Main Wartime Developments
As the war progresses, the Royal and Dominion Navies expand rapidly with large construction programmes, particularly escort carriers, destroyers, corvettes, frigates, submarines, landing ships and craft.
By mid-1944, 800,000 officers and men and 73,000 WRNS are in uniform.
Vastly improved radars and anti-submarine weapons have been introduced, and the tactics to use them effectively, honed to a fine pitch.
Ship-borne and land-based aircraft become vital in the life and death struggle against the U-boat, the only concern Prime Minister Winston Churchill retained throughout six years of war.
Huge combined operations landings take place with air superiority usually assured.
Although not defeated, magnetic, then acoustic and finally pressure mines are kept under control.
Perhaps of greatest single significance, the 'Ultra' operation against the German Enigma codes allows the Allies to penetrate to the very heart of German and Axis planning and operations.
In short, in a war that starts with Polish cavalry and ends with the Anglo-US atomic bomb, the Royal and Dominion Navies face new and continuing threats and learn to deal with them technically, operationally and above all, successfully.
But the price paid is high:
British Naval Casualties
not including RAF and Army personnel killed in related circumstances - Coastal Command, Defensively-Equipped Merchant Ships (DEMS) etc
Royal Navy - 50,758 killed, 820 missing, 14,663 wounded
Women's Royal Naval Service - 102 killed, 22 wounded
Merchant Navy - 30,248 lost through enemy action
and in ships:
Royal Navy Losses - Total Losses - by Year - by Theatre - by Enemy
TOTAL STRENGTH AND LOSSES
ROYAL NAVY
Warship types
|
Strength as of Sept 1939
|
Commissioned to Aug 1945
|
TOTAL IN SERVICE
|
TOTAL LOSSES
|
Capital ships
|
15
|
5
|
20
|
5
|
Carriers
|
7
|
58
|
65
|
10
|
Cruisers
|
66
|
35
|
101
|
34
|
Destroyers
|
184
|
277
|
461
|
153
|
Submarines
|
60
|
178
|
238
|
76
|
TOTALS
|
332
|
553
|
885
|
278
|
LOSSES BY YEAR - including not repaired
ROYAL NAVY
Warship types
|
1939
|
1940
|
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
1945
|
Totals
|
Capital ships
|
1
|
-
|
4
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
5
|
Carriers
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
10
|
Cruisers
|
-
|
3
-
|
11
(1 RAN)
|
13
(2 RAN)
|
4
-
|
3
-
|
-
|
34
(3 RAN)
|
Destroyers
|
3
-
-
|
37
-
(2 RCN)
|
22
(1 RAN)
-
|
51
(3 RAN)
(2 RCN)
|
18
-
(1 RCN)
|
20
-
(2 RCN)
|
2
-
-
|
153
(4 RAN)
(7 RCN)
|
Submarines
|
1
|
24
|
11
|
19
|
13
|
5
|
3
|
76
|
TOTALS
|
6
|
65
|
50
|
86
|
36
|
29
|
6
|
278
|
LOSSES BY THEATRE
ROYAL NAVY
Warship types
|
Atlantic
|
Europe
|
Mediterranean
|
Indian & Pacific Oceans
|
Capital ships
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
Carriers
|
4
|
3
|
2
|
1
|
Cruisers
|
4
|
4
|
20
|
6 (3 RAN)
|
Destroyers
|
23 (5 RCN)
|
53 (2 RCN)
|
67 (2 RAN)
|
10 (2 RAN)
|
Submarines
|
3
|
23
|
45
|
5
|
TOTALS
|
35
|
84
|
135
|
24
|
ROYAL NAVY
Warship types
|
German
|
Italian
|
Japanese
|
French
|
Other (a)
|
Unknown
|
Total
|
Capital ships
|
3
|
-
|
2
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
5
|
Carriers
|
8
|
-
|
1
|
-
|
1
|
-
|
10
|
Cruisers
|
20
|
6
|
5
|
-
|
3
|
-
|
34
|
Destroyers
|
114
|
15
|
8
|
1 (b)
|
15
|
-
|
153
|
Submarines (c)
|
24
|
37
|
4
|
-
|
6
|
5
|
76
|
TOTALS
|
169
|
58
|
20
|
1
|
25
|
5
|
278
|
Analysis of Axis Navy Losses - German Navy - Italian Navy - Japanese Navy
GERMAN NAVY - ALL MAJOR WARSHIPS - Totals and (Due to Royal Navy)
GERMAN NAVY
|
1939
|
1940
|
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
