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HARMS: VAGUENESS OF OBAMA PLAN NOT A PROBLEM
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- THE FAILURE OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO ARTICULATE ITS PLAN IS NO RATIONALE FOR CONSTELLATION-Logsdon ‘10
- DESPITE THE VAGUENESS OF THE OBAMA PLAN, IT OFFERS A PATH FORWARD FOR SPACE EXPLORATION-Friedman ‘10
- SOLVENCY: CONSTELLATION HURTS OTHER PROGRAMS CONTINUING THE CONSTELLATION PROGRAM WOULD KILL THE SPACE STATION-Zak ‘10
- CONSTELLATION MEANT ABANDONING THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION-Handberg ‘11
- SOLVENCY: CONSTELLATION WAS OVER BUDGET/EXPENSIVE CONSTELLATION WASN’T GOING TO WORK AND WOULD HAVE REQUIRED MUCH MORE MONEY-Spencer ‘10
- CONTINUING CONSTELLATION WOULD BE A WASTE OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS-Friedman ‘10
- CONSTELLATION WAS OVER BUDGET AND LACKED VISION FOR SPACE INNOVATION-Ly ‘11
- SOLVENCY: CONSTELLATION TOO NARROWLY FOCUSED/DIRECTED FOCUSING ON A DESTINATION IS A MISTAKEN POLICY THAT LIMITS TECHNOLOGY-Logsdon ‘10
- PRESIDENTIAL DEADLINES AND COMPLETION DATES CANNOT WORK-Huntress ‘09
- SPECIFICATION OF DESTINATIONS LIMITS THE CAPABILITY OF EXPLORATION CRAFT-Huntress ‘09
- NASA NEEDS TO ABANDON THE HOME RUN APPROACH AND FOCUS ON SMALL, SUCCESSFUL MISSIONS-Handberg ‘11
- FUTURE NASA MISSIONS MUST BE SUSTAINABLE AND REALISTIC TO SURVIVE-Handberg ‘11
- CONCEPTUALIZING SPACE EXPLORATION AS A PROCESS INSTEAD OF A DESTINATION ALLOWS FOR MORE SUCCESS-Handberg ‘11
- SOLVENCY: CONSTELLATION HURT INTERNATIONAL/PRIVATE COORDINATION
- THE OBAMA PLAN WILL INCREASE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP THROUGH COOPERATION-Mace ‘11
- CONSTELLEATION LACKED EMPHASIS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION-Faith ‘10
- SOLVENCY: CONSTELLATION WOULD NOT WORK CONSTELLATION LOST ITS FOCUS AND WOULD NOT GET THE US TO THE MOON FOR A GENERATION-Friedman ‘10
- AN APOLLO ON STEROIDS APPROACH IS A DEAD END AND CANNOT BE REPEATED SUCCESSFULLY-Logsdon ‘10
HARMS: VAGUENESS OF OBAMA PLAN NOT A PROBLEM THE LACK OF A DESTINATION IN THE OBAMA PLAN DOES NOT MEAN AN END TO MARS-Friedman ‘10 [Louis; executive director, The Planetary Society; NASA’s Down-To-Earth Problem; Los Angeles Times; 22 Mar 2010] The Planetary Society and 11 other nonprofit space interest groups have issued a position statement (as part of the Space Exploration Alliance) applauding "the administration's desire to begin human exploration of the solar system as well as for embracing these other valuable initiatives" in its proposed budget, while at the same time seeking timetable and technical details from NASA on the path for human spaceflight beyond low Earth orbit. The new budget's increase in NASA funding, stimulating of commercial partner funding and active promotion of international cooperation all bode well for a sustainable and exciting human spaceflight program. Constellation proponents' complaints about a lack of a destination in the president's space policy are disingenuous. The destination for human exploration eventually will be Mars, and that was recently reiterated by Bolden. But imagine the political reaction if the administration were to propose a human mission to Mars now. THE FAILURE OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO ARTICULATE ITS PLAN IS NO RATIONALE FOR CONSTELLATION-Logsdon ‘10 [John; Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University; The End of the Apollo Era—Finally?; 30 Jun 2010; http://www.spacenews.com/commentaries/100630-blog-end-apollo-era-finally.html; retrieved 22 Jul 2011] I interpret the new space strategy set out by the White House Feb. 1 to be at its foundation a proposal to move from the 20th century, Apollo-era approach to human spaceflight to a new approach consistent with 21st century national and international realities and future exploration and other strategic space objectives. It is not surprising that those with positive memories of Apollo and with vested interests in continuing the space status quo have been so strong in their opposition to the new approach; they are defending a space effort that to date has served them well. These critics have been met with a — literally — incoherent defense of the new strategy by its advocates