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2AC Navy DA

Our fleet can take anyone’s—no challengers


Work 12 - United States Under Secretary of the Navy and VP of Strategic Studies @ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Robert O, "The Coming Naval Century," May, Proceedings Magazine - Vol. 138/5/1311, US Naval Institute, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/coming-naval-century



For those in the military concerned about the impact of such cuts, I would simply say four things:¶ • Any grand strategy starts with an assumption that all resources are scarce, requiring a balancing of commitments and resources. As political commentator Walter Lippmann wrote: “The nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means, and its means equal to its purposes.”¶ • The upcoming defense drawdown will be less severe than past post–World War II drawdowns. Accommodating cuts will be hard, but manageable.¶ • At the end of the drawdown, the United States will still have the best and most capable armed forces in the world. The President well appreciates the importance of a world-class military. “The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances,” he said. “We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security. In this way our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced.”¶ • Most important, as the nation prioritizes what is most essential and brings into better balance its commitments and its elements of national power, we will see the beginning of a Naval Century—a new golden age of American sea power.¶ The Navy Is More Than Ships¶ Those who judge U.S. naval power solely by the number of vessels in the Navy’s battle force are not seeing the bigger picture. Our battle force is just one component—albeit an essential one—of a powerful National Fleet that includes the broad range of capabilities, capacities, and enablers resident in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It encompasses our special-mission, prepositioning, and surge-sealift fleets; the ready reserve force; naval aviation, including the maritime-patrol and reconnaissance force; Navy and Marine special operations and cyber forces; and the U.S. Merchant Marine. Moreover, it is crewed and operated by the finest sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, civilian mariners, and government civilians in our history, and supported by a talented and innovative national industrial base.¶ If this were not enough, the heart of the National Fleet is a Navy–Marine Corps team that is transforming itself from an organization focused on platforms to a total-force battle network that interconnects sensors, manned and unmanned platforms with modular payloads, combat systems, and network-enabled weapons, as well as tech-savvy, combat-tested people into a cohesive fighting force. This Fleet and its network would make short work of any past U.S. Fleet—and of any potential contemporary naval adversary.

No deterrent effect


Daniel 2

Donald C.F. “The Future of American Naval Power: Propositions and Recommendations,” Globalization and American Power. Chapter 27. Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/01_toc.htm



In sum, there would seem to be a special role for the U.S. Navy in contingency response along littorals, but, outside the context of a specific crisis, constant day-to-day presence does not do much to deter unwanted behavior. Thus, it would seem a raising of false expectations to argue, for example, that the “gapping of aircraft carriers in areas of potential crisis is an invitation to disaster—and therefore represents culpable negligence on the part of America’s defense decision-makers.”33 In the early 1960s, the United States maintained three aircraft carrier battlegroups in the Mediterranean Sea but later gradually found that it needed to scale back. Currently, a single battlegroup operates there for less than 9 months of the year on average. This is a significant reduction, but no one can prove that the Mediterranean region became less stable. Conversely, the Navy began to maintain a regular presence in the Arabian Gulf in 1979, but this did not prevent Iran or Iraq from attacking ships during their war. In the 1980s, attacks generally increased in number over the 8 years of the war. As for deterring the initiation of a crisis in the first place, it is essentially impossible for an outsider to prove that such deterrence was successful except in the rare case in which a deterred party admits that he was deterred and states the reasons. Adam Siegel, John Arquilla, Paul Huth, Paul Davis, and a Rutgers Center for Global Security and Democracy team led by Edward Rhodes have each attempted to study the effects of forward presence and general deterrence. The deficiency of such study is always in making the definitive link between them. The majority of these studies suggest that “[h]istorically seapower has not done well as a deterrent” in preventing the outbreak of conflicts,36 principally because land-based powers not dependent on overseas trade are relatively “insensitive” to the operations of naval forces.

Naval power not key to hegemony


Goure 10

Daniel Goure. PhD in IR, BA in government, VP of the Lexington Institute, member of the Department of Defense Transition Team, former director of Strategic Competitiveness for the Secretary of State, senior analyst on national security and defense issues with the Center for Naval Analyses. “Can the Case be Made for Naval Power?” 2 July 2010. Lexington Institute. http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171

More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

China makes naval power obsolete—anti-access/area-denial capabilities effectively shut out US ships


Krepinevich 9— president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Andrew, “The Pentagon’sWasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of American Power” Foreign Affairs Volume 88 • Number 4, July/August



