Arctic Oil/Gas Aff Inherency

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JDZ (S) Canada Relations

Solves the spat in relations over the sea—lets Canadian and U.S. policymakers frame the debate differently

JDZs solve diplomatic cooperation between the U.S. and Canada

Baker ’10 – associate professor and senior fellow for Oceans and Energy at the Institute for Energy and the Environment

(Betsy B. Baker, “Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea”, Vermont Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series,

Research Paper No. 10-37, 3-26-2010)

This article proposes that the model used for joint seabed mapping— Canadian–U.S. scientific cooperation in accord with international law and institutions including the law of the sea—can also apply to the use of areas such as the Beaufort Sea, in which the two countries have shared interests but disagree as to the relevant maritime boundaries.7 It suggests that cooperation to gather and expand upon relevant baseline data about the region is the proper foundation for any activity in the disputed triangle. On that basis, multiple, non-exclusive uses are possible and can provide for a range of sustainable and compatible activities if introduced gradually. Uses could be broader than typically associated with hydrocarbon cross-border unitization agreements and joint development zones or, for that matter, marine protected areas. Continuing to expand the storehouse of data about the region8 can also serve as the foundation for joint ecosystem-based, integrated management of the triangle—a principle that is already central to each country’s approach to oceans management.9 Canada and the United States have recently begun planning for a bilateral Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) management pilot project in the Beaufort Sea under the auspices of the PAME/Arctic Council.10 This paper introduces and complements that process by exploring the regulatory foundations for a model of science-based, phased, multiple, and nonexclusive uses of the Beaufort Sea triangle under joint oversight. Such a model has the potential to strengthen Canadian and U.S. sovereignty over their respective national maritime zones in at least three ways. First, it would allow the two states to better catalog and understand the area’s resources and thus share the responsibilities and benefits related to managing them well. Second, it would provide legal certainty as to jurisdiction over the area for parties interested in either protecting or exploiting those resources. Finally, it would allow for a comparison and possible future harmonization of the best regulatory practices in each system, improving the overall quality of the practices in each state. In turn, this comparison could demonstrate how guidelines and recommendations from such institutions as the Arctic Council can be implemented by neighboring states. This strengthened national sovereignty would be in accord with, and in turn contribute to, confirming and fortifying the navigational and other freedoms and duties of all states under the international law of the sea. This article proposes a bi-national model not only as a means to enhance Canadian and U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic, but also to provide concrete examples of how national legal systems can interrelate to fill gaps in arctic governance and regulation. This article and its title build on the Koivurova and Molenaar 2009 gap analysis11 of arctic governance (i.e. international institutions) and regulation (i.e., international laws and regulations)12 by applying it to the domestic and bilateral arrangements of Canada and the United States. These two authors, as well as Lamson and VanderZwaag,13 Nowlan,14 Rayfuse,15 Rothwell,16 Stokke,17 Vidas,18 and other legal scholars19 have laid the essential and painstaking groundwork of identifying regional and international institutions and norms relevant to arctic governance and regulation, as well as gaps in their coverage.20 This article assumes that certain key concepts Koivurova and Molenaar identify—environmental assessment, marine protected areas, and “integrated cross-sectoral ecosystem-based ocean management”21—are already woven into the legislative and regulatory fabric of Canada and the United States. However, it explores the extent to which this is true, as well as ways in which these elements can be expanded upon.22 It also suggests where these national systems might work together to improve legal and policy decisions affecting multiple uses of the disputed Beaufort Sea triangle. Academics and policymakers alike have reached a general consensus that, gaps notwithstanding, a new comprehensive treaty for management and governance of the Arctic,23 particularly along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty,24 is neither necessary nor feasible at this time.25 The 2008 Ilulissat Declaration26 and other documents27 identify the “law of the sea” as a sufficient “legal framework” and “solid foundation for responsible management”28 and cooperation in the Arctic. The bi-national model presumed in the following pages shares, yet critiques, this notion. Further, the model is based on the premise that international law in any geographic or substantive area is only as strong as the national legal systems that implement it.29 Similarly, it presumes that an ecosystem-based management plan is only as strong as the definitions and goals agreed upon.30 One of the proposed model’s greatest strengths is its potential to provide the appropriately stringent standards, strong enforcement, and effective implementation31 that two countries with similar legal cultures and a longstanding tradition of neighborly and diplomatic cooperation can more easily achieve than a grouping of all five coastal arctic states.32

Joint management is critical to fill gaps in bilateral cooperation

Sectorial Approach (S) Canada Relations (Also Good Concessions Card)

The U.S. will have to make a concession to Canada on sectoral approaches—Canada can’t compromise as easily due to domestic political pressures

McDorman ‘9 – professor of law at the University of Victoria

(Ted L., “Canada-United States Bilateral Ocean Law Relations in the Arctic”, Southwestern Journal of International Law Vol 15 No. 283 2009)

Currently, the United States appears to be comfortable with the recent actions by Canada to enhance its authority and capabilities re- garding the Northwest Passage. In August 2007, President Bush com- mented that, "the United States supports Canadian investments that have been made to exercise its sovereignty."89 The difficult calculus for Canada has always been to assert its legal position aggressively, but not so aggressively as to provoke a direct on-the-water challenge by the United States. What may upset the current relationship bal- ance of cooperation and agreeing-to-disagree may be future oil and gas development in Alaska and the possibility of an aggressive asser- tion by the United States of the right to move oil and gas by icebreak- ing tankers through the Northwest Passage.¶ Regarding the bilateral maritime boundary dispute within and beyond the Beaufort Sea, countries enter boundary agreements regu- larly. Most of the agreements involve some type of compromise be- tween the countries on their claimed lines. It is instructive that, while Canada has entered into maritime boundary agreements with both France regarding St. Pierre and Miquelon,9" and Denmark regarding Greenland,9 ' it has not reached an agreement with the United States since 1925. One can speculate that compromise by Canada with the United States is politically problematic in a way that is less the case in¶ terms of U.S. compromise with Canada.

