VENDE, Yves (Sun Yat Sen University, China)
“Mencius and Plato about Land Repartition: Humane Space is Well-divided Space”
One of the recurrent questions asked to Mencius by rulers who come to visit him, is how to gain the authority over all under Heaven (天下) and to unify the entire China under one sovereign power. Many rulers worry about the size of their territory which seems too small to achieve this goal. How to pretend to take command over all under Heaven with only a small kingdom? According to Mencius, to gain command over all under Heaven is not a question of the size of a territory but rather of the behavior of the ruler. If the ruler behaves like an authentic King and conducts a benevolent government - which includes giving the appropriate amount of space to each one in accordance with his rank - then all under Heaven will be willing to follow his leadership. To make a repartition of the available land, and to settle rules for the use of it, is also to give each one an opportunity to fulfill his needs and to make the world humane (otherwise wild beasts might come and enter into competition with men).
In Plato's Laws, the protagonists discuss a similar question, which is how to deal with issues relating to good governance. The goal was not to unify all of Greece but to create a colony in Crete, so as to make it an exemplary city. For that purpose, the city must not be too close to the sea (because ports bring business and business attracts all kinds of morally depraved people). The dialogue also addresses the issue of territorial repartition which should be done according to the size of the population. This division of the land is in fact closely tied up with the concern of avoiding conflicts among citizens. Therefore, an important aspect of this organization of space is agriculture, which should be the base of the economic life of the city. According to the Laws, a good King should act like a cloth-maker or a pastor.
Reading the Mencius and the Laws, we can observe that in both ancient texts, to divide land properly and to be strict on boundary issues is part of “good” government, whether the final objective is to unify China or to establish an exemplary city. For both Mencius and Plato: space is humane when it is politically organized, which first requires a well-divided space.
VOJTÍŠKOVÁ, Kristýna (Charles University, Czeh Republic)
“Watsuji Tetsurô’s Fûdo in the Context of Globalized World”
Watsuji Tetsurô's (和辻哲郎, 1889-1960) theory of fûdo (風土) as a “cultural climate” conceptualizes a “betweenness” (間柄) of humanity and milieu as inseparable and mutually determining. Watsuji tends to view fûdo as stable within a particular culture. However, globalization as a homogenizing element undermines human attachment to physical space, as well as cultural and national differences, which seems to be a prerequisite of Watsuji's concept of fûdo. Thus it may seem that it tells us little about the ethics of inter-relationality between human being and his milieu in the world of globalization and multiculturality. In my paper, I will argue that in the notion of “betweenness” as a fundamental structure of human being within fûdo, there is an ethical insight that enables Watsuji's view to shift from a theory of climatic (or national) characters, as it is often perceived to be, to an approach to cohabitation within a shared milieu that blurs the frontiers of cultures and nations.
WANG, Robin R. (Loyola Marymount University)
“Equality and Hieracrchy in A Swirling Space”
Based on a careful reading of some pre-qin Chinese texts this paper will focus on the space where equality and hieracrchy can be made compatible. It shows that equality and hieracrchy cannot be fixed in a frozen polarity and argue for a constructive and complicate relationship between equality and hieracrchy.
WEBER, Ralph (University of Basel, Switzerland)
“The Place of Europe in Philosophical Eurocentrism”
This paper revisits the global debates about Eurocentrism since the 1980s and offers a critical discussion of the variety of Eurocentrism charges. I distinguish between philosophical and political charges and argue that political Eurocentrism is something contemporary philosophy would do well to guard against. Ironically, more often than not lurking behind attempts at charging others with philosophical Eurocentrism is nothing more than a political anti-Eurocentrism. What needs to be examined, therefore, is what a philosophical Eurocentrism would amount to, how it could be philosophically defended if it can be so defended at all, and how best to attack it philosophically. Europe, whether understood as a concept or a place, is best understood relationally, which implies other concepts or other places.
In philosophical discussion and its underlying institutional support systems across the globe, Europe still has an impressing presence, while the relational quality it is given covers the entire range from appreciation to abhorrence. A better understanding of what philosophical Eurocentrism might and might not be and how it is tainted with political Eurocentrism is required precisely if one wants Europe to banished from philosophy and to be simply a place again. Europe should acquire a presence among other presences, or perhaps with regard to philosophy better a non-presence among non-presences. The philosophical importance of place is a double-edged sword, and the lessons that can be drawn from the debates about Eurocentrism should make us aware of the dangers involved in hypostatizing it.
