Aselford Martin Shopping Centres v. A.L. Raymond, [1990] R.J.Q. 1971 (C.S.)
Aselford says the essentially the same thing as L’H-D in Houle
Facts: Raymond sold a shopping centre to Aselford. Aselford was to make monthly payments in order to pay the balance of the sale price. A clause in the contract said that even if Aselford was not in default, Raymond could arrange to have the rents from the tenants paid directly to Raymond. Aselford applied to the Court to see if it could kick out one of the tenants who had a huge space in the mall but wasn’t paying very much rent. Raymond claimed that this constituted default because it threatened its security interest to remove such a substantial tenant. Aselford then desisted in that proceeding, but Raymond continued to collect the rents. Raymond claims that Aselford was in default, and even if they weren’t the contract allowed them to collect the rents anyway.
Issue: Can Raymond exercise its right to collect the rents from Aselford’s tenants even if Aselford is not in default on the loan payments?
Holding: No. This is an abuse of right. The exercise of the right as stipulated in the clause violated the principles of fair play in 1024, (now 1434).
Ratio: The right of the creditor to collect the rents owed to the debtor is in principle only exercisable when the debtor is in default, or if the debtor deteriorates or administers badly the hypothecated immovable, thereby diminishing the creditor’s security. Even if the declaratory action of Aselford constituted bad administration, that action was abandoned. Once an action is abandoned, things return to their previous state, as though the action had never been instituted. Thus, there is no question of Aselford being in default or jeopardizing the security of Raymond. The question then is whether the collection of the rents can take place in the absence of default. The answer is no. Even if freedom of contract is absolute in the Civil code, it is nonetheless subject to certain fundamental principles. In the interpretation of every contract, we must keep the principle of “equité” in mind (1024, not 1434). This is an integral part of all contracts in our law, and it exists despite the idea of autonomy of the will to allow the judge a discretionary power to correct the consequences of the most grave contractual inequities. The clause that gave the to transfer the rents in the absence of default is abusive, arbitrary and a violation of the fundamental principles of “équité”.
note that the judge has to ground it in 1024 CCLC principles of equity, because this is 1990 and the good faith provisions didn’t exist yet.
This case seems to almost bring good faith to a status of public order, the judge says that it’s not just the abusive exercise of the right but the clause itself is abusive, seems to be saying that you can’t contract out of good faith
Basically, Houle and Aselford tell us that equity exists despite autonomy of the will: is this overrides the parties’ will, then too bad. It’s worth it, and we have to have faith in the judiciary that it will only be used in appropriate circumstances.
Discussion
A court will not allow a party to act in a certain manner when it will be against good faith.
If you have an immovable property and has lessees you have to put an assignment of rents clause that allows you to pay the rent directly to you. It is a perfectly legitimate clause which is triggered by default of the debtor.
Was there a default in this case? The court later said that there was no default. Therefore the explicit clause in the assignment of rents gives the right to use it even in absence of default.
The court says that you cannot exercise a right contrary to good faith. If it is abusive or arbitrary and violate the rules of equity you cannot exercise the right. This is a continuation of Houle.
How can we override the obligations of the parties? In Houle there is a dissent that says if you give judgment for one of the parties you will undermine of the basic tenets of contract. In essence it would be an alteration of the contract which would violate autonomy of the will. Aselford answers in other words that it does not care.
HD in Houle says that it is without doubt and encroachment into the will of the parties.
If Aselford was decided in 2002, what would happen?
Art. 1379 – adhesive k
Art. 1437 – abusive right
Art. 1375 – good faith
Along comes the final case in what is called the trilogy of good faith cases – Bail. How does this case take it one step further?
Bank of Montreal v. Bail [1992] Gonthier,J.
