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| §3 summarizes Jaffray’s model and its arguments. Important: §3.4.3 characterizes maxmin if the set of priors is objectively given.
This paper shows that the -Hurwicz criterion a priori plus same criterion a posterior violate dynamic consistency. It, therefore, shows in fact that the criterion violates the meta-version of dynamic consistency of Epstein & Le Breton. %} Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1994) “Dynamic Decision Making with Belief Functions.” In Ronald R. Yager, Mario Fedrizzi, & Janus Kacprzyk (eds.) Advances in the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence, 331–352, Wiley, New York. Link to paper
Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1998) “Implementing Resolute Choice under Uncertainty.” In Chris Mellish (ed.) Proceedings of the Fourteenth Conference Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-98), 282–288, Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA. {% %} Jaffray, Jean-Yves (2006) “Bayesian Networks.” In Denis Bouyssou, Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, & MarcPilot (eds.) Decision-Making Process: Concepts and Methods, Ch. 13, 505–539, Wiley, New York. {% %} Jaffray, Jean-Yves & Meglena Jeleva (2003) “How to Deal with Partially Analyzed Acts?,” In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications (ISIPTA'03), 290-304. {% %} Jaffray, Jean-Yves & Meglena Jeleva (2011) “How to Deal with Partially Analyzed Acts?,” Theory and Decision 71, 129–149. {% %} Jaffray, Jean-Yves & Edi Karni (1999) “Elicitation of Subjective Probabilities when the Initial Endowment is Unobservable,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 18, 5–20. {% P. 165 2nd para describes matching probabilities. 3rd para points out that they can violate additivity. paternalism/Humean-view-of-preference: 4th para puts it right: “As in medicine, prescriptions should rest on diagnoses and diagnoses rely on the study of pathologies. Judgment psychology had identified several sources of `biases,’ ” %} Jaffray, Jean-Yves & Fabrice Philippe (1997) “On the Existence of Subjective Upper and Lower Probabilities,” Mathematics of Operations Research 22, 165–185. {% %} Jaffray, Jean-Yves & Jean-Charles Pomerol (1989) “A Direct Proof of the Kuhn-Tucker Necessary Optimality Theorem for Convex and Affine Inequalities,” SIAM Review 31, 671–674. {% %} Jaffray, Jean-Yves & Tanios Said (1994) “Optimal Hypothesis Testing with a Vague Prior.” In Sixto Rios (ed.) Decision Theory and Decision Analysis: Trends and Challenges, 261–277, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. {% criticism of monotonicity in Anscombe-Aumann (1963) for ambiguity: when working on this paper, Jaffray, who considered EU normative for risk but not for ambiguity, explained to me that one should condition only on unambiguous events, and not on ambiguous ones. So, the AA model as used in the ambiguity literature today (I write this in 2016) does it the wrong way around. Jaffray’s papers and also this one do it the right way. %} Jaffray, Jean-Yves & Peter P. Wakker (1993) “Decision Making with Belief Functions: Compatibility and Incompatibility with the Sure-Thing Principle,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7, 255–271. Link to paper
Jahnke, Herman, Anne Chwolka, & Dirk Simons (2005) “Coordinating Service-Sensitive Demand and Capacity by Adaptive Decision Making: An Application of Case-Based Decision Theory,” Decision Sciences 36, 1–32. {% measure of similarity %} Jain, Ramesh, Rangachar Kasturi, & Brian G. Shunk (1995) “Machine Vision.” McGraw-Hill, New York. {% information aversion: %} Jakobsen, Alexander (2017) “Dynamic (In)Consistency and the Value of Information,” working paper. {% “It is only when they go wrong that machines remind you how powerful they are.” %} James, Clive (1976, November 14) {% P. 190: “Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.” %} James, William (1884) “What is an Emotion?,” Mind 9, 188–205. {% measure of similarity; Ideomotor theory: the notion that conscious goals and images are inherently impulsive, and tend to be carried out by default, unless they are inhibited by other conscious thoughts or intentions. free-will/determinism: seems to have written: “Now how do we ever get up under such circumstances? … We suddenly find that we have got