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SOLVENCY: MISSILE DEFENSE ENCOURAGES PROLIFERATION
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- MISPLACED FAITH IN MISSILE DEFENSE WILL MAKE THE US AND ITS ALLIES MORE AGGRESSIVE AND UNDERMINE GLOBAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION-Butt ‘10
- MISSILE DEFENSE WILL ENCOURAGE ENEMIES TO LAUNCH MORE MISSILES-Deblois, Garwin, et al ‘05
- MISSILE DEFENSE WILL INITIATE A NEW NUCLEAR ARMS RACE-Lefvre ‘08
- US PURSUIT OF MISSILE DEFENSE INCREASES THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR OTHER STATES-Butt ‘10
- MISSILE DEFENSE INCITES PROLIFERATION-Butt ‘10
- MISSILE DEFENSE HAS EMPIRICALLY FAILED TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS-Butt ‘10
- MISSILE DEFENSE CANNOT WIN THE COST-BENEFIT CONTEST; IT WILL ALWAYS BE CHEAPER TO BUILD MORE MISSILES-Kosiak ‘07
- SOLVENCY: MISSILE DEFENSE UNDERMINES RELATIONS MISSILE DEFENSE NOT ONLY CREATES A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY, BUT UNDERMINES US-SINO AND US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS-Butt ‘10
- MISSILE DEFENSE WILL UNDERMINE AMERICAN SOFT POWER AND INCREASE ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE GLOBE-Lefvre ‘08
SOLVENCY: MISSILE DEFENSE ENCOURAGES PROLIFERATION THE PURSUIT OF MISSILE DEFENSE WILL LEAD TO AN ESCALATING SPIRAL OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE, CULMINATING IN NUCLEAR WAR-Johnson ‘07 [Rebecca; PhD, The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy; Threat of Weaponisation; 09 October 2007;http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm; retrieved 19 Jul 2011] The pursuit of missile defences could increase nuclear threats by creating an escalating offence-defence spiral, not only in production of weaponry, but also in operational situations, which could be particularly destabilising and dangerous in times of crisis. The use of space for targeting conventional forces may already provoke asymmetric threats, particularly through hacking, jamming or attacks to disable ground stations. A number of adverse security consequences are foreseeable if space were to be weaponised. It could exacerbate the threats from space debris and EMP and provoke other space-faring nations to deploy weapons for use in, to or from space. In computer wargame trials conducted by the Pentagon a few years ago, the use of weapons in space (including anti-satellite weapons) led inexorably to the use of nuclear weapons and therefore to nuclear war on the ground. Losing one's space-based 'eyes and ears' appeared to cause miscalculations that led to rushed, panicky 'use them or lose them' decisions being made, with devastating consequences. MISPLACED FAITH IN MISSILE DEFENSE WILL MAKE THE US AND ITS ALLIES MORE AGGRESSIVE AND UNDERMINE GLOBAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION-Butt ‘10 [Yousaf; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics; The Myth of Missile Defense as Deterrent; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 08 May 2010; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent; retrieved 20 Jul 2011] Unfounded claims of missile defense's effectiveness create a serious risk that political leaders might be misled into mistakenly believing that missile defenses actually work. And if they incorrectly think that missile defense has secured the country by neutralizing the threat of ballistic missile attack, policy makers might be emboldened to stake out riskier and more aggressive regional policies than in the absence of missile defense. A similar mistaken confidence in overwhelming U.S. conventional firepower misled Washington into the Iraq War debacle; nuclear miscalculations would be much more costly. For this reason, missile defense should not, as the NPR claims it would, play any role in "reassuring allies and partners around the world"; no ally should feel secured by a defensive system that can be penetrated by nuclear-tipped missiles. If allies do feel they have neutralized their adversaries' deterrent forces, they too might be tempted to undertake riskier actions, possibly leading to conflict and ultimately even U.S. nuclear intervention. A misplaced confidence in missile defenses could even lull Washington into complacency regarding the spread of WMD and ballistic missile technology: Imagining that they have largely addressed the threat from ballistic missiles, policy makers might feel less urgency to fight proliferation. MISSILE DEFENSE WILL ENCOURAGE ENEMIES TO LAUNCH MORE MISSILES-Deblois, Garwin, et al ‘05 [Bruce, director of systems integration for BAE Systems and Richard, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center; Star Crossed; Spectrum; March 2005; http://www.princeton.edu/~rskemp/IEEE%20Spectrum%20-%20Star%20Crossed.pdf; retrieved 09 Jul 2011]
