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Chapter 6: Kremlin Interference in
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| Chapter 6: Kremlin Interference in Consolidated Democracies 557 Countries with longstanding membership in the European Union or NATO are increasingly aware of the nature and scope of Russian government threats to their populations and democratic processes, and have developed a series of strong responses to deter and defend against Kremlin interference. Geographically, these countries are further away from the eastern flanks of NATO and the EU, and are generally less susceptible to Russian cultural, political, or linguistic influences, yet many remain vulnerable to Russian government threats to their energy security. While these countries benefit from healthy democratic political systems and vibrant independent media and civil societies, the bonds within these systems have come under increasing strain as societal frustrations have grown over economic inequalities and the pressures of migration. These societal tensions have been a focus for exploitation by the Russian government. The Russian tactics of interference follow two main trends in this region. First, Russia seeks to exacerbate divisions within countries that have membership in Western institutions like NATO and the EU, but where corruption or vulnerabilities in the rule of law provide openings to erode their bonds to European values and institutions. This includes undermining their support for EU sanctions on Russia or NATO exercises on the continent. A primary goal is to sow discord and confusion—since more frontal attacks by the Kremlin against these states are likely to invite unacceptable blowback for the Russian government. Second, Russia seeks to exacerbate divisions in consolidated democracies who are seen as the flagbearers for European values and institutions, and thus staunchly opposed to the Russian governments agenda to undermine those values and institutions. And in its attempts to weaken the democratic systems of these nations, the Kremlin amplifies their perceived weaknesses and problems to countries on Russia’s periphery, in an attempt to show that consolidated democracy is not a goal worth pursuing. VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 100 Statement of Rolandas Krisciunas, Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania, Russian Poli- cies & Intentions Toward Specific European Countries, Hearing before the US. Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Marat. The Constitution Protection Bureau of the Republic of Latvia, Annual Public Report 2016, at 1 (Mar. 2017). The Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) is one of three state security institutions of the Republic of Latvia, and is responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Ibid. 560 State Security Department and Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania, National Secu- rity Threat Assessment 2017, at 2. 561 Eriks Selga & Benjamin Rasmussen. Defending the West from Russian Disinformation The Role of Leadership Foreign Policy Research Institute, Nov. 13, 2017 Steven Lee Myers, Russia Rebukes Estonia for Moving Soviet Statue The New York Times, Apr. 27, 2007. Statement of Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Former President of Estonia, The Modus Operandi and Toolbox of Russia and Other Autocracies for Undermining Democracies Throughout the World, Hearing before the US. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, Marat. BALTIC STATES LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA The Russian government has sought to influence the Baltic countries through military intimidation, energy dependence, trade relations, business links, cultural ties, corruption, disinformation, and cyberattacks. As in Ukraine, the Kremlin has used the Baltics as a laboratory for its malign influence activities, especially in deploying hackers to engage in cyberwarfare. Because of their relatively small size, large Russian-speaking populations in Latvia and Estonia, and geographic proximity to Russia, the Baltic countries are subject to more intensive pressure from the Kremlin than other EU countries. Lithuania’s Ambassador to the United States testified to the US. Senate that, in addition to aggressive intelligence operations and cyberattacks on members of parliament, the Kremlin has also used supply of energy resources, investment in strategically important sectors of economy and trade relations as a tool to influence domestic and foreign policy of Lithuania.’’ 558 Latvia’s head intelligence agency has said that Russia is responsible for the most significant security threats in the Baltic sea region,’’ 559 and Lithuania’s government has called Russia a major source of threats posed to the national security of the Republic of Lithuania.’’ 560 In addition, all three presidents of the Baltic states have also taken strong and public positions against the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns and supported building resiliency against them. 561 The Kremlin has long used the Baltic states as a testing ground for its asymmetric arsenal. One infamous incident occurred on a morning in late April 2007, when the government of Estonia decided to move a six-and-a-half-foot statue of a Soviet soldier out of the center of its capital, Tallinn, to another part of town. Removing the statue, placed there during Soviet occupation in 1947, was a controversial act—protests by ethnic Russians and violence the night before had damaged property, injured dozens, and left one person dead. Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, called the move blasphemous Other Russian officials declared that removing the statue was glorifying Nazism, and both the Duma and the Federation Council called on Putin to sanction Estonia or cutoff bilateral relations. 562 What happened next was described by Estonia’s then-president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, as the first time a nation-state had been targeted using digital means for political objectives.’’ 563 The Inter- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 101 Evan Osnos et al., Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War The New Yorker, Mar. 6, 2016. 565 Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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