up. A fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs; we forget both the warmth and the cold;… the (spontaneous) idea flashes across us, "Hollo, I must lie here no longer" --- an idea which at that lucky instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing suggestions, and consequently produces immediately its appropriate motor effects. ... This case seems to me to contain … the data for an entire psychology of volition” %} James, William (1890) “Principles of Psychology.” Holt, New york. {% Table 1 in a nice didactical way indicates relations between discount factor, discount rate, present value, and other things. They also propose a sort of continuous extension of quasi-hyperbolic. Time is taken continuously. Then first during some period, “extended present” (my term) there is constant discounting (say the period during which present self controls), but after it suddenly drops by a factor, but other than that keeps the same exponential. There are some drawbacks to this model, as I read in a paper by Pan, Webb, & Zank. For instance, to accommodate (day 0: 1 apple) (day 1: 2 apples) and (day 365: 1 apple) (day 366: 2 apples), the well known violation of stationarity put forward by Thaler, the point of change of regime must be either between day 0 and day 1 or between day 365 and day 366. This is too restrictive. %} Jamison, Dean T. & Julian Jamison (2011) “Characterizing the Amount and Speed of Discounting Procedures,” Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 2:2, Article 1. {% Seems to be: decision under stress: general conflict theory of decision making, with stress-syndroms and their effects on decision making. P. 11 seems to write that there is “no dependable way of objectively assessing the success of a decision” which is qualified as a “somewhat demoralizing” conclusion. %} Janis, Irving L. & Leon Mann (1977) “Decision Making; A Study of Conflict, Choice and Commitment.” The Free Press, New York. {% %} Janowitz, Melvin F. (1988) “Induced Social Welfare Functions,” Mathematical Social Sciences 15, 261–276. {% %} Jansen, Sylvia J.T. (2000) “The Impact of Experience.” Ph.D. dissertation, Leiden University Medical Center, Leiden, the Netherlands. {% utility elicitation %} Jansen, Sylvia J.T., Job Kievit, Marianne A. Nooij, & Anne M. Stiggelbout (2001) “The Impact of Experience,” Medical Decision Making 21, 295–306. {% Total utility theory; utility elicitation; find that higher evaluation of their situation by patients when in health state is generated not only by their more positive evaluation of outcomes but also by their more optimistic assessment of probabilities. P.s.: kind of more probabilistic attitude towards probabilistic risk. %} Jansen, Sylvia J.T., Wilma Otten, Monique C.M. Baas-Thijssen, Cock J.H. van de Velde, J.W.R. Nortier, & Anne M. Stiggelbout (2005) “Explaining Differences in Attitude towards Adjuvant Chemotherapy between Experienced and Inexperienced Breast Cancer Patients,” {% Total utility theory; utility elicitation %} Jansen, Sylvia J.T., Anne M. Stiggelbout, Peter P. Wakker, Marianne A. Nooij, Evert M. Noordijk, & Job Kievit (2000) “Unstable Preferences: A Shift in Valuation or an Effect of the Elicitation Procedure?,” Medical Decision Making 20, 62–71. Link to paper
Jansen, Sylvia J.T., Anne M. Stiggelbout, Peter P. Wakker, Thea P.M. Vliet Vlieland, Jan-Willem H. Leer, Marianne A. Nooy, & Job Kievit (1998) “Patient Utilities for Cancer Treatments: A Study of the Chained Procedure for the Standard Gamble and Time Tradeoff,” Medical Decision Making 18, 391–399. Link to paper
Jansen, Sylvia J.T., Anne M. Stiggelbout, Marianne A. Nooy, & Job Kievit (2000) “The Effect of Individually Assessed Preference Weights on the Relationship between Holistic and Nonpreference-Based Assessment,” Quality of Life Research 9, 541–557. {% Study discrepancy hypothetical/actual within and between patients. %} Jansen, Sylvia J.T., Anne M. Stiggelbout, Marianne A. Nooy, & Job Kievit (2000) “The Stability of Preferences for Adjuvant Chemotherapy: Perspective of Early-Stage Breast-Cancer Patients,” . {% %} Janssen, Maarten C. & Peran van Reeven (1998) “Price as a Signal of Illegality,” International Review of Law and Economics 18, 51–60. {% %} Janssens, Wendy (2007) “Social Capital and Cooperation: An Impact Evaluation of a Women's Empowerment Programme in Rural India,” Dept. of