V. Case Study: The South China Sea Islands Dispute

V. Case Study: The South China Sea Islands Dispute

In late January 1995, the Philippine navy discovered Chinese-built concrete structures on Mischief (“Meiji” in Chinese) Reef, an atoll claimed by both China and the Philippines, two hundred kilometers west of the major Philippines island of Palawan. Despite Beijing’s claims that the structures were only shelters for fishing boats, in late March the Philippine government ordered its navy and air force to destroy the structures on Mischief Reef and dismantled survey markers installed by the Chinese on several reefs and atolls in the disputed Spratly islands. Nevertheless, when the Philippines government arranged for local and foreign journalists to visit other islands claimed by Manila, their boat was blocked by Chinese ships. On March 27, the Philippines navy retaliated by arresting sixty-two Chinese seafarers near Mischief Reef and charging them with trespassing. In mid-June, the Philippine military blew up a PRC boundary marker on another atoll.⁵⁴

To diffuse this tension, Beijing told Manila that the Chinese would not build any new structures in the disputed area and subsequently offered to discuss the South China Sea dispute with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a group at its 1995 summit in Bangkok. In their August 11, 1995 joint communiqué, the Philippines and China agreed that the bilateral territorial dispute should be resolved in a peaceful and friendly manner and not by force or by the threat of force. These principles were confirmed in later bilateral meetings regarding Mischief Reef.⁵⁵

However, by March 1996, the Chinese had rebuilt its structures on Mischief Reef. In late 1998, the Philippines realized that China had completed what appeared to be military structures on the Reef. China insisted Mischief Reef facilities were shelters for fishermen and would serve no military purpose. In March 1999, the Philippines found that China had built two more concrete structures on the Reef.⁵⁶

Aside from building these “shelters” on Mischief Reef, Beijing did not take any further provocative action against the Philippines. Instead, Beijing took a cooperative stance. On May 4, 1997, China abandoned a hut-like structure in the disputed Spratly Islands near an island claimed by Manila. In addition, China withdrew four armed vessels from two islands claimed by the Philippines after Manila protested. On November 30, 1998, the Philippines navy arrested 20 Chinese fishermen who were found near Mischief Reef. Beijing made no assertive intervention despite these arrests.⁵⁷

There is another serious territorial dispute in the South China Sea over Scarborough Shoal (“Huangyan Island” in Chinese). The PRC raised a sovereignty marker on Scarborough Shoal in 1991. The Philippines blew this up in 1996 and the following year planted its national flag on the island. In addition, on eight occasions between May 1997 and March 2001, twenty-nine Chinese fishing boats in the waters near Scarborough Shoal were chased and rammed by the Philippine navy and a few sank as a result. Furthermore, on three occasions between May 1997 and March 1998, the Philippine navy arrested 72 Chinese fishermen in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.⁵⁸

The Chinese government urged the Philippines to punish those responsible for the incidents, provide compensation for the losses, and take measures to stop the reoccurrence of such incidents. But a Philippine presidential spokesman said that the Chinese fishermen were to blame for entering Philippines waters and called on Beijing to “respect Philippine sovereignty.” In turn, China called on the Philippines to “refrain from creating any new trouble so as to work with China to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.”⁵⁹

Since the late 1980s, China has advocated the shelving of sovereignty disputes, settlement of all territorial disputes by peaceful means, cooperative economic ventures in the South China Sea, and negotiation of disputes consistent with the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. China did not change this policy even after severe confrontations with the Philippines and Vietnam. In order to maintain a stable international environment and diplomatic relations with the countries around the South China Sea, the PRC behaved with self-restraint and sought to reduce tension through negotiations. In the Mischief Reef case, China did not adopt more assertive action when the Philippines dismantled survey markers and structures installed by the Chinese and arrested hundreds of Chinese fishermen near Mischief Reef and Scarborough shoal. In a dispute over Chinese oil drilling activity near Vietnam, China suspended its activity after Vietnam protested in April 1997. About a year later, Vietnam again complained when a Chinese exploration ship and two armed fishing boats sailed near the Spratly Islands. These vessels also withdrew without any incident. Moreover, China did not take greater action during the Asian financial crisis in late 1997 and 1998, considering its relative military strength and Southeast Asia’s economic and political disarray at the time.⁶⁰

Beijing’s preference for peaceful resolution was reaffirmed, for example, by the joint statement by the heads of the ASEAN and China on December 16, 1997. On at least six occasions between March 1999 and March 2000, Chinese leaders have reiterated China’s stance toward the Spratly Islands by saying that the principle of “making joint development while leaving disputes aside” will help maintain peace and stability in the region though China has never really done anything to promote joint development. They contend that China’s sovereignty over the Spratlys Islands and surrounding sea areas is unarguable, but, paradoxically, China hopes to solve the problem through dialogue and consultation. Despite China’s preference for a bilateral approach to the Spratly disputes, on November 25, 1999, China agreed to negotiate multilaterally with the ASEAN for a “code of conduct” aimed at easing territorial disputes in the South China Sea.⁶¹

The contradiction between Chinese rhetoric of peaceful resolution and military intervention at both Johnson (“Chigua” in Chinese) Reef in 1988⁶² and creeping expansionism in the Spratly Islands in the 1990s is explained by Chung Chien-peng, H. Lyman Miller, and Liu Xiaohong. They argue that China’s concern is that its claims will be marginalized unless it actively asserts its presence in the Spratlys. In 1996 Vietnam controlled 20 of the Spratly islands while eight were held by the Philippines, six by China, three by Malaysia, and one by Taiwan. By 2001, the number of Spratly islands controlled by Vietnam increased to 27. Thus, Chinese contradictory assertion is at most a reaction to the active claims of others in the region.⁶³

In 1984, Deng Xiaoping explained China’s position in this way, “One alternative is to take all these [Nansha] islands [occupied by Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia] back by force; another is to set aside the question of sovereignty and develop them jointly…. We Chinese stand for peace and wish to settle all disputes by peaceful means.”⁶⁴ An international relations senior scholar in Beijing further explained, “China never seized the Spratly islands by force. China just built some shelters on unmanned shoals, as other countries did. Currently China occupies too few shoals and too late. China cannot help but respect the status quo and avoid the use of force. China’s goal is to maintain stability. China does not want to risk disturbing a generally peaceful environment because of small territory dispute. China does not want to disrupt its economic development.” ⁶⁵