Collision: the ¾ liability clause
Case Study Two Hall Bros Steamship Co Ltd v Young. [1939] 1 K.B. 748
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Case Study TwoHall Bros Steamship Co Ltd v Young. [1939] 1 K.B. 748The Issues Insurance (Marine)—Running down clause—Collision between insured ship and pilot boat—Insured ship not to blame—Recovery by pilot administration of cost of repairs to pilot boat—Recovery under French law—Shipowners claim to be recouped under policy—Meaning of "by way of damages." By a marine insurance policy dated March 18, 1929, the hull and machinery of a ship were insured for £47,500. The policy was subject to the Institute Time Clauses, including the common form running down clause by which it was provided: "If the ship hereby insured shall come into collision with any other ship or vessel and the assured shall in consequence thereof become liable to pay and shall pay by way of damages to any other person or persons any sum or sums in respect of such collision" the underwriters would pay to the assured three-fourths of such sum or sums. The ship while on a voyage arrived off Dunkirk and stopped to take up a pilot. The pilot boat was coming alongside when the steering-gear broke down and she collided with the ship. The ship was in no way to blame. Art. 7 of the French law of March 28, 1928 (as translated), provides "except in case of gross negligence of the pilot damage (avaries) sustained by the pilot boat in the course of pilotage operations, and in the course of embarking or disembarking the pilot, is chargeable to the ship." The pilot administration recovered from the owners the sum of £432 under this law, and the owners claimed to recover three-quarters of this sum from the underwriters:- Held (affirming Goddard J.), (1.) that the words "by way of damages" in the running down clause limited the right of recovery under the clause to cases where the liability of the shipowners was due to some breach of duty by the ship; (2.) that the meaning of these words could not be extended by reason of a proviso which excluded from the operation of the clause liabilities to which on the limited view of the operation of the main part of the clause stated above it could in no case apply; (3.) that the owners' claim therefore failed. Furness Withy & Co., Ld. v. Duder [1936] 2 K. B. 461 applied. The plaintiffs were at all material times the owners of the steamship Trident . By a policy of marine insurance dated March 18, 1929, the defendant insured the plaintiffs for a tenth part of 950l., which was itself part of the total sum of 47,500l. insured on the hull and machinery of the vessel *749 for one year from February 20, 1929. The policy was subject to the Institute Time Clauses attached to the policy, the first of which was: "And it is further agreed that if the ship hereby insured shall come into collision with any other ship or vessel and the assured shall in consequence thereof become liable to pay and shall pay by way of damages to any other person or persons any sum or sums in respect of such collision the undersigned will pay the assured such proportion of three-fourths of such sum or sums so paid as their respective subscriptions hereto bear to the value of the ship hereby insured, provided always that .... in cases in which the liability of the ship has been contested, or proceedings have been taken to limit liability, with the consent in writing of the undersigned, they will also pay a like proportion of three-fourths of the costs which the assured shall thereby incur, or be compelled to pay; but where both vessels are to blame, then unless the liability of the owners of one or both of such vessels becomes limited by law, claims under this clause shall be settled on the principle of cross-liabilities. ...." This was followed by a proviso in these terms: "Provided always that this clause shall in no case extend to any sum which the assured may become liable to pay or shall pay for removal of obstruction under statutory powers, for injury to harbours, wharves, piers, stages, and similar structures, consequent on such collision; or in respect of the cargo or engagements of the insured vessel or for loss of life or personal injury." While proceeding with a cargo of cereals from the River Plate to Dunkirk the Trident arrived off Dunkirk on August 24, 1929, and stopped to take up a pilot. The pilot boat Vétéran which belonged to the Pilotage Administration of Dunkirk, was drawing alongside the vessel when her steering-gear broke down and she came into collision with the vessel. The vessel and the pilot boat were both damaged. It was admitted that the vessel was in no way to blame. Art. 7 of the French law of March 28, 1928, dealing with matters of pilotage, provides: "Saut le cas de faute lourde *750 du pilote, les avaries survenues au bateau pilote au cours des opérations de pilotage, au cours des manoeuvres d'embarquement ou de débarquement du pilote, sont à la charge du navire." The following is the agreed translation: "Except in case of gross negligence of the pilot damage (avaries) sustained by the pilot boat in the course of pilotage operations, and in the course of embarking or disembarking the pilot is chargeable to the ship." Proceedings were brought in the French Courts by the Pilotage Administration