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decreasing ARA/increasing RRA
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decreasing ARA/increasing RRA: increasing RRA for Chinese students with actual, high, monetary rewards; constant for Canadian/US students with only moderate or with hypothetical monetary rewards. %} Kachelmeier, Steven J. & Mohamed Shehata (1992) “Examining Risk Preferences under High Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People’s Republic of China,” American Economic Review 82, 1120–1141; for comment see Steven J. Kachelmeier & Mohammed Shehata (1994) American Economic Review 84, 1104–1106. {% %} Kada, Osamu (2007) “Subjective Probability Measures on Equi-Ambiguous Sets,” working paper. {% Proposes explaining Allais and Ellsberg within SEU from subjective beliefs (e.g. suspicion; suspicion under ambiguity) %} Kadane, Joseph B. (1992) “Healthy Scepticism as an Expected-utility Explanation of the Phenomena of Allais and Ellsberg,” Theory and Decision 32 57–64. {% Argue that game theory is “just” a special case of DUU and that it should therefore be solved by SEU where one should think about the probability distribution over opponents’ strategy choice. Consider this to be a reason to criticize the study of solution concepts. In discussions of the paper printed in the pages following it, Harsanyi appropriately criticizes it (although I don’t like the circularity in his minimax reasoning at the bottom of p. 121). On p. 122 he calls the “SEU-for-game-theory” a “highly uninformative statement” and on p. 121 he writes “But this immediately poses the question of how this probability distribution is to be chosen.” [Italics from original]) That’s how it is. If one assumes that the Savage analysis can be applied to game theory and that opponents’ strategy choices can be treated like states of nature, then game theory can be considered to be the study of how the subjective probabilities over strategy choices of opponent should be chosen. Later papers trying to do so are Aumann & Drèze (2009) and Gilboa & Schmeidler (2003 GEB), but they both use highly hypothetical thought experiments. (game theory can/cannot be seen as decision under uncertainty) %} Kadane, Joseph B. & Patrick D. Larkey (1982) “Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games,” Management Science 28, 113–120. {% Continue on their 1982 paper. Didn’t change my views regarding the 82 paper. (game theory can/cannot be seen as decision under uncertainty) %} Kadane, Joseph B. & Patrick D. Larkey (1983) “The Conflict of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts,” Management Science 29, 1365–1379. {% Show when probability defined on arbitrary subset, can be extended to all subsets. %} Kadane, Joseph B. & Anthony O’Hagan (1995) “Using Finitely Additive Probability: Uniform Distributions on the Natural Numbers,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 90, 626–631. {% Usual trickeries with finite additivity. Then you can set up a partition (“experiment”) such that conditional on each outcome, a prior hypothesis becomes more probable. You can also be averse to cost-free information. (information aversion) %} Kadane, Joseph B., Mark J. Schervish, & Teddy Seidenfeld (1996) “Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 91, 1228–1235. {% The importance of convex capacities in statistics is explained on p. 1251. Characterize extreme points of upper distribution functions corresponding to coherent symmetric (i.e., transforms of Lebesgue measure) capacities on [0,1]. %} Kadane, Joseph B. & Larry E. Wasserman (1996) “Symmetric, Coherent, Choquet Capacities,” Annals of Statistics 24, 1250–1264. {% utility elicitation; probability elicitation; how these can be distorted by hidden stakes. %} Kadane, Joseph B. & Robert L. Winkler (1988) “Separating Probability Elicitation from Utilities,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 83, 357–363. {% anonymity protection: describe a way to present only sufficient statistics regarding tables with data. %} Kadane, Joseph B., Ramayya Krishnan, & Galit Shmueli (2006) “A Data Disclosure Policy for Count Data Based on the COM-Poisson Distribution,” Management Science 52, 1610–1617. {% On grading students, with an extra option “don’t know” and discussions about how best to score it. This topic is adjacent to: proper scoring rules. %} Kaernbach, Christian (2001) “Adaptive Threshold Estimation with Unforced-Choice Tasks,” Perception & Psychophysics 63, 1377–1388. {% %} Kafry, Ditsa, & Daniel Kahneman (1977) “Capacity Sharing and Refractoriness in Successive Reactions,” Perceptual and Motor Skills 44, 327–335. {% %} Kagel, John H. & Raymond C. Battalio (1975) “Experimental Studies of Consumer Behavior Using Laboratory Animals,” Economic Inquiry 13, 22–38. {% %} Kagel, John H., Raymond C. Battalio, & Leonard Green (1995) “Economic Choice Theory: An Experimental Analysis of Animal Behavior.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. {% losses from prior endowment mechanism: seem to do this real incentives/hypothetical choice: seem to do this. %} Kagel, John H., Don N. MacDonald, & Raymond C. Battalio (1990) “Tests of ‘Fanning Out’ of Indifference Curves: Results from Animal and Human Experiments,” American Economic Review 80, 912–921. {% %} Kagel, John H. & Alvin E. Roth (1995, eds.) “Handbook of Experimental Economics.” Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. {% The experiment in this paper is weak, and the theory not very important, but the discussions and interpretations are superb, showing deep understanding. Hence I like to cite this paper. P. 268 gives profound text on how people confuse knowledge about process with knowledge about outcome, which I also think is the mistake that Ellsberg-paradox people make: “This example shows the “irrational” nature of ambiguity avoidance. For example, if an ambiguity averse subject chooses less than 100 red balls to indicate indifference, then s/he is limiting his/her opportunity of winning to gain the false sense of security of thinking s/he knows more about the outcome. It is true that the subject knows more about the process of winning in the first urn than in the second urn, but s/he does not know any more about the probability of the outcome, information s/he mistakenly thinks s/he is “buying” by sacrificing the number of red balls in choosing an indifference value.” This is the essence, I think, of what misleads many researchers to think that ambiguity aversion is rational. I think that in the known Ellsberg urn you do not have better information than in the unknown but, if anything, the opposite: in the known urn you are sure to have the worst information that could be. P. 268 uses matching probabilities to measure weight of ambiguous events. It is similarly done by Viscusi & Magat (1992 Eq. 7). P. 268/269, ambiguous thumbtack versus fair coin, of 54 MBA students, 18 preferred fair coin, 21 preferred tack; On latter: “This group may represent some people who would pay to seek ambiguity, but does represent some people who believe that they have more information about the probability of winning with the tack and, hence, will pay more for that information.” ambiguity seeking for unlikely (below .1 or .3 according to Camerer & Weber, 1992) second-order probabilities to model ambiguity; generate ambiguity this way, and use a parametric model for that; p. 267 1st column 2nd para ambiguity seeking for losses; p. 270: “In the gains domain, there is ambiguity seeking at low mean probabilities and ambiguity aversion at high mean probabilities. In the loss domain, a reflection effect occurs with ambiguity aversion at low mean probabilities and ambiguity seeking at high mean probabilities. ... Therefore, the presence of ambiguity may accentuate the attitude toward risk.” uncertainty amplifies risk: p. 270: “Therefore, the presence of ambiguity may accentuate the attitude toward risk.” reflection at individual level for ambiguity: although the last experiment (p. 270) has within data, it is not reported. %} Kahn, Barbara E. & Rakesh K. Sarin (1988) “Modeling Ambiguity in Decisions under Uncertainty,” Journal of Consumer Research 15, 265–272. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1961) “An Analytical Model of the Semantic Differential.” Ph.D. Thesis. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1963) “The Semantic Differential and the Structure of Inferences among Attributes,” American Journal of Psychology 76, 554–567. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1964) “Temporal Summation in Acuity Tasks at Different Energy Levels: A Study of the Determinants of Summation,” Vision Research 4, 557–566. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1965) “Control of Spurious Association and the Reliability of the Controlled Variable,” Psychological Bulletin 64, 326–329. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1965) “Exposure Duration and Effective Figure-Ground Contrast,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 17, 308–314. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1966) “Time-Intensity Reciprocity in Acuity as a Function of Luminance and Figure-Ground Contrast,” Vision Research 6, 207–215. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1966) “Time-Intensity Reciprocity under Various Conditions of Adaptation and Backward Masking,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, 543–549. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1967) “An Onset-Onset Law for One Case of Apparent Motion and Metacontrast,” Perception and Psychophysics 2, 577–584. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1967) “Temporal Effects in the Perception of Light and Form.” In Weiant Wathen-Dunn (ed.) Models for the Perception of Speech and Visual Form, 157–170, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1968) “Effects of Verbalization and Incentive on the Pupillary Response to Mental Activity,” Canadian Journal of Psychology 22, 186–196. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1968) “Methods, Findings and Theory in Studies of Visual Masking,” Psychological Bulletin 70, 404–425. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1970) “Changes in Pupil Size and Visual Discrimination During Mental Effort.” In John R. Pierce (ed.) Visual Science. University of Indiana Press, Bloomington. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1970) “Remarks on Attention Control.” In Andries F. Sanders (ed.) Attention and Performance III, 118–131. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1973) “Attention and Effort.” Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1974) “Cognitive Limitations and Public Decision Making. Science and Absolute Values.” Proceedings of the Third International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, 1261–1281, International Cultural Foundation, London. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1975) “Effort, Recognition and Recall in Auditory Attention.” In Patrick M.A. Rabbitt & Stanislav Dornic (eds.) Attention and Performance IV, 65–80, New York, Academic Press. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1979) “Mechanisms that Produce Critical Durations,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2, 265–266. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1980) “A Review of M. Posner’s “An Experimental Study of Consciousness”,” Contemporary Psychology 25, 3–5. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1980) “Human Engineering of Decisions, in Ethics in an Age of Pervasive Technology.” Westview Press, Boulder. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1986) “Valuing Environmental Goods: An Assessment of the Contingent Valuation Method: The, Review Panel’s Assessment: Comments.” In Ronald G. Cummings, David S. Brookshire, & W222 D. Schulze (eds.) Valuing Environmental Goods: An Assessment of the Contingent Valuation Method, 185–194, Littlefield, Adams, Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, NJ. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1988) “Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective.” In Reinhard Tietz, Wulf Albers, & Reinhard Selten (eds.) Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems series 314, 11–18, Springer, Berlin. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1991) “Judgment and Decision Making: A Personal View,” Psychological Science 2, 142–145. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1992) “Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings. Special Issue: Decision Processes in Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51, 296–312. {% Kahneman thinks that violations of expected utility as in the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes are not irrational: p. 19: “Furthermore, the preferences that Allais and Ellsberg described do not appear foolish or unreasonable, …” Some later Kahneman writes, on p. 19: “Indeed, the ambiguous normative status of the Allais and Ellsberg patterns has inspired many attempts to reconcile observed preferences with rationality by adopting a more permissive definition of rational choice (Tversky and Kahneman [1986]).” Kahneman’s viewpoint here is opposite to Tversky’s who considered expected utility to be normative. Kahneman’s citation of Tversky & Kahneman (1986) is incorrect. The latter reference nowhere says that violations of expected utility can be normatively acceptable. To the contrary, it advances further arguments for the normative status of expected utility. paternalism/Humean-view-of-preference: p. 20: “More provocatively, the observed deficiencies suggest the outline of a case in favor of some paternalistic interventions, when it is plausible that the state knows more about an individual’s future tastes than the individual knows presently.” %} Kahneman, Daniel (1994) “New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150, 18–36. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1995) “Varieties of Counterfactual Thinking.” In Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson (eds.): What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking, Ch. 14. Erlabum, Hillsdale, NJ. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (1996) “Comment.” In Kenneth J. Arrow, Enrico Colombatto, Mark Perlman, & Christian Schmidt (eds.) The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference Held in Turin, Italy, 251–254, St. Martins Press, New York. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (2000), letter of October 4. {% P. 163: Kahneman does not consider expected utility to be normative: “Unlike the paradoxes of expected-utility theory, violations of invariance cannot be defended as normative.” Kahneman & Tversky (1979, p. 277) stated the opposite. P. 164 supports the Rabin calibration argument. P. 164 says loss aversion is about 2 on average. %} Kahneman, Daniel (2003) “A Psychological Perspective on Economics,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 93, 162–168. {% Further comments are in comments on the Kahneman (2003) AER paper. Here I only discuss things not in AER. P. 697: “… that intuitive judgments occupy a position—perhaps corresponding to evolutionary history—between the automatic operations of perception and the deliberate operations of reasoning.” P. 702, 2d para, has a remarkable sentence negating the value of theory: “… accessibility … the lack of a theory does little damage to the usefulness of the concept.” I did not find a similar sentence in his AER 2003 paper. This may agree with Kahneman’s opinion that the success of the ’79 prospect theory paper is mostly an academic coincidence, where Kahneman ignores the importance of the theoretical content of that ’79 paper (p. 702 3rd para), including the essence of that paper: that it