Canada Relations Brink

U.S.-Canada relations are on the brink now—past blunders and now bickering over the Arctic

Burney and Hampson ’12 – senior strategic adviser at Norton Rose Canada

(Derek H. Burney and Fen Osler Hampson, “How Obama Lost Canada”, Foreign Affairs, 6-21-2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/how-obama-lost-canada?page=2)

Permitting the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline should have been an easy diplomatic and economic decision for U.S. President Barack Obama. The completed project would have shipped more than 700,000 barrels a day of Albertan oil to refineries in the Gulf Coast, generated tens of thousands of jobs for U.S. workers, and met the needs of refineries in Texas that are desperately seeking oil from Canada, a more reliable supplier than Venezuela or countries in the Middle East. The project posed little risk to the landscape it traversed. But instead of acting on economic logic, the Obama administration caved to environmental activists in November 2011, postponing until 2013 the decision on whether to allow the pipeline.¶ Obama’s choice marked a triumph of campaign posturing over pragmatism and diplomacy, and it brought U.S.-Canadian relations to their lowest point in decades. It was hardly the first time that the administration has fumbled issues with Ottawa. Although relations have been civil, they have rarely been productive. Whether on trade, the environment, or Canada’s shared contribution in places such as Afghanistan, time and again the United States has jilted its northern neighbor. If the pattern of neglect continues, Ottawa will get less interested in cooperating with Washington. Already, Canada has reacted by turning elsewhere -- namely, toward Asia -- for more reliable economic partners. Economically, Canada and the United States are joined at the hip. Each country is the other’s number-one trading partner -- in 2011, the two-way trade in goods and services totaled $681 billion, more than U.S. trade with Mexico or China -- and trade with Canada supports more than eight million U.S. jobs. Yet the Obama administration has recently jeopardized this important relationship. It failed to combat the Buy American provision in Congress’ stimulus bill, which inefficiently excluded Canadian participation in infrastructure spending.¶ What’s more, by engaging in protectionism, Washington has violated the substance and spirit of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the trade bloc formed in 1994 among Canada, the United States, and Mexico. As a result, NAFTA, which was initially intended as a template for broader trade expansion by all three partners, has languished while each country has negotiated a spaghetti bowl of bilateral trade agreements with other countries. Trilateral economic summits among the NAFTA partners have become little more than photo-ops accompanied by bland communiqués. Bilateral meetings between U.S. and Canadian leaders, which were a regular feature of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush eras, have also mostly fallen by the wayside. Meanwhile, the United States demanded upfront concessions from Canada as the price of entry to negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a regional free-trade group, while preserving massive agriculture subsidies of its own. The protracted wrangling over a seat at the table does not augur well for meaningful progress.¶ After years of procrastination, Canada finally secured an agreement for a new Detroit-Windsor bridge -- over which 25 percent of trade between Canada and the United States crosses -- but only after it offered to cover all of the initial costs. The U.S. share is to be repaid over time by the tolls collected, but any shortfalls will rest with Canadian taxpayers. Canada was essentially forced to hold negotiations with Michigan; the U.S. federal government observed quietly from the sidelines.¶ The United States’ mistreatment of Canada extends beyond economic issues. Washington has also failed to trust and respect its loyal ally. To name one small but telling example, when Canada ran for a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2010, the United States offered little support. For whatever reason, Portugal was a more compelling choice.¶ One would also think the United States and Canada could find common ground on security, economic, and environmental issues in the Arctic, an area of shared sovereignty and responsibility. Yet there has been little more than senseless bickering and public spats between Ottawa and Washington on who should attend what meeting of Arctic states. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for example, went out of her way to rake Canada over the coals for hosting a meeting of Arctic coastal nations in March 2010 and failing to invite other countries with “legitimate interests” in the region. But she was also taking a jab at Canada’s long-standing claims to the waters of the Arctic archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, which the United States rejects. While Canada and the United States squabble, Russia and China are aggressively asserting their own interests in the region.

Canada relations won’t be reset now—low priorities after frustrated cooperation

Clark ’12

(Campbell, “What will U.S.-Canada relations look like in the next four years?”, The Globe and Mail, 11-7-2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/us-election/what-will-us-canada-relations-look-like-in-the-next-four-years/article5035946/)