WELTER, Albert (University of Arizona)
“Public Places and Privileged Spaces: Perspectives on the Public Sphere and the Sphere of Privilege in China and the West”
Public places (i.e., Habermas’ “public sphere”) have privileged status in modern democracies as arenas for the free exchange of ideas and commodities. Likewise, private interests enjoy a privileged status beyond state control, authorized as free expressions of the autonomous individual. In this paper, I compare the notions of public place and private space against common assumptions in the Chinese tradition, where public and private realms were never thought of as distinct, but as part of a continuum of harmonious, if sometimes contested terrain. In place of a public sphere where the principles of an engaged democracy are manifest, Confucian models in China provided for a “sphere of privilege” that allows access to the mechanisms of power and arenas of cultural privilege through control mandated by central authority. This authority designated and privileged an inside sphere, a “sphere of privilege,” where sanctioned activities deemed to foster government aims operated as legitimate organs of government policy.
WEN Haiming (Renmin University of China)
“Roger Ames’s Reconstruction of Chinese Metaphysical Idea of Place”
This article aims to clarify the metaphysical dimension of Roger Ames’s reinterpretation of Chinese philosophical idea of place. I argue that his metaphysical reinterpretation of Chinese philosophical idea of place can assist research on Chinese philosophy in transcending the background of Greek-German philosophies in particular, and Western philosophical narratives in general. What he has done is to reconstruct a new model of philosophical interpretation on the idea of place for Chinese metaphysics, one that connects ancient Confucian and Daoist metaphysics with the processual nature of reality in American Pragmatism. He has translated many ancient Confucian and Daoist classics into English, and by doing so, provided a new perspective of interpretation of the idea of place with which to reconstruct Chinese metaphysics, introducing a new vocabulary with distinctive metaphysical implications. Furthermore, through his reconstruction of Chinese metaphysics, his interpretation has also shed light on the continuing dialogue between Chinese and American philosophy.
WILLIAMS, John R. (National University of Singapore, Singapore)
"Our Journey Home is our Home: Zhuangzi and the Impossibility of a Coherent Philosophy of Place"
If the following claim from Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall's "four presuppositions of Daoist cosmology," (P1) "we too are inescapably people of a time and place," is taken to mean (at least by implication) our claims are all historically conditioned, then we must be prepared to accept the consequences of P1: namely, (P2) if P1 is true, then P1 is likewise, being itself a claim, historically conditioned; (P3) P2 must also be historically conditioned, given P1; (P4) P3 must also be historically conditioned, given P1; (P5) P4 must also be historically conditioned, given P1; and so on, ad infinitum. Subsequently, one can either (1) argue that at least claim P1 is exempt from the relativism it advocates; (2) argue that P1 results in the paradox of relativity, and is thereby refuted; or (3), argue that the implications of P1 corroborate rather than refute P1. Given one takes this regression to corroborate rather than refute the initial proposition, one cannot establish givens, such as Platonic ideas, or determiners, such as Kantian categories, as a point of departure for philosophical inquiry: that is, the regression precludes a perspective sub specie aeternitatis from which to establish such a point of departure in a non-question-begging-manner. I call this implication of P1 (qua "3") "homelessness."
Ames has recently aligned himself with Gadamerian hermeneutic phenomenology to confront this homelessness. In this paper, I hope to proffer the Zhuangzian notion of "the radiance of drift and doubt" (滑 疑 之 耀guyizhiyao) and related notions to complement Gadamerian hermeneutic phenomenology in this connection. As a result, I hope to give the reader a critical glimpse into a philosophy without foundations.
WONG, David (Duke University) and Marion HOURDEQUIN (Colorado College)
“Hiding the World in the World: A Case for Cosmopolitanism Based on the Zhuangzi”
Human relations to place cannot be easily or simply characterized. As a species, we have long been both settled and mobile, with some rooted in place and others more migratory. Mobility is not a new feature of human life; however, economic globalization and technologies that facilitate rapid movement from place to place have increased the pressures and opportunities to move. Some argue that greater mobility, in combination with the homogenization of places through the spread of chain stores and multinational corporations, has created a problematic placelessness for many persons and societies. This paper draws on classical Confucianism and the early Daoist thought of Zhuangzi to explore questions of place and mobility in the contemporary world.