In East Asia, an even more formidable challenge is emerging. China’s People’s Liberation Army is aggressively developing capabilities and strategies to degrade the U.S. military’s ability to project power into the region. The PLA’s buildup is being guided by the lessons drawn by the Chinese military from the two Iraq wars and the 1999 war in the Balkans. The Chinese were particularly impressed by the effectiveness of U.S. precision-strike capabilities and the role played by space systems, which provided reliable navigation and communications, as well as weather, targeting, and missile-warning data. The effort is also being driven by the Chinese experience during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, when a U.S. aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Nimitz, entered the Taiwan Strait to compel China to stand down from its threats to Taiwan. This display of U.S. naval power bolstered China’s determination to curb the United States’ access to East Asia. Senior Chinese political and military leaders decided it would be foolhardy to challenge the U.S. military head-on. Instead, China is working to combine Western technology with Eastern stratagems, aiming to be able to seize the initiative in the event of a conflict by exploiting the element of surprise. The Chinese approach would entail destroying or disrupting the U.S. military’s communications networks and launching preemptive attacks, to the point where such attacks, or even the threat of such attacks, would raise the costs of U.S. action to prohibitive levels. The Chinese call the military capabilities that support this strategy “assassin’s mace.” The underlying mantra is that assassin’s mace weapons and techniques will enable “the inferior” (China) to defeat “the superior” (the United States). Chinese efforts are focused on developing and fielding what U.S. military analysts refer to as “anti-access/area-denial (a2/ad) capabilities. Generally speaking, Chinese anti-access forces seek to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate from forward bases, such as Kadena Air Base, on Okinawa, and Andersen Air Force Base, on Guam. The Chinese are, for example, fielding large numbers of conventionally armed ballistic missiles capable of striking these bases with a high degree of accuracy. Although recent advances in directed-energy technology—such as solid-state lasers—may enable the United States to field significantly more effective missile defense systems in the next decade, present defenses against ballistic missile attacks are limited. These defenses can be overwhelmed when confronted with missile barrages. The intended message to the United States and its East Asian allies and partners is clear: China has the means to put at risk the forward bases from which most U.S. strike aircraft must operate. Area-denial capabilities are aimed at restricting the U.S. Navy’s freedom of action from China’s coast out to “the second island chain”— a line of islands that extends roughly from the southeastern edge of Japan to Guam. The PLA is constructing over-the-horizon radars, fielding unmanned aerial vehicles, and deploying reconnaissance satellites to detect U.S. surface warships at progressively greater distances. It is acquiring a large number of submarines armed with advanced torpedoes and high-speed, sea-skimming ascms to stalk U.S. carriers and their escorts. (In 2006, a Chinese submarine surfaced in the midst of a U.S. carrier strike group, much to the U.S. Navy’s embarrassment.) And it is procuring aircraft equipped with high-speed ascms and fielding antiship ballistic missiles that can strike U.S. carriers at extended ranges. Advanced antiship mines may constrain U.S. naval operations even further in coastal areas. The implications of these efforts are clear. East Asian waters are slowly but surely becoming another potential no-go zone for U.S. ships, particularly for aircraft carriers, which carry short-range strike aircraft that require them to operate well within the reach of the PLAs a2/ad systems if they want remain operationally relevant. The large air bases in the region that host the U.S. Air Force’s short-range strike aircraft and support aircraft are similarly under increased threat. All thus risk becoming wasting assets. If the United States does not adapt to these emerging challenges, the military balance in Asia will be fundamentally transformed in Beijing’s favor. This would increase the danger that China might be encouraged to resolve outstanding regional security issues through coercion, if not aggression.

Besides a 2-1 fleet displacement advantage over Russia and China combined the US Navy is qualitatively superior


Work 9 - United States Under Secretary of the Navy and VP of Strategic Studies @ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Robert, VP of Strategic Studies @ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Strategy for the Long Haul: the US Navy Charting A Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet”, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20090217.The_US_Navy_Charti/R.20090217.The_US_Navy_Charti.pdf



What this means is that the United States currently faces only two plausible naval competitors — Russia and China. The aggregate displacement of the combined fleets of these two countries amounts to 1,186,715 tons. With a war fleet of 3,121,014 tons, the US Navy enjoys a 2.63-to-one advantage in fleet displacementand fleet capabilities — over the combined Russian-Chinese fleet. However, these figures assume that every Russian and Chinese ship is well maintained — a questionable assumption. For example, a recent review of the Russian Navy reveals that thirteen Russian ships, amounting to some 113,922 tons of shipping, are inoperable due to poor maintenance.13 Despite some recent embarrassing maintenance inspections on US Navy ships,14 in any comparison with these two potential naval adversaries, it seems likely that the US Navy enjoys an even wider advantage in terms of both immediately available combat-ready warships and overall combat capabilities than a simple comparison of fleet displacements suggests. When factoring in the 2,445,555 tons of warships operated by US friends and allies, the US naval advantage over its potential naval competitors only widens.