Is there room for a reset of U.S.-Canadian relations in Barack Obama’s second term?¶ The relationship has been managed on a low boil for the last four years, as Stephen Harper’s government has tried to blunt Buy American measures and convinced the Americans to launch a nuts-and-bolts Beyond the Border initiative to speed cross-border trade and traffic. Most disputes have been wrestled down to minor differences. But there’s been no grand plan like the Free Trade Agreement of the 1980s, the NAFTA of the 1990s or even the linking of highway systems in the Eisenhower years. A U.S. President focused on a slow economy at home found time for only one bilateral visit to Canada, early in his days in office.¶ Now the question north of the border is whether Mr. Obama’s re-election opens the door for renewal in Canada-U.S. relations, or just four more years.¶ Mr. Harper’s first priority will be to renew the campaign to have the Obama Administration approve the Keystone XL pipeline extension to carry Alberta bitumen to Gulf Coast refineries.¶ Some, like Stephen Blank, an American who is the Fulbright visiting research chair at the University of Ottawa, said he doesn’t believe Mr. Harper will have to push too hard – the President’s refusal, he believes, was about local U.S. politics.¶ “There’ll be an XL pipeline under Mr. Obama, I don’t think there’s any question,” Mr. Blank said.¶ Mr. Harper’s natural resources minister, Joe Oliver, said in a CBC Television interview Tuesday night that he thinks that approval for the pipeline will come “sooner rather than later.”¶ But Mr. Blank said he believes that’s not enough. The United States and Canada must come to grips with their extensive economic integration by planning to build infrastructure together – not just bridges but roads, railways, energy grids, and more, he said. But he’s pessimistic: Politicians on both sides of the border don’t want to admit the importance of those things, he said. “This is a huge issue of North American competitiveness.”¶ There was one clear election victory for the Canadian government on a bridge: In Michigan, voters rejected a state-wide initiative, Proposition 6, that would have slowed the building of a new Windsor-Detroit bridge. But that’s a bridge that Ottawa will pay for.¶ The approval of a Keystone XL pipeline could remove an irritant, but Queen’s University political scientists Kim Nossal doubts that it will be the start of a grand new re-boot in Canada-U.S. relations.¶ There’s little sign Mr. Obama would say any legacy politics in North American matters. Mr. Harper, he said, appears to have settled on the idea that the best it can do with the Obama Administration is manage the relationship, keep disputes from flaring up, and make incremental advances.¶ “He looks at that thickening border, he tries to move as much as he can in things like the Beyond the Border initiative,” Mr. Nossal said. But he said Mr. Harper will know that any grander-scale initiative to deal with North American integration will never overcome the U.S. obsession with border security.¶ “It’s the usual stuff of U.S.-Canadian relations, but I don’t think there is any willingness on the part of the Harper government to go very far – and say, ‘Let’s start a new North American initiative,” he said. “I don’t think there’s a re-boot with Obama.” The other question, Mr. Nossal said, is whether the U.S. is at the top of Mr. Harper’s priorities any more.¶ Though the U.S. economy is still deeply tied to Canada’s, the prospects for economic growth seem increasingly linked to other places. The fact that Mr. Harper is in India right now while the U.S. picks a president is a ready symbol of how Canada’s foreign focus has changed, to Asia, to China, and to emerging markets.¶ In 2006, Mr. Harper came to office overtly planning to warm relations with the U.S. When Mr. Obama was first elected, Mr. Harper moved quickly to propose a continental alliance on energy and the environment. But more recently, Mr. Nossal noted, Mr. Harper used the rejection of Keystone XL to advocate for the Northern Gateway pipeline so Canada can ship bitumen to Asia. He has spent energy and political capital developing ties in Asia.¶ “I think the Harper government is looking elsewhere,” Mr. Nossal said.

Canada doesn’t perceive enough attention being paid to it now

Chase ’12

(Steven, “Canada in U.S. blindspot, Harper says”, The Globe and Mail, 11-20-2012, http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-in-us-blindspot-harper-says/article5460754/?service=mobile)

After seven years as Prime Minister, Stephen Harper has just one complaint about relations with the United States: Americans still don’t pay sufficient attention to Canada.¶ The squeaky wheel gets the grease in Washington, he says. “And we’re not the squeaky wheel.”¶ The Prime Minister offered up this gripe, unbidden, during a publicized sit-down interview with a Canadian-American business group in Ottawa Monday. It’s a revealing comment from a Prime Minister who came to office in 2006 vowing a stronger relationship with the United States. At the time,the Conservatives said past Liberal governments failed to make headway in Washington because they’d neglected the relationship with the Americans – a dynamic they vowed to change.¶ Today, however, Mr. Harper has a more nuanced perspective – one he offered as Canadians still wonder whether the White House will green-light a Canadian pipeline project to ship crude to Texas that was temporarily blocked this past January.¶ “My only complaint about the United States – and every Canadian will say this, but it’s just the way it is – is we always like to have more attention in the United States,” he told Maryscott Greenwood, a senior U.S. adviser to the Canadian American Business Council.¶ “We certainly pay a lot of attention to you; you sometimes don’t pay enough attention to us.”¶ The United States tends to focus on those who make the most noise, Mr. Harper said Monday, adding that this isn’t how Canada operates.¶ His comments came during an interview in which he described his Conservative government as “extremely pro-American” but one that can stand up for Canadian interests without “any sense of anti-Americanism.”¶ David Jacobson, the U.S. ambassador to Canada, told reporters after Mr. Harper’s comments that the Obama administration does “care very much what Canada thinks.”¶ He suggested Canada is not alone in feeling it is not heeded enough. “I think that probably most every country in the world wishes the United States paid a little bit more attention to them,” Mr. Jacobson said.¶ Canadian interests suffered a setback earlier this year when U.S. President Barack Obama put the Keystone XL pipeline on hold, citing environmental concerns about its proposed route for carrying crude oil to Texas from Alberta.

Beaufort Sea (K) Canada Relations

Beaufort Sea oil and gas will cause U.S.-Canada tensions to flare

Huebert ‘9 – associate professor of political science at the University of Calgary

(Rob, Canada and the Changing International Arctic: At the Crossroads of Cooperation and Conflict, Northern Exposure: Peoples, Powers and Prospects for Canada’s North, Institute for Research on Public Policy, pg. 18)