inside and outside of the government. U.S. President Barack Obama confused the situation even further in his April 15 speech at the Kennedy Space Center. The result has been a polarized debate unprecedented in my more than four decades of close observation of space policymaking. I am an optimist by nature, and so I hope that we will see emerging over this summer an approach that accepts the main tenets of the new strategy and allows NASA to start implementing them. But that outcome is far from assured, and the alternative is distressing to contemplate. DESPITE THE VAGUENESS OF THE OBAMA PLAN, IT OFFERS A PATH FORWARD FOR SPACE EXPLORATION-Friedman ‘10 [Louis; Hang Together or Hang Separately; 26 May 2010; http://www.planetary.org/action/opinions/blog_spacenews_20100526.html; retrieved 14 Jul 2011] Whether or not Congress approves the new NASA plan and budget, the future is not Apollo on Steroids. Our nation will not support spending the additional billions of dollars needed to fix Constellation and race to the Moon. If Congress does not pass the NASA budget this year, we can count on it coming back next year — several more billion dollars and another year wasted. Instead of spurring private industry into action and development, we will have another year of uncertainty and dithering — and be no nearer to closing the gap between the retirement of the shuttle and the initiation of a new launch capability. My biggest fear is that we will ultimately unleash the anti-human space exploration folks to ask, “Why are we spending all this money and accomplishing nothing?” We can agree that the new plan lacks specifics, is vague about the commercial incentives, the nature of the deep space rocket and the first steps on the Flexible Path. NASA gets that and that should be the first order of business after we get a NASA budget. But if we don’t start the new plan, we won’t be able to get the specifics.
SOLVENCY: CONSTELLATION HURTS OTHER PROGRAMS CONTINUING THE CONSTELLATION PROGRAM WOULD KILL THE SPACE STATION-Zak ‘10 [Anatoly; space historian and journalist; End of Constellation: It Is Not All Doom and Gloom; Russian Space Web; 04 Feb 2010; http://www.russianspaceweb.com/sei_end.html; retrieved 10 Jul 2011] First of all, the Obama administration promised to increase overall NASA funding, which along with recovering economy, puts the US space agency in a very strong position for drawing up an aggressive future strategy in space. The goal of going to the Moon itself has not been abandoned but only postponed, likely for a historically insignificant period of time. In the meantime, NASA and all its international partners will be able to send their astronauts to the International Space Station, ISS, to conduct scientific research and built foundation for human ventures beyond the Earth orbit. The fact that US astronauts will temporarily fly to the ISS onboard Russian spacecraft, should bother no one but isolationists and nationalists. It is much more tragic that under funding restraints of the Constellation program, a brand-new space station -- the largest and most complex man-made structure in orbit -- would have to be dumped into the ocean as soon as 2015. Perhaps, it still would not be the most unprecedented waste of taxpayers’ money in the history of space program – just ask the developers of the Soviet N1 moon rocket and the Energia-Buran system. (Both were abandoned practically on the launch pad, after years of colossal efforts.) CONSTELLATION MEANT ABANDONING THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION-Handberg ‘11 [Roger; Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida; Small Ball or Home Runs: The Changing Ethos of US Human Spaceflight Policy; The Space Review; 17 Jan 2011; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1; retrieved 12 Jul 2011] What this also means is that the US must become focused on maximizing its experience on the ISS. The VSE and Constellation program had no vision for the ISS: build it and then leave it to pursue the Moon or beyond. Leaving $100 billion on the table made little sense but resulted from the ISS being a compromised project once the Russians entered the program. The orbital position of the ISS was made by deliberate choice more difficult for the space shuttle to reach