A recent study by the American Physical Society, in College Park, Md., analyzed two types of space weapons that have been proposed for intercepting incoming missiles during boost phase: space-based interceptors (SBIs) that would propel a kinetic “kill vehicle” into a collision with the missile (much like the ground-based interceptors currently being deployed) and space-based lasers. As the study noted, the size of the constellation of SBIs or lasers that would be needed grows in proportion to the number of simultaneous launches that might occur. For example, if a missile-defense constellation can handle at most three simultaneous missiles from a small region, an adversary could surely defeat this defense by launching four. MISSILE DEFENSE WILL INITIATE A NEW NUCLEAR ARMS RACE-Lefvre ‘08 [Alexi; A Strategic Conversation about National Missile Defense; Strategic Studies Quarterly; Winter 2008; reprinted at http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Winter/lefevre.pdf; retrieved 19 Jul 2011] Many proponents of the NMD claim that it would be a stabilizing factor in the world. Nothing could be further from the truth. Russia has already stated its intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty if US missile defense systems are installed in Europe. It has also stated that it plans to develop hypersonic vehicles for its missile systems and to enhance its platforms already containing decoys, such as the Topol-M. China, too, has insisted that the formation of a US missile shield would likely cause it to develop more devastating nuclear weapons in larger numbers. These would not only render an NMD system impotent, they also would undoubtedly initiate a new arms race. The logic is simple. Why would any country willingly let its nuclear advantage slip away? Why would it not enhance its nuclear forces or develop them in order to achieve some level of influence? US PURSUIT OF MISSILE DEFENSE INCREASES THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR OTHER STATES-Butt ‘10 [Yousaf; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics; The Myth of Missile Defense as Deterrent; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 08 May 2010; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent; retrieved 20 Jul 2011] Just as with nuclear weapons, the U.S. infatuation with missile defense will cause other nations to desire this expensive and destabilizing technology. Following the U.S. lead, both China and India now have missile defense test programs. It doesn't take much imagination to anticipate Pakistan's response. There will be legitimate pressure for Islamabad to attempt to redress this perceived Indian defense by producing more missiles and nuclear weapons. In response, India and subsequently China will likely increase their own stockpiles--in turn increasing pressure on U.S. and Russian strategists to respond. So rather than reducing the value of nuclear weapons, missile defense actually increases it. MISSILE DEFENSE INCITES PROLIFERATION-Butt ‘10 [Yousaf; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics; The Myth of Missile Defense as Deterrent; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 08 May 2010; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent; retrieved 20 Jul 2011] Instead of dissuading countries from pursuing ballistic missiles, missile defense actually incites proliferation. Adversarial and competitor nations will build up their offensive capabilities to ensure some missiles get through. The development of alternate delivery methods and sneakier attack tactics will be a natural response to the fielding of a U.S. missile defense system. As the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission has pointed out PDF, "China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program." And the BMDR report explicitly states, "Both Russia and China have repeatedly expressed concerns that U.S. missile defenses adversely affect their own strategic capabilities and interests." MISSILE DEFENSE HAS EMPIRICALLY FAILED TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS-Butt ‘10 [Yousaf; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics; The Myth of Missile Defense as Deterrent; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 08 May 2010; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent; retrieved 20 Jul 2011] It's often incorrectly asserted that missile defenses dissuade adversaries from researching and producing ballistic missiles. For instance, the BMDR report states: "The United States, with the support of allies and partners, seeks to create an environment in which the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of such attacks, and thereby devaluing their ballistic missile arsenals." But the countries developing ballistic missile technology do so for numerous reasons, not just to launch nuclear attacks against the United States. Many countries desire conventional ballistic missile technology for prestige or because of regional considerations. Whether or not a U.S. missile defense system is operational, such nations will still try to acquire ballistic missile technology. In fact, the countries of most interest to the United States--Iran and North Korea--currently have well-developed ballistic missile programs. The BMDR's claims of an already-functioning missile defense shield obviously haven't diminished their ballistic ardor. Furthermore, space-launch technology and ICBM technology are