The second debate between Canada and the US is over the maritime boundary¶ between Alaska and the Yukon. In 1825, Russia (which then controlled what is¶ now Alaska) and the United Kingdom signed a treaty that established a land¶ boundary between Canada and Russia. Canada maintains that the Canada-US¶ maritime boundary should be a direct continuation of that land boundary; the US¶ insists that it should be drawn at a 90-degree angle to the coastline (Kirkey 1995).¶ The US version of the boundary extends in a more easterly direction than the¶ Canadian version. At the heart of the dispute is a wedge of marine territory in the¶ Beaufort Sea that has been created by this disparity in the two countries’ positions. ¶ At stake are the region’s oil and gas resources — during the 1970s, there¶ was considerable speculation that these could be extensive. But, as substantial as¶ the reserves may be, the severity of the climate may make their extraction (especially due to their offshore location) economically unfeasible. It is therefore not¶ surprising that when oil prices collapsed in the 1980s, the boundary dispute¶ seemed to disappear; neither Canada nor the US pursued commercial development in the disputed zone, and even exploration was contained. ¶ Recently, there have been signs that the dispute is heating up again. The¶ current US administration has signalled its intent to develop its northern oil and¶ gas reserves. President George W. Bush’s efforts to develop the oil and gas potential of the protected land region of northeast Alaska were ultimately defeated by¶ Congress, but, given the emphasis that the Bush administration has placed on¶ improving American energy security, it is unlikely to abandon this priority. There¶ are now suggestions from within the industry of large-scale oil and gas discoveries¶ in the Beaufort Sea. While the scale of these discoveries is as yet undetermined,¶ they could extend into the disputed zone, causing Canada-US tensions to flare.

Beaufort Sea disputes will directly affect Canada relations and security cooperation

Dorman and Kaufman ’11 – senior lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of the Strategic Studies Institute and professor of political science at Whittier College

(Dr. Andrew M., previously taught at the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich, and at the University of Birmingham. He has published widely and specializes in British defense and security policy, defense transformation, and European Security. Dr. Dorman is on the governing councils of the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association and the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association. He is also the Founding Chair of the APSA’s Kenneth N. Waltz Dissertation Prize and Editor of World Defence Systems. Dr. Dorman holds a masters’ degree and Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham, and Dr. Joyce P., has taught primarily in the areas of International Relations and American Foreign Policy and is the creator and director of the International Negotiation Project (INP), a community assisted simulation of international negotiation and foreign policy decision making for high school students, The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice, Stanford University Press, 2011, pg. 45)

The geographic dispersion of security concerns to places heretofore off the alliance’s radar screen may also hold unforeseen challenges for the trans-Atlantic partners. Canada, the US, and the EU have shown a heightened interest in the Arctic in recent years. This stems from the estimated 25 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas deposits that lie in the region, its potential as a route for maritime commerce, and its potential as a test-case for the international community’s willingness to tackle the threats posed by global warming. A maritime boundary dispute between Canada and the US in the Beaufort Sea, and its implications for the ownership of undersea resources, may become a serious bilateral irritant. Although policy-makers are loath to admit such linkages, a non-resolution of this dispute will be seen in Canada as a threat to national sovereignty—a perennial concern for any Canadian politician. Left unresolved, it may adversely affect the inclination of future Canadian governments to respond positively to American pleas to undertake or maintain commitments to international security operations such as Afghanistan.

It will be a serious irritant in U.S.-Canada bilateral relations

Riddell-Dixon ‘8 – professor of political science at the University of Western Ontario

(Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, “Canada and Arctic Politics: The Continental Shelf Extension”, Ocean Development & International Law, 39:4, 343-359, 2008, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00908320802459052)

In short, not only is there an international regime in place to address continental shelf¶ extensions beyond 200 nautical miles, but its legal norms are being followed by Arctic¶ countries. Having an orderly process is also in the best interests of private corporations¶ wishing to develop resources. No company wants to invest millions of dollars in exploration¶ and drilling costs without being certain of the rules under which it will operate and be able¶ to reap the beneﬁts of its long-term investment. This fact is evident in the Beaufort Sea,¶ where the exclusive economic zones of Canada and the United States overlap and where rich¶ resources are known to exist; yet, until the two countries agree on a maritime boundary, the¶ uncertainties are too great to warrant resource exploitation. For example, would corporations¶ have to operate under U.S. laws or Canadian laws? Few, if any, creditors in the world would¶ ﬁnance exploitation before titles were agreed on.¶ Just as there are overlaps in the exclusive economic zones between adjacent or opposing¶ states, there will be overlaps in the extended continental shelves. The above discussion is¶ not to suggest that the resolution of overlapping boundaries will necessarily be free of¶ conﬂict. Canadian and U.S. negotiators worked for a number of years in the 1970s to reach¶ an agreement on ﬁshing rights in the Gulf of Maine, only to have the settlement rejected¶ in the U.S. Senate. The maritime boundary dispute was then referred to the International¶ Court of Justice, which issued its judgment in 1984.¶ 34¶ The Canada-United States boundary¶ dispute in the Beaufort Sea has dragged on for years and it is deﬁnitely an irritant in bilateral¶ relations. These examples indicate that resolving disputes over maritime boundaries can¶ be difﬁcult and time consuming; however, in each case, countries have pursued legally¶ accepted channels for addressing the conﬂicts rather than resorting to unilateral grabs for¶ jurisdiction

Disputes Will Escalate

Disputes over the Beaufort Sea will escalate to broader relations—and it outweighs all other disputes with Canada

Crist ‘7 – program associate at the Wilson Center

(Ken, “Canada and the Arctic: The Issue of Northern Sovereignty”, The Wilson Center, 12-11-2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/canada-and-the-arctic-the-issue-northern-sovereignty)

