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93 Congressional Research Service, Background on Bulgaria for the Nomination of Eric S. Rubin to be United States Ambassador to the Republic of Bulgaria Oct. 2, 2015. operation with the West and support for EU sanctions on Russia. As described above however, significant vulnerabilities to the Russian asymmetric arsenal do persist and would benefit from additional assistance and engagement from Bulgaria’s democratic allies.
• Diminished US. Assistance has Consequences The United States provided more than $600 million in assistance for political and economic reforms in Bulgaria from 1990 to 2007, but this assistance was largely discontinued when the country joined the EU.
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These aid programs gave the United States the ability to engage with broad swaths of Bulgarian society on the merits of democratic values and the rule of law. Without this programming, the United States ability to engage on these issues has been significantly hampered while Russian propaganda and malign influence has thrived. While the US. Embassy has sought to continue to engage with limited resources, the diplomatic challenge in countering Russian malign influence remains considerable. With the dedication of more diplomatic attention and resources—particularly on energy diversification, addressing corruption, and building up the democratic rule of law—the United States will be in a position to help leaders within the Bulgarian government and civil society counter Russia’s asymmetric arsenal.
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Lorant Gyori & Peter Kreko, Russian Disinformation and Extremism in Hungary The
Warsaw Institute Review, Oct. 16, 2017.
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Lorant Gyori et al., Political Capital (Hungarian Think Tank, Does Russia Interfere in
Czech, Austrian and Hungarian Elections, at 12 (2017) (translated from Hungarian, citing
Orba´n’s comments in August 2014, available at http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20140815—orban—az— oroszorszag—elleni—szankciokkal—labon—lottuk—magunkat, and his speech at the Lamfalussy Lectures Conference, Jan. 23, 2017, available at http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor- beszede-lamfalussy-lectures-szakmai-konferencian/).
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Marton Dunai & Gergely Szakacs, Hungary Charges Jobbik MEP with Spying on EU for Russia Reuters, Dec. 6, 2017. Andrew Higgins, Intent on Unsettling EU, Russia Taps Foot Soldiers from the Fringe
The New York Times, Dec. 24, 2016.
HUNGARY
In Hungary, the Russian government’s asymmetric arsenal includes support for extreme political parties and organizations within the country, propaganda, and the use of corruption. The Russian government also enjoys a warm relationship with the country’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orba´n. Despite Hungary’s proud history of resistance to Moscow during the Cold War and its membership in the European Union and NATO, Orban has increasingly sought to deepen ties with Russia in recent years, calling into question the government’s commitment to the principles which underlie these international institutions. Within the EU and NATO, Prime Minister Orba´n is perhaps the most supportive leader of Vladimir Putin, his style of leadership, and his worldview. The platform of his party, Fidesz, includes an Eastern Opening foreign approach focused on an accommodating relationship with Moscow.
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Orba´n has reportedly said on several occasions that Hungary has shot itself in the foot by supporting sanctions against Russia, and that Moscow should be praised for opposing Western attempts of isolation, regime change.’’
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So while many citizens may remember with great pride the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 against the Soviets, today’s government in Budapest is closer now to Moscow than at anytime since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Given Orba´n’s positive orientation towards Moscow, his government has taken no discernable steps to stop or even discourage Russian malign influence, and appears to applaud the anti-EU, anti-U.S., and anti-migrant Russian propaganda because it aligns with the themes that Orba´n promotes. Instead of defending Hungary against Russian malign interference, Orba´1n appears to have welcomed it. Russia has exploited this relatively unimpeded access by flooding Hungary with pro-Kremlin and anti-western propaganda and reportedly providing support to far-right political parties and fringe militant groups. For example, in December 2017 Hungarian prosecutors charged Hungarian businessman and Jobbik party politician Bela Kovacs with spying on EU institutions on behalf of Russia.
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Kovacs joined the Jobbik party, which has espoused anti-Semitic and racist views, in 2005 and helped turnaround its financial prospects.
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In
2010, he was elected to the European Parliament. Kovacs has denied the charges and no date has been set for his trial. Russian intelligence also appears to be cultivating relationships with far-right groups in Hungary. In October 2016, the police raided the house of Istvan Gyorkos, the leader of a fringe neo-Nazi group called the Hungarian National Front, to search for illegal
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