A2: Impacts- Offense– Civil Unrest/Conflict Escalation
PMC’s solve civil unrest better than the UN – they are superior to peacekeeping troops in speed and skill.
Schreier and Caparini 5 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper - №6, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies” Fred and Marina Geneva, March http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/op06_privatising-security.pdf)KM
• PMCs and PSCs could improve the quality of UN missions. The UN is slow to deploy peacekeeping troops and the troops are often poorly trained and underequipped soldiers from developing countries. Not only are these types of operations less controversial when carried out by private companies, they are less costly. PMC operations in Sierra Leone cost about 4 percent of the costs of a subsequent UN peacekeeping operation.277 It is estimated that the intervention in Liberia would have cost 15 times more if US troops were used.278 One PMC claimed that it could have intervened to stop the killing in Rwanda within 14 days of hire at a cost of $600,000 per day. The UN Operation took much longer, cost $3 million per day and did not stop the genocide.279 A subsequent UN report emphasized the importance of rapid deployment and on-call expertise for peacekeeping operations.280
PMC’s stabilize failed states that international powers ignore – solves terrorism.
Schreier and Caparini 5 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper - №6, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies” Fred and Marina Geneva, March http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/op06_privatising-security.pdf)KM
PMCs can bring stability to conflicts in the developing world. Stabilizing “failed states” is important for reducing the threat of international terrorism and organized crime, and the provision of security is a prerequisite for such stabilization. Despite the prevailing distaste for mercenaries, the record of some PMCs speaks to their potential for resolving conflicts and establishing peace and order in countries that would otherwise be ignored by the world’s leading powers.282
PMC’s empirically solve conflicts before they escalate and allow for peace negotiations to be made.
Fitzsimmons 5 (Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Fall , Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2005 “DOGS OF PEACE: A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES IN PEACE IMPLEMENTATION” Scott , Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jmss/jmss_2005/v8n1/jmss_v8n1g.pdf)KM
In the twenty-one months that Executive Outcomes was deployed in Sierra Leone and with fewer than 500 foreign specialists, it was able to drive back rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) troops from around the capital, Freetown, retake key mines from the RUF, and destroy the RUF's headquarters. Furthermore, and most important in any discussion of security guarantees, EO was able to respond to threats from RUF forces geared towards disrupting the first official democratic election in Sierra Leonean history, thereby violating the November 1995 ceasefire. EO accomplished this by conducting reconnaissance missions to determine the location of RUF forces around Freetown and then eliminating them before a disruption of the election could spark a widespread outbreak of hostilities.11 This action had the additional benefit of bringing RUF leader Foday Sankhoh to the negotiating table and ultimately contributed to his signing a peace agreement with the government in November of 1996.12 EO's superior knowledge of military tactics appears to have greatly contributed to its successes. The style of warfare that characterized the Sierra Leonean conflict before EO's arrival was roadside ambushes followed by quick withdrawals. EO's tactics included constantly pursuing RUF forces from the air and on the ground and forcing the RUF to commit to standup battles that put the unskilled rebel force at a severe disadvantage.13 Veterans of EO's campaign described their tactics as being so effective that compelling the RUF to stop fighting was "child’s play."14 Similarly, P.W. Singer's assessment of EO actions in Sierra Leone concluded that the PMC’s small but tactically proficient force played a decisive role in compelling the RUF to stop fighting and negotiate with the government for the first time.15
A2: Impacts- Offense- Heg
And, contractors are key to US heg
Scahill 7 (Jeremy, Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling Blackwater, The Independent, Aug 10, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=35239 ) ET
"To the extent a population is called upon to go to war, there is resistance, a necessary resistance to prevent wars of self-aggrandizement, foolish wars and in the case of the United States, hegemonic imperialist wars. Private forces are almost a necessity for a United States bent on retaining its declining empire. Think about Rome and its increasing need for mercenaries."
And, getting rid of PMCs would destroy the military- downsizing
Lendman 10 (Stever, MA @ Harvard, Steve Lendman Blog, jan 19-10) ET
In the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon employed one PMC operative per 50 troops. For the 1999 Yugoslavia conflict, it was one for every 10, and by the 2003 Iraq War, PMCs comprised the second largest force after the US military. They've also been used in numerous civil wars globally in nations like Angola, Sierra Leone, the Balkans throughout the 1990s, Papua New Guinea, and elsewhere. From 1990 - 2000, they participated in 80 conflicts, compared to 15 from 1950 - 1989. Singer cites three reasons why, combined into "one dynamic:"
1. Supply and demand Since the Cold War ended in 1991, the US military downsized to about two-thirds its former size, a process Dick Cheney, as defense secretary, called BRAC - Base Realignment and Closure, followed by privatizing military functions. But given America's permanent war agenda, the Pentagon needed help, especially because of the proliferation of small arms, over 550 million globally or about one for every 12 human beings, and their increased use in local conflicts.
PMC’s are used more than military forces- Iraq and Afghanistan
Lendman 10 (Stever, MA @ Harvard, Steve Lendman Blog, jan 19-10) ET
In 2005, 80 PMCs operated there with over 20,000 personnel. Today, in Iraq and Afghanistan combined, it's grown exponentially, according to US Department of Defense figures - nearly 250,000 as of Q 3, 2009, mostly in Iraq but rising in Afghanistan to support more troops. Not included are PMCs working for the State Department, 16 US intelligence agencies, Homeland Security, other branches and foreign governments, commercial businesses, and individuals, so the true total is much higher. In addition, as Iraq troops are drawn down, PMCs will replace them, and in Afghanistan, they already exceed America's military force.
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