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| Extremist Groups in Central-Eastern Europe, at 47 (Apr. 2017). 305 Ibid. at 12. Peter Pomerantsev & Micahel Weiss, The Menace of Unreality How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, Institute of Modern Russia, at 19-20 (Nov. 2014). NRA’s President. 299 In 2015, the NRA sent a delegation to Moscow to meet with Dmitry Rogozin, a Putin ally and deputy prime minister who fell under US. sanctions in 2014 for his role in the crisis in Ukraine. 300 U.S. evangelicals, including Franklin Graham, have also supported Putin’s suppression of LGBT rights in Russia, saying that Putin has taken a stand to protect his nation’s children from the damaging effects of any gay and lesbian agenda.’’ 301 Brian Brown, who runs the World Council of Families (WCF), a group that opposes same-sex marriage and abortion rights, testified to the Duma before it adopted several anti-gay laws. 302 The WCF planned to hold its annual conference in Moscow in 2014, but cancelled it because of the difficulties presented by new US. sanctions legislation related to the crisis in Ukraine, which also hit a member of the WCF’s planning committee, Vladimir Yakunin. 303 The Kremlin’s illegal annexation of Crimea and military incursion into eastern Ukraine also affected the rhetoric and focus of its disparate ideological boots on the ground. A yearlong study by a Hungarian think tank found that since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, far right and extremist organizations that had previously predominantly focused on ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities as their main enemies, redirected their attention to geopolitical issues. They are not only agitating against NATO and the EU, but also share a particular sympathy towards Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which they regard as an ideological and political model.’’ 304 These groups also benefit from their voices being amplified by Kremlin-linked media networks that peddle in fake news and conspiracy theories. Furthermore, the small size and limited influence of fringe parties and paramilitary groups make it easy for the Kremlin to infiltrate, purchase, and control them. The report also noted that in Central and Eastern Europe, the Kremlin has sought to exploit the bitter memories of past territorial disputes, nation- alist-secessionist tendencies, and the haunting spectres of chauvinist ideologies promising to make these nations great again.’’ 305 Unlike in Soviet times, the Kremlin no longer limits its support to just one end of the ideological spectrum. In addition to right- wing groups, it still maintains strong ties with former and current communist parties—Ukraine’s Ministry of Justice in 2014 sought to ban the country’s Communist Party, which was believed to be acting on behalf of the Kremlin. 306 Some European left and far-left VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 53 In the Kremlin’s Pocket The Economist, Feb. 12,, 2015; Cynthia Kroet, The New Putin Coalition Politico, Nov. 21, 2016. Sam Jones et al., NATO Claims Moscow Funding Anti-Fracking Groups Financial Times, June 19, 2014. 309 Vladislava Vojtiskova et al., The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing, at 31. Andrew Higgins, In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines with Firepower The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2016. Letter from Patriarch Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Russian Orthodox Church, to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Mar. 22, 2010. Robert Blitt, Russia’s Orthodox Foreign Policy the Growing Influence of the Russian Ortho- dox Church in Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad, 33 U. PA. J. I NT ’ L L., at 379 (2011). 313 Ibid. parties have also adopted more friendly views toward Russia, including Spain’s Podemos party, Greece’s Syriza Party (which has led the government since 2015), Bulgaria’s Socialist Party, and Moldova’s Socialist Party, with candidates from the latter two winning presidential elections in November According to NATO officials, Russian intelligence agencies also reportedly provide covert support to European environmental groups to campaign against fracking for natural gas, thereby keeping the EU more dependent on Russian supplies. 309 A study by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies reports that the Russian government has invested $95 million in NGOs that seek to persuade EU governments to end shale gas exploration. 309 THE USE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH Just as the Kremlin has strengthened its relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church and used it to bolster its standing at home, the Russian Orthodox Church also serves as its proxy abroad, and the two institutions have several overlapping foreign policy objectives. According to the former editor of the official journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, the church has become an instrument of the Russian state. It is used to extend and legitimize the interests of the Kremlin.’’ 310 In a letter to Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Orthodox Church’s Patriarch, Kirill, wrote During your service as foreign minister, the cooperation between the Russian foreign policy department and the Moscow Patriarchate has considerably broadened. Through joint efforts we have managed to make a contribution to the gathering and consolidation of the Russian World.’’ 311 Scholar Robert Blitt notes that the Russian government, in an effort to restore its lost role as a global superpower, has recruited the Church as a primary instrument for rallying together a dubious assortment of states and religious representatives to support anew international order. This new order is premised on the rejection of universal human rights and the revival of relativism, two principles that serve the Church well.’’ 312 Blitt also notes that the Russian government has linked national security with spiritual security and that abroad, the government benefits from the Russian Orthodox Church]’s efforts as a willing partner in reinforcing Russia’s spiritual security which in turn boosts the channels available to it for the projection of Russian power abroad.’’ 313 In 2003, the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a working group that has, in the words of Foreign Minister Lavrov, allowed them to work together realizing a whole array of foreign policy and international activity VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 54 314 Ibid. at 381. Metropolitan Kirill, Chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate DECR, Address on the Panel Discussion on Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue at the 7th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, Mar. 22, 2008. 316 Orysia Lutsevych, Agents of the Russian World Proxy Groups in the Contested Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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