Arctic Oil/Gas Aff Inherency
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Arctic Disputes1ACArctic drilling inevitable—no barriers Smith ’10 – associate with Covington & Burling L.L.P. (Angelle C. Smith, J.D. from George Washington Law School, “Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 41, 2010) While global warming will melt enough of the polar ice cap to make the extraction and transportation of undersea oil and gas more readily available by 2030-2040, 69 the Russians and Norwegians have demonstrated that drilling in the Arctic is already possible. Russia, facing harsh conditions such as temperatures as low as negative fifty degrees Celsius, is preparing to drill in Arctic offshore fields in the Barents and Kara Seas. 70 Meanwhile, the Norwegians have successfully inaugurated the offshore fields of the bitterly cold East Arctic. 71 Ending speculation that harsh conditions and technological limitations would prevent drilling in the Arctic for many years to come, Norway’s state-owned Statoil brought offshore gas facilities online in 2007. 72 After twenty-five years of “false starts, planning and construction,” the Snohvit 73 facility is fully operational in the Barents Sea. 74 Statoil expects Snohvit to yield $1.4 billion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) each year for the next twenty-five years. 75 Snohvit demonstrates Statoil’s success developing the “skills and technology necessary to successfully drill in the Arctic.” 76 Specifically, production is inevitable in US and Canada Papp ’12 – U.S. Coast Guard Admiral (Robert J. Papp Jr., “The Emerging Arctic Frontier”, U.S. Naval Institute, February 2012, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-02/emerging-arctic-frontier) The economic promise of oil and gas production in the Arctic is increasingly attractive as supply of energy resources from traditional sources will struggle to meet demand without significant price increases. The Arctic today holds potentially 90 billion barrels of oil, 1.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, 84 percent of which is expected to be found in offshore areas. This is estimated to be 15 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 30 percent of natural gas reserves. Oil companies are bidding hundreds of millions of dollars to lease U.S. mineral rights in these waters and continue to invest in developing commercial infrastructure in preparation for exploration and production, and readiness to respond to potential oil spills or other emergencies. 3 In August, the Department of the Interior granted Royal Dutch Shell conditional approval to begin drilling exploratory wells in the Beaufort Sea north of Alaska starting next summer. ConocoPhillips may begin drilling in the Chukchi Sea in the next few years. Also, Russia has announced plans for two oil giants to begin drilling as early as 2015, and Canada has granted exploration permits for Arctic drilling. 4¶ The fisheries and seafood industry in the southern Arctic region (the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska) sustains thousands of jobs and annually produces approximately 1.8 million metric tons’ worth of catch valued at more than $1.3 billion. 5 Although subsistence-hunting has occurred in the higher latitudes for centuries, as waters warm, fish and other commercial stocks may migrate north, luring the commercial fishing industry with them. Jurisdictional battles inevitable—effective dispute resolution models key to de-escalate miscalculation Smith ’10 – associate with Covington & Burling L.L.P. (Angelle C. Smith, J.D. from George Washington Law School, “Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 41, 2010) Forget the Cold War; the really cold war is lurking. The looming debate over the natural resources in the Arctic is primed to explode. The glacial Arctic waters that harbored U.S. and Soviet submarines during the Cold War 1 may prove to be a battleground again if nothing is done to determine who has jurisdiction over the vast mineral deposits in the Arctic. Allocation of mineral rights in the Arctic is becoming increasingly important as global warming eases access to the area, the global demand for energy continues to rise, and advances in technology make extraction of these minerals possible. 2 The harmonization of these three factors, coupled with competing international claims to the Arctic’s continental shelf, may yield a dispute of epic proportions to conclusively determine which nation, or nations, has the best claim to the untapped natural resources beneath the Arctic seabed. The Arctic region, specifically the North Pole, contains significant oil and gas reserves. Based on recent estimates, this area may contain close to twenty-five percent of the world’s “undiscovered” oil and natural gas resources. 