Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Accidents
Their impact turns rely on unrealistic apocalyptic rhetoric – states would prioritize accidents on Earth over space.
Lambakis 1 (Steven. On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. p 259 http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1210/)KM
Even if a spacecraft were shot down by accident, the implications would not be so grave when compared, for example, to an accidental launch of a nuclear tipped missile. So, asked Walter McDougall, "why is it more important to protect pristine space, where nothing lives, than the crowded earth?" This is a good question. It is a question that has never been addressed fully by the space sanctuary enthusiasts (apart from making the apolitical, astrategic point that attacking unmanned targets in space makes wars "more likely" or is escalatory), who tend to use only one "strategic" framework for assessing the implications of space weapons: the framework of apocalypse. Any use of weapons in or from space will bring doom to "our planet." Arms races will drain the life blood out of that national budget. Interception of nuclear-tipped ICBMs in space is a precursor to a treacherous instability, that kind that could lead to nuclear holocaust. A decision by the United States to use the space environment for protection will bring the acrimony of the entire world against Washington, asphyxiating U.S. national and economic security. This is not strategic though -- this is the worst case, even unimaginable-case scenario played to the hilt.
Their impact turns would be solved by existing international law and protocol.
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 9 (“Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century” 2009. p 91, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1427)KM
Further, even if a [Brilliant Pebble] “got away” to “run wild,” it would quickly burn up in the atmosphere. And in the case of an accidental shoot-down involving the mistaken identity of someone’s “innocent” missile (such as one carrying a communications satellite), Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocols and international notification procedures that have long governed an unwarranted response by offensive nuclear weapons against another nation: when a country plans to launch a nonthreatening rocket – such as for a weather or communications satellite or to ferry astronauts and supplies to the international space station or the moon or to send robots to Mars or to orbit telescopes – those powers possessing offensive nuclear weapons are notified well in advance, so as to avoid a terrible misunderstanding that could trigger a massive retaliatory nuclear strike against the country of origin. Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocol of advance notification and, of course, their automated systems would be switched off, even as offensive nuclear weapons would be taken off hair-trigger alert and ordered to “stand down.”
Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – US-Russia War
War would not break out in satellite miscommunication – US and Russia have multiple communication outlets.
Lambakis 1 (Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. February, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1851)KM
In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing -- so we are not always in the dark.
Impact Turn – Space Good: A2: Space Bad – Indo-Pak War
India has no capabilities to develop space technology. No risk of escalation.
Chellaney 7 (Brahma. "India's Vulnerability Bared." Japan Times. February 9, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1358)KM
Before it can think of developing a counter-capability to shield itself from an ASAT menace, it will have to deal with two obtrusive mismatches that hobble its deterrence promise. The first mismatch is between its satellite and launch capabilities. Greater operational capability necessitates large satellites. While India has first-rate satellite-manufacturing expertise, it still needs a foreign commercial launcher like the Ariane 5 of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company to place its INSAT-4 series satellites in geostationary orbit. The second mismatch is in the military realm -- between the technical sophistication to build nuclear warheads and the extent to which they can be delivered reliably by missiles. Nearly a decade after it went overtly nuclear and almost a quarter-century after the missile program launch, India still lacks the full reach against China. The thermonuclear warhead India tested with a controlled yield in 1998 still awaits a delivery vehicle of the right payload range.
India lacks infrastructure, funding, and planning to implement any space programs.
Asia Times 8 ("India goes to war in space.". June 18, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1358)KM
India's expression of its intentions to set up an aerospace command and its announcement of the Integrated Space Cell has raised concern in some quarters that India is entering the arms race in space. Such fears might be premature, given that the Integrated Space Cell is at a very rudimentary stage. "India is just putting in place a very minimal budget initiative that will take several years to develop," argued Prabhakar. "Besides satellites in space, India's space architecture of offensive and defensive systems are yet to be conceived, built and deployed," said Prabhakar, pointing to the different kinds of satellites, space-based laser systems, space stations and ground-based laser stations for offensive space operations that the "space superpowers" - the United States, Russia and China - have.
India doesn’t have rudimentary defense capabilities – space is a long way away.
Asia Times 8 ("India goes to war in space.". June 18, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1358)KM
In the event of their satellites being knocked out by enemy action during a crisis, the US, Russia and China have the capability to launch substitute satellites into space at short notice. The US can move its satellites from one orbit level to another, higher level to escape being taken out by an enemy anti-satellite system (ASAT). India can program a satellite launch only on a programmed sequence basis and not on short notice for rapid launches to replenish lost satellites, Prabhakar said. "India doesn't have even preliminary capability to defend its satellites," he said, adding "it will take another 15 to 20 years or more before India can put these systems in place." For all its impressive achievements in building and launching satellites, India is decades away from establishing a fully-operational aerospace command. It has formidable capability in building satellites. It is now trying to find a way to defend them.
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