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| 2016, at 8 (Apr. 17, 2017). 580 Ibid. at 7. 581 Ibid. at 8. 582 582 Statement of Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Former President of Estonia, The Modus Ope- randi and Toolbox of Russia and Other Autocracies for Undermining Democracies Throughout the World, Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, Marat. 583 See Damien McGuinness, Russia Steps into Berlin Rape Storm Claiming German Cover- Up BBC News, Jan. 27, 2016; infra, section on Germany. policy, the goal of which has been the establishment of organized groups linked to Russia capable of influencing another country’s sovereign decisions.’’ 577 The Kremlin allegedly uses its embassies in the Baltics to disburse funding to NGOs that promote its narrative. According to the Lithuanian ambassador to the United States, the Russian Embassy in Lithuania directly controls, coordinates, and finances the activities of a variety of pro-Russian organizations, clubs and groups ranging from political protests to cultural events.’’ 578 Yet sometimes the culture of corruption among the Russian government bureaucracy can hamper the Kremlin’s disinformation efforts, with embassy officials reportedly taking kickbacks from organizations that receive grants. For example, in 2016, the Russian embassy in Estonia disbursed $30,000 in grant money for the publication of the Baltiysky Mir journal. However, no issue was published in 2016, and Estonia’s lead security agency notes that the best way to receive grants from the Russian embassy is to share them with Russian officials and diplomats.’’ 579 Estonia’s government also reports that the Kremlin constantly supports and funds people who promote anti-Estonian propaganda narratives at events held by international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, where Estonian activists whose travel was paid for by the Russian government, complained about government suppression of the ethnic Russian minority in Estonia. 580 And in one example from 2015, a skinhead from St. Petersburg was sent to Estonia to be captured on film as a local Nazi activist at a WWII battle memorial, and ‘‘Kremlin-controlled media was eager to pick this up as an example of events in Estonia.’’ 581 Kremlin disinformation operations have also targeted NATO exercises, especially after NATO established four multinational battlegroups led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, known as the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), to deter Russian military aggression in the Baltics and Poland. Pro-Kremlin media outlets falsely reported that German troops raped a 13-year-old Lithuanian girl just two days after the soldiers arrived to participate in NATO’s EFP exercise. 582 Because of its similarity to a fake story pushed in German media, it became known as the Lithuania Lisa case. 583 Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, noted that it was a clear example of information manipulation with a sense of weaponization, because it really was supposed VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 104 Teri Schultz, Why the Fake Rape Story Against German NATO Forces Fell Flat in Lithuania Deutsche Welle, Feb. 23, 2017. Andrew Higgins, Foes of Russia Say Child Pornography Is Planted to Ruin Them The New York Times, Dec. 9, 2016. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Robotrolling 2017, Issue 2, at 2, 4 Nov. 8, 2017). 587 Ibid. at 2. 588 Ibid. at 6. Congressional Research Service, European Efforts to Counter Russian Influence Oper- ations,’’July 24, 2017. to affect the perception about the presence of German troops as the [EFP] framework nation in Lithuania. It was supposed to affect morale it was supposed to affect everything—the operational func- tioning.’’ 584 Before another NATO exercise, hackers infiltrated the Lithuanian military’s website and replaced the statement announcing the exercise with a fake one proclaiming that it was part of a plan for Lithuania to annex Kaliningrad, a small Russian exclave to the west. The head of Lithuania’s National Cyber Security Center noted that the announcement was obviously fake and quickly taken down, but still spread through online networks and colored discussions about NATO. He summarized the effectiveness of such disinformation operations when he told a reporter that I don’t believe in aliens, but if you see enough articles about aliens visiting Earth, you start to think Who knows, maybe the government is hiding something As elsewhere in Europe and beyond, an extensive network of social media bots spread Kremlin disinformation narratives. According to a report by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, bot-generated messages are targeted at different audiences those aimed at the West emphasize how much smaller Russian exercises are than NATO ones, while those targeting domestic audiences rarely mention Russian military exercises. 586 In addition, approximately 70 percent of all Russian messages about NATO in the Baltics and Poland are created by Russian-language bots. NATO’s report also found that Twitter was less effective at removing Russian-language material generated by bots than messages in English, but did note improvement in the platform’s policing of content and urged continued pressure to ensure further im- provements. 587 NATO’s analysts also noted that increased interest by Twitter and other social media companies in tackling state- sponsored trolls and bots may offer an explanation for the low levels of activity in the current observation window.’’ 588 That conclusion underscores the point that social media companies have not only great responsibility, but also strong potential to successfully counter Kremlin disinformation operations (and fake news in general. The Baltic states have all taken concerted actions against Russian state-sponsored propaganda outlets, with methods ranging from outright censorship to public disregard. Since 2014, Latvia and Lithuania have placed restrictions on several Russian television channels, including three-to six-month bans on one station owned by a Russian state broadcaster, because of what government authorities deemed to be dangerous and unbalanced reporting on the situation in Ukraine, incitement of discord and unrest, and warmongering. 589 In March 2016, Latvia’s local domain registry VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 105 Latvia Blocks Russian Sputnik Site as Kremlin Propaganda Tool Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Mar. 30, 2016. Alex Spence, Russia Accusses Latvia of Blatant Censorship After Sputnik News Site is Shut Down Politico, Mar. 30, 2016. US Challenges Kremlin with New Russian TV Channel Daily Mail, Feb. 27, 2017. Statement of Rolandas Krisciunas, Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania, Russian Poli- Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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