against the present plaintiffs to recover the cost of repairing the damage sustained by the Vétéran under the above law. By a judgment given on February 9, 1931, the Tribunal de Commerce pronounced in favour of the claimants, but reserved the question of the amount payable to them. The Court of Appeal at Douai reversed this decision by a judgment dated December 3, 1931; but by a decision given on January 6, 1937, the Civil Chamber of the Cour de Cassation annulled the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal at Amiens. Subsequently the plaintiffs without further pursuing the litigation compromised the claim of the Pilotage Administration and paid to the Administration the sum of 47,468.45 francs or (at the exchange of 109.78½ francs to the £) the sum of 432l. 7s. 6d. in discharge of all liability. It was not disputed that the plaintiffs were in fact liable to the Pilotage Administration under the terms of the French law of March 28, 1928. The underwriters were kept informed of the claim made by the Pilotage Administration and of the progress of the litigation in the French Courts and of the negotiations for the settlement, but from the outset they took up the attitude that they were under no liability to reimburse the plaintiffs any sums which they (the plaintiffs) might become liable to pay to the Pilotage Administration, and were not concerned in the French proceedings or in the settlement; but, in so far as they might be concerned, they assented to the settlement. *751
In these circumstances the plaintiffs brought these proceedings against the defendant to recover 13s. 1d., being his proportion of three-quarters of the sum of 432l. 7s. 6d. Evidence was given at the hearing as to the nature of the liability that arose under the French law by two French lawyers who differed considerably in their views. The effect of their evidence is sufficiently stated in the judgment. Goddard J. said that the plaintiffs contended that the sum paid in respect of the repairs of the pilot boat was a sum recoverable under the running down clause, as the ships did come into collision; against this it was contended that the insurance here was an insurance only against a liability in tort, and that the intention of the policy was that the underwriter was to indemnify the shipowner only when the shipowner was held to blame or partly to blame, as the words "by way of damages" must be strictly construed. Both parties had called lawyers from France to explain the French law, which seemed to be reasonably clear in itself. There was some difference of opinion between them as to whether there was in the action brought by the pilotage authority any element or conception of what in English law would be called a tort and in French law a quasi delict. So far as it was a matter of coming to a decision upon the evidence of French lawyers there seemed to be no conception of tort in those proceedings. If it was a mere question of having to decide whether the action lay in contract or tort, he would incline to the view that it lay in contract. It was in effect a statutory cause of action. At any rate it was not a liability in tort or in quasi delict or delict. Then he had to consider the words "by way of damages" in the policy. The plaintiffs contended that in a business document between business men those words ought to include such a sum as that in question. His duty in construing a document, whether a commercial document or any other sort of document was to give a meaning to all the words of the document, and he had to give a meaning to the words "by way of damages." *752 He (his Lordship) thought he ought to construe the expression "by way of damages" as meaning by way of damages that had to be paid in consequence of a tortious act committed by the ship, and in that view he had the support of Branson J. in Furness Withy & Co., Ld. v. Duder. 1 He thought that the liabilities which might be imposed on a ship by foreign law, although the ship was in no way to blame, were not to be held covered by the common form of collision clause as this clause was. He thought it was intended to point only to cases where the ship was held liable for damages caused by her fault. Nor did he think the proviso inconsistent with the construction he had placed on the clause. The effect of the clause with the proviso was that, although the ship was negligently navigated so that the owners became liable for damages on account of a collision, the underwriters had to indemnify them against the damages they had to pay to the owners of the other ship, but not in respect of any sum which had to be paid in respect of the enumerated excepted risks. The plaintiff appealed. The appeal was heard on February 27 and 28, and March 1, 1939. Sir Robert Aske K.C. and W. L. McNair for the appellants. The sum for which the shipowners became liable to the Pilotage Administration under the French law is recoverable by the shipowners from the underwriters under the running down clause. The liability to the Administration existed although there had been no negligence on the part of the ship, but the liability is none the less one in tort: compare the cases of a common carrier and a common innkeeper, where the liability depends on custom of the Realm. In each case, however, there is a breach of something in the nature of a duty imposed by the common law, and therefore a liability in tort arises. This is relevant in considering the meaning of the words "by way of damages." These words may be considered from a technical point of view, but it is argued that they should be construed from a business point of view. *753