1945
|
Total
|
Capital ships
|
1 (RN)
|
-
|
1 (RN)
|
-
|
1 (RN)
|
1
|
3 (a)
|
7 (3 RN)
|
Cruisers
|
-
|
3 (2 RN)
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
3 (a)
|
6 (2 RN)
|
Raiders
|
-
|
-
|
3 (RN)
|
3 (1 RN)
|
1
|
-
|
-
|
7 (4 RN)
|
Destroyers (b)
|
-
|
12 (RN)
|
-
|
4 (3 RN)
|
2 (1 RN)
|
7 (2 RN)
|
2
|
27 (18 RN)
|
Submarines
|
9 (RN)
|
22 (17 RN)
|
35 (28 RN)
|
86 (34 RN)
|
237 (61 RN)
|
242 (85 RN)
|
149 (41 RN)
|
780 (275 RN)
|
TOTALS
|
10 (RN)
|
37 (31 RN)
|
39 (32 RN)
|
93 (38 RN)
|
241 (63 RN)
|
250 (87 RN)
|
157 (41 RN)
|
827 (302 RN)
|
ITALIAN NAVY - to 8th September 1943 - Totals and (Due to Royal Navy)
Warship types
|
1939
|
1940
|
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
Total
|
Battleships
|
N/A
|
1 (RN)
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
1 (RN)
|
Cruisers
|
N/A
|
1 (RN)
|
6 (RN)
|
3 (2 RN)
|
2
|
12 (9 RN)
|
Destroyers(a)
|
N/A
|
8 (RN)
|
14 (10 RN)
|
8 (4 RN)
|
13 (6 RN)
|
43 (28 RN)
|
Submarines
|
N/A
|
20 (12 RN)
|
18 (14 RN)
|
22 (17 RN)
|
25 (13 RN)
|
85 (56 RN)
|
TOTALS
|
N/A
|
30 (22 RN)
|
38 (30 RN)
|
33 (23 RN)
|
40 (19 RN)
|
141 (94 RN)
|
JAPANESE NAVY Totals and (Due to Royal Navy)
Warship types
|
1939
|
1940
|
1941
|
1942
|
1943
|
1944
|
1945
|
Total
|
Battleships
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
-
|
2
|
1
|
4
|
4
|
11
|
Carriers
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
-
|
6
|
1
|
12
|
2
|
21
|
Cruisers
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
-
|
6
|
2
|
24 (1 RN)
|
9 (3 RN)
|
41 (4 RN)
|
Destroyers
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
4
|
18
|
34
|
61
|
18
|
135
|
Submarines
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
3
|
16 (2.5 RN)
|
28 (2.5 RN)
|
53 (3 RN)
|
27
|
127 (8 RN)
|
TOTALS
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
7
|
48 (2.5 RN)
|
66 (2.5 RN)
|
154 (4 RN)
|
60 (3 RN)
|
335 (12 RN)
|
NOTES: Of 12 Submarines sunk RN: Royal Navy - 4, Australian - 2, Indian - 0.5, New Zealand - 1.5
CIVILIAN PRECAUTIONS
In considering the preparedness for war it is also necessary to consider civilian precautions, which began in 1938. It was estimated that in the first 6 months of the war, German bombers would kill one and a half million people. One civilian precaution was the provision of communal sheltering. These were built throughout the country in the first 3 months running up to the Munich Agreement. Some people found their own solutions though, by sheltering in the London Underground which caused over crowding and there was a high risk of mass casualties. Stuart Hylton says that, ‘about 60 percent of the population stayed in their beds during raids and took their chances’, referring to the lack of use of sheltering. However, a London Home Intelligence Report stated, ‘Sheltering has become the next best thing to evacuation for a great many Londoners’, showing that the provision of sheltering was partially effective.
The Anderson Shelter was one of the first shelters to be given to the British public by the government. It was named after Sir John Anderson who was in charge of civil defence and it cost £5 for those with an annual income of over £250. In some cases they were free of charge – over 1 and a half million free Anderson shelters were issued. By 1940 it protected a quarter of the population. It was made from corrugated iron and could be built in the back garden. It could withstand most explosions but it could not withstand a direct hit and was uncomfortable. Paul Addison mentions that Anderson Shelters, ‘undoubtedly saved many lives’.