Economics, VU, Amsterdam. {% conservation of influence: seems to have said: het is geen uitdaging te zien wat er is, maar wat er geweest zou kunnen zijn. %} Japin, Arthur (date unknown) {% Under PT, if a loss is large, its marginal utility can be smaller than the marginal utility for small positive gains, so much that it can even overcome loss aversion. Then splitting up a big loss into a somewhat bigger loss and a small gain can, if these are evaluated separately as with mental accounting, be an improvement. The paper shows it theoretically and experimentally. %} Jarnebrant, Peter, Olivier Toubia, & Eric Johnson (2009) “The Silver Lining Effect: Formal Analysis and Experiments,” Management Science 55, 1832–1841. {% Hypothetical choice, with also losses. More numerate subjects go more by expected value. (cognitive ability related to risk/ambiguity aversion) In particular, they are less risk seeking if the risky prospect has lower EV and involves a loss. %} Jasper, John D., Chandrima Bhattacharya, Irwin P. Levin, Lance Jones & Elaine Bossard (2013) “Numeracy as a Predictor of Adaptive Risky Decision Making,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 26, 164–173. {% Formulate second-order stochastic dominance conditions in terms of RDU. %} Javanmardi, Leili & Yuri Lawryshyn (2016) “A New Rank Dependent Utility Approach to Model Risk Averse Preferences in Portfolio Optimization,” Annals of Operations Research 237, 161–176. {% %} Jaynes, Edwin T. (1968) “Prior Probability,” IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics 4, 227–241. {% foundations of probability; foundations of statistics %} Jaynes, Edwin T. (2003) “Probability Theory: The Logic of Science.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. {% %} Jech, Thomas (1978) “Set Theory.” Academic Press, New York. {% %} Jech, Thomas (193) “Axiom of Choice.” North-Holland, Amsterdam. {% R.C. Jeffrey model %} Jeffrey, Richard C. (1965) “The Logic of Decision.” McGraw-Hill, New York. (2nd edn. 1983, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.) {% foundations of probability %} Jeffrey, Richard C. (1992) “Probability and the Art of Judgment.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. {% Previous studies have shown that people are risk seeking when below a goal. This agrees with the risk seeking for losses that PT predicts. The present study considers the case of all outcomes above the goal. PT would predict risk aversion for gains. They, however, find risk seeking. %} Jeffrey, Scott A., Selcuk Onay, & Richard P. Larrick (2010) “Goal Attainment as a Resource: The Cushion Effect in Risky Choice above a Goal,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 23, 191–202. {% %} Jehle, Geoffrey & Philip Reny (2001) “Advanced Microeconomic Theory; 2nd edn. Pearson Education, Reading, Mass. {% real incentives/hypothetical choice?, no, for learning experiments %} Jenkins, William O. & Julian C. Stanley Jr. (1950) “Partial Reinforcement: A Review and Critique,” Psychological Bulletin 47, 193–234. {% Discusses stopping rules Bayesianist//frequentist %} Jennison, Christopher & Bruce W. Turnbull (1990) “Statistical Approaches to Interim Monitoring of Medical Trials: A Review,” Statistical Science 5, 299–317. {% Didactical paper on influence diagrams, Bayesian networks, and so on. %} Jensen, Finn V. & Thomas Dyhre Nielsen (2013) “Probabilistic Decision Graphs for Optimization under Uncertainty,” Annals of Operations Research 204, 223–248. {% proper scoring rules; real incentives/hypothetical choice: found, for estimating probabilities, that real rewards through quadratic scoring rule versus no reward do not affect the results much. P. 316 discusses that losses are overweighted relative to gains (loss aversion avant la lettre!) so that it may be wiser to let all outcomes have the same sign. %} Jensen, Floyd A. & Cameron R. Peterson (1973) “Psychological Effects of Proper Scoring Rules,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 9, 307–317. {% %} Jensen, Niels-Erik (1967) “An Introduction to Bernoullian Utility Theory, I, II,” Swedish Journal of Economics 69, 163–183, 229–247. {% Estimate index of relative risk aversion from market data. Using EU it ranges from 7.4 to 15, and using multiple priors (maxmin) it ranges from 1 to 8. %} Jeong, Daehee, Hwagyun Kim, Joon Y. Park (2015) “Does Ambiguity