Bennett Steamship Company v Hull Mutual Steamship Protecting Society [1914] 3 K.B. 57
The Issues
Insurance (Marine)—Collision Clause of Lloyd's Policy—“Collision with ship or vessel”—Collision with Nets of Fishing Vessel.
The Facts
A steamship ran into the nets attached to and extending from a fishing vessel which was about a mile distant from the steamship; there was no contact between the hulls of the two vessels. The plaintiffs, as members of the defendant association, brought this action to recover £509. 14s. alleged to be due to them under the rules of the association, as an indemnity in respect of a claim against the plaintiffs for damage done by their vessel the SS Burma.
The terms of the rules of the defendant association, provided protection in respect of (a) the sums which the member might become liable to pay and should pay in respect of: collision, &c.; (c) claims for losses, damages, or expenses arising from or consequent upon collision, and for losses, damages, or expenses arising from or consequent upon damage caused by the entered steamship to other ships or property without actual contact or collision so far as such claims are not recoverable under the usual form of Lloyd's or Mutual Insurance Association's policy with collision clause attached; and (e) loss or damage caused by such steamship to any harbour, dock or pier, or the quays or works connected therewith, or to any jetty erection or other fixed or movable things whatsoever, other than ships or vessels, whether caused by negligence or otherwise.
The collision clause attached to the usual form of Lloyd's policy is as follows:
“And it is further agreed that if the ship hereby insured shall come into collision with any other ship or vessel and the assured shall in consequence thereof become liable to pay and shall pay by way of damages to any other person or persons any sum or sums not exceeding in respect of any one such collision the value of the ship herein insured this company will pay the assured such proportion of three-fourths of such sum or sums so paid as its subscription hereto bears to the value of the ship hereby insured.”
The defendants contended that the proportion of three-fourths of the damages in question was recoverable by the plaintiffs under the collision clause attached to the usual form of Lloyd's policy, and that their liability extended only to the one quarter, or the sum of £127. 8s. 6d not recoverable under such Lloyd's policy with collision clause attached.
The defendants paid to the plaintiffs the sum of £127. 8s. 6d prior to the commencement of these proceedings.
The question for the opinion of the Court was whether in the circumstances set forth in paragraph 1 there was a collision within the collision clause of a Lloyd's policy. If the Court should be of opinion in the negative, judgment was to be entered for the plaintiffs for the sum of £382. 5s. 6d and costs of the action. If the Court should be of opinion in the affirmative, judgment was to be entered for the defendants with the cost of defence.
Pickford J. held that there had not been a collision between the plaintiffs' vessel and another ship or vessel, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs.
The defendants appealed.
Held, that the SS Burma had not “come into collision with any other ship or vessel” within the meaning of the collision clause attached to the usual form of Lloyd's policy.
LORD READING C.J.
This is an appeal by the defendants from the judgment of Pickford J. upon a special case. The question raised is whether upon the facts stated the insured ship came into collision with another ship or vessel. That question, upon the facts of this case, is whether the Burma came into collision with the fishing vessel.
On these facts it is contended that the Burma came into collision with the fishing vessel. Apart from authority, I agree with Pickford J. that no one could say, giving a reasonable meaning to the words used, that this ship came into collision with the fishing vessel. Upon the words “come into collision with any other ship or vessel” alone I would have no doubt that there was not a collision. It is said, however, that there is a number of authorities which in principle have decided that there may be a collision between one ship and another although there has been no contact between the ships themselves.
We were first referred to The Niobe. In that case the decision of the House of Lords rested upon the tug and tow together being, for this purpose, one vessel—in other words, that the tug was part of the apparatus of the tow. It was accordingly held that the tow was to blame although there had not been in fact any contact between her and the other vessel. It is sufficient to say that that case goes as far as any case has yet gone in that direction, and, speaking for myself, I cannot see my way to extend that principle so as to apply it to this particular case. Indeed I have no inclination to extend the principle beyond that decision. Then In re Margetts and Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation [1901] 2 KB 792 was cited, in which the words of a policy of insurance were “owing to actual collision between any such tug and any vessel, bridge, &c.,” and one of the insured tugs was damaged by striking upon the anchor to which a vessel was then riding, and it was held that the tug had come into collision with a vessel within the meaning of the policy. No doubt that decision was based upon the view that when a vessel is riding at anchor the anchor and chain are part of the vessel, and that coming into collision with either is a collision with the ship. In the words of Phillimore J. in that case, “it may fairly be said that a vessel comes into collision with another vessel if it comes in to collision with any portion of that other vessel.” Another authority cited was The Warwick 15 P. D. 189. Upon looking at the report of that case in Aspinall's Maritime Cases (1890) 6 Asp. M. Law C. 545 it appears that the collision there was between the warps of the trawls attached to two fishing smacks. The question there was as to the jurisdiction of a county court, and that case is no authority in the present case.
I think that the decision of Pickford J. was correct and that I cannot improve upon the reasons which he gave for his decision. I do not feel impelled by any of the cases which have been cited to decide in favour of the appellants.
PHILLIMORE L.J.
I am of the same opinion. Whenever any part of the tackle of a vessel is being used in connection with the vessel, although it may be outside the ambit of the hull, as the anchor or a boat towing astern or working ahead to warp the vessel, it may just as well be said to be a part of the vessel when there is a collision with it as if it were still on board the vessel itself. Upon that ground the case of In re Margetts and Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation was properly decided. Nets, however, are not a part of the ship in that sense, nor are they things which it is necessary for her to have and without which she could not prudently put to sea.
I think that it would be straining language to say that the collision in this case with the nets was a collision with the ship.
LUSH J.
I am of the same opinion. It does not seem to me to be possible to say, without distorting language, that running into the nets of a fishing vessel which is a mile away is the same thing as running into the vessel itself merely because the nets are attached to it; and I do not think that the authorities would justify us in holding that it is.
Appeal dismissed.
“BY WAY OF DAMAGES”
The primary object of the ¾ Collision Liability Clause is to cover the assured’s liabilities resulting from a collision between the insured vessel and other vessels. It covers the liability arising “by way of damages that is to a claim payable to a third party by the assured, that sounds in tort in contradistinction to a claim arising from a breach of contract or statute, which are not covered by the clause. These issues were addressed in the following two case studies.
Case Study One
Bottom of Form
Share with your friends: | 
