Cdl core Files 2015-2016 cdl core Files


NC ANSWERS TO: Democracy Advantage



Download 1.69 Mb.
Page11/75
Date18.10.2016
Size1.69 Mb.
#2993
1   ...   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   ...   75

1NC ANSWERS TO: Democracy Advantage



Stingray devices aren’t a serious threat to innocent people because they release non-target devices
Zetter, 2015 (Kim Zetter, award-winning senior staff reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, and security http://www.wired.com/2015/03/feds-admit-stingrays-can-disrupt-cell-service-bystanders/)

Although Scimeca disclosed to the magistrate that the equipment could disrupt phone service, he didn’t elaborate about how the disruption might occur. Experts suspect it has something to do with the “catch-and-release” way stingrays work. For example, once the stingray obtains the unique ID of a device, it releases it so that it can connect to a legitimate cell tower, allowing data and voice calls to go through.


“As each phone tries to connect, [the stingray] will say, ‘I’m really busy right now so go use a different tower. So rather than catching the phone, it will release it,” says Chris Soghoian, chief technologist for the ACLU. “The moment it tries to connect, [the stingray] can reject every single phone” that is not the target phone.

1NC ANSWERS TO: Racial Profiling Advantage



Racial profiling is subconscious. The plan does nothing to address the cause, so it will continue even if the plan is in effect
Stone 2010 (associate professor of social psychology at the University of Arizona, “Racist, prejudiced attitudes seep from our subconscious”, Arizona Daily Star http://tucson.com/news/opinion/racist-prejudiced-attitudes-seep-from-our-subconscious/article_dd243e21-c99a-55af-851b-ba004f549c91.html)
The problem is that stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination are not entirely conscious and under our control. Research shows that people tend to use race and ethnicity when they interact with others without knowing it, and this leads to subconscious forms of racial and ethnic bias. There was a time in America when stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities were conscious, deliberate and widely accepted. The Jim Crow laws that once characterized race relations promoted prejudice and discrimination in many of its most harmful forms. The Civil Rights Act ushered in new laws against institutionalized discrimination, and with them, new norms among Americans against expressing blatant hatred based on race and ethnicity. Today, Americans simply do not condone or tolerate racism or other forms of bias. Cities and organizations are boycotting Arizona because they believe that SB 1070 reintroduces explicit and deliberate forms of racism. Supporters of SB 1070 strongly deny this and vehemently claim that they are not racist. Supporters of SB 1070 live and work with people of Mexican, Hispanic or Latino descent every day. How can people be racist when they interact daily across racial and ethnic boundaries? Whereas the conscious rejection of racism is critical to maintaining the tight intergroup fabric of our community, it does not keep racial or ethnic biases from happening. Over the last decade, social psychologists have discovered that people who explicitly reject racism can also hold subconscious negative attitudes and stereotypes about racial and ethnic minorities. When these thoughts and feelings operate outside of awareness, people can express hate and discriminate without realizing it. Our brain has a leaky seal that drips hints of dislike when we interact with people who are racially or ethnically different from us. Many subconscious acts of discrimination are subtle, like avoiding eye contact when talking to someone, or avoiding physical contact like a handshake or placing money into a cashier's hand. In its worst form, subconscious bias leads people to refuse to let someone use the bathroom, make someone wait in line while helping other customers or dismiss an application for a job. Subconscious racial and ethnic biases also cause people to mistakenly decide that the tool or wallet in the hand of a minority individual is a gun. When playing a shooter-style video game, people are more likely to accidently shoot an unarmed black person than a white person. Some of these studies have been done with police officers who are trained to avoid making such mistakes because of racial profiling.

There are many examples of racial profiling that don’t involve Stingray surveillance and which the plan can’t fix
Houston Police Department 2015 (“Racial Profiling” http://www.houstontx.gov/police/racialprof.htm)
Racial profiling is any law enforcement-initiated action based on an individual’s race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than on the individual’s behavior or information identifying the individual as having engaged in criminal activity. Examples of racial profiling include but are not limited to the following: Initiating a motor vehicle stop on a particular vehicle because of the race, ethnicity, or national origin of the driver of a vehicle. Stopping or detaining the driver of a vehicle based on the determination that a person of that race, ethnicity, or national origin is unlikely to own or possess that specific make or model of vehicle. Stopping or detaining an individual based on the determination that a person of that race, ethnicity, or national origin does not belong in a specific part of town or a specific place