Matter? Estimating Asset Pricing Models with a Multiple-Priors Recursive Utility,” Journal of Financial Economics 115, 361–382. {% %} Jessen, Børge (1931) “Bemaerkinger om Konvekse Funktiner og Uligheder imellem Middelvaerdier (I),” Maematisk Tidsskrift B 2, 17–28. {% marginal utility is diminishing: in 1889 edn. seems to be stated on p. 173. decreasing ARA/increasing RRA: 1889 edn. seems to have stated it on p. 172/173. Seems that Jevons resolved the paradox of value (water is more useful than diamonds but we pay less for it) by considering marginal utility and, thus, turned utility into a central concept for economics. This constitutes the revolution of marginal utility of around 1870, where also Menger (1971) and Walras (1874) came up with the idea of marginal utility. Sugden wrote that they showed that for any pair of goods and for any consumer who maximises utility, the ratio of the marginal utilities of those goods is equal to the ratio of their prices. P. 6 of 1911 edn. seems to write: “Utility is plainly the subject-matter of economics from beginning to end … the object of Economics is to maximize happiness by purchasing pleasure, as it were, at the lowest cost of pain.” P. 36 of 1911 edn. seems to express/suggest the thought that a person could find out about his strength of preference through introspection; this str. of pr. then could as well serve as vNM utility, certainly in a normative sense. Was like Bentham but formalized more/better (Selten grouped these two together) Seems that he was not very good at doing formal analyses. P. 51: “Utility may be treated as a quantity of two dimensions.” Those are intensity and time. P. 61-62 seems to write: “the final degree of utility is that function upon which the whole Theory of Economy will be found to turn.” P. 72-73: discounting normative: argues against discounting (unless for uncertainty). Strotz (1956) cites Jevons, p. 77-80, as: “people of good sense will not discount the future except for uncertainty-but people do discount the future in accordance with its remoteness.” P. 85 seems to state impossibility of interpersonal comparison of utility. Stigler cites him as pessimistic on measuring utility. %} Jevons, W. Stanley (1871) “The Theory of Political Economy.” (5th edn. 1957, Kelley and MacMillan, New York; other edn. Penguin, 1970.) {% Act f is more ambiguous (I) than act g if an ambiguity averse DM prefers g to f whereas an ambiguity neutral replica of himself is indifferent. It is extended to more ambiguous (II) if, the more ambiguity averse the decision maker, the more compensation he requires for f. Is analyzed for maxmin and smooth ambiguity model. The use of ambiguity neutral replica is reminiscent of the ambiguity definitions of Epstein and Ghirardato & Marinacci, who chose either probabilistically sophisticated or expected-utility maximizing replicas of the DM, and the difficulty is that such replicas are not easily observable. The separation of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude is by assuming ambiguity attitude constant. %} Jewitt, Ian & Sujoy Mukerji (2017) “Ordering Ambiguous Acts,” Journal of Economic Theory 171, 213–267. {% %} Jia, Jianmin, James S. Dyer, & John C. Butler (2001) “Generalized Disappointment Models,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 22, 59–78. {% Use simulation to see which methods for determining attibute weights in MAUT work best. %} Jia, Jianmin, Gregory W. Fischer, & James S. Dyer (1998) “Attribute Weighting Methods and Decision Quality in the Presence of Response Error: A Simulation Study,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 11, 85–105. {% gender differences in risk attitude: %} Jianakoplos, Nancy Ammon & Alexandra Bernasek (1998) “Are Women more Risk Averse?” Economic Inquiry 36, 620–630. {% dominance violation by pref. for increasing income: not exactly that but close and also a violation of dominance due to contrast effects and special effects of te 0 outcome much in the spirit of Birnbaum, Coffey, Mellers, & Weiss (1992). Follows up on Scholten & Read (2014) and show that the violations also occur when the preference for increasing outcomes, put forward by S&R, cannot explain it. %} Jiang, Cheng-Ming, Hong-Mei Sun, Long-Fei Zhu, Lei Zhao, Hong-Zhi Liu, & Hong-Yue Sun (2017) “Better is Worse, Worse Is Better: Reexamination of Violations of Dominance