in the interest of fostering international cooperation. Rather than a dead end, the ISS now becomes part of this larger process of human exploration of space. The ISS provides much needed experience in long-duration flight—critical information for missions beyond the orbit of the Moon. One of the signs of the home run approach was the VSE’s willingness to write off the ISS so quickly after its completion. In fact, the US unilaterally proposed a truncated ISS construction process that would have severely damaged its partners’ programs by effectively eliminating their costly lab facilities, Columbus and Kibo. That effort was rejected. From the US perspective, rather than seen as an asset, the ISS became a burden after a hard decade long struggle to build it. The ISS became merely another project, which meant it was a dead end rather than part of an ongoing space exploration process. SOLVENCY: CONSTELLATION WAS OVER BUDGET/EXPENSIVE CONSTELLATION WASN’T GOING TO WORK AND WOULD HAVE REQUIRED MUCH MORE MONEY-Spencer ‘10 [Henry; space engineer;NASA Moon Plan Was an Illusion, Wrapped in Denial; New Scientist; 11 Feb 2011; http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18515-nasa-moon-plan-was-an-illusion-wrapped-in-denial.html; retrieved 22 Jul 2011] First, it probably wasn't going to work. Even so early in its life, the programme was already deep into a death spiral of "solving" every problem by reducing expectations of what the system would do. Actually reaching the moon would probably have required a major redesign, which wasn't going to be funded. Second, even if all went as planned, there was a money problem. As the Augustine committee noted, Constellation was already underfunded, and couldn't ever get beyond Earth orbit without a big budget increase. Which didn't seem too likely. CONTINUING CONSTELLATION WOULD BE A WASTE OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS-Friedman ‘10 [Louis; executive director, The Planetary Society; NASA’s Down-To-Earth Problem; Los Angeles Times; 22 Mar 2010] Congress may well dispose of the president's plan for NASA, but if all they do is try to protect the special interests of their own congressional districts, then we will again have a human spaceflight program with no rationale except to protect vested interests. Twenty-seven members of Congress (two-thirds of them from Alabama and Texas) have written to NASA Administrator Charles Bolden saying: "The termination of the Constellation programs is a proposal by the president, but it is Congress who will accept or reject that proposal. In the meantime, FY10 funds for the Constellation programs are to be spent as if the program will continue." If Congress forces that spending, it guarantees that at least an additional $2 billion of NASA funds will be wasted -- $2 billion! However the budget proposal is acted on in Congress, it is clear that the nation is not going to go ahead with the Constellation project, which had a primary goal of returning humans to the moon by 2020 -- neither its Ares I rocket, which was to replace the space shuttle in delivering humans into Earth orbit, nor its moon mission. The 2004 Vision for Space Exploration may have been farsighted, but its implementation plan for Constellation was shortsighted: an inadequate goal and inadequate funds to achieve it. CONSTELLATION WAS OVER BUDGET AND LACKED VISION FOR SPACE INNOVATION-Ly ‘11 [Len; Senior Staff Reporter; NASA Decides on Human Deep Space Vehicle; 26 May 2011; http://www.neontommy.com/news/2011/05/nasa-decides-human-deep-space-vehicle; retrieved 11 Jul 2011] President Barack Obama canceled Constellation last year in his fiscal 2011 budget request to Congress. Based on an independent panel's review, the program was determined “over budget, behind schedule, and lacking in innovation” and “had drawn funding away from other NASA programs.” Instead, the budget called for investments that would “significantly lower operation costs” and potentially take humans “farther and faster into space.” Central to that approach was NASA would partner with the private sector in a fundamentally new way: In the post-shuttle era, commercial vehicles would be the primary mode of crew transportation to and from the International Space Station, a laboratory in low-Earth orbit.
