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| Ibid. at 61 574 Sanita Jemberga et al., Money From Russia Kremlin’s Millions re:Balitca, Aug. 27, 2015. For more on Russia’s use of GONGOs, see Chapter 2. 575 Ibid. 576 Heather A. Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook Understanding Russian Influence in Cen- tral and Eastern Europe, Center for Strategic & International Studies, at 51 (Oct. 2016). as puppets of those supranational organizations that are being used to provoke Russia into military conflict. • Ridicule or marginalize the culture, history, traditions, and achievements of the Baltic states, to weaken the will of local populations to defend their countries in the event of a military conflict with Russia. Multiple studies have found that Russian-speaking populations in the Baltics have absorbed the narratives that the Kremlin’s propaganda machines have concocted. For example, during the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the majority of ethnic Russians in Estonia were more likely to believe reports from Russian media than Estonian and foreign media. A similar result occurred during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, with ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia believing the narrative put forth by Russian media and subsequently holding Kiev, not Moscow, responsible for the conflict. 570 Pro-Russian narratives are also promoted by Kremlin-linked groups throughout the Baltic states. A 2014 report commissioned by the Swedish Defense Research Agency found that a large number of organizations that are directly or indirectly governed by the Russian federal government are helping to implement a strategy that aims to undermine the self-confidence of the Baltic states as independent political entities and interfere in their domestic political affairs. 571 The study also concluded that these efforts were all reinforced by systematic Russian attempts—through political, media and cultural outlets—to portray the Baltic states as fascist, not least in terms of their treatment of their Russian minorities . . . . As a whole, the Russian strategy can be considered as aiming at destabilizing the Baltic states.’’ 572 The head of the Latvian security service also reported that there is a clear link between organizations that promote the Kremlin’s narrative and Russian-funded NGOs. 573 According to the Baltic Centre for Investigative Journalism, also known as re:Baltica, more than 40 NGOs in the Baltics have received grants from large Russian GONGOs (government-controlled NGOs) over the past several years, though the figure could be much higher as NGOs are not required to publish financial reports in every Baltic country. 574 Fur- thermore, nearly 70 percent of those grant recipients are linked to pro-Kremlin political parties in the Baltics. 575 Disbursing grants to NGOs is an important element of Russia’s compatriots policy which the Kremlin has stated involves always defending the interests of Russians and Russian-speakers abroad using political, diplomatic, and legal means.’’ 576 The director of Estonia’s domestic intelligence service has noted that the Russian population or the Russian-speaking minority is a target for the so-called compatriots VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 103 Michael Weiss, The Estonian Spymasters Tallin’s Revolutionary Approach to Stopping Russian Spies Foreign Affairs, June 3, 2014. Statement of Rolandas Krisciunas, Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania, Russian Poli- cies & Intentions Toward Specific European Countries, Hearing before the US. Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Marat. Estonian Internal Security Service, Estonian Internal Security Service Annual Review Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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