Despite the environmental risks, economic development in the Arctic is expected to move forward. Huebert noted that several major oil companies believe that the Arctic may hold up to 25 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and gas reserves. Attempts to gain control over these resources, maintained Huebert, could lead to international disputes over unresolved land claims between Arctic nations in the near future. He warned that Canada and the United States could face a major conflict over control of part of the Beaufort Sea—an area believed to be rich in undiscovered oil and gas reserves—that could be more contentious than the ongoing bilateral dispute over the Northwest Passage. Both countries are currently preparing their case to settle a maritime boundary dispute that would decide which country controls offshore oil rights in the Beaufort Sea. In order for the United States to win its claim, the U.S. government must first follow Canada's lead and ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Failure to ratify the treaty would prevent the United States from asserting its rights over offshore areas. Regardless of whether or not the United States decides to ratify the treaty, Huebert maintained that Canada and the United States will most likely face tense bilateral negotiations over control of the mineral-rich portion of the Beaufort Sea in the near future: "We will see this issue escalate." "When it comes to Canada and the United States, each and every [Arctic] issue can be resolved," maintained Huebert. In the case of the Beaufort Sea dispute, Huebert pointed out that Canada and the United States could develop a "joint management scheme" over resources in the region that would allow both countries to prosper. Huebert noted that while resolving current international Arctic disputes will require a great amount of political will to successfully achieve, reaching major agreements is not out of the realm of possibility. In 1988, one such agreement was nearly struck that would have resolved many Arctic sovereignty issues between Canada and the United States and set international standards for Arctic shipping and construction. Although opposition from the U.S. State Department ultimately led to the agreement's demise, the fact that it was nearly negotiated successfully by both Canada and the United States offers hope that future bilateral or multilateral agreements can be reached. Huebert cautioned, however, that efforts to resolve Arctic disputes must begin now in order to avoid major international confrontations over Arctic land and resources: "The stakes are becoming very high and the longer the issues are allowed to fester the more difficult they will be to solve."

The Beaufort Sea dispute will spill over—it’ll be the ugliest maritime boundary dispute

Huebert ‘8 – associate professor of political science at the University of Calgary

(Rob, “Canadian Artic Security in an ¶ “Unsecure” World”, Reddin Symposium XXI Canadian Studies Center, 1-19-2008, http://www.bgsu.edu/downloads/cas/file65541.pdf)

In terms of the maritime boundary dispute, it is the Beaufort Sea that ¶ will be the most challenging. That one is going to be ugly because it is ¶ about resources. The way Canada and the US draw their maritime borders ¶ are equally acceptable under international law. But the question emerges ¶ as to which position will prevail? Further complicating this is the fact ¶ that Canada established one of its ﬁrst Indigenous Northern land claim ¶ agreements on its understanding of the border. The 1984 Western Inuvialuit ¶ Land Claims Agreement follows the Canadian border. If Canada is ever able ¶ to have some form of renegotiations with the US that requires a retreat from ¶ its existing position, Canada will have to go back and rewrite that particular ¶ agreement. This is politically a very sensitive issue in Canada. ¶ While this dispute has been somewhat dormant, there are signs it could ¶ soon heat up. The previously mentioned South Korean tankers that are ¶ ice-capable could be used in the region. They have a regular open water ¶ bow and are economic to operate in open water. They have an icebreaking ¶ bow on the stern. They have this because they do not have a regular ﬁxed ¶ propeller. Instead they have one that can rotate 360 degrees. The technology ¶ that allows this is called an Azipod. It turns around 360 degrees. That means ¶ this ship is economical to operate in ice-covered waters of up to a meter ¶ of ice, and in open water. They are more expensive to build, but this is the ¶ future of Arctic oil transportation.

Beaufort Sea disputes will amplify relations in light of Keystone XL

Daly ’12 – CEO of U.S.-Central Asia Biofuels Ltd.

(John, “Canada - More of the Great White North Up for Energy Development?”, CNBC, 5-31-2012, http://www.cnbc.com/id/47629821/Canada_More_of_the_Great_White_North_Up_for_Energy_Development)

Quick — which is the U.S.’s biggest supply of non-OPEC oil?¶ Canada — according to the U.S. Energy Administration, the United States total crude oil imports now average 9.033 million barrels per day (mbpd), with Canada sending 2.666 mbpd southward to the U.S., making it America’s top source of oil imports.¶ But relations between Ottawa and Washington have been strained recently, not least because of the stymied Keystone XL, with the conservative Canadian government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, stung by the environmentalists’ opposition to the Keystone XL pipeline sending Alberta’s oil sands southward to U.S. refineries on the Gulf of Mexico angrily threatening to send Canadian future energy production exports westward for exports to Asia, particularly to China.¶ But prime ministerial unhappiness aside, the U.S. remains Canada’s best energy market, and Harper’s government knows it.¶ Want proof? Look no further than the quiet research done over the past half-decade by Houston-based ION Geophysical Corp., which since beginning in 2006 has spent more than $150 million compiling hydrocarbon data using advanced seismic and gravity equipment to identify potential oil and natural gas deposits in Canada’s Arctic Beaufort Sea, capturing more than 14,000 miles of 2D seismic data in the Beaufort-Mackenzie basin from a research vessel towing a 5½-mile-long cable equipped with seismic equipment.¶ The result of the company’s research in the Great White North? According to ION Geophysical Corp., “a world-class play.” ION Geophysical has recouped its investment costs and then some, although the company modestly declines to say how much, by selling their data to interested energy companies.¶ Never mind that the Beaufort Sea, lying north of the Northwest Territories and west of Canada's Arctic Islands, is one of the most isolated and inhospitable regions of the world. The Beaufort Sea is characterized by severe climate and is frozen over most of the year, with only a narrow 60-mile-wide passage opening up along its shoreline in August and September. Although more than 400 wells have been drilled in the north and 65 petroleum fields indentified, barely a trickle of oil and gas has made it to market.¶ But if that’s the down side, then the up side is that ION Geophysical’s data combined with previous studies by other Artic nations, including Norway, Russia and the U.S. indicate that the Arctic Ocean area may hold up to 25 percent of the world's untapped crude oil and natural gas deposits. In 2008 BP committed $1.2 billion (Canadian) to drilling in the Beaufort, a decision that was based on ION Geophysical data; and after reviewing their materials, Imperial Oil Ltd. and Chevron Corp. also made large Beaufort Sea lease bids.¶ But wait, there’s more. Harper’s government has placed 3,500 square miles of the northern offshore Beaufort Sea up for bids, clearing the way for energy companies to snap up exploration rights for an area half the size of Lake Ontario.¶ The Beaufort Sea’s potential has led South Korea’s Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs to conclude an agreement with Canada to conduct joint research in the Beaufort Sea within Canada's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Accordingly, Seoul will soon dispatch South Korea's first icebreaker, the 7,487-ton Araon, to conduct research. Speaking on condition of anonymity a ministry official said, "Exact details have to be worked out with Canada, but the Araon should begin exploration in the summer of 2013."¶ Possible U.S.-Canadian friction clouding this otherwise sunny picture? The Beaufort Sea is divided between Canada and Alaska and constitutes a long-time maritime border dispute complete with on-going negotiations. On the Alaskan side of the maritime frontier, on April 27 Shell Chief Financial Officer Simon Henry told financial analysts during a question and answer session following the company’s presentation on its first quarter 2012 results that the company was gearing up to dispatch two drilling vessels and 35 support vessels for drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas later this year, noting that a number of them are already either in Alaska or are on their way to the state, adding, “It’s a huge logistical exercise.”¶ In the year of the bicentenary of the War of 1812, it seems indeed ironic that the U.S. and Canada may once again be preparing to square off, this time over energy disputes and maritime frontiers. The final twist to the story is that global warming in shrinking the Arctic polar ice has made these areas available for exploration.

