Arctic Oil/Gas Aff Inherency

2AC’s- Counterplans

Continental Shelf Theory

Continental shelf theory won’t work

(Angelle C. Smith, J.D. from George Washington Law School, “Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 41, 2010)

Today, the international community is debating whether to grant jurisdiction to nations based on their prolonged continental shelves. 34 The continental shelf is the seabed and subsoil that extend from the coast to the slope and rise between a continent and the deep ocean. 35 Currently, no Arctic coastal state can simply declare that its seabed extends to the North Pole and demand jurisdiction over the area. 36 Rather, any such determination would have to be made by the International Seabed Authority. 37 Any country that wishes to extend its boundaries into the Arctic region must first submit a claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a body established under UNCLOS. 38 The CLCS can recommend a coastal state’s sovereignty over the continental shelf be expanded to include a “natural prolongation” of a coastal state’s land territory. 39 As will be discussed in greater detail below, though this option currently exists, it has yet to be used effectively to expand a nation’s jurisdiction in the Arctic. 40 For example, the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater ridge on the Arctic Ocean floor, is the type of “natural prolongation” of a coastal state’s territory that would legitimize extending sovereignty of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles. 41 A significant factor in deciding the jurisdiction of the area may be ownership of the Lomonosov Ridge. 42

Partial Submission

Partial submission wouldn’t work

(James S. Baker and Michael Byers, also experts on Artic affairs and international law, Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, “Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the

Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary Dispute”, Ocean Development & International Law, 43:1, 70-95)

While the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf can provide recommendations on the sufficiency of scientific data presented to it with regard to areas that are subject to competing claims, such recommendations are without prejudice to existing maritime delimitation matters 124 and a state can indicate to the Commission that because of a dispute it cannot proceed. In light of this, it is possible for a country to make only a partial submission that excludes data with respect to a disputed zone, thus enabling the Commission to proceed and the country in question to meet its submission deadline. This option will certainly be considered by Canada as it progresses toward the 2013 deadline for its submission. But while this option may seem attractive at first glance, it has the unfortunate consequence of leaving the outer limit of the extended continental shelf undetermined in an area where the problem that the Commission is intended to prevent—uncertainty and potential contestation of maritime zones—already exists and could well worsen. 125 Indeed, that indeterminacy could persist for as long as three or four decades, given the increasing backlog of submissions at the CLCS. 126 For these reasons, it would not seem sensible for Canada and the United States to adopt this approach.

Litigation

Canada and the U.S. would hate litigation

(James S. Baker and Michael Byers, also experts on Artic affairs and international law, Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, “Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the

Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary Dispute”, Ocean Development & International Law, 43:1, 70-95)

The Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute has recently become salient because of a combination of climate change, increased access to hydrocarbon resources, and the possibility for overlapping claims to extend beyond 200 nautical miles onto the extended continental shelf. Canada and the United States have not recently made public their boundary claims in the Beaufort Sea, perhaps because they are still digesting the extent to which the bases for their claims within 200 nautical miles, paradoxically, favor the other party further out. In seeking to resolve the boundary dispute, it is likely that both parties will partially or wholly abandon their existing claims and formulate new ones. We have argued here that Canada might adopt the position that an equidistance line should be modified to take into account the concave nature of its coastline in the east of the delimitation area while the United States may maintain its position on equidistance within the EEZ and argue that geological and geomorphological characteristics should determine the course of the boundary beyond. Though such positions would not likely reduce the size of the area in dispute, the parties are likely to favor negotiation over litigation because it enables them to retain control over the delimitation process. Creative solutions as opposed to a single maritime boundary are also available to the parties, though some might be as complicated to negotiate as a single boundary itself.

Litigation doesn’t solve

(James S. Baker and Michael Byers, also experts on Artic affairs and international law, THE BEAUFORT SEA BOUNDARY DISPUTE: ¶ IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING OPTIONS, 2-25-2010, http://byers.typepad.com/files/baker-byers-discussion-paper-25-feb-2010.pdf)

Only joint development in the Beaufort Sea provides the flexibility necessary for cooperation—litigation and arbitration installs the wrong mindset

(James S. Baker and Michael Byers, also experts on Artic affairs and international law, THE BEAUFORT SEA BOUNDARY DISPUTE: ¶ IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING OPTIONS, 2-25-2010, http://byers.typepad.com/files/baker-byers-discussion-paper-25-feb-2010.pdf)