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| Spies, Lies, and How Russia Dupes the West. As then Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves told Foreign Affairs in 2014: We caught four moles in the last five years. That means one of two things. Either we’re the only country in the EU with a mole problem, or we’re the only country in the EU doing anything about it.’’ 597 Estonia has adopted a zero tolerance approach to illegal activities by Russian intelligence operatives and does not downplay their capture or trade them back to Russia. Instead, it prosecutes them to the maximum extent of the law and publicizes an annual report that reviews major cases and publicly names organizations and individuals that are suspected of working with the Russian intelligence services. 598 Estonia’s intelligence service, known as Kapo, publishes annual reviews that detail activities by Russian intelligence services and the government’s responses (as do Latvia and Lithuania). 599 Per- haps the most egregious case it documented in recent years was the incursion into sovereign Estonian territory and the alleged kidnapping of an Estonian Kapo officer by Russian security operatives in The officer had been investigating cross-border cigarette smuggling by Russian smugglers, and some assert that he was kidnapped because he had threatened the FSB’s lucrative collaboration with criminal traffickers. 601 Smugglers have also reportedly been recruited by the security services as spies and informants to assist the Kremlin’s efforts to destabilize Estonia. Similar to there- cruiting method the FSB uses with hackers, traffickers are reportedly threatened with jail time if they refuse to cooperate with Russia s security services. 602 These comprehensive intelligence reports also help to inform the general public as well as civil society and journalists, who can use the information pursue their own investigations. For example, re:Baltica reporters used a clue from Kapo’s 2014 report to trace the ownership of three Baltic Russian-language news sites, collectively known as Baltnews, through a chain of holding companies that ultimately linked them to Russia’s state-sponsored propaganda network. 603 Kapo’s reports also make clear the intentions and capabilities of the Kremlin’s influence operations, especially when it comes to economic corruption, and how that knowledge informs its own work. For example, in its 2016 report, the agency noted that Because of the link between Russian power structures, criminal circles and corruption, we especially focus on corruption that may strengthen Russia’s hold on our state. We have noted attempts by the Kremlin to use business contacts and business influence in shaping Estonia s policy. Relevant in this context is the business continuity and VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 107 Estonian Internal Security Service, Estonian Internal Security Service Annual Review 2016, at 35 (Apr. 17, 2017). 605 Aija Krutaine & Andrius Sytas, ‘‘Baltics Can Keep Lights On If Russia Turns Off the Gas Reuters, May 7, 2014. 606 Georgi Kantchev, With US. Gas, Europe Seeks Escape From Russia’s Energy Grip The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 25, 2016. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, About Us https://ccdcoe.org (visited Dec. 31, 2017). 608 Ott Ummelas, Worlds Most High-Tech Voting System to Get New Hacking Defenses Bloomberg Politics, July 18, 2017. supply security of energy, where the role of corruption can secretly and considerably influence the country’s energy independence.’’ 604 The Baltic states have thus made it a priority to reduce their historical dependence on energy supplies from Russia. After independence, their legacy gas infrastructure was only connected to countries of the former Soviet Union, not Europe. Russia’s state-owned Gazprom and other Russian gas companies held large stakes—up to 50 percent—in Baltic states natural gas companies, though new EU regulatory requirements led Gazprom to start selling its shares in those companies in 2014. To diversify its supplies, Lithuania opened an LNG regasification terminal in 2014, which has also allowed it to negotiate much better prices for its purchases from Russia (in 2013 Gazprom charged Lithuania $460-$490 per 1,000 cubic meters, compared to an average of $370-$380 for the EU). 605 At the opening ceremony of the terminal, Lithuania’s president remarked, Nobody else, from now on, will be able to dictate to us the price of gas, or to buy our political will.’’ 606 There is also the potential for Lithuania to export some of the LNG it has imported and regasified to its Baltic neighbors, though such infrastructure is not in place yet. As one of the most connected countries in the world, Estonia has long been a leader in the realm of internet innovation and cyber security. In 2004, Estonia proposed a NATO cyber defense center, which was established in Tallinn in 2008 and consists of six branches focused on technology, strategy, operations, law, education and training, and support. 607 Estonia is also working to strengthen the security of its online voting system by overhauling its software and adding new anti-tampering features that will help guard against potential hacking attacks directed by the Kremlin or other malicious actors. 608 Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are clearly on the front line of the Kremlin’s malign influence operations, and have suffered from some of the most egregious cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns yet seen in Russia’s near abroad. As members of NATO and the EU that share borders both with Russia and its exclave of Kaliningrad, and which collectively host large Russian-speaking populations, the Baltic states are both primary targets and uniquely susceptible to Russian active measures campaigns. The United States should therefore make it a high priority to study the experiences of the Baltics and apply lessons learned to its own defenses and those of allies and partners around Europe, as well as increase support to the Baltics, in both word and deed, to further deter Kremlin aggression. VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 108 Statement of Rolandas Krisciunas, Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania, Russian Poli- Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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