3 Given the mineral potential of the area, the time to settle ownership of the Arctic seabed is now. And the countries with competing claims know this. The Russian Federation recently planted a flag on the North Pole, 4 Canada plans to build an Arctic military force, 5 and the other Arctic coastal states—Denmark (through Greenland6 ), Norway, and the United States—are all seeking to establish an Arctic presence. 7 As one commentator noted, the Arctic is “a perfect storm seeded with political opportunism, national pride, military muscle flexing, high energy prices and the arcane exigencies of international law.” 8 Facially, it appears that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a comprehensive international maritime treaty establishing rights, responsibilities, and procedures for settling claims in the world’s oceans and seas, should be the proper mechanism to determine jurisdiction in the Artic. 9 UNCLOS, however, is not a viable option because not all of the interested parties have ratified the treaty and the UNCLOS component that recommends limits of the continental shelf has not achieved the status of customary international law. 10 While the United Nations should take steps to address these shortfalls, it is highly unlikely that any amendment to the present regime will be proposed and accepted before anarchy on the high Arctic seas ensues. UNCLOS, therefore, is not the answer. Plan key to solve effective Arctic dispute leadership between US and Canada Bergh ’12 – Researcher with the SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme (Kristofer, holds a master’s degree in social sciences with a major in peace and conflict studies from Uppsala University. “The Arctic Policies of Canada and the United States: Domestic Motives and International Context”, SIPRI Institute, Insights on Peace and Security, 2012) While Canada has fairly comprehensive strategies to deal with its own Arctic areas as well as wider foreign policy in the region, the presidential directive that guides US policy is quite limited. However, the scope of the two policy documents also testifies to the importance of the Arctic as a political issue in both countries.¶ The Arctic has become a region of great political importance in Canada. However, the Canadian Government’s statements about identity and sovereignty may not be conducive to international cooperation. Although US public and political interest remains low and the USA’s capacity to operate in the region leaves much to be desired, changes are visible in terms of US foreign and defence policy.¶ While the USA has not particularly distinguished itself in the inter- national cooperation over the Arctic—although it seems that this is now changing—Canada has repeatedly made clear that it is seeking a leadership role. The lingering disagreements between the two countries may, however undermine their ability to pursue their interests in the region. The future of the Arctic will require close cooperation between Canada and the USA, not least if human activity in the area increases as it becomes more accessible. Increased traffic in the Northwest Passage will present a challenge to both Canadian and US capacity to operate in the region, not least if responsibilities in the area are unclear. The two countries’ inability to agree on key issues such as the legal status of the Northwest Passage and the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea is affecting not only their domestic abilities but also their abilities to exercise international leadership in the region. In terms of boundary issues, for example, Norway and Russia, rather than Canada and the USA, have set a positive example and created a model for future delimitations. Joint development zones key to resolving Arctic disputes peacefully --- best modelJelinski ’10 – MA Candidate at the University of British Columbia (Cameron, “Diplomacy and the Lomonosov Ridge: Prospects for International Cooperation in the ¶ Arctic”, University of British Columbia, August, 2010, https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/28128/ubc_2010_fall_jelinski_cameron.pdf?sequence=1) While this paper focuses on interim solutions that may help lead to final delimitation of ¶ boundaries, it is important to mention in brief the possibilities for alternative solutions. As ¶ noted in the discussion above, the more conventional approach is for countries to enter into ¶ bilateral or multilateral delimitation negotiations in order to determine the final boundaries ¶ between them. As Vivian Forbes asserts, ―[t]he settlement of boundary disputes involving ¶ resources has traditionally centred on the demarcation of specific lines ... dividing the ¶ disputed resource area between the States involved.