Australian Quarantine Review Secretariat Australian Quarantine a shared responsibility


OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES 6.1 PRINCIPLES



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OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES




6.1 PRINCIPLES

Offshore activities constitute the first element of the continuum of quarantine — pre-border, border, post-border — advocated by the Review Committee (see Section 2.3.2). The term 'border' is used in preference to 'barrier' in recognition of the fact that, given natural migrations and modern methods of transport, in fact no country has a 'barrier' around it, only a border. The Review Committee believes that the pre-border element of the continuum of quarantine is an efficient and effective means of contributing to maintaining Australia's animal and plant health status. The Review Committee believes strongly that there should be a greater focus on offshore activities through increased attention and resources to help keep problems offshore in the first instance. Such a focus also provides a means of identifying potential high risks so that appropriate preparedness and response strategies can be developed.


Some additional resources will need to be made available to increase the level of offshore activities as recommended in this chapter. Details of the likely additional amounts and possible sources of funds are provided in Chapter 11 on Resources and Legislation.

6.1.1 Managing Quarantine Risks Offshore

The Review Committee is of the firm view that Australia has much to gain from managing quarantine risks — from pests and diseases of concern — offshore. This approach should include, where possible, effectively pushing back the 'border' and decreasing the 'pool' of threat in neighbouring countries and countries that have significant contact with Australia through trade and tourism.


The principles of developing the offshore element of the continuum of quarantine are to:
· identify pest and disease threats;
· increase Australia's knowledge of pests and diseases that might enter;
· implement appropriate preventive and control measures;
· develop appropriate preparedness and response strategies;
· undertake research on pests and diseases of concern, with mutual benefit to Australia and countries where they are endemic; and
· increase offshore awareness of Australia's quarantine requirements.

6.1.2 Offshore Monitoring and Surveillance

Australia's offshore monitoring and surveillance of pests and diseases should have a strong regional focus reflecting most likely geographical sources of incursions of exotic pests and diseases. Such a focus would include Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Indonesia (as currently targeted in the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy, NAQS), the Philippines (especially its southern region, adjacent to Indonesia), and New Zealand.


Australia's offshore monitoring and surveillance of pests and diseases should also focus on its major trading partners — that is, on countries that have significant contact with Australia through trade and tourism. This is already practised to some extent (e.g. monitoring of vessels that have been in Russian Far Eastern ports for the presence of Asian gypsy moth, an important exotic pest of forest trees).
There is also a need for specific monitoring and surveillance of pests and diseases that affect Australian native animals and plants that are now raised or grown in other countries. Such monitoring and surveillance enables an assessment of the susceptibility of Australian species to pests and diseases that are endemic in other countries but exotic to Australia. This information is useful for improving Australia's preparedness against incursions of exotic pests and diseases. Species for which this strategy should be developed include animals such as monotremes and marsupials, and plants such as eucalypts, acacias and macadamias. For example, useful information on the susceptibility of a range of Australian native flowers to exotic pests and diseases could be obtained from data on the effects that pests and diseases have on them in countries such as Israel where they are now grown commercially.
Similarly, plantations of Australian native trees have been established overseas on a vast scale during the past three decades. For example, by the turn of the century there will be more than one million hectares of Australian native acacias and eucalypt plantations in Indonesia and more than four million hectares of eucalypts in South America and South Africa. These plantations include areas where related species occur naturally, creating the opportunity for pathogens from these species to transfer to eucalypt hosts (as has already happened for guava rust). The establishment of these plantations and the highly competitive nature of industrial forestry, which encourages movement of germplasm between countries, have increased the risk of incursion of exotic pathogens of eucalypts.

6.1.3 Overseas Information

Official sources of information on pests and diseases include the Office International des Epizooties (for animals) and the International Plant Protection Convention (for plants). Australia is a member of these organisations and similar bodies exist at a regional level (e.g. the Animal Health and Production Commission for Asia and the Pacific).


Another official source of information is Australia's own record of pests and diseases intercepted with passengers, animals, plants or other goods at the border. An interceptions database can provide valuable information on the extent of the risk of entry of exotic pests and pathogens to Australia.
However, there are also a number of potentially useful unofficial sources of such information, including:
· industry contacts (e.g. importer, exporter and producer networks);

· agency contacts (e.g. major marketing authorities such as the Australian Wheat Board); and


· Australian quarantine (and other official) staff who are seconded to or stationed in overseas positions.
All of these sources of information are available to help identify the most immediate and serious potential pest and disease threats facing Australia. Quarantine Australia should actively coordinate all available information to identify these pest and disease threats before they are introduced into Australia. A particular focus of this information collection should be on the most immediate and serious threats in neighbouring countries and, where appropriate, in countries from which significant movements of people, animals, plants and goods originate — that is, Australia's major partners in trade (including the tourist trade).
Recommendation 27: The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia coordinate the identification of quarantine threats in neighbouring countries and in countries that have significant contact with Australia through trade and tourism.


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