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| Evolves Its Cyber Operations, at 4-5 (Jan 2017). Adam Nossiter et al., Hackers Came, but the French Were Prepared The New York Times, May 9, 2017. Andrew Higgins, Foes of Russia Say Child Pornography Is Planted to Ruin Them The New York Times, Dec. 9, 2016. Esther King, Russian Hackers Targeting Germany Intelligence Chief Politico, Nov. 29, 2016. etary, secret, or incriminating information, and then leak it for public consumption. 261 For example, hackers that have been linked to Russian security services attacked the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) after it published a report that revealed Russian sports doping, and then released the private medical information of American athletes. 262 During the 2016 US. presidential election campaign, both the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the campaign manager of the Democratic presidential candidate were victims of doxing by the same Kremlin-backed hackers who attacked WADA in 2016, France’s TV5Monde in 2015, and Ukraine’s election commission in Anew tactic is planting fake documents among the authentic ones leaked as part of a doxing operation—the Macron campaign alleged that this happened when it was attacked (though in addition to the fake documents planted by the hackers, the campaign had also created several false email accounts and loaded them with fake documents to confuse the hackers and slow them down). 264 Similarly, hackers have previously placed child pornography on the computers of Kremlin critics living abroad, and then alerted the local police. If the hackers are sophisticated enough, it is extremely difficult to discover the source of the intrusion, or even whether an intrusion has taken place. As the head of one cybersecurity company told The New York Times, ‘‘to use a technical term, you are completely screwed. If something like this is sponsored by the Russian government, or any government or anyone with sufficient skill, you are not going to be successful in salvaging your reputation. It is terrible.’’ 265 It is not hard to imagine similar attacks being carried out on Western politicians who have taken a strong position against Putin’s regime, and the subsequent consequences for their campaigns, careers, and legacies. Combining all of these tools together, the Kremlin can ensure that its disinformation operations are seen early, often, and widely. Furthermore, disinformation efforts can now take advantage of increasingly powerful analytics that identify customer sentiment allowing them to target the most susceptible and vulnerable audiences. In the case of the United States, Kremlin-backed propagandists and internet trolls sought not just to promote the Kremlin s narratives, but also to advance divisive narratives that further erode social cohesion. In the words of Germany’s intelligence chief, the aim is simply to delegitimize the democratic process, no matter whom they help get ahead.’’ 266 Such efforts are both harder to detect than traditional propaganda and, arguably, more dangerous to the target society. VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER (47) 267 Orysia Lutsevych, Agents of the Russian World Proxy Groups in the Contested Neighbourhood, Chatham House, at 10 (Apr. 2016). Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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