Energy/Arctic (K) Issue

Energy issues along the Arctic border are key to U.S.-Canada relations

Kolisnek ‘9 – Senior Research Fellow at the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies

(George, former director of Strategic Intelligence at the National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and was Senior Policy Advisor for Intelligence and Security Matters in the Privy Council Office, “Potential of Geopolitical Friction over Arctic Energy Grows”, The Cutting Edge News, 2-9-2009, http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=1077&pageid=21&pagename=Energy)

As the Arctic ice cap melts providing increased ease of access to potential oil, coal and gas deposits how is Canada addressing the question of energy security, that is to say how should Canadian interests proceed with the development of dependable supplies at market prices, in such an immense area that is sparsely populated in relatively isolated communities?¶ There has already been oil, coal and gas deposits found and to some degree developed in the Mackenzie Delta and Western Arctic Islands of the Canadian Arctic. The potential for finding new deposits of natural gas and oil in these areas is quite high. Canada, the largest external supplier of oil and petroleum products to the US, exports approximately 2 million barrels per day of crude oil to the US, which is between 10% and 15% of US requirements.¶ Canada consumes about one million barrels of its own crude oil per day for domestic use. At present the Canadian Arctic region is only a minor contributor to this production. Anticipated increases in natural gas consumption in the coming decade due to higher oil and petroleum costs will heighten the need for new natural gas deposits to be found. Many think these new deposits will be found in the Arctic regions. This will bring additional pressures on the Canadian and US governments to control exploration, drilling and shipping.¶ These developments highlight the importance of energy security in the Canada-US relationship and point out that its importance can only increase given any significant finding of new oil and gas resources, either within the Canadian Arctic or across the Canada-US border areas in the Arctic. This could result in either mutual cooperation or become a source of friction depending on how both governments react to any new discoveries and in responding to internal domestic pressures.

Arctic energy is heavily politicized issue in Canada—failure to resolve it will spill over to broader relations

Bergh ’12 – Researcher with the SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme

(Kristofer, holds a master’s degree in social sciences with a major in peace and conflict studies from Uppsala University. “The Arctic Policies of Canada and the United States: Domestic Motives and International Context”, SIPRI Institute, Insights on Peace and Security, 2012)

With the increased global attention given to the Arctic region due to the changing climate, the governments of Canada and the USA have both pushed the Arctic further up the political agenda. In Canada this shift was clear when Stephen Harper took office in 2006 and declared the Arctic a national priority. In the USA, the shift has been subtler, beginning with the directive issued during the last days of the Bush administration, and¶ reinforced by the Obama administration’s increasing atten- tion to Arctic issues. The Arctic is a highly politicized issue in Canada that is closely tied to national identity.76 ‘Pressing the Arctic button’ has been viewed as a way of creating a ‘rally round the flag-effect’ in an otherwise internationalist society.77 Harper has been accused of seeking political support rather than actually addressing real challenges in the region, which are more often social and environmental than military.78 Several leaked cables from the US embassy in Ottawa seem to confirm that Harper’s tough talk on Arctic sovereignty is aimed primarily at a domestic audience, rather than reflecting substantive foreign policy concerns.79 In the USA the Arctic has traditionally been the concern of the state of Alaska, but as climate change is expected to open up the region, interest from the federal government has increased as well. The prospect of energy extraction seem to be the main driver of this new interest and increased exploration in the region fits well into Obama’s energy strategy.

Canada cares deeply about Arctic sovereignty—top national priority

Bergh ’12 – Researcher with the SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme

Many features of Canadian and¶ US societies are intimately intertwined. The two countries share the worlds longest international border; each is the other’s most important trading partners; and they work together militarily, both multilaterally through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilaterally through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).3 Their bilateral relationship has often been the defining factor in their respective Arctic policies, yet despite their apparent similarities, they have adopted substantially different approaches to the Arctic region. While the two countries’ different Arctic geographies account for many of the differ- ences, other factors contribute to both differences and similarities. Among these, domestic factors should not be underestimated. The Arctic is a relatively low priority issue for the USA among the range of international challenges that it faces. The top levels of US leadership may pay attention to the region, but the Arctic is not in the minds of the US public and is thus not a politicized issue. Canada, in contrast, has made the Arctic a top national priority, closely linked to Canadian identity and sovereignty.

