A) Uniqueness: President Obama is focused on using his limited diplomatic capital on resolving problems in the Middle East, but success will require his full foreign policy attention.
WASHINGTON POST, 13
[David Ignatius, “Obama’s pragmatic approach to Mideast,” 3/27, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-27/opinions/38068629_1_president-obama-netanyahu-israel]
This pragmatic line on foreign policy was evident during Obama’s trip to the Middle East this month. Though the president is often criticized for his passive, “leading from behind” style, he made some notable advances on the trip. The challenge, as always for Obama, will be to follow through with coherent “from the front” leadership. Here are three strategic gains that emerged from the trip: Obama breathed a little life back into an Israeli-Palestinian peace process that had all but expired. He did this largely by the force of his March 21 speech in Israel. What he accomplished was the diplomat’s trick of riding two horses at once: The speech was a love letter to Israel, as one commentator noted, and it was also a passionate evocation of the Palestinians’ plight, and the need to “look at the world through their eyes.” Obama pulled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu toward the U.S. position on military action against Iran. Netanyahu said that “if Iran decides to go for a nuclear weapon — that is, to actually manufacture the weapon — then . . . it will take them about a year.” He said the United States and Israel share “a common assessment” of Iran. This sounded close to agreement with Obama’s position that the trigger for a military strike would be an Iranian breakout toward a bomb; that’s quite different from the “zone of immunity” arguments Netanyahu was making last year, which viewed Iran’s very position of enrichment technology as the threat. These exchanges demonstrated that Obama is stronger politically than he was a year ago and Netanyahu is weaker. The Israeli prime minister is now trying to associate himself with Obama’s Iran policy, rather than pressuring him. Obama brokered an important reconciliation between Netanyahu and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. With the region in turmoil, this was a matter of vital national interest for both Israel and Turkey, but it took Obama to provide the personal link that made it happen. This was a payoff for Obama’s cultivation of Erdogan since 2010, and for his “reset” with Netanyahu. Syria remains the test of whether Obama can, forgive the term, “lean in” more during his second term. Obama has been slow to see the dangers of U.S. passivity there: For months he let things drift in Syria; the United States had a nominal commitment to strengthening command-and-control within the opposition but no real policy on the ground to accomplish it. Obama is now said to understand the risk that Syria’s sectarian conflict will spread to Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan if the United States doesn’t take stronger action. The White House is eager to work with Brig. Gen. Salim Idriss, the commander of the Free Syrian Army, on training, logistics and other priorities. The administration recognizes that it may need “safe zones,” perhaps protected by air defenses, to train Syrian rebels inside the country rather than in Jordan and Turkey. The president is still said to resist the simple formula of “arm the rebels,” but he seems close to partnering with friendly intelligence services in the region on what would be a major covert action program, reminiscent of Afghanistan in the 1980s, with all the attendant risks. In framing this project, he’d be wise to bring in some CIA veterans who have experience running similar programs, pronto. Obama hasn’t had a personality transplant. He’s still likely to be slow and deliberate. But the Middle East trip showed that he has built some political and diplomatic capital and is starting to use it wisely.
1NC Shell: Diplomatic Capital Disadvantage 257
B) Link: The plan forces Obama to focus his resources on Latin America, which causes foreign policy overstretch and prevents his ability to deal with the Middle East.
ANDERSON AND GREWELL, 01
[Terry, Senior fellow at Hoover Institute; and Bishop, Research associate @ Political Economy Research Center; “It Isn't Easy Being Green: Environmental Policy Implications for Foreign Policy, International Law, and Sovereignty," Chicago Journal of International Law, Fall 2001, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 427, Nexis]
Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence, such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer writes, "Because diplomatic currency is finite... it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies."40
C) Impact: Peace process failure causes escalating proliferation and aggression that causes nuclear war.
SLATER, 99
[Jerome, Professor of Political Science at SUNY-Buffalo; Tikkun Magazine, 3/01]
There has been a kind of conspiracy of silence over the potential consequences of a breakdown of the peace process, perhaps because in the worst case they are nothing short of apocalyptic. But the risks are real. Israel has hundreds of nuclear weapons, Syria has nerve gas mounted on ballistic missiles aimed at Israeli cities, and it is only a matter of time before other Arab states or - far worse - fanatical terrorist groups obtain weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, or biological. Here is the nightmare scenario: The intransigence of the Netanyahu government and its clear intention to continue to dominate the West Bank and deny the Palestinians true national citizenship and sovereignty lead to a resumption of sustained terrorism, this time with the tacit acquiescence or open support of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority and with the general support of the Palestinian population. Israel reacts with economic and military retaliation that creates widespread desperation among the Palestinians, and this results in the eclipse of Arafat by Hamas and other Palestinian extremists. The intifada resumes, this time not with stones but with guns and bombs. Israel responds with unprecedented repression, and the cycle of communal violence and counterviolence continues to escalate until Israel decides to reoccupy the West Bank and perhaps Gaza in order to crush the Palestinian movement - maybe even expelling large numbers of Palestinians into neighboring Arab states. An inflamed Arab world greatly increases its support of the new intifada or, worse, moderate governments that try to stand clear are overthrown and replaced by extremists in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. In these circumstances, even if a general war in the Middle East could somehow be averted, there is likely to be escalating international terrorism against Israel and its supporters - sooner or later including nuclear or other forms of mass terrorism.
Share with your friends: |