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NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: Solvency—FCC Can’t Do It
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2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: Solvency—FCC Can’t Do ItOur evidence is literally a response to yours—the FCC did not certify Stingray based on the information you are referencing and it has no authority over itLaw 360, 2015 “FCC Says It Doesn't Control 'StingRay' Cellphone Tracking,” April 29th, 2015 (http://www.law360.com/articles/649460/fcc-says-it-doesn-t-control-stingray-cellphone-tracking) In a letter released by the U.S.Federal Communications Commission on Tuesday, Chairman Tom Wheeler told a U.S. senator that the agency has essentially no authority over state and local law enforcement agencies’ use of cellphone tracking devices known as “StingRays.” Wheeler’s response to an inquiry by Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., confirmed that the FCC’s certification of the devices manufactured by Harris Corp. was contingent upon the conditions that they only be sold to law enforcement officials and that state and local agencies must coordinate their use of StingRays and other “International Mobile Subscriber Identity catchers” with the FBI, but revealed the limitations of the FCC’s involvement. “The commission has no information about the extent to which or conditions under which law enforcement has obtained authority to use the devices ,” Wheeler said.In February, Nelson pointed to a Washington Post article that detailed local police departments’ use of StingRays to collect data on phone calls, and asked the FCC to clarify its certification process and oversight of the devices. 2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: Solvency—CircumventionThe FCC will make it easy to get around the plan because they can’t say no to the wireless industry Alster 2015 (Norm Alster, Journalism Fellow with the Investigative Journalism Project at the Harvard University Center for Ethics. “Captured Agency How the Federal Communications Commission Is Dominated by the Industries It Presumably Regulates” http://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-ethics/files/capturedagency_alster.pdf) Renee Sharp seemed proud to discuss her spring 2014 meeting with the Federal Communications Commission. As research director for the non-profit Environmental Working Group, Sharp doesn‘t get many chances to visit with the FCC. But on this occasion she was able to express her concerns that lax FCC standards on radiation from wireless technologies were especially hazardous for children. The FCC, however, should have little trouble dismissing those concerns. Arguing that current standards are more than sufficient and that children are at no elevated risk from microwave radiation, wireless industry lobbyists don‘t generally have to set up appointments months in advance. They are at the FCC‘s door night and day. Indeed, a former executive with the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), the industry‘s main lobbying group, has boasted that the CTIA meets with FCC officials ―500 times a year.‖1 Sharp does not seem surprised. ―There‘s no question that the government has been under the influence of industry. The FCC is a captured agency,‖ she said.2 Captured agency. That‘s a term that comes up time and time again with the FCC. Captured agencies are essentially controlled by the industries they are supposed to regulate. A detailed look at FCC actions—and non-actions—shows that over the years the FCC has granted the wireless industry pretty much what it has wanted. Until very recently it has also granted cable what it wants. More broadly, the FCC has again and again echoed the lobbying points of major technology interests. Terror Disadvantage LinksStingRay type surveillance is necessary. Banning it will destroy our ability to fight terrorism and protect our citizens. Sulmasy 2013 (Glenn Sulmasy 2013 for CNN “Why We Need Government Surveillance” Online http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/opinion/sulmasy-nsa-snowden/) The current threat by al Qaeda and jihadists is one that requires aggressive intelligence collection and efforts. One has to look no further than the disruption of the New York City subway bombers (the one being touted by DNI Clapper) or the Boston Marathon bombers to know that the war on al Qaeda is coming home to us, to our citizens, to our students, to our streets and our subways.This 21st century war is different and requires new ways and methods of gathering information. As technology has increased, so has our ability to gather valuable, often actionable, intelligence. However, the move toward "home-grown" terror will necessarily require, by accident or purposefully, collections of U.S. citizens' conversations with potential overseas persons of interest.An open society, such as the United States, ironically needs to use this technology to protect itself. This truth is naturally uncomfortable