[MACKINNON L.J. Under the French law a liability might have arisen although the ship and the pilot boat never touched each other.] Yes, but here there was a collision, and the damage was caused by the collision, so that the case comes directly within the running down clause. The cause of action against the underwriters is for unliquidated damages in the nature of an indemnity: see Baker v. Adam 2 (a case of total loss) and Castelli v. Boddington. 3 This amount now being claimed was sued for in the French Courts as damages and it would have been so sued for in England. In the case of a liability on a ship-owner for damage done without any fault on his part the liability is for damages: see River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson 4 and Great Western Ry. Co. v. Owners of S.S. Mostyn. 5 In the case of a collision clause the Court will lean strongly in favour of the assured: David M'Cowan v. Baine and Johnston. 6 In Mayne on Damages, 10th ed., p. 1, damages are defined as follows: "Damages are the pecuniary satisfaction obtainable by success in an action." That covers everything in the present case. The words "by way of damages" were put in to exclude costs. In McArthur on The Contract of Marine Insurance, 2nd ed., p. 324, it is said: "The nature of the damages covered consists in 'any sum or sums' which the assured shall, in consequence of the collision of the ship insured with any other ship or vessel 'become liable to pay, and shall pay by way of damages to any other person or persons.' These words if they stood alone would include all damages consequent upon collision whether to person or property but the proviso appended to the clause excepts from them - (1.) liability 'for removal of obstructions under statutory powers'; (2.) liability 'for injury to harbours, wharves, piers, stages, and similar structures'; (3.) liability in respect of the cargo or engagements of the injured *754 vessel'; and (4.) liability 'for loss of life or personal injury'" : see also Taylor v. Dewar. 7 It is not necessary for the present purpose to attack Furness Withy & Co., Ld. v. Duder. 8 There the shipowners had brought a liability on themselves by a contract with very special terms. It is different from the case where by common law or statute a liability is imposed on a shipowner. The words here cover all liabilities to which the shipowners become liable by reason of their ship being in collision. It would be strange if the more negligent was the management of the ship the more they could recover under the collision clause, while if there was no negligence at all they could recover nothing. This clause in question arose out of De Vaux v. Salvador 9 , which showed that policies of marine insurance were defective in not covering shipowners in respect of certain liabilities. Faced with that decision the insurance world produced the clause now in question to fill up the gap. It covers all the liabilities the ship may incur through a collision. It is wrong to classify all these liabilities to which a ship may be exposed as being either contract or tort. For in England such a classification is not entirely accurate or exhaustive. When harbour authorities sue under the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847, s. 74 , in respect of damage done to a harbour by a ship, they sue for damages. The Air Navigation Act, 1920, s. 9 , created a right to damages independently of any fault or negligence. It is wrong to assume that in all systems of jurisprudence there must be some element of fault to give a right to damages as is required to make an English tort. The liability here is for "damages" within the meaning of the clause even if not "damages" stricto sensu. The parties have provided a "dictionary" to interpret the word. Another reason why "damages" in the clause in question should be given a wide meaning is because of the proviso, which expressly excludes from the application of the clause liabilities which are clearly not damages in its ordinary *755 meaning. The exception of payments for removal of obstructions is only explicable on this footing: see The North Britain 10 and The Engineer . 11 [MACKINNON L.J. I am impressed by the fact that here the liability had not as its proximate cause the collision.] It never has, for negligence is always in English law the proximate cause: Adelaide Steamship Co. v. Attorney-General. 12 Nor is it to the point to say that here the liability might have arisen without any collision. It is sufficient that there was here a collision, and therefore that the running down clause in the policy applies. As used in this clause, the words "by way of damages" would not exclude a liability to the other ship in respect of payments by them of workmen's compensation. The word "damages" must be given a very wide meaning, although it would exclude penalties and costs. The Court should not treat the claim here as outside the clause as not being something which in English law would be a claim for damages.
