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| Welle, Jul. 1, 2016. 284 Ibid. ing to current and former US. officials, RISS also reportedly developed a plan to swing the 2016 US. presidential election to Donald Trump and undermine voters faith in the American electoral sys- tem.’’ 277 However, more than a few scholars and independent journalists doubt the efficacy of RISS, with one commenting that these guys (average age 70) couldn’t have possibly game-planned making a sandwich, let alone rigging the US. election].’’ 278 Such opinions are likely based on some of RISS’s other work, such as a study which reportedly claimed that condoms were one of the factors spreading HIV in Russia. 279 Other think tanks and GONGOs in Europe that promote the Kremlin’s narrative have opaque funding structures that hide potential sources of support. A 2017 report published by the Swedish Defense Research Agency noted that much of the funding that these GONGOs receive from commercial entities would not happen if there were not a clear understanding that these think tanks are closely connected to the political leadership and contributing to activities that do enjoy the trust and patronage of the political leadership could give both enterprises and individual businessmen advantages . . . . Ina political system where economic and political activity are intrinsically linked, the fact that business finances a think tank does not mean that it is therefore more independent of the political leadership.’’ 280 One such example of a privately funded think tank is the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute, which opened in Berlin in 2016, and was co-founded and financed by Vladimir Yakunin, a longtime Putin associate and former head of Russian Railways (who the United States sanctioned for his role in Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea). 281 The Institute’s goal, according to a report by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, is to coordinate a worldwide network of Russian think tanks. 282 One German newspaper reportedly described it as an instrument of Moscow’s hybrid warfare whose primary purpose is to create an alternative civilization to the American.’’ 283 The Institute denies any connections to the Kremlin, but does not make its funding transparent, and Yakunin is reported to be investing about $28 million in the Institute over five years, in addition to funding from other Russian businessmen. 284 Such opaque funding is a hallmark of many Kremlin-linked NGOs and think tanks. An Atlantic Council report explains why these financial streams are so difficult to trace VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 50 285 Alina Polyakova et al., The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses, Atlantic Council, at 4 (Nov. 2016). Alison Smale, ‘‘Austria’s Far Right Signs a Cooperation Pact with Putin’s Party Dec. 19, 2016. Marine Turchi, How a Russian Bank Gave France’s Far-Right Front National Party 9mln Euros Mediapart, Nov. 24, 2014; Suzanne Daley & Maia de la Baume, French Far Right Gets Helping Hand With Russian Loan The New York Times, Dec. 1, 2014. Andrew Rettman, Illicit Russian Money Poses Threat to EU Democracy EUobserver, Apr. 21, 2017. Congressional Research Service, Russian Influence on Politics and Elections in Europe June 27, 2017. Peter Pomerantsev & Micahel Weiss, The Menace of Unreality How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, Institute of Modern Russia, at 19 (Nov. 2014). Congressional Research Service, Russia Background and US. Policy, at 29 (Aug. 21, 2017). The [Kremlin’s] web of political networks is hidden and nontransparent by design, making it purposefully difficult to expose. Traceable financial links would inevitably make Moscow’s enterprise less effective when ostensibly independent political figures call for closer relations with Russia, the removal of sanctions, or criticize the EU and NATO, it legitimizes the Kremlin’s worldview. It is far less effective, from the Kremlin’s point of view, to have such statements come from individuals or organizations known to be on the Kremlin’s payroll. 285 THE KREMLIN ’ S CULTIVATION OF POLITICAL EXTREMES The Kremlin has also adopted anew practice in cultivating relationships with some of the more mainstream far-right parties in Europe, by establishing cooperation agreements between the dominant United Russia party and parties in Austria (Freedom Party, Hungary (Jobbik), Italy (Northern League, France (National Front, and Germany (AfD). These cooperation agreements include plans for regular meetings and collaboration where suitable on economic, business and political projects.’’ 286 Kremlin- linked banks, funds, and oligarchs even lent nearly $13 million into France’s far-right National Front party to finance its election campaign. 287 And the German newspaper Bild reported that the Russian government clandestinely funded the AfD ahead of 2017 parliamentary elections—perhaps without the AfD’s knowledge by using middlemen to sell it gold at below-market prices. 288 In addition to monetary resources, the Kremlin has reportedly also offered organizational, political, and media expertise and assistance to far-right European parties. 289 Different Kremlin narratives attract different groups from left and right. Scholars Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss describe how European right-nationalists are seduced by the [Kremlin’s] anti-EU message members of the far-left are brought in by tales of fighting US hegemony and US. religious conservatives are convinced by the Kremlin’s stance against homosexuality.’’ 290 The Congressional Research Service reports that many of the far-right European parties linked to the Kremlin are ‘‘anti-establishment and anti-EU, and they often share some combination of extreme nationalism a commitment to law and order and traditional family values and anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, or anti-Islamic senti- ments.’’ 291 Far-right gatherings are also sponsored by Kremlin- linked oligarchs like Vladimir Yakunin and Konstantin Malofeev who, according to the EUobserver, a Brussels-based online news- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 51 Andrew Rettman, Illicit Russian Money Poses Threat to EU Democracy EUobserver, Apr. 21, 2017. Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber, Russian, European Far-Right Parties Converge in St. Peters- burg The Moscow Times, Mar. 22, 2015. 294 Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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