for a country with a Constitution that prevents the federal government from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures." American historical resistance towards such activities is a bedrock of our laws, policies and police procedures.But what might have been reasonable 10 years ago is not the same any longer. The constant armed struggle against the jihadists has adjusted our beliefs on what we think our government can, and must, do in order to protect its citizens.However, when we hear of programs such PRISM, or the Department of Justice getting phone records of scores of citizens without any signs of suspicious activities nor indications of probable cause that they might be involved in terrorist related activities, the American demand for privacy naturally emerges to challenge such "trolling" measures or data-mining.The executive branch, although particularly powerful in this arena, must ensure the Congress is kept abreast of activities such as these surveillance programs. The need for enhanced intelligence activities is a necessary part of the war on al Qaeda, but abuse can occur without ensuring the legislative branch has awareness of aggressive tactics such as these.Our Founding Fathers, aware of the need to have an energetic, vibrant executive branch in foreign affairs, still anticipated checks upon the presidency by the legislature. Working together, the two branches can ensure that both legally, and by policy, this is what the citizens desire of their government -- and that leaks such as Snowden's won't have the impact and damage that his leaks are likely to cause.As for Snowden, regardless of how any of us feel about the national security surveillance programs at issue, he must be extradited back to the U.S. for interviews and potential trial -- if for no other reason than to deter others from feeling emboldened to break the law in the same way in the future. Information we get from surveillance is vital to preventing terrorist plots, which are even more complex after 9/11. A ban would weaken our defenses. Hirsh 2013 [Michael Hirsh, chief correspondent, the National Journal, “The Next Bin Laden,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-next-bin-laden-20131114, November 14 2013] Ever since the death of Osama bin Laden, President Obama and his senior lieutenants have been telling war-weary Americans that the end of the nation’s longest conflict is within sight. “Core al-Qaida is a shell of its former self,” Obama said in a speech in May. “This war, like all wars, must end.” That was the triumphal tone of last year’s reelection campaign, too.The truth is much grimmer. Intelligence officials and terrorism experts today believe that the death of bin Laden and the decimation of the Qaida “core” in Pakistan only set the stage for a rebirth of al-Qaida as a global threat. Its tactics have morphed into something more insidious and increasingly dangerous as safe havens multiply in war-torn or failed states—at exactly the moment we are talking about curtailing the National Security Agency’s monitoring capability. And the jihadist who many terrorism experts believe is al-Qaida’s new strategic mastermind, Abu Musab al-Suri (a nom de guerre that means “the Syrian”), has a diametrically different approach that emphasizes quantity over quality. The red-haired, blue-eyed former mechanical engineer was born in Aleppo in 1958 as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar; he has lived in France and Spain. Al-Suri is believed to have helped plan the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 bombings in London—and has been called the “Clausewitz” of the new al-Qaida.Whereas bin Laden preached big dramatic acts directed by him and senior Qaida leaders, al-Suri urges the creation of self-generating cells of lone terrorists or small groups in his 1,600-page Internet manifesto. They are to keep up attacks, like multiplying fleas on a dog that finds itself endlessly distracted—and ultimately dysfunctional. (A classic Western book on guerrilla warfare called The War of the Flea reportedly influenced al-Suri.) The attacks are to culminate, he hopes, in acts using weapons of mass destruction.Recent terrorist attacks against U.S. targets, from the murderous 2009 spree of Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood to the Boston Marathon bombings last year, suggest that al-Suri’s philosophy dominates al-Qaida’s newly flattened hierarchy. The late Yemeni-American imam Anwar al-Awlaki, who preached this strategy and induced Hasan’s attack, is said to have developed his ideas from al-Suri’s. Meanwhile, with new refuges in North Africa, Syria, and Yemen, jihadists have much more territory from which to hatch plots unmolested.Yet the politics at home are changing as the threat abroad is growing. The revelations dribbled out by fugitive leaker Edward Snowden have outraged members of Congress and world leaders, including those of close allies such as Germany and France. They say they are aghast at American overreach. Writing