The obligation undertaken by the underwriters is this: "If the ship hereby insured shall come into collision with any other ship or vessel and the assured shall in consequence thereof become liable to pay and shall pay by way of damages to any other person or persons any sum or sums in respect of such collision" - that is the event upon which the underwriters' liability springs up. Now, it is to be noticed that it is not a liability to make any payment to any other persons in respect of the collision, but a liability to pay "by way of damages." Accordingly the clause does not extend to every pecuniary liability arising in respect of the collision but only to such liabilities as arise by way of damages. The word "damages" is one which to an English lawyer conveys a sufficiently precise meaning. This document is an English contract which falls to be construed according to English law. That does not, of course, mean that in its application to liabilities arising under foreign law (an application which the parties, of course, clearly contemplated as possible) the operation of the clause is to be excluded merely because some liability arising under foreign law as a result of a collision does not precisely coincide with the liability which is recognized in the Courts of this country. Nevertheless it is necessary in my opinion, in construing a document of this kind, to give to the word "damages" its ordinary meaning in English law. "Damages" to an English lawyer imports this idea, that the sums payable by way of damages are sums which fall to be paid by reason of some breach of duty or obligation, whether that duty or obligation is imposed by contract, by the general law, or legislation. Now, the measure of the duty, of course, will depend upon the particular law. A statute may impose an absolute obligation not to do certain things, and as the result of that the person injured by the doing of such a thing may have a right to damages. That is a question of the measure of the duty. An example which was referred to in the course of the discussion is to be found in the Air Navigation Act, 1920, s. 9, sub-s. 1, under which damages are recoverable from the owner of aircraft who causes damage irrespective of negligence or intention: it is a standard of duty not to do certain things imposed by that statute. Looking at it from another point of view, there are certain classes of liability to make pecuniary payments which clearly fall outside the word "damages." For instance, compensation paid under the Lands Clauses Act or a matter of that kind is certainly not damages. Workmen's compensation payments are certainly not damages in the ordinary sense of the word, and in spite of Mr. McNair's argument to the contrary I find it quite impossible to suppose that workmen's compensation payments are included in the word "damages" in this clause. The foundation of that class of liability is something entirely different from the foundation of the liability which gives rise to a claim for damages. Proceeding with the clause, it is to be noticed that in the last branch of the clause there occurs the phrase "but when both vessels are to blame." That phrase seems to me to throw light upon the construction of the earlier part of the clause and to confirm what I have been saying about it. The phrase, "but when both vessels are to blame," imports the idea that what the clause is dealing with is a case where the vessel insured is to blame, that is to say, has been guilty of some breach of duty (normally, the duty to take care), and the last part of the clause makes special provision for the case where the other vessel also is to blame. Then comes the proviso, and an argument was based upon it to this effect. It was said that the proviso upon its true construction covers matters which would not fall within the word "damages" in its ordinary meaning - matters such as liability under s. 74 of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847 , to pay for removal of obstructions under statutory powers or to pay for injury to wharves, piers and so forth. The argument is of this nature: it is said that because the proviso extends to cover cases of statutory liability, imposed without reference to any breach of duty at all, therefore the word "damages" in the main part of the clause must be given a very wide and loose meaning. I cannot give that force to the proviso. The two cases that were relied upon on this part of the argument were The North Britain 13 , and a later case in the House of Lords, that of The Engineer 14 , a case in which the same point arose. In the case of the North Britain, the claim against the underwriters was truly a claim for damages, because it was a claim by the owners of the North Britain, the vessel insured, to be reimbursed by the underwriters the sum which they had been compelled to pay to the owners of the other vessel who had incurred the statutory liability to pay for the removal of their vessel as an obstruction. The liability of the North Britain was a liability to pay to the owners of the other vessel its share of that particular head of damage suffered by them in consequence of the negligence of the North Britain. It was argued in that case that the proviso only extends to cases where the liability to make a payment for removal of obstructions under statutory powers arises apart altogether from a liability to pay damages, and that, as in that case the liability was a liability to pay damages, the measure of which was the amount which the other vessel had to pay for removal of the obstruction, the proviso did not cover it and it fell to be governed by the main clause. It will be seen therefore that the point in that case is very far removed from anything which we have to consider here; but it is argued that in that case it was said that the clause extends not merely to payments for removal of obstructions which are payments by way of damages but also to payments for removal where no question of damages arises. It seems to me that the observations in that case are, if anything, against the contention of the appellants. Lindley L.J., for instance, agrees 15 with the view expressed by Gorell Barnes J. in the Court below that the proviso is not an exception and that it is put in by way of precaution. Lindley L.J. says that he regards "the proviso as a warning that you are not to read the clause so as to include the