could combine empirics and theory. P. 703: “Guided by the analogy of perception, we expected the evaluation of decision outcomes to be reference dependent.” P. 705, 2nd para: “… because the value function is a psychophysical mapping.” Such a universal claim is not in his AER 2002 paper. utility concave near ruin: p. 705, 2nd para: “However, the value function is not expected to describe preferences for losses that are large relative to total assets, where ruin or near ruin is a possible outcome.” P. 707 2nd column 1st para: “… people who are confronted with a difficult question sometimes answer an easier one instead.” P. 713 4th para nicely follows up on this: “The probability of Linda being a bank teller is an extensional variable, but her resemblance to a typical bank teller is a prototype attribute.” P. 710 2nd para of 2nd column, and elsewhere explains that Kahneman & Tversky emphasized cognitive aspects and not emotional because, in their days, psychologists automatically assumed that everything was emotional, and cognitive aspects were new then. P. 712 3rd para: within-subjects designs have problem for study of intuitive non-reasoned tasks that they may trigger reasoning. P. 726, 2/3 at 2nd column: “The concept of loss aversion was, I believe, our [Tversky & Kahneman] most useful contribution to the study of decision making.” %} Kahneman, Daniel (2003) “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice; Mapping Bounded Rationality,” American Psychologist 58, 697–720. {% In what follows, “AP” refers to Kahneman (2003, American Psychologist), which, like this paper, is a summary of Kahneman’s Nobel-lecture. P. 1453, para on 1st/2nd column: discussion that distinguishing between good and bad, approach/avoidance, is very basic. Is in AP at p. 701, end of 1st column. P. 1454, last para, presents reference-dependence in perception as universal: “A general property of perceptual systems is that they are designed to enhance the accessibility of changes and differences. Perception is reference dependent …” paternalism/Humean-view-of-preference: §VII, pp. 1467-1469 discusses corrections/avoidance of biases. AP has it on pp. 710-712. P. 1456, on prospect-theory’s departure from rationality: “One novelty of prospect theory was that it was explicitly presented as a formal descriptive theory of the choices that people actually make, not as a normative model. This was a departure from a long history of choice models that served double duty as normative logics and as idealized descriptive models.” P. 1457, 3rd para (also AP p. 705, 3rd para): “Bernoulli’s error—the assumption that the carriers of utility are final states—…” P. 1457, end of 1st column: “The core idea of prospect theory—that the value function is kinked at the reference point and loss averse—…” %} Kahneman, Daniel (2003) “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,” American Economic Review 93, 1449–1475. {% P. 726, 2/3 at 2nd column: “The concept of loss aversion was, I believe, our [Tversky & Kahneman] most useful contribution to the study of decision making.” P. 727, top of 2nd column, suggests that the success of prospect theory is by arbitrary processes. I disagree. The success is because 1979 prospect theory was the first rational theory of irrational behavior, which is a major intellectual breakthrough. dynamic consistency: p. 727, 2nd column, bottom, describes that Amos and he considered dynamic decision principles, which they indeed did in their magnificent Science 1981 paper, way before Hammond (1988) and others. %} Kahneman, Daniel (2003) “Experiences of Collaborative Research,” American Psychologist 58, 723–730. {% §4.5, in a discussion of the Allais paradox, states explicitly that Amos Tversky considered deviations from expected utility as in the Allais paradox to be irrational, and that he developed prospect theory only for modeling irrational behavior. In a preliminary January 2011 version of the chapter that Daniel wrote and that I commented on, Daniel wrote: “Most theorists, notably including Allais, maintained their belief in human rationality and tried to bend the rules of rational choice to make the Allais pattern permissible. Over the years there have been multiple attempts to find a plausible justification for the certainty effect, none very convincing. Amos had little patience for these efforts – he called the theorists who tried to rationalize violations of utility theory “lawyers for the misguided.” We went in another direction: we retained utility theory as a logic of rational choice, but abandoned the idea that people are perfectly rational decision makers. We took on the task of developing a psychological theory that would describe the choices that people make, whether or not they are rational. In prospect theory, decision weights would not be identical to probabilities.” %} Kahneman, Daniel (2011) book in preparation. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel (2011) “Thinking: Fast and Slow.” Penguin Books, London. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, & Jean Beatty (1966) “Pupil Diameter and Load on Memory,” Science154, 1583–1585. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, & Jean Beatty (1967) “Pupillary Responses in a Pitch-Discrimination Task,” Perception and Psychophysics 2, 101–105. {% They distinguish emotional and (a thinking-based) life evaluation. They anayze > 450,000 responses to the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index (in US) and do regressions. Income and education are closely related to life evaluation. Health, care giving, loneliness, and smoking are closely related to daily emotions. Life evaluation always increases in income, but emotional stops after annual income of $75,000. %} Kahneman, Daniel & Angus Deaton (2010) “High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but not Emotional Well-Being,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, 16489–16493. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, Jean Beatty, & Irwin Pollack (1967) “Perceptual Deficit During a Mental Task,” Science 157, 218–219. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, Rachel Ben-Ishai, & Michael Lotan (1973) “Relation of a Test of Attention to Road Accidents,” Journal of Applied Psychology 58, 113–115. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, & Diane Chajczyk (1983) “Tests of the Automaticity of Reading: Dilution of Stroop Effects by Color-Irrelevant Stimuli,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 9, 497–509. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, Barbara L. Fredrickson, Charles A. Schreiber, & Donald A. Redelmeier (1993) “When More Pain is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End,” Psychological Science 4, 401–405. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, & Edwin E. Ghiselli (1962) “Validity and Nonlinear Heteroschedastic Models,” Personnel Psychology 1–12. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, & Avishai Henik (1976) “Effects of Visual Grouping on Immediate Recall and Selective Attention.” In Stanislav Dornic (ed.) Attention and Performance V, 307–332, Academic Press, New York. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, & Avishai Henik (1981) “Perceptual Organization and Attention.” In Michael Kubovy & James R. Pomerantz (eds.) Perceptual Organization, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. {% Contingent valuation responses reflect the willingness to pay for the moral satisfaction of contributing to public goods, not the economic value of these goods. Scope insensitivity/embedding effect: if you ask people how much money it is worth to them to save the polar bear, they answer an amount that in fact reflects the total value they want to spend on helping animals. %} Kahneman, Daniel & Jack L. Knetsch (1992) “Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 22, pages 57–70. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel & Jack L. Knetsch (1992) “Contingent Valuation and the Value of Public Goods: Reply,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 22, 90–94. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler (1986) “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics,” Journal of Business 59, S285–300. {% Telephone surveys on fair prices/wages %} Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler (1986) “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,” American Economic Review 76, 728–741. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler (1990) “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy 98, 1325–1348. Reprinted in Richard H. Thaler (ed.) Quasi -Rational Economics, 167–188, New York, Russell Sage Foundation. {% PT, applications, loss aversion; consider buyers, sellers, and choosers. %} Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler (1991) “The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias: Anomalies,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 no. 1, 193–206. {% P. 4 equates Bentham’s utility with Kahneman’s experienced utility, as if solely to be aggregated over time, even though Bentham also considered aggregations over other dimensions. Argue for various concepts of utility, not one. New contribution of this paper is proposing the U-index: let subjects categorize all kinds of aspects and specify their intensity. Each time point is categorized as negative if the most negative score over attributes exceeds in absolute value the most positive score over attributes. The U-index then specifies the percentage of time with a negative score. The authors point out that in this way information is lost and call the index ordinal in this respect (although it compares positive distances from 0 to negative ones), but reassure the readers by stating that they see this as an advantage. %} Kahneman, Daniel & Alan B. Krueger (2006) “Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, 3–24. {% Total utility theory. Kahneman argued in several papers that it may be useful not to let people decide/choose over episodes, because there are biases in time aggregation. In such cases, let people only evaluate instant utility through introspection at that moment, and let researchers/policy makers integrate these (total utility or ERM). Getting such introspections can be cumbersome and costly. This paper proposes DRM, a tractable alternative: let people retrieve from memory their instant utility of the past day, by letting them partition that day into episodes, letting them recall the events and instant utility