From one point of view, contemporary mobility can be seen as liberating. Particularly among global elites, people have greater freedom than ever to cross cultural boundaries, to make homes in new places, and to pursue opportunities – economic, intellectual, artistic, or otherwise – that would otherwise be unavailable to them. Experiences of mobility for the less advantaged are often fraught with danger and insecurity, but often hold out the promise of a different or better life. Even if moving were easy and safe for all persons, however, we might still ask whether it would be an unmitigated good. In the Analects, Confucius criticizes those who withdraw from society to free themselves from its various problems and shackles. Although the text does not put it this way, one might read Confucius as criticizing moral placelessness, a form of human life where one is cut off from the social connections and cultural rootedness that make moral personhood possible (see, e.g., Analects 18.6). The Analects thus offers an important cautionary note regarding mobility and detachment from one’s roots.
Zhuangzi, however, might be more optimistic about the possibilities for a cosmopolitan moral self, and in the remainder of the paper we explore the theme of roaming in the Zhuangzi, and what lessons the text might offer for contemporary life. Zhuangzi suggests that excessive attachment – to place, to one’s bodily form, and even to other persons – is problematic, and from this perspective, one might critique certain parochial forms of rootedness, given the interdependence and moral entanglements of the contemporary world. For example, Zhuangzi tells a story about trying to hide what you value by secreting in a hiding place, only to have it exposed and your treasure stolen – but, the text says, if you hide the world in the world, you cannot lose it. This offers grounds for a positive conception of contemporary mobility, one that draws on a Zhuangist acknowledgement of interconnection and interdependencies to support an attitude of identification with the whole and not just one’s own corner of the world. At the same time, Zhuangzi does not shun attachment altogether, as attachments – to the human form, to one another, and to the places we inhabit – are important to our particular form of life, transient though it may be.
WONG, Peter Yih Jiun (University of Melbourne, Australia)
“On Realising One's Fate and Finding Contentment in One's Environs”
In the “Appended Statements” (Xici 繫 辭) collected in the Book of Changes, the notion of knowing and realising one's fate (zhiming 知命) is paired with finding contentment within one's environs (antu 安土). It involves a sense of place that is always dynamic—there is no one place that is the ideal place: no Heaven, no paradise, no pure land. Instead, the person is required to sensitively and creatively adapt to the places and situations in which one finds oneself—both in finding an appropriate posture and in enhancement of the place. This paper seeks to articulate the foregoing understanding through a reading of the Confucian commentaries contained in the Book of Changes, which represent an interpretation of the core passages of the Book of Changes by means of categories that are ritual in origin—among which, the notion of place (wei 位) plays a key role. We then pose the question: Is successful and creative adaptation to a particular place a completely satisfying goal in its own right? Are there some situations that are preferred by the Confucians over others?
XU Di (University of Hawai’i)
“The Dunhuang Grottos and Education”
Dunhuang is a famous and fascinating World Heritage site on the Silk Road in the desolated Gobi Dessert northwest of China (Fan & Wu, 2004; Treasures of Dunhuang Grotto, 2002). Since 366 AD, a traveling Buddhist monk built a modest and simply meditation grotto on the east side of Mt. Mingsha, over a thousand grottos, fancy or basic, have followed the suite over a thousand years of civilization. They first flourished over 13 dynasties (366 – 1368 AD), and then survived approximately another thousand years through wars and turmoil in the nation. Today Dunhuang Grottos is well-known and well studied in terms of its contributions to Buddhist religion, history, archeology, art, geography, sociology, and multiple fields.
However, interestingly there is a missing link in Dunhuang study regarding Dunhuang and philosophy in general and educational philosophy in particular. This panel will explore and examine the relation between Dunhuang and educational philosophy as it is manifested through Northern Liang (421–439 AD) to Yuan Dynasty (1227 –1368AD). The primary questions are: What is the connection between Dunhuang and Chinese educational philosophy or if there is any? How has the place influenced the Chinese educational philosophy in theory and practice? Where is the place of Dunhuang in education then in China’s ancient past and now for global education for both China and the rest of the world?