‖¶ xcvi¶ In addition to this approach, ¶ however, another option exists—one that has been adopted by several countries worldwide ¶ when faced with continental shelf delimitation disagreements. Specifically, it is possible for¶ two or more states to effectively share jurisdiction indefinitely, by enacting arrangements ¶ that are variously called Joint Development Zones, areas, or regimes. Joint development has ¶ been defined as ―cooperation between States with regard to the exploration for and ¶ exploitation of certain deposits ... of non-living resources, which ... lie in an area of ¶ overlapping claims.‖¶ xcvii¶ It is informative to examine in brief several existing examples of ¶ joint development before discussing the prospects of such a regime in the central Arctic ¶ Ocean.¶ A number of joint development regimes exist in various situations of maritime or ¶ continental shelf delimitation disputes worldwide, such that Forbes posits that these regimes ¶ ―have gained universal acceptance.‖¶ xcviii¶ An oft-cited example concerns the overlapping ¶ claims to the continental shelf that existed between Australia and Indonesia, and now ¶ between Australia and East Timor.¶ xcix¶ After years of disagreement over control of the 29¶ resources in this area, Australia and Indonesia reached in 1989 ―an elaborate compromise: ¶ the two sides set aside the question of permanent boundaries and agreed, instead, to the ¶ establishment of a zone of joint development‖ under which any government revenues from ¶ petroleum exploitation were equally shared by the two countries.¶ c¶ Thus, while this agreement ¶ did not determine final areas of exclusive sovereignty, it did effectively neutralize a ¶ longstanding dispute by creating an arrangement that could be adhered to indefinitely. In ¶ other words, while final delimitation was not achieved, delimitation was no longer seen as a ¶ pressing matter as long as the joint development agreement was respected. When East Timor ¶ gained independence from Indonesia, it renegotiated the treaty in such a way that the concept ¶ of joint development was maintained, albeit in a manner far more beneficial to this small ¶ developing country.¶ ci¶ In another example, Thailand and Malaysia formally created a Joint Development Area ¶ (JDA) in 1990.¶ cii¶ Forbes points out that the two countries’ belief that hydrocarbon resources ¶ existed in the area made delimitation more difficult, but that the perceived ―economic ¶ benefits‖ of exploitation was a driving factor behind the states’ willingness to pursue a joint ¶ development arrangement.¶ ciii¶ This factor may be relevant in the case of the central Arctic ¶ Ocean, as discussed below. Finally, a third example of joint development may be mentioned ¶ – this one on the southern fringes of the Arctic. In 1980, when negotiations on a maritime ¶ boundary between Iceland and Jan Mayen (Norway) failed to delimit the continental shelf, a ¶ Conciliation Commission recommended the creation of a joint development zone for ―an ¶ area of the shelf which had the greatest resource potential.‖¶ civ¶ Since adopting the ¶ recommendations, cooperation between the two states typically ―takes the form of joint ¶ venture contracts.‖¶ cv¶ In short, then, the concept of joint development is well-established in 30¶ relations between countries, and in several cases has effectively removed from contention ¶ disputes over the continental shelf.¶ In light of these concrete examples, it is possible to discuss the feasibility of a joint ¶ development regime as a method of defusing any disputes in the central Arctic Ocean. On the ¶ one hand, some of the factors that seem to facilitate joint development are present in the ¶ central Arctic Ocean, including areas of potentially overlapping claims, belief that resources ¶ may be found in these areas, and a history of some cooperation. Therefore, if eventual ¶ delimitation negotiations are found to be intractable, a joint development regime in the Arctic ¶ could attain the benefits that such regimes have facilitated elsewhere, particularly by ¶ providing ―a management tool in situations which otherwise would lead to disputes and ¶ confrontations.‖¶ cvi¶ Such a regime could be established through a series of bilateral ¶ agreements, or through one multilateral agreement. ¶ On the other hand, however, it was noted above that the perceived economic benefits of ¶ joint exploitation were in at least one case a major factor behind the push for a joint ¶ development area.¶ cvii¶ Given that few oil and gas resources may exist in the area of potential ¶ overlap, and that their exploitation would be very costly, the drive for a joint development ¶ zone may be less urgent along the Lomonosov Ridge in the near term. It should be noted, ¶ however, that while resource exploitation is typically the main reason for joint development ¶ regimes of shared jurisdiction, other issues may be covered by such agreements. For ¶ example, Francisco Orrego Vicuna points out that some agreements on shared development ¶ jurisdiction ―have included clauses on cooperation regarding living resources, the ¶ environment, scientific research, search and rescue, and other issues.