[John; Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University; The End of the Apollo Era—Finally?; 30 Jun 2010; http://www.spacenews.com/commentaries/100630-blog-end-apollo-era-finally.html; retrieved 22 Jul 2011] There is a coherent explanation of what is being proposed, but NASA has given it little emphasis and it seems not to have registered with those trying to understand the new strategy. That strategy involves a restart — a five-year period of building the technological foundation for the future. That restart would be followed by another five to seven years of developing new systems based on that foundation, then a series of human missions to various destinations beyond Earth orbit. There is no commitment to a specific destination on a specific schedule; that avoids the narrowing effect that was a characteristic of Apollo. To me this is a quite sensible and easily understandable strategy, if the United States wants to be in the vanguard of 21st century space exploration. But it does not follow the Apollo model of setting a date to arrive at a specific destination that gave the United States unquestioned space leadership. It will be a challenge to maintain focus and technological discipline in implementing a strategy without a “date by” goal, but a capabilities-based approach can pave the way to U.S. leadership in reaching all the interesting destinations between the Earth and Mars. To me, the greatest threat to U.S. space leadership would come from our political system insisting on staying with the Apollo-era approach to the future, not from adopting this new strategy. PRESIDENTIAL DEADLINES AND COMPLETION DATES CANNOT WORK-Huntress ‘09 [Wesley; Former NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science; Lessons for the Future of Human Space Flight; 21 Jun 2009; http://www.planetary.org/programs/projects/space_advocacy/lessons_for_future.pdf; retrieved 12 Jul 2011] Second, absent unlimited resources as in the Apollo years, presidentially imposed completion dates are deadly. Why? Because NASA will sacrifice everything to meet them. There are only three controllable variables to engineering development: cost, schedule and performance. With both schedule and agency budget fixed, as costs inevitably rise for a technologically challenging development the only alternatives are to compromise system performance or to cannibalize funds from other agency enterprises. NASA has done both as the funding required to meet the President’s “Moon by 2020” directive has not been forthcoming from the Office of Management and Budget. This deadline must be deleted in favor of direction to proceed at a pace commensurate with available budget. SPECIFICATION OF DESTINATIONS LIMITS THE CAPABILITY OF EXPLORATION CRAFT-Huntress ‘09 [Wesley; Former NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science; Lessons for the Future of Human Space Flight; 21 Jun 2009; http://www.planetary.org/programs/projects/space_advocacy/lessons_for_future.pdf; retrieved 12 Jul 2011] Third, specification of a particular destination will limit the capability of the transportation system to go to other destinations. Another result of the President’s “Moon by 2020” direction is NASA’s singular focus on the Moon as a destination. The driving requirements for Constellation are all lunar-derived and only passing attention has been given to requirements for other destinations. Constellation is now a point design for the Moon that will be costly to adapt or rebuild for other destinations beyond. The President should not only delete the deadline from his directive but also the emphasis on the Moon as a destination. NASA NEEDS TO ABANDON THE HOME RUN APPROACH AND FOCUS ON SMALL, SUCCESSFUL MISSIONS-Handberg ‘11 [Roger; Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida; Small Ball or Home Runs: The Changing Ethos of US Human Spaceflight Policy; The Space Review; 17 Jan 2011; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1; retrieved 12 Jul 2011] The reality is that the Apollo program, the SEI, and the VSE are examples in space terms of the home run approach. Such efforts confront the cruel but obvious reality that the human spaceflight program is considered by the public and most of Congress to be a “nice to have,” but not a necessity when compared to other programs or national priorities. Congressional support is narrow and constituency-driven (i.e. protect local jobs), which means most in Congress only support the space program in the abstract. Big ticket items or programs are not a priority for most, given other priorities. What happens is what can be loosely termed normal politics: a situation where human spaceflight remains a low priority on the national agenda. Funding for bold new initiatives is going to be hard to come by even when the economy recovers and deficits are under control. The home run approach has run its course at least for a time; now the small ball approach becomes your mantra. FUTURE NASA MISSIONS MUST BE SUSTAINABLE AND REALISTIC TO SURVIVE-Handberg ‘11 [Roger; Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida; Small Ball or Home Runs: The Changing Ethos of US Human Spaceflight Policy; The Space Review; 17 Jan 