of those episodes, and let them report those. (This also gives info on time budgeting.) It was done with a convenience sample of N = 909 women who had worked the day before. Participants reconstruct experiences of preceding day. For some things, there is a nice contrast between what this method measures and what global overal satisfaction judgment gives. The latter may say “I enjoy my kids,” whereas the former shows that all activities related to children were perceived of as a burden. DRM may avoid social desirability, but missing out on global overall value that is not easily allocated to particular time and on valuable long-term things that are not perceived as an instant change (with supposedly flowers bringing more happiness than a couch). %} Kahneman, Daniel, Alan B. Krueger, David A. Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, & Arthur A. Stone (2004) “A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method,” Science 306, 1776–1780. {% This papers discusses, first, the ESM (Experience Sampling Method) where people several times per day receive the request to describe their experiences at that moment, so that instant utilituy is measured truly as meant to be. The authors call this the gold standard (p. 431 l. 1). Then it discusses the DRM (daily reconstruction method), where people at end of day are asked what happened. It is a pragmatic alternative to the ESM. Then it discusses the ERM (Event Recall Method), another pragmatic alternative. Proposes to use these measurements to measure national well being. %} Kahneman, Daniel, Alan B. Krueger, David A. Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, & Arthur A. Stone (2004) “Toward National Well-Being Accounts,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 94, 429–434. {% linear utility for small stakes: claim that this is normative although empirically violated. Claim that people are generally too risk averse, for one thing because they isolate choices too much. In this point they preceded the narrow bracketing of Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin (1999) and the myopic loss aversion of Benartzi & Thaler (1995). Kahneman (January 22, 2008, personal communication, email) pointed out that the arguments in this paper should only concern moderate stakes that are not a substantial portion of total wealth. They wanted to have this restriction. Kahneman checked out the paper and saw that they had forgotten to write it. %} Kahneman, Daniel & Dan Lovallo (1993) “Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking,” Management Science 39, 17–31. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, & Dale T. Miller (1986) “Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives,” Psychological Review 93, 136–153. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, & Joel Norman (1964) “The Time-Intensity Relation in Visual Perception as a Function of Observer’s Task,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 68, 215–220. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, Joel Norman, & Michael Kubovy (1967) “Critical Duration for the Resolution of Form: Centrally or Peripherally Determined?,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 73, 323–327. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, L. Onuska, & Ruth E. Wolman (1968) “Effects of Grouping on the Pupillary Response in a Short-Term Memory Task,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 20, 309–311. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel & W. Scott Peavler (1969) “Incentive Effects and Pupillary Changes in Association Learning,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 79, 312–318. {% Argue that known biases are all in favor of hawks, so that they more often win in politics than doves. Relate it to the current war (2007) in Iraque. %} Kahneman, Daniel & Jonathan Renshon (2007) “Why Hawks Win,” Foreign Policy Magazine. Translated into Dutch as “Over Oorlog en Vrede Wordt niet Rationeel Beslist: Waarom Haviken vaak Winnen van Duiven” in NRC Handelsblad, February 3&4 2007, Opinie en Debat, p. 17.
Kahneman, Daniel & Ilana Ritov (1994) “Determinants of Stated Willingness to Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 9, 5–38. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, Ilana Ritov, Karen E. Jacowitz, & Paul Grant (1993) “Stated Willingness to Pay for Public Goods: A Psychological Perspective,” Psychological Science 4, 310–315. {% conservation of influence: if it is violated, then behavior is just noise. The authors state this point for choice inconsistencies in companies. %} Kahneman, Daniel, Andrew M. Rosenfield, Linnea Gandhi, & Tom Blaser (2016) “Noise: How to Overcome the High, Hidden Cost of Inconsistent Decision Making,” Harvard Business Review October 2016, 40–46. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, & Ozer Schild (1966) “Training Agents of Social Change in Israel: Definitions of Objectives and a Training Approach,” Human Organization 25, 323–327. {% %} Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky (1982, eds.) “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. {% Christiane, Veronika & I Download 7.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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