limited to actions that have legitimacy in the inter¶ national community. At the same time, the security of the United ¶ States and its citizens is one of the president’s main responsibilities ¶ and cannot be compromised. ¶ The shortterm objectives encompass avoiding military conflict as ¶ well as denying any other country dominance of the Arctic. From an ¶ economic perspective, US interests can be described as maximizing ¶ its access to natural resources and securing the access of new ship¶ ping routes. But solving the disputed issues may be more impor tant, and even more profitable, than maximizing the extent of the ¶ US continental shelf. Ensuring that available resources and short¶ ened shipping routes benefit the world economy may be the true ¶ economic interest. ¶ Besides considering US objectives, US Arctic policy must address ¶ recent and likely future developments in the region. A decrease in the ¶ Arctic ice cap will make new sea routes available and permit extraction of more natural resources. Since climate change is likely to increase instability in the Middle East, the strategic significance of the ¶ Arctic will grow, resulting in greater commercial as well as military ¶ activity in the region. The key strategic challenges are to settle the ¶ dispute concerning the EEZs and, to a lesser degree, the control over ¶ new shipping routes. It may be tempting to pursue a policy similar to ¶ that of other Arctic countries: to ratify the UNCLOS and then file US ¶ territorial claims. However, that would not bring the issue closer to a ¶ solution. Another possibility may be an international conference to ¶ reach an agreement concerning the continental shelf. Because of ¶ conflicting interests, this approach is unlikely to succeed. But it is ¶ possible to formulate a policy that creates synergy by combining the ¶ objective of increasing the credibility of US strategic leadership with ¶ securing economic gain and a peaceful development in the Arctic. ¶ Actually, this opportunity exists because of the conflicting national ¶ interests and the uncertain significance of the international frame¶ work. It combines multi and bilateral initiatives within the existing ¶ international framework.

U.S. leadership key

Borgerson ‘10 – International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

(SCOTT G. BORGERSON is International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard, April 2008, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20032581.pdf?acceptTC=true)

Washington cannot afford to stand idly by. The Arctic region is ¶ not currently governed by any comprehensive multilateral norms and ¶ regulations because it was never expected to become a navigable water ¶ way or a site for large-scale commercial development. Decisions ¶ made by Arctic powers in the coming years will therefore profoundly ¶ shape the future of the region for decades. Without U.S. leadership ¶ to help develop diplomatic solutions to competing claims and potential ¶ conflicts, the region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources

AT: Arctic Melting Not Inevitable

Arctic melting is inevitable—no warming mitigation will reverse status quo trends

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