US is not facing naval challengers—other aspects of heg outweigh


Goure 10

Daniel Goure. PhD in IR, BA in government, VP of the Lexington Institute, member of the Department of Defense Transition Team, former director of Strategic Competitiveness for the Secretary of State, senior analyst on national security and defense issues with the Center for Naval Analyses. “Can the Case be Made for Naval Power?” 2 July 2010. Lexington Institute. http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171

This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers. While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy this is many years off. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others, including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required to reopen the waterway? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses.

naval decline won’t collapse heg


Friedman 7

(George, Stratfor, April)



The issue for the United States is not whether it should abandon control of the seas -- that would be irrational in the extreme. Rather, the question is whether it has to exert itself at all in order to retain that control. Other powers either have abandoned attempts to challenge the United States, have fallen short of challenging the United States or have confined their efforts to building navies for extremely limited uses, or for uses aligned with the United States. No one has a shipbuilding program under way that could challenge the United States for several generations. One argument, then, is that the United States should cut its naval forces radically -- since they have, in effect, done their job. Mothballing a good portion of the fleet would free up resources for other military requirements without threatening U.S. ability to control the sea-lanes. Should other powers attempt to build fleets to challenge the United States, the lead time involved in naval construction is such that the United States would have plenty of opportunities for re-commissioning ships or building new generations of vessels to thwart the potential challenge. The counterargument normally given is that the U.S. Navy provides a critical service in what is called littoral warfare. In other words, while the Navy might not be needed immediately to control sea-lanes, it carries out critical functions in securing access to those lanes and projecting rapid power into countries where the United States might want to intervene. Thus, U.S. aircraft carriers can bring tactical airpower to bear relatively quickly in any intervention. Moreover, the Navy's amphibious capabilities -- particularly those of deploying and supplying the U.S. Marines -- make for a rapid deployment force that, when coupled with Naval airpower, can secure hostile areas of interest for the United States. That argument is persuasive, but it poses this problem: The Navy provides a powerful option for war initiation by the United States, but it cannot by itself sustain the war. In any sustained conflict, the Army must be brought in to occupy territory -- or, as in Iraq, the Marines must be diverted from the amphibious specialty to serve essentially as Army units. Naval air by itself is a powerful opening move, but greater infusions of airpower are needed for a longer conflict. Naval transport might well be critically important in the opening stages, but commercial transport sustains the operation. If one accepts this argument, the case for a Navy of the current size and shape is not proven. How many carrier battle groups are needed and, given the threat to the carriers, is an entire battle group needed to protect them? If we consider the Iraq war in isolation, for example, it is apparent that the Navy served a function in the defeat of Iraq's conventional forces. It is not clear, however, that the Navy has served an important role in the attempt to occupy and pacify Iraq. And, as we have seen in the case of Iran, a blockade is such a complex politico-military matter that the option not to blockade tends to emerge as the obvious choice.

Carriers not key to naval power—obsolete because of long range anti-ship missiles


Haddick 8/31

Robert, “Shipping Out” [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/31/shipping_out?page=full]



However, new and disruptive weapons and technologies will soon upset long-standing assumptions and cozy inter-service arrangements. In particular, the spread of long-range anti-ship missiles threatens the ability of aircraft carriers to perform their traditional missions. What's more, these disruptions are occurring at the moment when U.S. policymakers are under pressure to find cheaper ways of performing essential military missions. And the Air Force could develop the technology and the long-range platforms to carry out many of the carrier's missions at less cost. All these factors could force planners to rethink air power from first principles, leading to stormy times for aircraft carriers and inter-service harmony. The aircraft carrier's combat debut in the Pacific theater in 1941 instantly made the battleship obsolete. Aircraft carriers delivered more firepower, over longer ranges, with more speed and flexibility, over a wider variety of targets at sea and ashore. After World War II, the power of U.S. aircraft carriers forced adversaries to focus their naval spending on submarines rather than major surface ships, a trend still visible today. Without enemy surface ships to sink, the Navy's carrier pilots focused on projecting air power ashore, which they did against North Korea, Vietnam, Iraq (twice), and Afghanistan. Over the past half-century, the Navy's carriers also became well-suited to crisis response. Carrier strike groups could typically arrive at trouble spots within days and without the need for tedious negotiations with host countries over permissions and basing rights. The Air Force was fine with this arrangement because, although its tactical fighter wings could theoretically perform a similar role, the service's doctrine called for large, well-established, and well-supplied bases from which it could reliably generate a high sortie rate. Such ponderous guidance could not deal well with fleeting contingencies, many of which occurred in austere locations. But the proliferation of cheap but deadly long-range anti-ship missiles promises to upset these assumptions and arrangements. For example, China is putting anti-ship missiles on submarines, patrol boats, surface ships, aircraft, and trucks, giving it the ability to dominate its nearby seas. For the price of a single major warship, China can buy hundreds or even thousands of anti-ship missiles. And as it perfects its own reconnaissance drones, China will be able to thoroughly patrol neighborhood waters, identifying targets for these missiles. The Navy's aircraft carriers will come under pressure to retreat from this missile zone. However, there is a limit to how far they can retreat while still remaining in the game. As large as U.S. aircraft carriers are, they can only launch relatively small short-range fighter-bomber aircraft. For example, the F-35C, the carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter, has a combat radius of just 615 miles. Mid-air refueling can extend this range. But refueling is not possible in hostile air space, and even with it, small fighters are constrained by the physiological limits of their single pilot.