consequences mentioned in the proviso" and then he says: "The true meaning of the proviso is that 'this clause shall in no case extend to any sum which the assured shall have to pay for removal of obstruction consequent on such collision.' I know the clause itself says in terms 'shall pay by way of damages'; but I do not think the construction which I am adopting involves the insertion of any words at all. It is, 'in no case shall extend to any sum the assured shall become liable to pay' - that is, pay in respect of any ship by way of damages or otherwise." Lindley L.J. therefore is reading the proviso as extending not merely to cases where the payment falls to be made by way of damages, but to cases where it falls to be made not by way of damages. That is in agreement with what he has just said that he is regarding the proviso, in so far as it goes beyond the subject-matter of the main clause, as something put in ex abundanti cautela. Davey L.J. in his judgment also appears to take the same view that the proviso is to that extent put in ex abundanti cautela: and indeed to find a proviso inserted in such a context for such a purpose is a thing of common occurrence. The case of The Engineer 16 is one to which I do not think I need refer except to say that the House there approved the observations of Davey L.J. I find myself quite unable to find in this proviso any words sufficient to give to the word "damages" the extended and inaccurate signification which the appellants would have us give to it. The difficulties into which the appellants get in trying to construe the word on some such basis as that is illustrated by the fact that they feel constrained to include within the word workmen's compensation payments, which are not damages at all, but to exclude such things as penalties. On what principle that distinction can be drawn I am quite unable to appreciate. Therefore, taking the matter of the construction of this clause, the conclusion to which I have come is that the payments "by way of damages" to which it refers are payments the obligation to make which arises from a fault of some kind on the part of the ship insured. That is in accordance with a decision of Branson J. in the case of Furness Withy & Co., Ld. v. Duder. 17 That was a case where the obligation to make a payment arose, not by reason of a local law but by reason of a special contract into which the owners of the vessel had entered with the Admiralty, who provided the only tugs which were available at the spot. It was under that contract that the payments fell to be made. Branson J. had in that case to deal therefore with a point which is on all fours with the present point, save for the fact that the obligation arose not by legislation but by contract. He construed the clause in this way. He said: "I think the clause means that where in consequence of a collision there arises a legal liability upon the shipowners to pay a sum which can properly be described as damages for a tort, then the underwriters will indemnify them. The expression 'become liable to pay .... by way of damages' indicates, to my mind, a liability which arises as a matter of tort, and not as a matter of contract." As I said earlier in this judgment the word "tort" in regard to a document intended to apply to foreign countries under foreign jurisdiction must not necessarily be read in the precise technical sense of English law. It would not be necessary to find that the act should necessarily be tortious by English law, but it must be at any rate of that character. Now I come to examine the nature of the payment in this case. The first thing to be observed about it is that the liability to make the payment falls upon the vessel without any regard to the question whether it has or has not been guilty of any fault or breach of duty. The obligation which arises is an obligation to make good the damage suffered by the pilot vessel in the circumstances stated, whether or not there is a collision, whether or not the vessel insured is to blame, whether or not the pilot himself is negligent, provided that his negligence is not the type of negligence described as "faute lourde." It has nothing in the world to do with any duty on the vessel itself, but it is a provision under which the vessel is compelled to bear a particular charge irrespective of any question of duty imposed upon it. In the present case the liability would have arisen equally if the pilot vessel, without touching the Trident , had been swamped by a sea owing to the failure of its steering-gear. It so happened that that failure led, not to the pilot boat being swamped, but to its colliding with the Trident . But the liability would have been precisely the same in either case. Looking at the terms of the French law - without doing what the learned judge found it unnecessary to do and I find it unnecessary to do, namely, to express any concluded opinion as to the true category into which this class of payment ought to be put - one thing which is to my mind quite clear is this, that it cannot be put into the category of "damages" within the meaning of this particular clause. It is based on an entirely different conception, and the liability which arises under it is not a liability to avoid collision, it is not an obligation to navigate carefully or to do acts of that kind; it is merely a liability to make a payment of that particular character; it has no reference whatsoever to any act or default on the part of the vessel insured. That is the conclusion to which I should have come upon an examination of the language of the French law itself; but evidence was called before the learned judge, given by two distinguished French lawyers, one of whom, the lawyer called by the respondent, had very special experience in Maritime Law, and there again, without considering whether or not the evidence of the respondent's expert is evidence which we are bound to accept or ought to accept, I am quite clearly of opinion that the evidence of the appellants', expert is evidence which cannot be accepted. What he said was this, that liability under the French Decree was based upon negligence; he said that "faute" is at the bottom of it and that it raises a presumption of "faute." That seems to me to be a thing which it is quite impossible to extract from this provision. There is no conception in it at all of fault on the part of the vessel.