in Intertemporal Choice,” Judgment and Decision Making 12, 253–259. {% %} Jiang, Long (2006) “A Note on g-Expectation with Comonotonic Additivity,” Statistics & Probability Letters 76, 1895–1903. {% Consider to what extent an agent wants to move from a probability distribution towards a preferred one for various costs. In some situations the Pratt-Arrow measure arises as relevant index, in other situations the Ross characterization. %} Jindapona, Paan & William S. Neilson (2007) “Higher-Order Generalizations of Arrow–Pratt and Ross Risk Aversion: A Comparative Statics Approach,” Journal of Economic Theory 136, 719–728. {% Elo-ratings %} Joe, Harry (1990) “Extended Use of Paired Comparison Models, with Application to Chess Rankings,” Applied Statistics 39, 85–93. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus (1994) “QALYs, HYEs, and Individual Preferences - A Graphical Illustration,” Social Science and Medicine 39, 1623–1632. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus (1995) “Quality-Adjusted Life-Years versus Healthy-Years Equivalents- A Comment,” Journal of Health Economics 14, 9–16. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus (1995) “The Ranking Properties of Healthy-Years Equivalents and Quality-Adjusted Life-Years under Certainty and Uncertainty,” International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 11, 40–48. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus (1995) “QALYs: A Comment,” Journal of Public Economics 56, 327–328. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus (1995) “A Second Opinion: On the Estimation of Cost-Effectiveness Ratios,” Health Policy 31, 225–229. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus (1995) “A Note on the Depreciation of the Societal Perspective in Economic Evaluation in Health Care,” Health Policy 33, 59–66. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus (1996) “A Note on the Relationship between Ex Ante and Expected Willingness to Pay for Health Care,” Social Science & Medicine 42, 305–311. {% measure of similarity %} Johannesson, Magnus (2000) “Modelling Asymmetric Similarity with Prominence,” British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 53, 121–139. {% real incentives/hypothetical choice: study method of Blumenschein, Johannesson, Blomquist, Liljas, & O'Conor (1998; Southern Economic Journal 65). %} Johannesson, Magnus, Glenn C. Blomquist, Karen Blumenschein, Per-Olof Johannson, Bengt Liljas, & Richard M. O'Conor (1999) “Calibrating Hypothetical Willingness to Pay Responses,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 8, 21–32. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus & Ulf G. Gerdtham (1995) “A Pilot Test of Using the Veil of Ignorance Approach to Estimate a Social Welfare Function for Income,” Applied Economics Letters 2, 400–402. {% Marc referaat Jan 20, 1993. Ask people how much they want to pay for a preventive measure, how high they estimate their subjective risk with and without the therapy. The open contingent valuation did bad. %} Johannesson, Magnus, Bengt Jönsson, & Lars Borgquist (1991) “Willingness to Pay for Antihypertensive Therapy—Results of a Swedish Pilot Study,” Journal of Health Economics 10, 461–474. {% P. 283 does not commit to utilities having to be elicited from general public. P. 286: additive separability underlies Markov models. Pp. 289-292: nice discussion of WTP history, e.g. NOAA. %} Johannesson, Magnus, Bengt Jönsson, & Goran Karlsson (1996) “Outcome Measurement in Economic Evaluation. Health Economics,” Health Economics 5, 279–296. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus & Per-Olov Johansson (1996) “To Be, or not to Be, That Is the Question: An Empirical Study of the WTP for an Increased Life Expectancy at an Advanced Age,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 13, 163–174. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus & Goran Karlsson (1997) “The Friction Cost Method: A Comment,” Journal of Health Economics 16, 249–255. