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SOLVENCY: MISSILE DEFENSE CANNOT STOP NORTH KOREA/IRAN
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- THE FACT THAT MISSILE DEFENSE CANNOT BE FLAWLESS MEANS IT CANNOT CHANGE US POLICY TOWARDS IRAN OR NORTH KOREA-Butt ‘10
- BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE AMONG THE LEAST LIKELY AVENUES OF AN IRANIAN/NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ATTACK-Kosiak ‘07
- SOLVENCY: SPACE BASED MISSILE DEFENSE FAILS SPACE-BASED WEAPONS ARE 20 YEARS FROM VIABILITY AND WILL NEVER BE COST-EFFECTIVE-Kosiak ‘07
- THE SYSTEM WILL NOT BE COST-EFFECTIVE INVESTMENT-Kosiak ‘07
- SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WOULD COST AS MUCH AS $290 BILLION WITHOUT DEVELOPING THE CAPACITY TO STOP EVEN THE SMALLEST ATTACKS-Kosiak ‘07
- SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WILL BE EXPENSIVE AND VULNERABLE TO ATTACK-Deblois, Garwin, et al ‘05
- SPACE BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WILL NOT DESTROY THE WARHEADS-Kosiak ‘07
- SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WOULD FAIL AND CREATE MORE CONFLICT-Grego ‘11
SOLVENCY: MISSILE DEFENSE CANNOT STOP NORTH KOREA/IRAN MISSILE DEFENSE WILL NOT PREVENT AN IRANIAN NUCLEAR ATTACK-Butt ‘10 [Yousaf; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics; The Myth of Missile Defense as Deterrent; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 08 May 2010; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent; retrieved 20 Jul 2011] Third, even if one agrees with the NPR's argument that missile defense can somehow compensate for the deterrence allegedly lost by reducing the nuclear arsenal, an enormous logical flaw persists: The two alleged "deterrents"--the operational stockpile and missile defenses--are aimed at different countries and aren't interchangeable. Reducing the U.S. operational nuclear stockpile, which is calibrated to Russia's arsenal, isn't going to be compensated by investing in missile defenses to protect against an Iranian attack. Plus, many experts agree that if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it wouldn't use them in a suicidal first strike. A detailed National Defense University study concluded that Tehran desires nuclear weapons mainly because it feels strategically isolated and that "possession of such weapons would give the regime legitimacy, respectability, and protection." Basically, Iran wants a nuclear capability for deterrence purposes--just like every other nuclear-armed nation. The Polish foreign minister has even admitted that Warsaw is involved with U.S. missile defense plans in Europe to improve diplomatic ties with Washington, not out of any fear of Iranian nuclear attack. THE FACT THAT MISSILE DEFENSE CANNOT BE FLAWLESS MEANS IT CANNOT CHANGE US POLICY TOWARDS IRAN OR NORTH KOREA-Butt ‘10 [Yousaf; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics; The Myth of Missile Defense as Deterrent; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 08 May 2010; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent; retrieved 20 Jul 2011] The strategic uselessness of missile defenses aimed at intercepting nuclear-tipped missiles is clear (as I have argued before). This is a conceptual problem, not merely a technical one. The reason is simple: There is always a reasonable probability that one or more nuclear missiles will penetrate even the best missile defense system. Since a single nuclear missile hit would cause unacceptable damage to the United States, a missile defense system shouldn't change U.S. strategic calculations with respect to its enemies. Washington should treat North Korea, Iran, and other adversaries the same before and after setting up missile defense systems. Recently, Schelling publicly stated that missile defense will be of dubious value in addressing the possible future threats from Iran. BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE AMONG THE LEAST LIKELY AVENUES OF AN IRANIAN/NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ATTACK-Kosiak ‘07 [Stephen, defense analyst at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectivenessof Space-Based Weapons; 2007; http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2007.10.31-Spaced-Based-Weapons.pdf] In considering the cost-effectiveness of space-based ballistic missile defense systems, and ballistic missile defenses generally, it is also important to recall that ballistic missiles are only one of many means that North Korea, Iran or another potential adversary might use to attack the United States with nuclear warheads or other WMD. In fact, such an attack may be among the least likely ways any adversary would choose to attack the United States. Alternative means of delivering WMD include the use of aircraft or cruise missiles, ships entering US harbors, or smuggling the weapons into the country. Space-based ballistic missile defense systems would provide no protection against these threats. Furthermore, any of these alternative means could be acquired with far less difficulty and at far lower cost than an ICBM capability. On the other hand, ICBMs may offer some advantages over various alternative means of delivering WMD (e.g., in terms of the ability to maintain centralized control, and strike targets rapidly). SOLVENCY: SPACE BASED MISSILE DEFENSE FAILS SPACE-BASED WEAPONS ARE 20 YEARS FROM VIABILITY AND WILL NEVER BE COST-EFFECTIVE-Kosiak ‘07 [Stephen, defense analyst at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectivenessof Space-Based Weapons; 2007; http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2007.10.31-Spaced-Based-Weapons.pdf] The case for space-based weapons appears to be weakest in the case of the boost-phase ballistic missile defense mission. A constellation of spacebased weapons designed to defend the United States against an ICBM attack would be extremely costly to acquire and support. Moreover, at least based on the technology likely to be available over the next twenty years, such a system would probably not prove to be a cost-effective investment, especially when measured against the cost to a potential adversary of defeating such a system. THE SYSTEM WILL NOT BE COST-EFFECTIVE INVESTMENT-Kosiak ‘07 [Stephen, defense analyst at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectivenessof Space-Based Weapons; 2007; http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2007.10.31-Spaced-Based-Weapons.pdf] First, a constellation of