‖¶ cviii¶ Thus, even if 31¶ shared resource exploitation does not present an immediately compelling reason for pursuing ¶ a zone of joint jurisdiction, such an agreement could also increase the possibility of ¶ cooperation on other matters in the central Arctic Ocean. It should be noted as well that as in ¶ the case of a provisional delimitation arrangement, more information on the seabed may be ¶ needed in the central Arctic Ocean before the establishment of a joint development regime is ¶ feasible.¶ In short, then, several potential forms of political cooperation could be pursued in the ¶ central Arctic Ocean. In an assertion that addresses potential concerns about the difficulties ¶ of diplomatic relations, Riddell-Dixon argues that ―[t]he prospects of dealing with [probable ¶ overlaps] in an orderly manner appear promising in light of the high degree of cooperation ¶ evident in Canada’s relations with Denmark, the United States, and Russia in the ¶ preparations of their respective submissions.‖¶ cix While she does not advocate one form of ¶ cooperation or another, by formalizing such cooperation by means of a joint or coordinated ¶ submission, through a provisional delimitation agreement, or potentially through A Joint ¶ Development Zone in the future, the concerned states could further enhance the prospects of ¶ dealing with overlaps peacefully and fairly. U.S.-Canada dispute resolution sets a model for other Arctic boundary disputes Bergh ’12 – Researcher with the SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme (Kristofer, holds a master’s degree in social sciences with a major in peace and conflict studies from Uppsala University. “The Arctic Policies of Canada and the United States: Domestic Motives and International Context”, SIPRI Institute, Insights on Peace and Security, 2012) The two ongoing disagreements between Canada and the USA over maritime boundaries are affecting the two countries’ Arctic policies. The first involves a wedge of maritime territory extending from the Alaska–Yukon border. The seabed under this part of the Beaufort Sea is believed to contain both oil and natural gas but ambiguity over its ownership means that no one will invest in exploiting these resources. Public opinion on how to resolve the issue differs between the two countries. The number of Canadians who think that Canada should ‘assert full sovereignty’ over the area rather than strike a deal with the USA is around 50 per cent while the corresponding number in the USA is only 10 per cent.85 While the Canadian public’s reluctance to strike a deal may actually give the Canadian Government a stronger bargain- ing position, pushing any negotiated settlement through the US Senate is unlikely to be an easy task. UNCLOS would provide a possible framework for settling the Beaufort Sea dispute, but the USA’s failure to ratify the conven- tion undermines its effectiveness, even though UNCLOS actually strength- ens the US claim. The USA showed some interest in the settlement of the Norway–Russia maritime boundary dispute in 2010 and how that could be applied to the case in the Beaufort Sea.86 Despite these recent developments, the Beaufort Sea dispute still lingers in relative obscurity in both the USA and Canada. The relative disinterest in solving this issue is undermining the two countries ambitions for regional leadership. The possibility to set an example and create models for future resolutions of boundary disputes elsewhere is diminishing and the only settlement in recent years has been that between Norway and Russia. Joint development zone would be modeledBaker ’10 – associate professor and senior fellow for Oceans and Energy at the Institute for Energy and the Environment (Betsy B. Baker, “Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea”, Vermont Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-37, 3-26-2010) In a May 2008 speech, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, posed three key questions states should ask when confronted with a particular issue in the Arctic Ocean: (1) Are existing rules also applicable there? (2) Are these widely known, binding on relevant actors and actually being applied? (3) Are real needs still not met through effective regulation?416 The Beaufort Sea triangle is an ideal platform for Canada and the United States to think constructively, on a pilot basis and within defined physical parameters, about how to answer these questions for their own legal systems. Undertaken imaginatively and with a clear-eyed understanding of the hard work and ability to disagree that true cooperation requires, collaboration on joint or parallel implementation of international and regional norms can provide a working model for other Arctic states. Extinction Smith ’10 – associate with Covington & Burling