Canada K/T Afghanistan

Canada is necessary to Afghanistan success

(Doug MacArthur 2007 “Don’t Leave Afghanistan in American hands” http://findarticles.com/p/articl es/mi_qa4014/is_200701/ai_n18621753)

I argue that abandoning Afghanistan now would be strategically wrong and morally unacceptable. While it would be easy to withdraw and leave the Afghan people to their fate, Canada has an interest in what happens that transcends the tragedy of the death of soldiers and the desire to disentangle from U.S. foreign ventures. Canada's departure would almost certainly encourage other countries to do likewise, leaving the fate of the country in the hands of the United States. It is doubtful whether the United States has much continuing interest in the future of the country beyond that which military dominance can provide. To leave Afghanistan to the United States is not in the interests of the Afghan people or the world community. Afghanistan would most likely continue to be a pawn in the ever-growing battle between the United States and those who see the U.S. as an imperial power determined to impose its will around the world. Canada is needed in Afghanistan. Canada has been there since the beginning of the reconstruction effort and is in a unique position to provide the leadership needed to help the country develop democratic institutions and political, social and economic stability in tune with what Afghans want.

US action alone in Afghanistan fails

(Samantha Power 4/17/08 “ Keeping Canada in Afganistan” http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1731892,00.html)

The U.S. alone can't succeed in Afghanistan. But Canada's example shows that even our closest allies need to be convinced that the fight is theirs too. Before countries like Macedonia, Albania and Croatia gain admission to NATO, they should be reminded that membership carries responsibilities as well as rewards. NATO rules should be rewritten to ensure that countries that invest disproportionate military and financial resources (as Canada has done) should have some of their costs subsidized by the alliance. If a government does not want to send its troops to fight, it should still be obliged to contribute funding and civilian expertise, which remains in short supply.

NORAD Mod

That’s key to NORAD effectiveness.

Christuik, 08 (Karen Christuik, writer for the Canadian Air Force. “Celebrating 50 Years of NORAD” http://www.airforce.gc.ca/site/newsroom/news_e.asp?cat=114&id=6161)
"There are no two nations like Canada and the United States that have agreed to protect each other's air space and sovereignty. When you consider the support that NORAD provides and the threats in so many domains that it counters, it is a truly outstanding relationship." Today, May 12, 2008 marks the 50th anniversary of the most significant military agreement between Canada and the US, an agreement that saw the creation of NORAD. Although originally created during the Cold War to defend North America against possible air invasion, NORAD has evolved considerably since then, particularly in response to the 2001 World Trade Center attacks. Most military personnel know NORAD as the entity that provides aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America through the command centre at NORAD-US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in Colorado Springs, Colo., and at three regional headquarters in Winnipeg,Alaska and Florida. "Through [the Canadian NORAD Region at 17 Wing Winnipeg], Canadians play a major role in NORAD," says Major Jason Proulx, Assistant Deputy at NORADUSNORTHCOM Public Affairs. "When you look at a map that shows the NORAD airspace, you will notice that the Canadian region comprises the largest area to cover and protect - nearly 10 million square kilometres. This air coverage is particularly vital in less populated areas such as Canada's Arctic." Unquestionably, the NORAD of today is vastly different from what it was 50 years ago. In those days, one of Canada's main contributions was the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, a massive engineering marvel of radar stations that stretched across the Arctic and remained in operation for 30 years. Two other radar systems (the Pinetree Line and the Mid-Canada Line) worked in conjunction with the DEW Line as additional sites for detection. For air defence fighter aircraft, Canada relied on nine Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons headquartered at Air Defence Command in Saint-Hubert, Que. According to Joseph T. Jockel, director of Canadian Studies at St. Lawrence University in Canton, N.Y. and author of a recent book on NORAD's history, one reason for the large number of fighter squadrons was because many people believed that if an air defence battle occurred in North America, it would take place over southern Canada. "Then, the threat shifted to missiles," explains Mr. Jockel, "and NORAD turned into more of a warning and assessment command. That is still one of its key roles - warning and assessing." One person who can speak with first-hand knowledge about the post-September 11 changes to NORAD, and the new spotlight on homeland security, is Colonel Christopher Coates, the current director of operations for 1 Canadian Air Division/Canadian NORAD Region. "We've developed procedures and means to look inward to extend our air defence capabilities over the continent," says Col Coates. "Operationally, our protection used to start at the edge of our continent, and we focused outward, trying to keep the threats at a distance." With its long and complicated history, and new threats occurring continually throughout the world, it is difficult to imagine what NORAD will look like in the next 50 years. Nonetheless, with the backbone of the first five decades behind us, the future of NORAD definitely looks bright for both Canada and the US "NORAD is more relevant today than ever as an interdiction force against multi-layered threats," says Gen Renuart. "Its foundation is a relationship based on sincere friendship, shared values and mutual respect. Canada has been a committed ally of the United States, and the bond of NORAD is an example of that."
NORAD is key to preventing a terrorist attack against the US