2011; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1; retrieved 12 Jul 2011] NASA Administrator Charles Bolden alluded to that reality recently: “Future NASA space programs must be affordable, sustainable and realistic to survive political and funding dangers that have killed previous initiatives.” This is harsh talk but it reflects the reality confronting all US discretionary programs in the federal budget. The new Republican House majority is determined to cut federal expenditures and appear to have little concern for where the cuts occur. The budget struggles this year and next will find all discretionary programs mobilizing their supporters. Competing agencies like the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Science Foundation (NSF) have constituencies who are savvy veterans of getting their way even when budgets are tight. The cure for some disease is always just another appropriation away from happening. CONCEPTUALIZING SPACE EXPLORATION AS A PROCESS INSTEAD OF A DESTINATION ALLOWS FOR MORE SUCCESS-Handberg ‘11 [Roger; Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida; Small Ball or Home Runs: The Changing Ethos of US Human Spaceflight Policy; The Space Review; 17 Jan 2011; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1; retrieved 12 Jul 2011] As has been repeatedly said, Apollo was sui generis, one of a kind, a product of unique historical circumstances. NASA’s future in human spaceflight is budget wise and politically more supportable as a small ball approach. This is clearly less flashy, but today being politically sustainable must become the focus. The flexible path suggested by the Obama Administration is perceived by some as too vague and indefinite (see “Prognosticating NASA’s Future”, The Space Review, March 29, 2010). That may be an accurate judgment, but that plan envisions a process rather than a constituency or destination focus, which has been typical of NASA initiatives. Such a project or destination focus becomes finite, with an end date and no logical follow on into the future. Conceptualizing space exploration as a process rather than a destination or project allows you to build on success and push outward beyond the Moon and into the solar system. SOLVENCY: CONSTELLATION HURT INTERNATIONAL/PRIVATE COORDINATION THE CONSTELLATION PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO BE ENTIRELY IN-HOUSE, PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION-Zak ‘10 [Anatoly; space historian and journalist; End of Constellation: It Is Not All Doom and Gloom; Russian Space Web; 04 Feb 2010; http://www.russianspaceweb.com/sei_end.html; retrieved 10 Jul 2011] Unlike the Constellation, which was intentionally set up to be an “in-house” program, the future efforts to explore deep space should include a broad international cooperation with Russia, China, Europe and other countries. No longer mandated to exclude foreign partners, NASA can return to the negotiation table with other space agencies and formulate a common approach toward future goals. Based on recommendations of the Augustine Committee last year, NASA can allow foreign partners into the so-called “critical path” in future cooperative projects, meaning that their goals would not be achievable without hardware and support of other countries. While it may or may not cut cost of the whole enterprise, it would certainly give space program an important political clout. Interdependency in space as well as on Earth would help to ensure that governments make a habit of finding common solutions to international problems at the negotiation table. THE OBAMA PLAN WILL INCREASE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP THROUGH COOPERATION-Mace ‘11 [Frank; online columnist; In Defense of the Obama Space Exploration Plan; Harvard Political Review; 07 April 2011; http://hpronline.org/united-states/in-defense-of-the-obama-space-exploration-plan/; retrieved 12 Jul 2011] Armstrong, Lovell, and Cernon assert that the Obama plan will sacrifice American leadership in space. Worthy recipients of the status of national hero, these astronauts nonetheless hail from the space race era. Obama, however, points out that “what was once a global competition has long since become a global collaboration.” I agree with the president that the ambitious nature of his plan will do nothing but “ensure that our leadership in space is even stronger in this new century than it was in the last” as well as “strengthen America’s leadership here on earth.” Obama’s space exploration plan will create jobs, advance science, and inspire a nation, and it will do so not by sacrificing American dominance in space, but by extending that dominance into new areas of research and exploration. CONSTELLEATION LACKED EMPHASIS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION-Faith ‘10 [G. Ryan; President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration; The Space Review; 26 April 2010; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1616/1; retrieved 13 August 2011] One common feature that both President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration and the vision outlined by President Obama do share is the lack of emphasis placed on international