L.L.P. (Angelle C. Smith, J.D. from George Washington Law School, “Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War”, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 41, 2010) Without a new regime for the coastal states to peacefully and effectively extract the Arctic’s minerals, chaos could ensue on the Arctic’s cold seas. It is not hard to envisage a world with vastly increasing energy demands where developed and developing nations are battling for access to oil and gas. Nuclear winter has been avoided before and a new Arctic regime may be necessary to prevent a permanent winter from enveloping the world again. Specifically, US-Russian Arctic conflict goes nuclearCohen 10 Ariel [Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies] “From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy” The Heritage Foundation 6/15/10 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/from-russian-competition-to-natural-resources-access-recasting-us-arctic-policy DR accessed: 6/25/12 To advance its position, Russia has undertaken a three-year mission to map the Arctic.[26] The Kremlin is also moving rapidly to establish a comprehensive sea, ground, and air presence. Under Putin, Russia focused on the Arctic as a major natural resources base. The Russian national leadership insists that the state, not the private sector, must take the lead in developing the vast region. The Kremlin published its Arctic doctrine in March 2009.[27] The main goal is to transform the Arctic into Russia’s strategic resource base and make Russia a leading Arctic power by 2020. Russian Militarization of the Arctic. The military is an important dimension of Moscow’s Arctic push. The policy calls for creating “general purpose military formations drawn from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” as well as “other troops and military formations [most importantly, border units] in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, capable of ensuring security under various military and political circumstances.”[28] These formations will be drawn from the armed forces and from the “power ministries” (e.g., the Federal Security Service, Border Guard Service, and Internal Ministry). Above all, the policy calls for a coast guard to patrol Russia’s Arctic waters and estuaries. Russia views the High North as a major staging area for a potential nuclear confrontation with the United States and has steadily expanded its military presence in the Arctic since 2007. This has included resuming air patrols over the Arctic, including strategic bomber flights.[29] During 2007 alone, Russian bombers penetrated Alaska’s 12-mile air defense zone 18 times.[30] The Russian Navy is expanding its presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War, increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleet’s submarines. Russia is also reorienting its military strategy to meet threats to the country’s interests in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf.[31] Russia is also modernizing its Northern Fleet. During 2008 and 2009, Russian icebreakers regularly patrolled in the Arctic. Russia has the world’s largest polar-capable icebreaker flotilla, with 24 icebreakers. Seven are nuclear, including the 50 Years of Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world.[32] Russia plans to build new nuclear-powered icebreakers starting in 2015.[33] Moscow clearly views a strong icebreaker fleet as a key to the region’s economic development. Russia ’s Commercial Presence. Russia’s energy rush to the Arctic continues apace. On May 12, 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev approved Russia’s security strategy.[34] This document views Russia’s natural resources in the Arctic as a base for both economic development and geopolitical influence. Paragraph 11 identifies potential battlegrounds where conflicts over energy may occur: “The attention of international politics in the long-term will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia.” The document seriously considers the use of military force to resolve competition for energy near Russia’s borders or those of its allies: “In case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might. The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be changed.”[35] In August 2008, Medvedev signed a law that allows “the government to allocate strategic oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf without auctions.” The law restricts participation to companies with five years’ experience in a region’s continental shelf and in which the government controls at least a 50 percent stake. This effectively allows only state-controlled Gazprom and Rosneft to participate.[36] However, when the global financial crisis ensued, Russia backtracked and began to seek foreign investors for Arctic gas development. 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