III. Opening Policy and Stable International Environment

III. Opening Policy and Stable International Environment

Since the late 1970s, the external environment has served as a very important factor in China’s economic modernization. For example, Deng Xiaoping said in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, “We must never close our door. China can never go back to the days of isolationism. Isolationism brought about disasters like the ‘cultural revolution’…. The world today is progressing by leaps and bounds…. It will be difficult for us to catch up.”³¹

Because of its need to develop foreign trade, attract foreign investment, and acquire foreign advanced technology, China has a crucial stake in maintaining a cooperative foreign policy and stable international environment. Therefore, whatever appears good for China’s domestic economic development is reflected in Beijing’s foreign policy. Chinese leaders have consistently articulated China’s focus interests in stability, prosperity and peace in the Asia-Pacific region. In August 1994, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen expounded that China pursue three basic objectives with its foreign policy: first, stability and prosperity; second, a lasting, peaceful, and tranquil situation in the surrounding region; and third, dialogue and cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and equality.³² In his governmental work report of March 1997, Chinese Premier Li Peng argued that a long-lasting peaceful international environment and stability are prerequisites for China to achieve its economic modernization goals.³³

In explaining Chinese policy to an American audience, President Jiang Zemin said in October 1997, “The supreme interest of China is peace and nation-building. As to all threats to peace and development, no matter where they come from, the Chinese people will join hands with the people of the rest of the world to prevent and eliminate all of them.”³⁴ In the ninth meeting of diplomatic envoys in August 1998, President Jiang reiterated that the most important task of China’s diplomatic work is “to strive for peace and to serve the socialist modernization of our country. To realize socialist modernization and to do a good job in reform and opening, we need a domestic political situation of stability and unity, and an international peace environment.”³⁵

In order to promote economic development, China has shown an ability to rebuild co-operative ties with former adversaries, as its relations with the United States after 1969, Japan after 1972, the Soviet Union after 1982, and India after the mid-1980s illustrate. In all these cases, Chinese leaders came to acknowledge both the costs of further confrontation and the benefits that could be achieved through greater cooperation. In the early 1990s, China normalized relations with Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and South Korea, hosted the first-ever visit by Japan’s emperor, and agreed to participate actively in multilateral organizations like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). China has played a constructive role in the Cambodian peace process and cooperated with other countries to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. China has ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1992, abides by the ban on atmospheric nuclear tests, signed the chemical weapons convention in 1993, and agreed to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (though it is not yet a formal member of the regime). In addition, although China conducted nuclear tests in 1995, China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.³⁶

In the 1990s and early 2000s, five events – the post Tiananmen sanctions of 1989-90, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the 2001 reconnaissance plane incident with the United States – prompted a debate over whether to continue the 1980s foreign policy line stressing peace and development. In each case the debate concluded with a renewed commitment to Deng’s policy of placing primacy on China’s domestic economic development, though this position was modified by an accelerated effort to modernize China’s defense capacities.³⁷

This research will use the following four case studies to further evaluate China’s broad national agendas, all involving the most sensitive sovereignty issues for China and/or nationalism. They will help clarify whether and to what degree China’s priorities really center on economic development, domestic stability, and a stable international environment.

IV. Case Study: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute

In 1972, the United States returned control of Okinawa and the Senkaku (in Japanese) or Diaoyu (in Chinese) Islands to Japan. At that time, Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping agreed that both the Chinese and Japanese governments would set aside the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands for a later date. During the bilateral negotiations over a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan in 1978, Vice Premier Deng said, “Our generation don’t [sic] have the wisdom to solve the Diaoyu Islands dispute. Let’s leave it to future generations to solve.”³⁸

In mid-July 1996, the Japan Youth Association, a Japanese right-wing group, constructed a lighthouse on one of the Senkaku islands. Moreover, on August 28, during talks with Hong Kong officials, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda reiterated the Japanese claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Beijing said Minister Ikeda’s remarks “were most irresponsible. The Diaoyu Islands have been an inherent part of China since ancient times…. They are a part of China and this is irrefutable.”³⁹ Despite its rhetoric condemnation, however, Beijing did not adopt any action to intervene in the Diaoyu Islands issue.