in Der Spiegel, Snowden justified himself this way: “Instead of causing damage, the usefulness of the new public knowledge for society is now clear, because reforms to politics, supervision, and laws are being suggested.” Thanks to him, Congress will almost certainly rein in the National Security Agency’s data-trolling methods—though it’s not yet clear how much.But the agency’s opponents may not realize that the practice they most hope to stop—its seemingly indiscriminate scouring of phone data and emails—is precisely what intelligence officials say they need to detect the kinds of plots al-Suri favors. For the foreseeable future, al-Suri’s approach will mean more terrorist attacks against more targets—albeit with a much lower level of organization and competence. “It’s harder to track. Future attacks against the homeland will be less sophisticated and less lethal, but there’s just going to be more of them,” says Michael Hayden, the former NSA director who steered the agency after 9/11 toward deep dives into Internet and telephonic data. Adds Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, “I think al-Qaida’s capabilities for a strike into the United States are more dangerous and more numerous than before 9/11.” For better or worse, the only hope to track them all is an exceptionally deep, organized, and free-ranging intelligence apparatus, experts say.Intelligence officials who are well briefed in the technical aspects of NSA surveillance also note that global communications are vastly more complex than they were as recently as 9/11, not just in terms of speed and bandwidth but also in the kinds of digital paths they can take. Messages can travel partly by air and partly by cable, for example, and the NSA must keep up. “If you take the diffuse physical environment [of more failed-state havens] and you layer that with the diffuse communications environment, and then you layer that with the diffuse ideological environment—more lone wolves, for example—that makes for a far more generally dangerous environment,” says a knowledgeable U.S. government official who asked to remain anonymous. All of which means that despite very legitimate questions about whether the National Security Agency is going beyond what the law and Constitution allow, Americans probably need the NSA now more than ever. Without Stingray style surveillance devices, terrorists will be able to remain anonymous Gamma Group 2011 (manufacturer of a Stingray style device. “3G-GSM Tactical Interception and Target Location” https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/810727-772-gamma-group-catalogue-3g-gsm-tactical.html) Cellular networks have created a haven for criminals and terrorists. Over GSM & 3G networks, criminals and terrorist can remain anonymous, able to continue illegal activities on a global scale without fear of action because:
Although powerful Strategic/Countrywide surveillance monitoring tools are at the disposal of Law Enforcement Agencies, the ability to monitor specific criminals/targets critically requires having specific target identity data. In the case of cellular networks the fundamental information is the IMSI (unique identifier or serial number of the SIM) and the IMEI (unique identifier or serial number of the handset) The IMSI and IMEI is highly prized data, and to protect users it is not normally transmitted within cellular networks. However, if the data is obtained, then Law Enforcement Agencies have all they need to monitor Target(s). The challenge is how to overcome the protective security messages within cellular networks protecting their subscribers and covertly elicit specific target user data. Fortunately, to assist Law Enforcement Agencies we are able to offer solutions which can overcome these challenges. Tactical off-air solutions are available which are able to emulate the cellular network in order to: 1. Indentify & Locate GSM Target(s) Cell-phones Determine and locate the identity of a Target(s) GSM cell-phone by pretending to be the real network and tricking the phone to register accordingly. This process allows the unique identity of the phone (IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI) to be covertly captured, and designated a Target to be precisely located. 2. Identify & Locate 3G Target(s) cell-phones Determine and locate the identity of a Target(s) 3G cell-phone by pretending to be the real network and tricking the phone to register accordingly. THis process allows the unique identity of the phone (IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI) to be covertly captured, and designated Targets to be precisely located. 3. Intercept the Voice and SMS Communication of Designated Targets The communication of Target(s) under surveillance can be captured without their knowledge, including:
the ability to edit all SMS before they are received by the Target(s) Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 1.69 Mb. Share with your friends:
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