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Turkey would take the place of the US – strong military and second largest standing army

Aorere 9 (Manatu, NZ Ministry of For. Affairs and Trade, June 25 2009, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Middle-East/Turkey.php)IM

There have been signs that relations were improving between Armenia and Turkey ever since President Gül attended an Armenian/Turkish World Cup qualifying football match in Armenia’s capital Yerevan in September last year (the first visit by a Turkish leader to Armenia). Since then, intense discussions have occurred at all levels between the governments of Armenia and Turkey, with the possible outcome an historic reconciliation between two traditional enemies divided by strategic differences in the Caucasus and by the Ottoman Empire’s killing of Armenians in 1915. Turkey is currently a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. It is a member of NATO and maintains one of the largest standing armies in the world, and the second largest in NATO behind the United States. As a result, its defence spending places a heavy burden on both the government budget and the balance of payments. Turkey has been engaged in Afghanistan, having led the UN-authorised International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), for six months in 2002-3 and again from February to August 2005. It established a Provincial Reconstruction Team in November 2006, in Wardak, the province next to Bamyan, where New Zealand’s PRT is based. Turkey also plays an active role in the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the Alliance of Civilisations, an interfaith forum New Zealand also participates in.



Link Turn – Afghanistan x Readiness


NATO engagement in Afghanistan strains US military effectiveness

Ruhle 9 (Michael, Oct 21, ,Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit of the NATO Secretary GeneralStrategic Insights, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Sep/ruhleSep09.html date accessed 7/6)CM

At NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit in April 2009, the Alliance’s Heads of State and Government agreed that work should start on the development of a new Strategic Concept. The momentum for such a decision had been building up for quite some time. Over the past few years, NATO’s growing number of operations and missions, and in particular its engagement in Afghanistan, have put strains both on the Allies’ military capabilities and their political consensus. In addition, Russia’s new assertiveness, and notably the war in Georgia in August 2008, fueled a debate on the proper balance between collective defense at home and expeditionary missions abroad. Finally, the fact that new threats, such as a cyber attack or an energy cut-off, do not affect all Allies in quite the same way, has also led to calls for a re-definition of the meaning of Alliance solidarity. In short, ten years after the publication of the current Strategic Concept, there were found to be a number of good reasons to develop a new document. Initially, nuclear issues did not really feature among these reasons. Despite the long battle of a range of NGOs against NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements and the deployment of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons on the soil of some European Allies, NATO’s nuclear “acquis” has long been considered as essentially sound. Neither doubts in expert circles about the military utility of aircraft armed with nuclear gravity bombs, nor occasional anti-nuclear sentiments in the Parliaments of some NATO countries, would trump the logic of Alliance reassurance and risk-sharing. However, several recent developments now require NATO to revisit its nuclear dimension and to carefully consider how this is reflected in the new Strategic Concept. In particular, heightened concern about nuclear proliferation has prompted a change in U.S. rhetoric and policy. Guided by the conviction that restoring an eroding non-proliferation regime requires the United States to lead by example, President Obama’s Prague speech of April 2009 espoused the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. To be sure, the President qualified this long-term objective with the proviso that as long as other states possessed nuclear weapons, the United States would maintain a nuclear deterrent of its own, including for the protection of its friends and Allies. In doing so, he remained within the tradition of every U.S. President since Harry Truman. In the public perception, however, these qualifications received little attention. Although the U.S. President did not touch upon NATO’s nuclear policy or posture, some European politicians were quick to interpret his plea for a nuclear-weapon-free world as support for their own goal to see U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons removed from Europe. Predictably, several NGOs reacted in similar ways, interpreting the President’s speech as an invitation to unilateral gestures by the United States and NATO. As a result, while U.S. policy on NATO’s nuclear dimension may not necessarily have changed, the public debate is characterized by expectations to the contrary.

Impact Turn – NATO  Afghan Stability**


NATO aid is only quick fixes, doesn’t address the underlying causes of poverty, is poorly executed and causes heightened instability

Oxfam 10 (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

Undoubtedly, Afghans have seen some improvements, particularly in the expansion of access to healthcare and education. While it costs approximately $1 million a year to support the deployment of one US soldier in Afghanistan, an average of just $93 in development aid has been spent per Afghan per year over the past seven years.2 Far too much aid has focused on “quick fixes” and band-aid approaches rather than on what will produce positive and lasting results for Afghans over the long term. As political pressures to “show results” in troop contributing countries intensify, more and more assistance is being channelled through military actors to “win hearts and minds” while efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty and repair the destruction wrought by three decades of conflict and disorder are being sidelined. Development projects implemented with military money or through (the) military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable. There is little evidence this approach is generating stability and, in some cases, military involvement in development activities is, paradoxically, putting Afghan lives further at risk as these projects quickly become targeted by anti-government elements. As eight non-governmental organizations, working in Afghanistan for up to fifty years and currently serving over 5 million Afghans across the country, we are deeply concerned about the harmful effects of this increasingly militarized aid strategy. As leaders from 70 nations gather in London to debate the future of Afghanistan, we urge them to revaluate this approach to development and reconstruction.





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