space-based weapons designed to defend the United States against an attack with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would be extremely costly to acquire and support. Moreover, at least based on the technology likely to be available over the next twenty years, such a system would probably not prove to be a cost-effective investment, especially when measured against the cost to a potential adversary of defeating such a system. SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WOULD COST AS MUCH AS $290 BILLION WITHOUT DEVELOPING THE CAPACITY TO STOP EVEN THE SMALLEST ATTACKS-Kosiak ‘07 [Stephen, defense analyst at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectivenessof Space-Based Weapons; 2007; http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2007.10.31-Spaced-Based-Weapons.pdf] Based on the best available open-source descriptions of potential SBI and SBL systems—provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Department of Defense (DoD), RAND, the American Physical Society (APS), and others—this report estimates that an SBI constellation intended for the boost-phase ballistic missile defense mission would have 20-year lifecycle costs of some $29–290 billion, with the lower-end estimate requiring a technological leap in kill vehicle miniaturization. The technological uncertainty and risk associated with developing an SBL system for this mission is far greater. Indeed, it may be doubtful that, even absent budgetary constraints, such a system could be developed within the time frame considered in this report. But assuming those hurdles could be overcome eventually, such a system might have costs ranging from $128–196 billion. Despite these high costs, it appears that neither of these systems would have more than, at best, a very modest capability, even in the absence of countermeasures. In the case of the SBI constellations considered in this report, if the attacker prudently timed and salvo-launched its attack, only a single intercontinental-ballistic missile (ICBM) could be intercepted (assuming, consistent with current Missile Defense Agency doctrine, that two interceptors would be launched against each booster)—even if the technology worked perfectly. The SBL missile defense constellations considered in this report would also likely have only relatively limited capabilities—e.g., the ability to intercept perhaps half a dozen ICBMs in the event of such an attack. SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WILL BE EXPENSIVE AND VULNERABLE TO ATTACK-Deblois, Garwin, et al ‘05 [Bruce, director of systems integration for BAE Systems and Richard, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center; Star Crossed; Spectrum; March 2005; http://www.princeton.edu/~rskemp/IEEE%20Spectrum%20-%20Star%20Crossed.pdf; retrieved 09 Jul 2011]
on nearby ships, or on Russian territory south of Vladivostok, would likely be considerably more capable, not to mention cheaper, than space-based interceptors. What’s more, these fragile battleships of space would need to be protected from preemptive attack; we describe in the main text how low-Earth orbit satellites are relatively easy to destroy. SPACE BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WILL NOT DESTROY THE WARHEADS-Kosiak ‘07 [Stephen, defense analyst at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectivenessof Space-Based Weapons; 2007; http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2007.10.31-Spaced-Based-Weapons.pdf] Another problem inherent in boost-phase ballistic missile defense is that an intercept that successfully disabled a missile’s booster would probably not result in the destruction the missile’s warhead. An intercepted booster would rapidly lose thrust, but the ICBM’s warhead, which is only loosely coupled to the final stage of the missile, along with booster fragments and other debris, would likely continue to fall to earth on a ballistic trajectory. The warhead would fall to the earth short of its intended target, but possibly in populated areas. And, if launched from North Korea or Iran, those areas would not be in the attacking country, but could be in the United States or another country.6 To ensure that an ICBM’s warhead had not attained the velocity needed to reach the United States, it would be necessary to intercept the booster as early as 40 seconds before it would normally burnout. SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WOULD FAIL AND CREATE MORE CONFLICT-Grego ‘11 [Laura; Space-Based Missile Defense: Still a Bad Idea; Union of Concerned Scientists; 2 June 2011; http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/6105337195/space-based-missile-defense-still-a-bad-idea; retrieved 13 August 2011] Why not just put up a few interceptors? A little protection is better than none, right? The answer is a resounding no. A space-based interceptor would only be in the right place to be able to intercept a given ICBM intermittently: space-based interceptors need to keep circling Earth to stay in orbit. Because space-based interceptors (like all satellites) orbit predictably and are readily observable from the ground, a single interceptor is like a single police officer who is charged with protecting a neighborhood from mischief but required never to deviate from the precise timing of her route. She would be only a minor nuisance to determined troublemakers, who would find it easy to do what they pleased without getting caught. In the same way that the neighborhood wouldn’t be protected until a full coterie of officers could cover the territory, space-based missile defense would be completely ineffective until a full system was deployed. Until then, the attacker could always choose her time and place to coincide with the absence of a usable interceptor. Space-based missile defense is worse off than that, actually. In fact, even if a full system were deployed and the technology worked perfectly, an attacker could easily create such an absence by using a cheaper short- or medium-range missile either to draw out the space-based interceptor or to destroy it. Increasing the missile defense’s robustness by doubling the number of ground-based missiles such a defense could engage? This would require doubling the size of the entire interceptor constellation. Thus, this defense based on deploying hundreds to thousands of space-based interceptors can always be defeated by a handful of enemy missiles.
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