Facts: Hydro Quebec accepted tenders for a project. The tenderers based their bid on information supplied by Hydro Quebec. Hydro Quebec knew that there were errors in that information and never disclosed it. Hydro-Quebec knew its design was erroneous, and refused to admit the error in order to induce the contractor and sub-contractor to complete the work without having to renegotiate. The bank, who is now the receiver in bankruptcy of the sub-contractor whose business was ruined, was allowed to rely on the failure of the obligation to inform because Hydro Quebec had a duty to act reasonably towards sub-contractors, particularly when it is a matter of informing them of errors in tender documents. Contractors commonly use sub-contractors in such large projects. Thus, the obligation to inform benefits the contractor and the subcontractor.
Ratio: Obligation to Inform in Quebec Law
“The obligation to inform is now well-established in Quebec Law”
I believe it is possible to outline a general theory of the obligation to inform, based on the duty of good faith in the realm of contracts.
The main elements of the obligation to inform are the following:
Actual or presumed knowledge of the information on the part of the party which owes the obligation to inform
The information in question is of decisive importance
It is impossible for the party to whom the obligation is owed to inform itself, or the creditor is legitimately relying on the debtor of the obligation
the advent of this obligation relates to a certain shift that has been taking place in the civil law: we are now more attentive to inequalities in terms of information, and are imposing positive obligations where one party is in a vulnerable position with regard to information, from which damage may result
the obligation to inform and the duty not to give false information are two sides of the same coin
However, the obligation to inform must not be construed so broadly as to obviate the fundamental obligation which rests on every one to self-inform and take care in conducting one’s affairs. Moreover, this must not be confused with the obligation to counsel or advise.
This case deals with a contractual duty to inform, although such a duty may arise in other circumstances
NOTES:
So, obligation to inform is a subset of overarching concept of good faith, and it extends to the pre-K sphere
But, in this case although the contractual duty to inform is the key point, the fact is that the Bank’s action is based on x-k responsibility because there was no K between Hydro Quebec and the sub-K’or. The question is not whether there was K’al fault, although it is a juridical fact that can aid in the assessment of delictual fault. The Q is whether Hydro Quebec acted reasonably towards the third party, the subcontractor. In this situation, Hydro Quebec committed an x-k fault by creating a fact situation which it could easily have foreseen would cause damage to the sub-contractor.
Where does it say that this doctrine applies - with respect to third parties?
Where is the breach of the obligation of good faith in Soucise? In the extinction of the obligation.
In Bail the obligation of good faith extends into the formation of the contract.
-This translates into an obligation to inform. Gone are the days of caveat emptor (buyer beware).
-Gonthier says that if one of the parties in the pre-contractual stage has knowledge, and is important, and it is impossible for the other party to get that knowledge, and the other party is in reliance.
-You better spit out that knowledge or you will be found to be in violation of that obligation.
We see these three decisions that in a period of 11 years extends the notion of good faith and extends into all aspects.
Remember Martel (2000) in which a lease was being negotiated between a lessee and a branch of the government. The lessor dangled the lessee along and the latter did everything to try to win the lease and finally the lease was not awarded to the lessee. The SCC in this case said there was no obligation of good faith in the common law.
State of the Law Post-Trilogy
Where does the law stand post this trilogy?
The first thing to now is that the CCQ which come into force in Jan 1, 1994 is tremendously influenced by these decisions and we can remember that the tradition of the civil law is that it is supposed to provide a guide to future behaviour.
Here is an example where the Code is influenced by the jurisprudence and the Code reflects the developments of the jurisprudence. This contradicts the notion that civil law judges do not make law.
The new Code contains a number of important provisions:
CCQ 6, 7 these articles pick up that good faith is reasonableness.
There is also art. 1375, which picks up on the jurisprudence.
We also have 1434 (CCLC 1024). The other articles that we will look at are CCQ arts. 1416/1419/1401(2).
The CCQ is tremendously influenced by case law with respect to the GOOD FAITH.
These articles are enacted in the Code
There is jurisprudence that is developing the doctrine. There are no countless articles on good faith.
We now have a proliferation of doctrine and jurisprudence in this area. The doctrine is now being extended to all kinds of situations. Some would say that good faith is a principle of public order. Therefore you cannot contract around public order provisions.
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