cooperation. In the space policy arena, two prevalent schools of thought about reducing the cost of space exploration—heavier reliance on the private sector and stronger international engagement—often operate independently, or even in opposition to each other. Given the likely overall budget outlook through the end of this decade and beyond, it is likely that all available means to manage costs and ensure political sustainability need to be pursued, including international cooperation and commercial competition, international commercial cooperation, and organizational efficiency measures, such as the ones recommended in Augustine Committee report and CAIB report. SOLVENCY: CONSTELLATION WOULD NOT WORK CONSTELLATION LOST ITS FOCUS AND WOULD NOT GET THE US TO THE MOON FOR A GENERATION-Friedman ‘10 [Louis; executive director, The Planetary Society; NASA’s Down-To-Earth Problem; Los Angeles Times; 22 Mar 2010] It was the Constellation plan that lost its focus. Declaring a destination is not enough. We have to prepare our way into the solar system, and the flexible path defined in 2009 by the Augustine Committee -- charged by President Obama to review the U.S. human spaceflight program -- will do just that. That blue-ribbon panel came up with a path recommendation to take humans on an ever-increasing series of longer flights, eventually reaching Mars. The technical accomplishments are to be defined as the program is developed and funds are made available. The question before Congress and the nation, and indeed the world, is: Do we start the journey down that path now, or do we dither around in Earth orbit for another decade or two? NASA needs a new way of doing business. Constellation probably would not have gotten us to the moon until nearly 2030, and not beyond the moon until well after that. The new plan -- harnessing government and private resources, engaging international partners and building up new technology -- can yield quicker and greater achievements with more public interest. Let's give it a chance. AN APOLLO ON STEROIDS APPROACH IS A DEAD END AND CANNOT BE REPEATED SUCCESSFULLY-Logsdon ‘10 [John; Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University; The End of the Apollo Era—Finally?; 30 Jun 2010; http://www.spacenews.com/commentaries/100630-blog-end-apollo-era-finally.html; retrieved 22 Jul 2011] Apollo was aimed at beating the Russians to the Moon; it was not propelled by a long-term vision of space exploration. To meet Kennedy’s “before this decade is out” goal, NASA chose a set of hardware systems and an architecture optimized for getting to the Moon as soon as possible; these choices had unfortunate consequences. The Apollo spacecraft and the magnificent Saturn 5 launcher proved not to be relevant to any post-Apollo mission that could gain political support in the early 1970s, and were quickly discarded. But in developing, testing and operating the Apollo-Saturn system, NASA developed a large facility infrastructure, an extremely competent and dedicated work force, and a widespread space industrial base; those remain. One way of understanding the 40 years since Apollo is by viewing the space shuttle and the international space station as attempts to preserve and take advantage of that infrastructure, work force and industrial base. Pursuing an “Apollo on steroids” approach to the Constellation program was an understandable sequel to those programs, once again trying to employ the heritage left by Apollo. But this, like the hardware developed for Apollo and then abandoned, is ultimately a dead-end approach. Yale University organizational sociologist Gary Brewer more than 20 years ago observed that NASA during the Apollo program came close to being “a perfect place” — the best organization that human beings could create to accomplish a particular goal. But, suggested Brewer, “perfect places do not last for long.” NASA was “no longer a perfect place.” The organization needed “new ways of thinking, new people, and new means.” He added “The innocent clarity of purpose, the relatively easy and economically painless public consent, and the technical confidence [of Apollo] ... are gone and will probably never occur again. Trying to recreate those by-gone moments by sloganeering, frightening, or appealing to mankind’s mystical needs for exploration and conquest seems somehow futile considering all that has happened since Jack Kennedy set the nation on course to the Moon.” Directory: file -> fetch fetch -> 11 th Lit Semester 1 Final Study Guide!!! fetch -> Industrial Revolution Inventors fetch -> Analysis for Galveston Hurricane of 1900 fetch -> The Illuminators (Team 2) 1900 Galveston Hurricane Cycle a team Assignment fetch -> Team csi-utb ruth Reyes Jose Ferrer fetch -> Galveston Hurricane of 1900 Cycle a-teacher as a Problem Solver fetch -> Is Climate Change Starting a New Dust Bowl? Cycle A fetch -> What makes a storm a hurricane fetch -> The 1950s were the "Happy Days" because it was a time of economic prosperity, technology development, new entertainment, new fashion and family growth. The 1950s was a great time fetch -> Sputnik and The Dawn of the Space Age Download 1.49 Mb. 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