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| Ibid. 538 Ibid. 539 Lili Bayer, Moscow Spooks Return to Hungary, Raising NATO Hackles Politico, July 19, 2017. Andrew Higgins, Intent on Unsettling EU, Russia Taps Foot Soldiers from the Fringe The New York Times, Dec. 24, 2016. 541 Ibid. 542 Ibid.; Lili Bayer, Moscow Spooks Return to Hungary, Raising NATO Hackles Politico, July 19, 2017. Andrew Higgins, Intent on Unsettling EU, Russia Taps Foot Soldiers from the Fringe The New York Times, Dec. 24, 2016. 544 Lili Bayer, ‘‘Fidesz-Friendly Media Peddling Russian Propaganda The Budapest Beacon, Nov. 17, 2016. 545 Ibid. 546 Ibid. 547 Transparency International Hungary, Corruption Perceptions Index 2015.’’ 548 Ibid. weapons. A shootout ensued, and a police officer was killed. 537 The New York Times reported that in the investigation that followed, Hungarian intelligence officials told a parliamentary committee that Gyorkos gathered regularly with Russian intelligence officers to conduct mock combat exercises in the area around his house. 538 The Hungarian online news portal Index also reported that Gyorkos had been meeting with Russian intelligence officers for years. 539 Hungarian security officials believe that the Russian intelligence sector’s main goal in cultivating Gyorkos was to gain control of Hidfo (the Bridgehead, a website that was controlled by his Hungarian National Front and had a significant following among extremists in the country. 540 Following its efforts to cultivate are- lationship with Gyorkos, Russian intelligence was reportedly successful in commandeering the site and moving its server to Russia where it has been used as a platform to broadcast propaganda targeting the West and the United States. 541 For example, the website circulated a fake US. Department of Homeland Security assessment that the 2016 US. election was not a victim of cyberattacks. 542 It also issued false reports that Austria sought to lift sanctions against Russia and that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had sought to make European nations vassals of Washington. 543 Russian government propaganda also finds fertile ground in Hungary’s domestic media landscape. Content by Sputnik and RT is widely referenced by pro-government news sources in Hun- gary. 544 The pro-government daily newspaper Magyar Idok (The Hungarian Times) has published pieces by the Strategic Culture website, a well-known Russian propaganda outlet. 545 The Russian propaganda site New Eastern Outlook has also been reportedly referenced by pro-Fidesz websites like 888.hu and Magyar Hirlap (Hungarian Gazette). 546 There does not appear to be discernable effort by the government to counter this disinformation. Alack of transparency in the political process has also allowed for increased corruption, another opening that Russia can exploit. In 2016, Jozsef Peter Martin, the executive director of Transparency International in Hungary, said that a centralised form of corruption has been developed and systematically pursued in Hun- gary.’’ 547 He also directly criticized the government and asserted that turning public funds into private wealth using legal instruments is an important element of corruption in Hungary.’’ 548 In 2014, Russia directly benefitted from this lack of transparency with VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 96 Budapest Times, ‘‘Paks Data to Be Classified for 30 Years The Budapest Times, Mar. 6, 2015. 550 Zoltan Simon, ‘‘Orba´n Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy in Hungary Bloomberg, July 28, 2014. Daniel Hegedus, Nations in Transit 2017 Hungary Chapter Freedom House, 2017. 552 GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends 2017: Mixed Messages and Signs of Hope from Central and Eastern Europe, at 13 (Jan. 8, 2017). 553 Ibid. at 20. 554 Ibid. at 23. 555 See European Union External Action Service, Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-ques- tions-and-answers-about-the-east-stratcom-task-force—en (visited Dec. 14, 2017); see also Chapter. the Paks nuclear deal, in which the Russian nuclear operator Rosatom was awarded a sole source contract to construct two plants, and the Hungarian parliament subsequently passed legislation which would keep details related to the deal classified for 30 years. 549 Since returning to power in 2010, Orba´n has embraced the concept of illiberal democracy modeled on the sovereign democracy advanced by Vladislav Surkov in Russia. 550 As Orba´n deepens relations with Russia abroad, he has steadily eroded the democratic process at home, where Hungary’s political opposition has been marginalized and civil society watchdogs have a diminished voice. 551 Without the critical scrutiny provided by political opposition or civil society, Russian malign influence is able to spread with little resistance. The Hungarian public does not seem to share Orba´n’s affinity for Russia or his antagonism toward western institutions. According to a survey by the think tank GLOBSEC, 79 percent of Hungarians want to stay in the EU and 61 percent think the union is a good thing. 552 A resounding 81 percent of Hungarians believe that NATO is important for their safety and 71 percent believe that liberal democracy is the best political system for Hungary, as opposed to an autocracy. 553 However, 45 percent of Hungarians hold a favorable view of Orban, a number nearly matched by Vladimir Putin, who was seen sympathetically by 44 percent of Hungar- ians. 554 The international community, working through existing watchdog efforts like the EU East StratCom Task Force, should aggressively uncover and publicize the scope and scale of Russian influence in Hungary. 555 Orba´n appears to have cast his lot with Moscow, but the Hungarian people chose a western path after the fall of communism and continue to embrace those values. With parliamentary elections due in the spring of 2018, the international community should proactively seek to build resilience within the Hungarian population so that they are made fully aware of the level of Russian interference in the affairs of the country. Lessons Learned • Opposing the Asymmetric Arsenal without a Government Part- ner is Difficult, But not Impossible As the United States and its allies look to build resilience to Russian interference in Europe, they will unfortunately not find a partner in the Hungarian government. Regardless, the international community should increase support for transparency and anti-corruption efforts in the country—the denial of US. visas for six Hun- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 97 Rick Lyman, US. Denial of Visas for 6 in Hungary Strains Ties The New York Times, Oct. 20, 2014. garian officials suspected of corruption in 2014, for example, was an effective step that should be replicated when pos- sible. 556 VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER (99) The countries in this chapter are defined as consolidated democracies a term drawn from the Freedom House Nations in Transit study, which ranks and measures the progress toward or backsliding from democracy of 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia. The ranking is determined by an assessment of a country’s national democratic governance, electoral process, civil society, independent media, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption. Countries receiving the consolidated democracy classification are defined as ones that embody the best policies and practices of liberal democracy, but may face challenges often associated with corruption—that contribute to a slightly lower score Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2017: The False Promise of Populism, at 22 (2017). Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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