Impact Turns – NATO Fails

Impact Turns – NATO Fails

But according to research by the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, it is corruption and the ineffectiveness of the government rather than poverty that is at the root of Afghanistan's current insecurity. "A COIN strategy premised on using aid to win the population over to such a negatively perceived government faces an uphill struggle, especially in a competitive environment where the Taliban are perceived by many to be more effective in addressing the people's highest priority needs of security and access to justice." In the report of a conference discussing the COIN strategy in March 2010, researchers argued that ill-conceived, poorly implemented aid projects with weak oversight has done more harm than good for the international coalition in Afghanistan. "There is a need for much greater awareness regarding the destabilizing effects of aid in terms of creating perceived winners and losers, promoting a destructive war/aid economy, and fuelling corruption," the report noted. "Donors should avoid setting development aid up to fail by expecting it to deliver on unrealistically ambitious stabilisation objectives for which it is not well-suited."

As Foreign Ministers gather in London for a major conference on Afghanistan, leading aid agencies warn that the international militaries' use of aid as a “non-lethal” weapon of war that may even be putting Afghans at greater risk. A US army manual for commanders in Afghanistan and in Iraq defines aid as a non-lethal weapon designed “to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents”. The Afghan government estimates international forces have already spent $1.7 billion on “aid” in Afghanistan. The US military alone has budgeted an additional $1 billion for the coming year – more than Afghanistan’s state budget for agriculture, health and education combined. The eight international agencies are concerned that the militarization of aid is putting ordinary people on the frontlines of the conflict. Afghans say that the military places them at greater risk when they build schools and clinics which then become targets of armed opposition groups. The agencies say that “quick impact” projects provide a quick fix rather than sustainable development. Military-led humanitarian and development activities are driven by donors’ political interests and short-term security objectives and are often ineffective, wasteful and potentially harmful to Afghans. International guidelines agreed by ISAF and the UN state that “the military is primarily responsible for providing security, and if necessary, basic infrastructure and urgent reconstruction assistance limited to gap-filling measures until civilian organisations are able to take over” The agencies say that the international forces are going way beyond their remit. Ashley Jackson, head of policy for Oxfam International in Afghanistan, says: “There are no 'quick fixes' in Afghanistan and nobody should be cutting corners - the people here deserve better. Afghan people have coped with decades of grinding poverty, conflict and disorder and need real, long-term solutions.”

Impact Turns – NATO Fails

NATO’s training efforts kill Afghan soldiers and drain public and political support for NATO troops

Al-Jazeera 10 (July 7 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/07/2010778313947561.html)IM

At least five Afghan soldiers have been killed by a Nato air raid in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing took place in Ghazni province, where the soldiers were carrying out a pre-dawn raid against Taliban fighters, according to a spokesman for the Afghan defence ministry. "Isaf aircraft bombed and martyred five of our soldiers," Zaher Azimi, a spokesman for the ministry, said, referring to the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf). "We condemn this incident and regret that this is not the first time such an incident has occurred. We hope it will be the last time." Two other soldiers were injured in the air raid. Josef Blotz, a Nato spokesman, confirmed the attack. He said he regretted the incident and that Isaf would launch an investigation. "The reason for this is perhaps a co-ordination issue," Blotz said. "We were obviously not absolutely clear whether there were Afghan national security forces in the area." He extended the personal condolences of General David Petraeus, the newly arrived commander of Nato and US forces in Afghanistan, to the families of the victims. So-called "friendly fire" incidents continue to occur in Afghanistan, despite tighter new rules of engagement designed to limit the use of air raids. A Nato air strike killed four Afghan soldiers in Wardak province in January and the German army accidentally killed five Afghan soldiers in April in a "friendly fire" incident in Kunduz province. Such incidents have been repeatedly condemned by the Afghan government, which highlights the effect the negative effect that they have on attempts to get the Afghan public, and the government, to support efforts against the Taliban.
NATO hurts Afghanistan – ineffective, unsustainable, corrupt, creates dependency and ill equipped

Oxfam 10 (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

Military-dominated institutions, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), often lack the capacity to manage effective development initiatives, even where civilians are inserted into these structures. They are unable to achieve the level of local trust, engagement and community ownership required to achieve positive and lasting improvements to Afghan lives. In many cases, PRTs in insecure areas rely on local contracting companies that have limited capacities, weak links to communities and are widely seen as wasteful, ineffective and corrupt.3 Part of the problem is that the militarized aid approach focuses not on alleviating poverty but on winning the loyalty of Afghans through the provision of aid. In “Commanders’ Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” a US army manual for troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, aid is defined as “a nonlethal weapon” that is utilized to “win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents.”4 In a country where some 6,000 schools are needed, it is difficult to argue that those with the resources should refrain from building them. However, this approach to assistance is more likely to create dependencies rather than increase the self-sufficiency of communities. And given that it is so often poorly implemented, it is highly unlikely to achieve even its intended security objectives. One school constructed by a PRT in Kapisa province was found to have problems with its structural integrity and serious design flaws, with latrines emptying just above a stream that the community used as a water source. Another PRT-constructed school in the same province was found to have “design and safety issues” and “presented an unsafe environment in its current state” due to the absence of a retaining wall to prevent potential rock and mudslides.5 Achieving sustainability and local ownership is also a challenge: a review of PRTs by the US Congress found that “the lack of planning led PRTs to pursue short-term ‘feel good’ projects (with success measured by money spent or satisfaction of the local governor) without consideration of larger strategic and capacity-building implications.”6 Schools, for example, require much more than just buildings to function. They must have trained male and female teachers, relevant textbooks and curricula, a safe environment to enable children (especially girls) to attend and a sense of community ownership as well as links with the Ministry of Education (MoE) to ensure sustainability. PRTs, however, are scarcely equipped to provide anything beyond basic infrastructure, particularly given that the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, which support the assistance activities of US PRTs and battalions, are explicitly prohibited from being used for project maintenance or upkeep.7 In the words of one tribal leader from Paktia, “we have a common saying, it is better to have less from a sustainable source than having a great deal just once…we really do not need somebody to distribute biscuits to us and do not need construction projects that fall down after a year.”

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