I agree. The plaintiffs seek to recover three-quarters of the amount of a certain sum which they have become liable to pay. I entirely agree with the Master of the Rolls that they fail to establish any right to recover that sum, because they fail to establish that theirs was a liability to pay "by way of damages." This appeal therefore fails from a consideration of those four words, "by way of damages." I think that the same result is arrived at by a consideration of three other words in a neighbouring part of the clause. Those three other words are "in consequence thereof." It has been a well settled rule for over seventy years, in regard to the construction of marine insurance policies, that where, in an added clause in a policy, there are words like "in consequence thereof," you must, in dealing with causation, look at the proximate and not the remote cause. I say that was settled over seventy years ago; it was so in the case of Ionides v. Universal Marine Insurance Co (1863) 14 CB (NS) 259, where the words were "all consequences of hostilities." So here, where you have the words "in consequence thereof," they mean "and the assured shall as a result proximately caused by the collision be liable to pay." This liability of the appellants was not proximately caused by the collision. Indeed it was not caused by the collision at all. This liability was caused by the French law, which created a liability on the ship to pay for any damage caused to the pilot boat by any cause, though, of course, "any cause" included collision. A similar conclusion was arrived at in a case which at first sight is not very pertinent, and that is the case of Inman Steamship Co., Ld. v. Bischoff (1882) 7 App 670. There there was a claim for loss of freight under an insurance policy against the loss of freight by perils of sea. It was held that the freight that was lost could not be recovered. For the loss was not caused by perils of the sea, but was caused by the operation of the contractual right of the charterers to stop the payment of freight, even though the exercise of that right by the charterers was made possible by the insured ship having been damaged by perils of the sea. In the result for these reasons, in addition to those given by the Master of the Rolls, I think the appellants fail to establish that the respondent is liable to pay them the sum of 13s. 1d.
I agree both with the judgments which have just been delivered and with the judgment which was delivered by my brother Goddard. There is only one passage in his judgment to which I should like to call attention, because I think it accurately deals with the question of what the position was by French law. My brother Goddard, of course, had the advantage of hearing and seeing the experts who were called, and what he says is this: "It seems to me that, certainly so far as it is a matter of coming to a decision upon the evidence of the French lawyers, there is no conception of delict or tort in the cause of action which is given by the French Decree to the pilot boat. It seems to me that the probable theory which underlies the legislation, though it does not matter, when it is a matter of policy of law, what theory underlies the legislation, is that the pilot boat is rendering a service for the benefit of the ship which requires pilotage and, therefore, any damage which the pilot boat may receive in the course of rendering that service is to be regarded as an expense of the pilotage and is to be paid by the ship in just the same way as she would have to pay the pilotage dues, or whatever is the correct expression used in France, as remuneration for the service which the pilot renders." Applying that passage, it seems to me, for the reasons which have been given by my brethren, clear here that in the first place this was not a payment by way of damages in any possible sense in which that word could be used in an English clause of this character, and in the second place it appears to me to result, as my brother MacKinnon has pointed out, that the payment, whatever it was, was not made in consequence of the collision but was made because the French law has imposed a liability - nothing to do with collision, though collision is one of the matters which may arise - to make a payment in case of damage suffered by the pilot vessel during the pilotage, during the manoeuvres necessary for embarking and disembarking the pilot. On all the grounds which have been assigned by the Master of the Rolls and by my brother MacKinnon, as well as for the reasons which were assigned by my brother Goddard, I entirely agree in the result. Appeal dismissed. “Paid by the assured” (The pay to be paid rule) The “Collision Liability Clause” enables the assured, who having paid the third party, to be indemnified by the insurer in respect of the money so paid. This rule stems from the “pay to be paid” doctrine, widely employed in the P & I insurance field; and was applied in the Re Nautilus SS Co (1935) 52 LlL Rep 183 & The Fanti [1991] 2 AC 1 Download 0.53 Mb. Share with your friends:
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