Miles,7 (Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service “NORTHCOM, NORAD Working to Ensure Terror Plots Against Homeland Fail.” http://terrorism-online.blogspot.com/2007/07/northcom-norad-working-to-ensure-terror.html)
Officials at U.S. Northern Command are "keenly aware" of information within the newly released National Intelligence Estimate and are committed to working to ensure terrorists don't succeed in attacking the United States, a NORTHCOM official said. A declassified version of the report released yesterday notes that Islamic terrorist groups, particularly al Qaeda, are likely to remain a persistent threat to the U.S. homeland over the next three years. The report paints a picture of terrorists' "undiminished intent to attack the homeland." "We assess that al Qaeda's homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks and/or fear among the U.S. population," the report states. NORTHCOM, the Defense Department's lead agency for homeland defense, is working closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other partners to "deter and disrupt, and if necessary, confront any planned attack against the homeland," said Michael Kucharek, a spokesman for NORTHCOM and North American Aerospace Defense Command. The command is "focused on ensuring that we disrupt and defeat those who wish to kill innocent civilians by any means possible," he said. NORTHCOM maintains a representative in the National Counterterrorism Center and is connected to more than 150 operation centers throughout the United States, Kucharek explained. This network continuously evaluates all credible intelligence information to establish appropriate response force posture levels and force protection levels for Defense Department installations nationwide, he said. Meanwhile, "U.S. Northern Command has directed all subordinate commands to increase their vigilance, to take precautionary actions and to review their local force protection procedures," he said. Due to security considerations, the command does not discuss the specific types of security measures it is taking. NORAD, the U.S.-Canadian command that provides aerospace warning and control for North America, is a key player in that effort. NORAD is "standing vigilant to protect our homelands from any emerging threat by working in close cooperation and coordination with our partners in the U.S. and Canada and their respective government agencies," Kucharek said. Eight intelligence organizations within the Defense Department contributed to the National Intelligence Estimate: the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps intelligence.

Nuclear war

Time June 27, 2008 (Postcard from Cheyenne Mountain, Still Training for the End of the World, Eben Harrell Friday, Jun 27, 2008http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1826276,00.html)

Prophecies aside, the first news of the apocalypse will appear on a giant monitor screen in a small control room deep inside Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station. Here, in a fortress dug into a mountain high above Colorado Springs, the trip-wire that would once have turned the Cold War very, very hot remains taut, ready to alert America's commander in chief of any incoming missiles. The outlook at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has changed considerably since the collapse of communism dramatically reduced prospects for thermonuclear war — although security remains tight, Cheyenne Mountain is now open to tourists and school groups, and a shop on the base sells T-shirts, hats, commemorative coins and other tchotchkes at its visitor center. On May 13, in apparent confirmation of the facility's obsolescence, NORAD — the joint American-Canadian command for which this structure was built in 1966 — marked its 50th anniversary by moving almost all of its operations to nearby Peterson Air Force base. There it has established what it calls an "integrated command center for the 21st century" — one attuned to more plausible, if less apocalyptic, perils such as drug smugglers, suspicious ships and airline hijacks. Cheyenne Mountain has not been mothballed, however. One of NORAD's original missions — missile watch — remains in force, and has once again entered the national conversation as America's nuclear readiness has become part of the presidential campaign debate. Behind its 25-ton blast doors, the 900-odd residents of Cheyenne Mountain live in a self-contained, 4.5-acre world. It has four man-made lakes holding millions of gallons of water. It has two fitness centers, a basketball court, a canteen, a chapel, a barber shop, a dental clinic, and enough food to survive for a minimum of 30 days. The entire complex is designed to support the 30 NORAD personnel on the grim nuclear-watch detail. They work in crews of five behind a door that reads in gold letters "North America's Command Center of Excellence," and their sole mission is to distinguish benign rocket launches from missiles traveling toward North America at 4 miles a second, bearing multiple, independently targeted nuclear warheads, each capable of destroying an entire city. They have a matter of minutes to make the call that could unleash nuclear Armageddon. "It's a typical military watch," explains Captain Steve Thompson, Cheyenne Mountain Division Chief, who oversees the crews. "A lot of routine punctuated by moments of sheer terror." Even now, Russia and the United States maintain thousands of nuclear warheads on hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles ready to launch at a moment's notice. With so many weapons on hair-trigger alert, and with both sides retaining the option to "launch on warning" of an incoming attack, critics warn that an accidental nuclear war remains a plausible danger. Senator Barack Obama has pledged to remove America's weapons from launch-ready status if elected President; Senator John McCain has been more cautious, saying only that he will review U.S. nuclear policy. For now, however, the missile-warning detail in Cheyenne Mountain carries a heavy burden. The typical burnout rate for personnel in the high-stress missile-watch postings is two years. Captain Thompson says the strain comes not from waiting for the end of the world, but from the troglodytic lifestyle it requires.

Terrorism Mod

Canada is key to the war on terrorism

Banda 4, (Maria Canadian Pugwash Group and Science for Peace Eric Fawcett Memorial Forum Saturday, 4/17, “Development of Canadian Policy in the Shadow of U.S. Defence and Foreign Policy; Power of the Weak? Canada’s Diplomacy and the Bush Doctrine” (http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/events/documents/2004/2004.04.17-Banda_presentation.pdf)

American analysts are increasingly coming to recognize that the United States cannot win the War on Terror on its own. Despite its astounding military budget, the U.S. is not self-sufficient. Why was Washington insisting on Canada’s contribution in Iraq? Two reasons: Canada’s and its allies’ military contribution was critical to the coalition’s success; and, international support garners domestic legitimacy for the Bush government. Even Robert Kagan observed that the United States would otherwise face a crisis of legitimacy. Second, if allies are important in the military arm of the war on terror, they are vital in the support activities: there are certain things that U.S. cannot do—or cannot do well. Americans know how to bomb from high altitudes or win staggering military victories—but Afghanistan and Iraq have yet again confirmed that they cannot adequately deal with the aftermath of war: peace-building and nation-building efforts—from training of police forces and judicial reform to the creation of civil society. This has been the middle-powers’ métier, which President Bush’s appeal for U.N.’s help in post-war reconstruction has confirmed.

Terrorism Risks Extinction

Alexander 3, (Yonah, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, 7/28, “Terrorism myths and realities” Washington Times)

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

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