1NC ANSWERS TO: Solvency



Banning Stingray devices won’t work. The people who would enforce the ban don’t know enough about technology to effectively keep them from operating.
Assange et. al, 2012 (Julian, editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks. Andy Muller-Maguhn, specialist on computers, telecommunications, and surveillance. Jacob Appelbaum, computer security researcher. Jeremie Zimmerman, co-founder and spokesperson for the citizen advocacy group La Quadrature du Net. Conversation in the book “Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet,” chapter titled “The Militarization of Cyberspace”)
democratic states within Europe are massively buying machines that allow them to act exactly outside the law in regard to interception because they don’t need a court decision, they can just switch it on and do it, and this technology can’t be controlled. JULIAN: But are there two approaches to dealing with mass state surveillance: the laws of physics; and the laws of man? One is to use the laws of physics by actually building devices that prevent interception. The other is to enact democratic controls through the law to make sure people must have warrants and so on and to try to gain some regulatory accountability. But strategic interception cannot be a part of that, cannot be meaningfully constrained by regulation. Strategic interception is about intercepting everyone regardless of whether they are innocent or guilty. We must remember that it is the core of the Establishment carrying such surveillance. There will always be a lack of political will to expose state spying. And the technology is inherently so complex, and its use in practice so secret that there cannot be meaningful democratic oversight. ANDY: Or you spy on your own parliament. JULIAN: But those are excuses— the mafia and foreign intelligence— they are excuses that people will accept to erect such a system. JACOB: The Four Horsemen of the Info-pocalypse: child pornography, terrorism, money laundering, and The War on Some Drugs. JULIAN: Once you have erected this surveillance, given that it is complex, given that it is designed to operate in secret, isn’t it true that it cannot be regulated with policy? I think that except for very small nations like Iceland, unless there are revolutionary conditions it is simply not possible to control mass interception with legislation and policy. It is just not going to happen. It is too cheap and too easy to get around political accountability and to actually perform interception. The Swedes got through an interception bill in 2008, known as the FRA-lagen which meant the Swedish signals intelligence agency the FRA could legally intercept all communication travelling through the country in bulk, and ship it off to the United States, with some caveats. 48 Now how can you enforce those caveats once you’ve set up the interception system and the organization doing it is a secret spy agency? It’s impossible. And in fact cases have come out showing that the FRA had on a variety of occasions broken the law previously. Many countries simply do it off-law with no legislative cover at all. So we’re sort of lucky if, like in the Swedish example, they decided that for their own protection from prosecution they want to go legal by changing the law. And that’s the case for most countries— there is bulk interception occurring, and when there is a legislative proposal it is to protect the ass of those who are doing it. This technology is very complex; for example in the debate in Australia and the UK about proposed legislation to intercept all metadata, most people do not understand the value of metadata or even the word itself. 49 Intercepting all metadata means you have to build a system that physically intercepts all data and then throws everything but the metadata away. But such a system cannot be trusted. There’s no way to determine whether it is in fact intercepting and storing all data without having highly skilled engineers with authorization to go in and check out precisely what is going on, and there’s no political will to grant access. The problem is getting worse because complexity and secrecy are a toxic mix. Hidden by complexity. Hidden by secrecy. Unaccountability is built-in. It is a feature. It is dangerous by design.

You can’t challenge the surveillance state, it works hard to protect itself
Stanley 2013 (Jay Stanley, Senior Policy Analyst, Speech, Privacy & Technology Project, “How to Think About the National Security State,” American Civil Liberties Union, Free Future, 9—5—13, www.aclu.org/blog/how-think-about-national-security-state)




2) Perpetuation, protection, and expansion of self Like all life forms, bureaucracies seek to perpetuate themselves, and just as species seek to spread their genes, bureaucracies seek to expand their budgets, payrolls, powers, and domain, as political scientists have long noted. The FBI and NSA push for new surveillance powers such as the Patriot Act and the FISA Amendments Act. TSA seeks to expand its airport role into other areas of American life. Agencies relentlessly overdramatize the threat of cybersecurity in order to grab more power and bigger budgets. By the same token, bureaucracies will generally do whatever it takes to protect their core interests and will rarely if ever be seen sacrificing themselves. Not for principle, or truth, or justice, or morality.


Download 1.69 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   ...   75



The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message
    Main page
Guide
Instructions
Report
Request
Review