Chicago Debate League 2013/14 Core Files
NC Extension Solvency: #1 “Alternate Causality” 212
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- 2NC Extension Solvency: 2 “Law Fails To Protect Minorities” 213
- 2NC Extension Solvency: 3 “Narratives Fail” 214
- 2NC Extension Solvency: 4 “Exploitation Turn” 215
2NC Extension Solvency: #1 “Alternate Causality” 2121) Discrimination is not simply a result of the law’s definition of citizen but also of the economic conditions that drive immigration in the first place. Plentiful labor leads to more immigration, but low-wage jobs lead to discrimination. This causes a cycle led by economics that the Affirmative does not solve. Extend our JOHNSON evidence. 2) Any risk of alternate causalities is a reason to reject their solvency contention. The U.S. will create loopholes and fail to enforce the plan, so any remaining institutional racism will run rampant. JOHNSON, 98 [Kevin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of California at Davis School of Law; “AN ESSAY ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND U.S./MEXICO RELATIONS: THE TALE OF TWO TREATIES;" 5 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 121] Failure of the United States to abide by the idyllic migration agreement would be consistent with its inability to honor the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This history is characteristic of this nation's checkered record of complying with treaty obligations. The United States, for example, infamously violated treaties with Indian tribes. Similarly, the United States has been less than conscientious in adhering to human rights treaties, as demonstrated by the U.S. government's forced return to Haiti of persons fleeing that nation's political violence in the 1990s. More generally, the United States has a spotty record in ensuring that the immigration laws conform to international law. 2NC Extension Solvency: #2 “Law Fails To Protect Minorities” 2131) Legal action cannot protect minority rights because the government will refuse to go beyond their literal demand for minimal benefits, and the court system is too slow to react. New immigrant communities will need more legal protection than established citizens, but the government will not move to help them. Extend our JOHNSON evidence. 2) Laws have unintended consequences: encouraging more immigration will only cause increased discrimination. JOHNSON, 98 [Kevin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of California at Davis School of Law; “AN ESSAY ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND U.S./MEXICO RELATIONS: THE TALE OF TWO TREATIES;" 5 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 121] Moreover, facially neutral laws may have unintended racial consequences. For example, the law imposing sanctions on employers of undocumented immigrants has not proven effective and, at the same time, has resulted in national origin discrimination against persons of Latin American and Asian ancestry. Such discrimination occurs despite the fact that it is prohibited by law. 2NC Extension Solvency: #3 “Narratives Fail” 2141) Adding narratives about personal suffering to policy debates does not accomplish their intended goal because those narratives can never be fully understood by the judge or the policymaker that hears them. The KLEINMAN AND KLEINMAN evidence says that no two individuals experience suffering the same way, and says that the kind of use the aff is making out of testimonials of suffering and injustice is actually exploitative and sensationalizing and doesn’t make for effective policy-making. 2) This is offense against their framework: Reading their story in this round cheapens it by making it just a tool to win a debate, which is no different than using images of starving children to raise money on television. Suffering becomes a currency that gets co-opted by those with power without returning any of that victory to the actual people being hurt. 2NC Extension Solvency: #4 “Exploitation Turn” 2151) Opening the border does not mean that immigrants suddenly have better lives. Most immigrants are unskilled laborers, and flooding the job market will create downward pressure on wages that mean everyone has a lower quality of life. Access to rights does not mean that immigrants will have the material ability to enjoy those rights. Extend our JOHNSON evidence. 2) History proves that new immigrants will be exploited by companies for cheap labor, and capitalism will co-opt the plan. JOHNSON, 98 [Kevin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of California at Davis School of Law; “AN ESSAY ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND U.S./MEXICO RELATIONS: THE TALE OF TWO TREATIES;" 5 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 121] Nor could we be confident that, regardless of any agreement, the United States could ensure that employers do not exploit Mexican labor. Not-so-distant history suggests to the contrary. In the 1950s, the United States and Mexico entered into agreements allowing for the creation of the Bracero Program, a temporary worker program that ostensibly protected the wages and working conditions of Mexican workers. The United States failed to enforce worker protections and, consequently, agricultural growers frequently paid substandard wages to Mexican farmworkers. The Bracero Program also drove down wages for all agricultural workers. As Mario Barrera commented: [t]he benefits of the bracero program were disproportionately appropriated by the large growers ... The various adverse effects which were not supposed to happen but did - were borne by others. Domestic workers were displaced from jobs; farm wages in California showed a downward trend; housing for workers on the farms deteriorated; and unions experienced even greater difficulties organizing in the countryside. 3) Mexico will not be able to negotiate fair terms with the U.S. regarding immigration, and this causes more racism. JOHNSON, 98 [Kevin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of California at Davis School of Law; “AN ESSAY ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND U.S./MEXICO RELATIONS: THE TALE OF TWO TREATIES;" 5 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 121] Finally, Mexico, with its relatively weak bargaining posture, could not be expected to be in a position to ensure that the U.S. government keeps its word with respect to any migration agreement. Mexico's lack of leverage in its dealings with the United States can be seen, for example, in NAFTA's investment provisions, which decidedly favor U.S. interests and may negatively affect Mexican citizens as well as Latina/os in this country. Similarly, the agreement's dispute resolution mechanisms imitate U.S. legal traditions and ignore Mexico's rich, though different, legal culture. Mexico's limited bargaining power in negotiating NAFTA ultimately suggests that it might be unable to pressure the United States to enforce any protections for Mexican citizens in a migration agreement. 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