This event triggered a surge of nationalism in Hong Kong and China, as well as in Taiwan. On September 1, a group of 257 Chinese civilians from Beijing and Tianjin wrote a letter to Chinese leaders to demand that Chinese authorities “send navy boats to remove the lighthouse and all structures put up by the Japanese group [on Diaoyu islands].” In addition, students from nine universities in Shanghai applied for permits to demonstrate against Japan. At the same time, about 35 journalists in Beijing signed an open letter urging the Chinese government to mobilize its navy to protect Chinese fishing boats heading for the Diaoyu Islands. On September 8, thousands of people took to streets of Hong Kong calling on Japan to give up its claim to the Diaoyu Islands. On September 13, President Jiang Zemin reportedly met with some generals in Zhongnanhai, including Zhang Aiping, Chen Xilian, and Liao Hansheng, who appealed for efforts to “resist Japanese militarism and recapture the Diaoyu Islands.” On the spot, General Zhang Aiping presented President Jiang with an eight-character scroll in his own handwriting: “We would rather lose a thousand pieces of gold than an inch of land.”⁴⁰

According to a September 14 report carried by Trends, a publication of the CCP Central Committee, relevant central departments and official media received some 37,300 telegrams and letters with a total of 152,000 signatures, including those of 18,000 people from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and from overseas. They urged Beijing to adopt a tougher stance against Japan and even to use warships to recover the islands for China. In addition, on September 15, over 10,000 people marched through Hong Kong’s streets in the largest protest ever against Japanese claims to the Diaoyu Islands.⁴¹

Nevertheless, it was reported that as early as September 6, Beijing decided to discourage Chinese fishing boats from getting close to the Diaoyu Islands to avoid triggering an armed conflict with the Japanese navy. Beijing also banned all newspapers and magazines from carrying articles containing sharp words against Japan. The official Xinhua News Agency did not even cover the mass demonstration held by Hong Kong people on September 15. Moreover, September 18 was the 65^th anniversary of the “September 18^th Incident,”⁴² but the Chinese government did not hold any commemorative activities nor did any Beijing newspaper carry articles about the “September 18^th Incident.”⁴³

In addition, Beijing gave orders to disperse rallies, protest marches, and demonstrations against the revival of Japanese militarism and occupation of Diaoyu Islands. While anti-Japanese demonstrations raged in Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Chinese government denied requests from students and other groups to stage public protests. Five leaders who headed a petition drive to protest Japanese possession of the islands were ordered to leave Beijing. One of the banished petitioners, Tong Zeng, said the government accused him of “interfering in foreign affairs and affecting Chinese-Japanese relations.”⁴⁴ Beijing worried that the “campaign to protect Diaoyu Islands may trigger social disturbances which are aimed against a corrupt and incompetent government.”⁴⁵

China’s official response to the Diaoyu Islands issue was moderate and cautious. On September 17, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “We believe that the Japanese side must quickly adopt active measures to do away with the negative influences. But the circumstances surrounding the Diaoyu Islands are complex, so we believe that we must caution the sending of [Taiwan and Hong Kong civilian] ships there.”⁴⁶ On September 24, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen expressed China’s serious concern to Japan while at the same time referring to the importance of relations between the two countries.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, by late September a rusty freighter with 18 Hong Kong protestors sailed for the Diaoyu Islands. The protesters vowed to retake the Diaoyu Islands in China’s name by removing the Japanese lighthouse. As they neared their destination, Japanese coast guard ships shadowed the freighter, which was flying the Chinese flag, repeatedly urging it not to approach. Unfortunately, one Hong Kong man drowned on September 26 after leaping from the freighter in an attempt to swim to the islets. While expressing its condolences for the accident, Japan continued to assert its sovereignty over the islands.⁴⁸

Thereafter, several anti-Japanese protests took place in Hong Kong. On two occasions in 1997 and 1998, activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan attempted to land on the Diaoyu Islands only to be turned back by Japanese coastguard vessels. On two occasions in 1999 and 2000, activists in Hong Kong called on the Japanese government to halt its intrusions into the Diaoyu Islands and repeatedly called on Beijing to intervene with the slogan, “We would rather lose [a thousand pieces] of gold than an inch of our territory.”⁴⁹

However, Beijing took no steps to intervene on the issue and sought to restrain popular protest in China itself. For example, in response to Japan’s damaging of a Hong Kong ship near the Diaoyu Islands in 1998, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “[T]he Chinese side has, through diplomatic channels, expounded China’s position to the Japanese side, and strongly demanded that the Japanese side draw lessons from the past, refrain from taking stern acts or moves, and refrain from intensifying conflicts.”⁵⁰

Japan’s importance as a source of technology, capital, and market is the likely reason for China’s moderate response. In 1996, China was negotiating the resumption of Japan’s yen loans that had been suspended after China’s 1995 nuclear tests. From 1979 to 1998, Japan offered $23.1 billion in financial aid to China. In 1996, Japan was China’s fourth largest source of cumulative FDI, with realized FDI totaling $14.2 billion, and its largest trading partner, with two-way trade reaching $60.1 billion.⁵¹ An international relations senior scholar in Beijing explained the Chinese position in this way, “This issue is difficult to resolve so China proposes to shelve disputes. China does not want to risk a military conflict with Japan over a small island, which would disrupt the progress of China’s economic development and modernization.”⁵² Another international relations senior scholar in Beijing also agreed that the economic factor is very important for the Chinese government in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations.⁵³