The discussion will focus on the direct connection between Dunhuang Grottos and education. The paper will examine the formation of Chinese educational philosophy through cultural, social, historical, and geographical, and political diversity. It will highlight the synergy and transformation of educational philosophy and practices in Dunhuang and China over the course of history. Most importantly, the paper will draw from the insights of Dunhuang and its education for education today.
Together the panelists hope to start a new field in Dunhuang study that has been seriously neglected and overlooked. Dunhuang is not only a place in the past or merely an ancient museum of the lost civilizations. It actually offers insightful and rich educational philosophy that has been developed, synergized, and transformed over thousands of years. It still holds the philosophical essence for education, relevant for us today.
XUE, Fuxing (Nankai University, China)
“Callicott’s Interpretation of Daoism”
J. Baird Callicott considers Chinese Daoism significant for reflecting upon the limitations of traditional Western thinking, particularly the mechanical worldview. Drawing from leading scholarship in Daoist philosophy, Callicott addresses core concepts such as chi, Dao, de, yin and yang, and the wuwei/youwei distinction. He finds a deep and intrinsic connection between Daoism and contemporary environmental philosophy, and states that Daoism provides a classical paradigm that is applicable to today’s society. The cyclical nature of the Way closely parallels contemporary ecology, which describes cyclical and reciprocal processes in nature. The dynamic worldview embodied by “Dao” is crucial for today’s world and offers a rationale for “appropriate technology.” However, Callicott’s discussion of Daoism has some critical limitations: he neglects the importance of the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi and he fails to address the problematic nature of the concept of wuwei.
YANG, Liuxin (Peking University, China)
“A Home under tian 天 for the People of ren 仁: On the Cultural Symbolism of the “Xiangdang Chapter 乡党篇 of the Analects of Kongzi”
The “Xiangdang” chapter of the Analects of Kongzi is an extremely valuable document in describing the details of daily life of Kongzi in the classics of ru 儒 school. The parent’s country is exactly the home where exemplary persons junzi 君子 can “dwell poetically ”, and the folk society composed by parents and children, brothers and sisters, and friends is just the community where exemplary persons can practice ren 仁 and li 礼. As a model, Xiangdang reflects Kongzi’s cultivation and teaching, with extremely rich and profound cultural symbolic meaning. We can find through the window of Xiangdang, traditions and customs of the Chinese moral civilization that Kongzi admired and inherited. Xiangdang symbolizes a moral civilization and a home of people under tian 天 , and has eternal significance.
YAO, Fuchuan (Chinese Culture University, Taiwan)
“The Place of Justice in Buddhism”
In the West, justice has been a conventional and vague concept. It means different things for different people in different contexts. Although it may be significant to investigate why the concept of justice is vague, we are not interested in it. Instead, we are interested in an ignored question of what justice means for Buddhism in the East.
In other words, we are interested in what the place of justice is in Buddhism. This issue has been neglected and might not be legitimate for Buddhism. For “justice” is surely a western vocabulary and the Buddha had never said anything about it.
However, given the significance of justice and the emphasis on pluralistic views in today’s world and without clarifying this neglected question, it would be difficult for Buddhists to offer any plausible arguments in terms of Buddhist justice.
So this paper is to do three things. First, I review this ignored question with very few literature in the East and West. Second, I argue that karma is the main concept of justice in Buddhism and explain how the law of karma can construe three western concepts of justice. Third, I raise and defend three cardinal concerns with the law of karma.
YAO, Zhihua (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
“Does Space Exist? Buddhist Disputes on Ākāśa”
In the Buddhist Abhidharma system, space (ākāśa) is classified as one of the unconditioned factors and enjoys a higher status than time (kāla), which marks the conditioned existence. All the conditioned existents, being bound in temporality, are inevitably impermanent. Owing to its unconditioned nature, space, however, is as permanent as nirvāṇa—the final goal of Buddhist practice. The privileged status of space is challenged by a group of Buddhists, who see it as violating the Buddhist teaching of impermanence. They try to reduce space to a conceptual construction and hence deny its existence. The current paper will examine the disputes on the reality of space between the two parties and try to articulate the Buddhist theories of space, a topic neglected by most contemporary Buddhist scholars.