There is little risk of naval conflict – the sea acts as a barrier to aggression, it has clearly defined borders, and slow speed of navies reduce miscalculation and provide time for reduction of tensions.


Kaplan ’11 – Senior Fellow for the CNAS and member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board

Robert Kaplan, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and appointed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, which advises the Secretary on key issues. “The South China Sea Is The Future Of Conflict”. August 15, 2011. http://www.cnas.org/node/6830



Military engagements on land and at sea are vastly different, with major implications for the grand strategies needed to win -- or avoid -- them. Those on land enmesh civilian populations, in effect making human rights a signal element of war studies. Those at sea approach conflict as a clinical and technocratic affair, in effect reducing war to math, in marked contrast with the intellectual battles that helped define previous conflicts. World War II was a moral struggle against fascism, the ideology responsible for the murder of tens of millions of noncombatants. The Cold War was a moral struggle against communism, an equally oppressive ideology by which the vast territories captured by the Red Army were ruled. The immediate post-Cold War period became a moral struggle against genocide in the Balkans and Central Africa, two places where ground warfare and crimes against humanity could not be separated. More recently, a moral struggle against radical Islam has drawn the United States deep into the mountainous confines of Afghanistan, where the humane treatment of millions of civilians is critical to the war's success. In all these efforts, war and foreign policy have become subjects not only for soldiers and diplomats, but for humanists and intellectuals. Indeed, counterinsurgency represents a culmination of sorts of the union between uniformed officers and human rights experts. This is the upshot of ground war evolving into total war in the modern age. East Asia, or more precisely the Western Pacific, which is quickly becoming the world's new center of naval activity, presages a fundamentally different dynamic. It will likely produce relatively few moral dilemmas of the kind we have been used to in the 20th and early 21st centuries, with the remote possibility of land warfare on the Korean Peninsula as the striking exception. The Western Pacific will return military affairs to the narrow realm of defense experts. This is not merely because we are dealing with a naval realm, in which civilians are not present. It is also because of the nature of the states themselves in East Asia, which, like China, may be strongly authoritarian but in most cases are not tyrannical or deeply inhumane. The struggle for primacy in the Western Pacific will not necessarily involve combat; much of what takes place will happen quietly and over the horizon in blank sea space, at a glacial tempo befitting the slow, steady accommodation to superior economic and military power that states have made throughout history. War is far from inevitable even if competition is a given. And if China and the United States manage the coming handoff successfully, Asia, and the world, will be a more secure, prosperous place. What could be more moral than that? Remember: It is realism in the service of the national interest -- whose goal is the avoidance of war -- that has saved lives over the span of history far more than humanitarian interventionism. East Asia is a vast, yawning expanse stretching nearly from the Arctic to Antarctic -- from the Kuril Islands southward to New Zealand -- and characterized by a shattered array of isolated coastlines and far-flung archipelagos. Even accounting for how dramatically technology has compressed distance, the sea itself still acts as a barrier to aggression, at least to a degree that dry land does not. The sea, unlike land, creates clearly defined borders, giving it the potential to reduce conflict. Then there is speed to consider. Even the fastest warships travel comparatively slowly, 35 knots, say, reducing the chance of miscalculations and giving diplomats more hours -- days, even -- to reconsider decisions. Navies and air forces simply do not occupy territory the way that armies do. It is because of the seas around East Asia -- the center of global manufacturing as well as rising military purchases -- that the 21st century has a better chance than the 20th of avoiding great military conflagrations.


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