Chicago Debate League 2013/14 Core Files


NC Extensions: A/t – #6 “Evidence Isn’t Causal” 232



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2NC Extensions: A/t – #6 “Evidence Isn’t Causal” 232



3) And the Link only goes one direction. Aid quickly becomes manipulated for profit, and without any attached threat the recipient governments have no reason to modify behavior.
LEVIN, 00

[Yuval, fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center; “American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions,”http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat11/strategic11.pdf]


In sum, U.S. aid to Egypt is remarkably powerless against Egyptian misbehavior in part because it involves only carrots, and no stick. As Barry Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy has put it: “While important and fundamental areas of U.S.- Egyptian cooperation remain intact, I fear that they reflect only an episodic convergence of interests, not a pattern of partnership” 34 Aid is not changing that. Alas, aid has brought about the sort of convergence of interests between U.S. and Egyptian officials that is injurious to the United States. The enormous amounts of money involved inevitably created interests inside the U.S. bureaucracy as well as in the body politic, whose prestige and pocketbooks profit from continued aid. Hence their support for Egypt has less to do with any affection for Egypt or for U.S. foreign policy than with a tacit bargain: American officials help Egyptian officials to get rich, and Egyptian officials help their American counterparts to validate their reputations.

2NC Extensions: A/t – #7 “Businesses Cause Corruption” [1/2] 233



1) Our argument is specific to government corruption. The plan gives more aid to a specific government, meaning the businesses in that country do not matter. Our Links prove that government-to-government assistance increases corruption, which is enough to trigger our impacts.
2) Government corruption makes business corruption worse, which feeds the cycle. More government assistance scares away good businesses, leaving only the corrupt ones.

REGNERY, 12

[Alfred, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division for US Justice Department; “The Scandal That Is Foreign Aid,” 10/03, www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2012/10/03/The-Scandal-That-Is-Foreign-Aid]


Although US foreign aid may be very good for the contractors, it is very bad for poor countries – or at least the general population of poor countries. Economist Dambisa Moyo, a native of Zambia and an expert on foreign assistance in Africa wrote recently in The Wall Street Journal that over the past 60 years some $1 trillion has been transferred from Western countries to Africa. But real per-capita income is lower today than it was in the 1970s, and more than one half of the population of the entire continent lives on less than one dollar a day – nearly twice the number of 20 years ago. Moyo makes no bones about the fact that foreign aid is “an unmitigated political, economic and humanitarian disaster… it has made the poor poorer, and the growth slower. It has left African countries debt-laden, inflation-prone, vulnerable to the vagaries of the currency markets and unattractive to higher quality investment.

2NC Extensions: A/t – #7 “Businesses Cause Corruption” [2/2] 234



3) Corruption drives successful businesses underground and hampers investment, leading to economic regression.
TAVARES, 03

[Jose, Department of Economics at Universidade Nova de Lisboa in Portugal; “Does foreign aid corrupt?” Economic Letters v. 79, http://www.dochas.ie/Shared/Files/4/DoesForeignAidCorruptFinal.pdf]


Several empirical studies have provided evidence that the costs of corruption are considerable. Mauro (1995) estimates that an increase in corruption of one sample standard deviation decreases investment and growth by 5 and 0.5% of GDP, respectively. Keefer and Knack (1995) confirm the existence of a direct negative effect of corruption on growth, in addition to the effect of corruption on investment. In addition, corruption makes it difficult for governments to raise revenue to finance public services since corrupt environments drive businesses underground to avoid formal taxation (Loayza, 1996). More, since bribes are harder to collect on certain transactions, corruption biases the 8 provision of public goods away from education. On the monetary front, Al-Marhubi (2000) shows that corruption and inflation are positively associated, even after controlling for other determinants of inflation such as political instability and central-bank independence.

2NC Extensions: A/t – #8 “Plan Solves Corruption” [1/3] 235



1) Our Link arguments above prove that plan cannot overcome corruption. It is still financial assistance to a foreign government, which encourages bad policies. Their evidence is about hope, not reality.
REGNERY, 12

[Alfred, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division for US Justice Department; “The Scandal That Is Foreign Aid,” 10/03, www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2012/10/03/The-Scandal-That-Is-Foreign-Aid]


Former Reagan-era Ambassador Eugene Douglas, who has visited Africa dozens of times both as a diplomat and as a businessman, and who has closely observed US foreign aid and its impact for years, told me, “the system is rotten and has become just another piggy bank for the ‘one world’ progressive college graduates who find it so uplifting to act out fantasies with taxpayer funds and virtually no practical accountability.” US foreign aid is no stranger to criticism. It was originally intended to promote US foreign policy but is increasingly used for political and humanitarian purposes which often have little to do with American interests. It is questionable whether it has any positive impact on US foreign policy; nobody knows how much of what we send abroad is stolen, converted to another use, or actually reaches its intended destination.
2) Attempting to fight corruption with more aid only makes the problem worse. This forces corrupt businesses to pursue government ties in other countries in the region, spreading corruption everywhere.
LUNA, 13

[David, Director for Anticrime Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; “Leveraging Partnerships to Combat Corruption, Money Laundering, and Illicit Networks,“ 03/13, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/2013/205899.htm]


Ladies and gentlemen, in recent years, our hemisphere has seen the rise of violent criminal networks vying for a greater market share in the global illegal economy. We have learned that when we apply pressure on these networks in one place, they adapt their operations and routes to new places. They bring with them violence, firepower, and corruption. We saw this “balloon effect” in the 1990s: when Colombia cracked down on drug production and trafficking, these activities increased in other Andean countries, like Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. New trafficking routes emerged, and the counter-narcotics battlefield shifted to Mexico. Sustained pressure by Mexican security forces in recent years has forced the cartels to push their operations into Central America. Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize are now suffering a staggering increase in drug trafficking and crime.



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