YE, Lin (Dunhuang Research Academy, China)
“School Education in Dunhuang”
The discussion will examine the school education in Dunhuang. Dunhuang grottos have once been the public place that offered education to the ordinary people, as well as the women’s club and study center for scholars. The chair monks delivered Buddhism lectures and lay folks often gathered in the grottoes for special meetings. The murals and paintings documented the Buddhist stories and teachings which guided people’s behaviors based on moral principles. This discussion will focus on the educational function of Dunhuang grottoes and the implication of Dunhuang education to the contemporary education in China and beyond.
YUAN, Jinmei (Creighton University)
“On Zheng 正, Associative Properness and Logical Validity: A Case Study of Shared Practices of Matteo Ricci, S. J, and Chinese Mathematicians in the 17th Century
Thinking through the discourse between Jesuits and Chinese scholars in 17th century China, one can discover some significant progresses in building a mutual understanding between the West and the East at a level of logical practices. One of successful example is the co-work of translating Euclid’s Elements Books 1-VI, Jihe yuanben 几何原本, done by Matteo Ricci, S. J. (1552-1610) and Chinese mathematician, Xu Guangqi徐光启(1562-1633) in 1607. (The rest of nine books (Books 7-15) of Elements was translated by the Protestant missionary Alexander Wylie and Chinese mathematician Li Shannan 李善兰 (1811-1882) in 1857). Their efforts and contributions provide a good case for us to study how a mutual understanding between two very different language games could be possible.
The contemporary philosopher Richard Rorty suggests that it would be extremely hard to introduce a notion, even one as simple as the concept of “pain,” to another group of people who lack it in their language game. The concepts in a language are related, and one cannot grasp one concept without understanding a whole set of other concepts in the language game.
Although it is a fact that the discourse between Chinese and Westerners often encounters problems and misunderstandings, Matteo Ricci’s and Xu Guangqi’s effort in bridging the East and the West could be a meaningful case study in clarifying how accurate one can understand the rules in another language game, and further to understand another unfamiliar culture. To study thinking patterns, which normally backup human thought and reasoning, brings in an inquiring of the differences between Chinese and western ways of thinking at the logical level. In this paper, I shall explore how Matteo Ricci, as a traditional Aristotelian thinker, tried hard to adopt Confucian terms and ways of teaching. In doing so, Ricci turns to be one of earliest western thinkers who can think within and outside the box.
First of all, I shall discuss the gap caused by different thinking rules between Chinese and Western logics. I argue that while Aristotelian thinkers separate the logical world from the real one, Chinese thinkers show no such attempt. The former, based on a presumption that there is an order in the universe, studies logical patterns for reaching logical certainty in deductive logic and seeks for the high probability in inductive logic. On the contrast, the latter, based on a presumption that everything is changing, seeks for associative properness, zheng正, in doing reasoning, which can be examined from different perspectives. Secondly, I shall exam how an analogical argument, as an important associative logical tool, functions in Chinese ways of reasoning. Analogical arguments are also recognized and carefully used in Aristotelian induction, in which it is concluded that two entities are alike in one or more respects. After Ricci arrived in China, he soon learned how to use analogical arguments to discuss with Neo-Confucian scholars, including Xu Guangqi. Starting from there, he introduced Aristotelian understanding of Truth and Validity to Chinese mathematicians. Thirdly, I shall further focus on a particular rule, ostensive definitions, or pointing out, which is a rule used by both Ricci and Chinese mathematicians in learning from one and another. According to Aristotelian logic, an ostensive definition is a demonstrative definition in which the objects denoted by the term being defined are referred to by means of pointing, or with some other gesture. For Chinese mathematicians, using pointing out to demonstrate associations, one can reach zheng 正, associative properness. Pointing out turns to be a rule which can open possible paths to understand logical validity. Xu Guangqi’s strong curiosity in accurate proofs echoes Ricci’s effort. With some compromises, Aristotelian deductive logic is finally introduced to Chinese via Elements, a Geometry text.
The conclusion of this paper is that Chinese logic and Aristotelian logic are very different. The effort of seeking for zheng, associative properness has no comparison to seeking for logical validity. However, the attempts to understand the unfamiliar and the novelty are commonalities of human beings. To understand different ways of thinking, efforts must be made from both sides. The discourse between Jesuits and Chinese mathematicians in 17th century is an excellent example of having an open mind for a sense of wonderings. This is the hope for human knowledge and mutual understanding.
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