Australian Quarantine Review Secretariat Australian Quarantine a shared responsibility
Download 1.49 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Vessels
- AIRCRAFT DISINSECTION
8.6 HEALTH CLEARANCE (PRATIQUE)All aircraft arriving from overseas are required to land at approved first ports of call unless special permission to land elsewhere is obtained before arrival. Approved landing places are located in every State in Australia. The aircraft crew must send (or have sent ahead) to the quarantine staff at the aircraft’s intended first port of arrival, a message attesting to the health status of those on board to advise whether there are live animals on board and that the aircraft has been disinsected. The message seeks quarantine clearance to land and disembark passengers (known internationally as pratique). The Review Committee believes that the routine request to be granted pratique should be re-examined. In most instances, the airline’s base staff or an agent send the message to quarantine staff on the captain’s behalf. There is anecdotal evidence indicating that the current compulsory system of prior notification for pratique is not efficient because of instances of quarantine concern not being reported before arrival due largely to the routine nature of the requirement. The Review Committee considers that the routine reporting of freedom from quarantine concern has the inherent danger of losing its impact. Certainly the need to advise of illness or the presence of an animal onboard is essential for basic quarantine protection and in that regard a system of exception reporting is seen as a more positive way of ensuring quarantine security. In other words, the advance message need only be sent where there is something of quarantine interest to report. Penalties should be applied in the event of failure to report illness, animals or other non-compliance with quarantine requirements. VesselsAll vessels arriving at Australian first ports of call must obtain pratique. Pratique is usually granted by a quarantine officer after the perusal of answers to a questionnaire radioed in by each ship. The questionnaire covers the health of the crew, details of the vessel, presence of any animals on board, previous presence in any port subject to Asian gypsy moth infestation during certain risk periods, and details of the ballast water carried by the vessel. The problem identified for aircraft pratique also applies to pratique for vessels, and the routine pratique message is a matter of concern to the Review Committee. The importance of advising illness, the ballast status, Asian gypsy moth certification, or the presence of an animal on board is not in dispute. The routine nature of the message is the issue, and reporting by exception would ensure a stronger focus on the issue by captains of vessels. This issue has been discussed with the Department of Health and Family Services, which concurs with the Review Committee’s position on pratique for both aircraft and vessels. This recommended system of reporting by exception should be reviewed after 12 months of operation to assess its effectiveness. Recommendation 66: The Review Committee recommends that pratique for aircraft and vessels move to a system of reporting by exception. Australia has been disinsecting aircraft arriving from overseas since the end of the Second World War. Although the procedures have varied significantly in the intervening 50 years, the basic requirement has not altered. A number of reviews of the need for and means of disinsecting aircraft have been undertaken in that time. In reviewing this procedure, the Review Committee questions the need for continuation of this practice. All aircraft from all countries except New Zealand are required to be disinsected, irrespective of the disease or vector status of the country or countries that the aircraft either originate in or transit. Aircraft from New Zealand are required to have only their cargo holds disinsected. The disinsection procedure required by Australian quarantine authorities accords with the standards and recommended practices of Annex 9 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which is administered by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Review Committee notes that disinsection of aircraft is not compulsory under this Convention and the vast majority of countries do not practise aircraft disinsection. Only about 30 of the 190 member countries of the World Health Organization (WHO) require any form of disinsection at all. The Lindsay Review expressed concern that the scientific basis for the need for disinsection had not been established or that disinsection was effective in significantly reducing the risk of entry of pests and diseases. The report further commented that ‘disinsection is an excellent example of quarantine being applied in response to a general biological principle, with little or no attempt to assess the risk, consider wider effects or evaluate its cost-effectiveness’ (DPIE 1988, p. 153). In response, AQIS commissioned a review of disinsection in 1990. In May 1994, an interdepartmental working group comprising nominees from AQIS, the Bureau of Resource Sciences, the Department of Health and Family Services, and the Department of Transport was convened to examine aircraft disinsection. The working party recommended, inter alia, that AQIS and the Bureau undertake a full scientific assessment of the risks of entry of insects in aircraft cabins and holds within two years. Subsequently, trials were undertaken on the effectiveness of varying spraying practices on insects in aircraft. Despite this work, it appears that the situation identified by the Lindsay Review in 1988 still persists. A recent review by the Bureau of Resource Sciences on incursions of exotic insects presents no evidence that exotic insect pests have entered Australia through aircraft (Clarke in prep.). Indeed the report, while suggesting that compulsory disinsection of aircraft may reduce the risk of introducing hitchhiking insects, comments that ‘it is likely that most hitchhiking species gain entry via shipping containers and vessels’ (Clarke in prep.). Flights within Australia are not compulsorily disinsected. The Review Committee notes that despite the presence of the Aedes aegypti in and around Cairns airport, there is no evidence that this vector (of yellow and dengue fevers) has been transported from Cairns to Darwin, despite daily flights between the two ports. Since the introduction of procedures whereby the airline staff carry out the process and at airline expense, disinsection is neither labour intensive nor costly to quarantine. However, there are still concerns as to the extent to which each and every international flight is disinsected. Despite the production of empty cans of spray, quarantine staff rely on assurances from the cabin crew that the procedure has been carried out according to specifications. Anecdotal evidence from passengers who have been asked to observe the procedure would suggest that this is not always the case. In addition, many international travellers, particularly those from the United States and Asian countries, regard disinsection as an unacceptable imposition. In fact, it appears that travellers from most areas of the world have a very poor perception of disinsection. Several submissions to the Review also queried the effectiveness of disinsection. In one submission, a senior airline pilot with substantial experience operating aircraft into Australia from the Asian region, observed that with the latest aircraft designs there are many areas that cannot be reached by a disinsection spray no matter how carefully applied. In essence, it was contended that the procedure is ineffectual, as it does not achieve full coverage. With regard to the introduction of human pests or diseases via aircraft, a human disease carrier is more likely to pose a greater threat to quarantine than an insect vector. For example, large numbers of people carrying organisms of malaria and a range of viruses in their blood enter Australia every month. The risk of incursions from such infected travellers arriving by air is likely to be far higher than any risk of arrival of infected insect vectors on aircraft. The Review Committee has consulted widely on this issue, including contact with respected scientists in medical entomology and with the Chief Medical Advisor and Director of Human Quarantine. The prevailing view is that although disinsection may well kill insects, there is no sound scientific evidence to confirm that the process significantly reduces the risk of introduction of exotic pests and diseases. Recommendation 67: The Review Committee recommends that aircraft disinsection be discontinued. Directory: SiteCollectionDocuments SiteCollectionDocuments -> Emerging Transport Technologies SiteCollectionDocuments -> Lesson Plan What are smart goals? SiteCollectionDocuments -> Melbourne Library Service Policy Public Access Internet and Computer Use Policy SiteCollectionDocuments -> Navy Drug Screening Laboratory Jacksonville SiteCollectionDocuments -> Building Management Systems (bms) Seminar 2 Advanced Management and Improvement Opportunities SiteCollectionDocuments -> Commitments and Pledges for Training and Capacity Building 2014-15 SiteCollectionDocuments -> Galileo® and Apollo® Systems – Airline Participants SiteCollectionDocuments -> Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy 25 years of protecting Australia SiteCollectionDocuments -> Final pest risk analysis report for Drosophila suzukii April 2013 SiteCollectionDocuments -> Permitted Seeds List – 16 June 2016 Download 1.49 Mb. Share with your friends:
|