identical, and U.S. missile defenses are unlikely to dissuade an adversary from pursuing a space-launch capability. So missile defense has been, is, and will be, an empirical failure at dissuading countries of concern to the United States from pursuing ballistic missile programs. MISSILE DEFENSE CANNOT WIN THE COST-BENEFIT CONTEST; IT WILL ALWAYS BE CHEAPER TO BUILD MORE MISSILES-Kosiak ‘07 [Stephen, defense analyst at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectivenessof Space-Based Weapons; 2007; http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2007.10.31-Spaced-Based-Weapons.pdf] Since, for a country that has already developed and deployed a single ICBM, the production costs for additional ICBMs would likely be in only the tens of millions of dollars, a simple cost-exchange analysis strongly suggests that the acquisition of space-based ballistic missile defenses would not be a cost-effective option for the United States—at least over the next two decades. Moreover, if the attacker employs even relatively simple countermeasures, the effectiveness of these systems could be substantially further reduced, or eliminated entirely. Furthermore, the cost-exchange ratio appears to be so lopsided in favor of the attacker that this may be a case where the United States cannot prevail by simply outspending its opponent. SOLVENCY: MISSILE DEFENSE UNDERMINES RELATIONS MISSILE DEFENSE NOT ONLY CREATES A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY, BUT UNDERMINES US-SINO AND US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS-Butt ‘10 [Yousaf; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics; The Myth of Missile Defense as Deterrent; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 08 May 2010; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent; retrieved 20 Jul 2011] As George Lewis and Ted Postol have reported, in the past, Russia had a legitimate concern regarding U.S. missile defense architecture in Eastern Europe. Interceptors based in Poland could "engage essentially all Russian ICBMs launched against the continental United States from Russian sites west of the Urals. It is difficult to see why any well-informed Russian analyst would not find such a potential situation alarming." Similar concerns are now resurfacing. Considering that missile defense won't change the U.S. strategic equation with respect to Iran or North Korea (except perhaps to engender in leaders a false sense of security), is it really worth unnecessarily antagonizing U.S. relations with Russia and China and possibly sparking Russia's withdrawal from New START? MISSILE DEFENSE WILL UNDERMINE AMERICAN SOFT POWER AND INCREASE ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE GLOBE-Lefvre ‘08 [Alexi; A Strategic Conversation about National Missile Defense; Strategic Studies Quarterly; Winter 2008; reprinted at http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Winter/lefevre.pdf; retrieved 19 Jul 2011] There is also a broader issue to address. The perception that the United States acts in a unilateral manner has increased markedly over the previous eight years. While there are various sides to this argument, there can be no denying that anti-Americanism has risen significantly in that time. Domestic opposition in other countries to housing an American antimissile shield will not deaden over time, nor will the perception that American foreign policy is one-sided in global conflicts. By installing antimissile sites in specific countries, by potentially transferring this technology through foreign military sales to allied countries, by promising protection to some and not to others, we offer a dangerous declaration. We state to the world that rather than adhere to the honest, universal ideals of civil liberty, justice, representative governance, and so forth, we are stooping to petty power politics and proxy wars. We confirm to those who might question our motives that we see the world as a chessboard free for us to manipulate by injecting money and arms into those areas we deem weak and refusing it to those we deem too strong. This is a seriously backwards way of looking at the world, especially one becoming increasingly interconnected. If we unilaterally spread our antimissile shield throughout the world, there will be no more confusion about the sources of anti- Americanism. The resulting instability of establishing a national missile defense system is too great to simply dismiss. Directory: file -> fetch fetch -> 11 th Lit Semester 1 Final Study Guide!!! fetch -> Industrial Revolution Inventors fetch -> Analysis for Galveston Hurricane of 1900 fetch -> The Illuminators (Team 2) 1900 Galveston Hurricane Cycle a team Assignment fetch -> Team csi-utb ruth Reyes Jose Ferrer fetch -> Galveston Hurricane of 1900 Cycle a-teacher as a Problem Solver fetch -> Is Climate Change Starting a New Dust Bowl? Cycle A fetch -> What makes a storm a hurricane fetch -> The 1950s were the "Happy Days" because it was a time of economic prosperity, technology development, new entertainment, new fashion and family growth. 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