Another shelter was the Morrison Shelter. This was designed to go inside the house and could be used as a table during the day. It was good if quick cover was needed. Conversely, it could withstand only smaller explosions and could not withstand a direct hit. It was proved to be the most successful of the war.
In 1938 over 38 million gas masks were distributed following the Munich Agreement. Also, by the beginning of 1937 gas masks were being produced at a rate of 150,000 a week. This was because there was widespread terror of a gas attack to spread panic. However, these were uncomfortable and there were none provided for babies. Paul Addison says that when gas masks were first distributed, they became a ‘minority habit’ but as time went on ‘almost no-one bothered’. In fact for many young men Stuart Hylton points out that ‘they became a source of ridicule’.
EVACUATION
Another civilian precaution was evacuation. Robert MacKay says, ‘the daunting task of working out a scheme for the sudden mass movement of perhaps five million people was purposefully addressed’. Many pregnant women, children, and teachers were evacuated from inner cities to the countryside for protection. Almost 3 and a half million children were evacuated at the start of war. However, there were some flaws.
For example, during the ‘phoney war’ almost 700,000 evacuees returned home. There was a lack of organisation: in some cases the diet for 4 days consisted of milk, apples and cheese and some had to sleep on straw covered by grain bags. Other problems included hostility towards the evacuees; one Home Intelligence Report stated that the friction between hosts and evacuees was caused by the, ‘untidy and dirty habits of evacuees’.
Many evacuees lacked proper toilet training (between 5 and 10%) and about half were verminous with lice and scabies. Five percent could not use cutlery, some children had only one set of clothes, and malnutrition was common. Michael Lynch argues that, ‘Evacuation let the British people see how the other half lived. It revealed to the middle classes the sheer depravity of their poorer counterparts. It pricked the nation’s conscience’. Chamberlain stated, ‘little did I know that such conditions existed in this country’ revealing the ignorance of the people of Britain to the poverty that existed’. Furthermore, sometimes it took a long time for people to be evacuated. J. Stephens describes evacuation as a ‘knee-jerk reaction’. Another issue was that the billeting officers for evacuation were volunteers. Angus Calder points out that the volunteers ‘varied in status, competence, integrity and compassion’.
One weakness of civil defence during World War Two was that the wealthier had an increased chance of survival than poorer groups. Tiratsoo argues that, ‘Different classes experience different wars’, and, that ‘The upper classes got gourmet dinners and underground basements in top class hotels’. Those who could afford it were able to evacuate overseas, which is another example of the inequalities that existed between the rich and poor. Stuart Hylton poses another example of how the government failed as he states, ‘After the first month of bombing, there was considerable anger at the failure of the authorities to provide sufficient deep shelters, and the shortcomings of other air raid precautions’.
ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCE
Anti-aircraft defence was also an issue. Anti-aircraft defence was poor quality at the start of war. Firstly, there was a meagre supply of guns. The national stock stood at 100 guns in 1938 yet the estimated minimum for London alone was 216. In addition, they were very inaccurate. As Stuart Hylton states, ‘The nation’s anti-aircraft defences were not in good shape at the outbreak of war. In a practice exercise they scored just two hits out of 2935 shots fired’. Clearly these inadequacies speak for themselves.
To provide extra support, Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War introduced a voluntary scheme of local defence volunteers, or the ‘home guard’. These were members of the public who would be armed to fight off Germans. It was part-time and unpaid work. Unfortunately, many volunteers were very young or very old. Also, many were unfit. Fitzgibbon states, ‘Out of a thousand recruits sent to the 31st Anti-Aircraft Brigade, fifty had to be discharged immediately, twenty more were mentally deficient, and a further 18 were below medical category B2’.
When it comes to civilian precautions, Britain was mostly ready. Sheltering and evacuation suitably protected people in vulnerable areas against air raids and gas masks were widely available. On the other hand, evacuation raised serious social issues, especially poverty in Britain and the inequalities that existed. Furthermore, the Home Guard and anti-aircraft defence were not properly prepared but overall, Britain’s civilian precautions were fairly prepared
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