Broad National Agendas and a two-Level Game
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VIII. ConclusionSince 1978, China’s foremost national goal has been to develop its economy through its reform and opening policy emphasizing domestic stability and a conducive international environment. Domestic stability is a very important factor not only for the development of China’s economy but also for attracting foreign investment. In addition, a peaceful and stable international environment is also necessary to develop the economy, attract foreign investment, and facilitate international trade. Moreover, China needs to show its prudence and willingness to cooperate within the international system in order to attract foreign investors as well as maintain a peaceful and stable international political and economic environment. The four case studies in this chapter have significantly confirmed China’s broad national agendas as described above. In each case, Beijing tried to minimize the impact of surging nationalism on its overall economic development and domestic stability. Moreover, Beijing has adopted a low profile in elaborating its sovereignty claims and has avoided direct military confrontation over disputed territories, including Taiwan. Even when facing other countries’ aggressive claims and actions in disputed territories by Japan and the Philippines from Chinese perspective and the resulting nationalism among Chinese people, Beijing never went beyond rhetorical and limited military posturing. Far from fanning nationalism, Beijing tried to minimize public overreaction. Beijing banned demonstrations and protests in the cases of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island and Taiwan, and only allowed “controlled” demonstrations and protests followed by calls to focus on economic development, as was the case after the embassy bombing. In the case of the South China Sea Islands, Beijing’s action was mostly defensive compared with that of the Philippines and Vietnam. Beijing did not adopt any concrete action against the Philippines and Vietnam when they destroyed Chinese structures on Mischief Reef and dismantled Chinese markers in many atolls. In addition, the Philippines arrested hundreds of Chinese fishermen near the disputed islands claimed by both sides while China refrained from enforcing its own law banning unauthorized passage through the Spratlys by foreign military vessels and fishing boats. Beijing consistently emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the region through shelving sovereignty disputes and joint development and without resorting to force or the threat of force. An American studies senior scholar in Beijing explained China’s position in this way, “The fundamental goals of Chinese foreign policy are to sustain long-term development, peace, and stable international environment. China needs not only an international environment conducive to development, but also requires no distractions from economic development. Therefore, China does not want to antagonize other countries. For example, in the case of the Diaoyu Islands, China was very self-restrained. In addition, Beijing would not allow students to protest against the South China Sea or the Sino-Indian border issues.”99 Another American studies senior scholar in Beijing emphasized, “Economic development is the core of Chinese foreign policy. All diplomatic lines are conducted along with peace and development.”100 An international relations senior scholar in Beijing also agreed, “The Mainland attaches great importance to economic development and modernization in considering its foreign policy.”101 Regarding the sharp contrast between Beijing’s rhetoric assertiveness and actual prudence, a Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing frankly stated, “The most important priority for China is economics. It is fraud that China puts politics as its first priority. Beijing needs to consider people’s living standards and welfare. This is a prevailing consensus among the public and elite. Beijing should have acted stronger against the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan, but Beijing had economic interests in mind. Beijing still puts economy as the first priority, including when considering whether to use force against Taiwan.”102 China’s broad national agendas provide us an overall picture and value system to assess China’s Taiwan policy in proceeding chapters. In particular, the two-level game103 framework helps illuminate China’s complicated calculation and decision-making regarding its foreign policy as well as Taiwan policy as discussed above. Theories on the initiation of economic sanctions discussed in Chapter 4 also suggest a two-level framework to analyze China’s economic leverage. 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Mingming Wang, in Teng Teng (ed.), Deng Xiaoping Lilun yu Shiji zhi Jiao de Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue [Deng Xiaoping Theory and China’s International Strategy on the Eve of New Century] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2001), p. 597. 64 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), pp. 87-88. 65 An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 17, 2001. 66 David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 57-59. 67 “AFP Views Nationwide Fury in China Over NATO Bombing,” Hong Kong AFP, May 9, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0509. 68 David M. Lampton, Download 127.94 Kb. Share with your friends:
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