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus, Bengt Liljas, & Per-Olov Johansson (1995) “Homegrown Values and Hypothetical Surveys: A Comment.” {% %} Johannesson, Magnus, Joseph S. Pliskin, & Milton C. Weinstein (1993) “Are Healthy-Years Equivalents an Improvement over Quality-Adjusted Life Years?,” Medical Decision Making 13, 281–286. {% %} Johannesson, Magnus, Joseph S. Pliskin, & Milton C. Weinstein (1994) “A Note on QALYs, Time Tradeoff, and Discounting,” Medical Decision Making 14, 188–193. {% paternalism/Humean-view-of-preference: many references. Analyzes cases of discrepancies between objective probabilities and probabilities as perceived by the public. Assumes that the correct probabilities should be used, but that the public’s misperception enters directly as a loss in the utility function. So this is not consequentialist utility but a kind of meta- and perception-driven utility. Given that utility component, deviations from conventional efficiency rules. Makes prospect-theory inverse-S assumptions about misperceived risks. Then analyzes if taxes and (costly) information-provision can improve total welfare. In some situations can if people overestimate risks but not if they underestimate. %} Johansson-Stenman, Olof (2008) “Mad Cows, Terrorism and Junk Food: Should Public Policy Reflect Perceived or Objective Risks?,” Journal of Health Economics 27, 234–248. {% Defends Rabin’s (2000) critique against the criticisms by Cox & Sadiraj (2006) and by Rubinstein (2006). It takes data of Holt & Laury (2002), fits this into an economic model with all the flesh and bones of lifelong consumption etc., and shows that under expected utility the risk aversion found by Holt & Laury in terms of lifelong utility implies absurd curvature of utility. %} Johansson-Stenman, Olof (2010) “Risk Behavior and Expected Utility of Consumption over Time,” Games and Economic Behavior 68, 208–219. {% Loss aversion of prospect theory is useful in this study. %} John, Leslie K. & Baruch Fischhoff (2010) “Changes of Heart: The Switch-Value Method for Assessing Value Uncertainty,” Medical Decision Making 30, 388–397. {% %} John, Reinhard (1995) “A Simple Cycle Preserving Extension of a Demand Function,” Journal of Economic Theory 72, 442–445. {% Show that consistency does not imply EU. (Time) consistency is dynamic consistency, forgone-branch independence (often called consequentialism) is incorporated by letting 2nd period utility be independent of unrealised alternatives; more precisely, their assumption of Conditional Weak Independence holds iff one can get forgone-branch independence satisfied. They have no uncertainty in 2nd stage. %} Johnsen, Thore H. & John B. Donaldson (1985) “The Structure of Intertemporal Preferences under Uncertainty and Time Consistent Plans,” Econometrica 53, 1451–1458. {% Generalizations of result that every pair of three events can be independent but not the triple %} Johnson, Bruce R. & Benjamin J.Tilly (1996) “On the Construction of Independence Counterexamples,” American Statistician 50, 14–16. {% %} Johnson, Cathleen, Aurélien Baillon, Han Bleichrodt, Zhihua Li, Dennie van Dolder, & Peter P. Wakker (2015) “Prince: An Improved Method for Measuring Incentivized Preferences,” working paper. {% %} Johnson, Cathleen, Jim Engle-Warnick, & Catherine Eckel (2007) “Adaptively Eliciting Risk Preferences through an Incentive Compatible Mechanism.” Working paper, University of Arizona. {% A short and accessible account of the influence of default on decisions. %} Johnson, Eric J. & Daniel Goldstein (2003) “Do Defaults Save Lives?,” Science 302, 21 November 2003, 1338–1339. {% Observed that participants pay more for flight insurance that explicitly listed certain events covered by the policy (e.g., death resulting from an act or terrorism or mechanical failure) than for a more inclusive policy that did not list specific events (e.g., death from any cause). Choices are hypothetical. Authors do cite some real-choice evidence in agreement with their findings. %} Johnson, Eric J., John C. Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros, & Howard C. Kunreuther (1993) “Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7, 35–51. {% %} Johnson, Eric J., John W. Payne, & James R. Bettman (1989) “Information Displays and Preference Reversals,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 42, 1–21. {% SG higher than CE; utility elicitation; extended Hershey & Schoemaker (1985) by broader range of stimuli; conclude that reframing cannot account for all of their own data and propose that response mechanisms also intervene. Download 7.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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