Corruption in Privatization in the Public Utility Sector and Growth in South-East Europe: Contracts and Regulations in Telecommunication


Table 2 – Ownership of incumbent fixed-line operators – July 2005



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Table 2 – Ownership of incumbent fixed-line operators – July 2005

Country










Albania

Albtelecom

24.0%

Turk Telekom

Belarus

Beltelecom

100.0%

n/a

Bosnia

BH Telecom

HT Mostar

Telecom Srpske


100.0%

67.0%


80.0%

n/a

Hrvatsk tel.30.29%

n/a


Bulgaria

BTC

Single golden share

Advent International – 65%

Croatia

Hrvatski Telekom

49.0%

Deutshe Telekom – 51%

Cyprus

CyTA

100.0%

n/a

Czech Republic

Cesky Telecom

0.0%

Telefonika – 51.1%

Estonia

Eesti Telekom

27.3%

Telia Sonera – 50.3%

Greece

OTE

48.6%

n/a

Hungary

Magyar Telekom

Single golden share

Detsche Telekom – 59.5%

Latvia

Lattelekom

51.0%

Telia Sonera– 49%

Lithuania

Lietuvos Telekomas

7.5%

Telia Sonera– 60%

Macedonia

Makedonski Telekomunikacii

47.1% plus golden share

Magyar Telekom

51%


Moldova

Moldtelecom

100.0%

n/a

Poland

TPSA

4.0%

France Telecom-47.5%

Romania

Romtelecom

46.0%

OTE-54%

Russia

Svyazinvest

75.0%

n/a

Serbia & Montenegro

Telekom CrnaGora

Posta Telekom Kosovec



80.0%

0.0%


100.0%

OTE-20%

Slovakia

Slovak Telecom

49.0%

Deutshe Telekom -51%

Slovenia

Telekom Slovenije

62.5%

n/a

Ukraine

Ukrtelecom

92.8%

n/a


Table 3 – Appeal Procedures against NRA decisions





Table 3– Appeal procedures against NRA decisions

Source: Country Comparative Report – June 26, 2006


Table 4 –Licensing requirements for fixed telecommunication networks and services

Source: Country Comparative Report – June, 2006





Figure 1- Mobile and fixed line penetration, recent developments



Figure 2 – Fixed lines penetration



Figure 3 – Price of fixed incumbent and alternative fixed operator for a 3-minute local in nominal eurocents



Figure 4 - Price of fixed incumbent and alternative fixed operator for a 10-minute local call in nominal eurocents



Figure 5 – Interconnection charges for call termination on fixed network of incumbent operator – local level






Figure 6 – Information about tariffs

Bibliography




  1. Armstrong, M. 1996, Network Interconnection’, DPET 9625, Southhampton

  2. Armstrong, M, 1998, Network Interconnection in Telecommunication’. Economic Journal, 108 May 545-564

  3. Blanchard Oliver, Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman, and Lawrence Summers, 1991, Reform in Eastern Europe, Cambridge, MA, London: MIT Press

  4. Boylaud, Oliver and Guiseppe Nicoletti, 2001, Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Telecommunications, OECD Economic Studies, n. 32, 99-142

  5. European Electronic Regulation and Markets 2005 (11th Report), SEC (2006) 193, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 20.02.2006, COM(2006)68 final

  6. Geradin Damien and Kerf Michael, 2003, Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications, Antitrust vs Sector –specific Regulation, Oxford University Press

  7. Gomez-Ibanez, Jose A., 2003, Regulating Infrastructure, Monopoly, Contracts and Discretion, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA and London, England

  8. Hylton, Keith, 2003, Antitrust Law, Economic Theory & Common Law Evolution, Cambridge University Press

  9. Johnson Simeon, Kaufmann, Daniel and Shleifer Andrei, 1997, “The Unofficial Economy in Transition’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 159-221

  10. Kahn, Alfred E., 1998, The Economics of Regulation, Principles and Institutions, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, London, England

  11. Kaufmann, Daniel and Wei, Shang-Jin, 1999, Does Grease Money Speed up the Wheels of Commerce, Policy Research Working Paper, NO. 2254, World Bank

  12. Kennedy David, 2004, The Dark Side of Virtue, Chapter Five, The Rule of Law as Development, Princeton University Press

  13. Lerner Josh and Schoar Antoinette, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equtiy

  14. Levy Brian and Spiller Pablo, 1996, Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications, Cambridge University Press

  15. Newbery David, 1991, Reform in Hungary: Sequencing and Privatization, European Economic Review, 35:2-3, pp 571-80

  16. Newbery, David M.G. 1999, Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

  17. Nuechterlein Jonathan E. and Weiser Philip J. 2005, Digital Crossroads, American Telecommunication Policy in the Internet Age, The MIT Press

  18. Roland, Gerard, 1994, On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatization and Restructuring, The Economic Journal, 104, pp. 1158-68

  19. Ronald, Gerard, 2000, Transition and Economics, Politics, Markets and Firms, the MIT Press.

  20. Shavell, Stephen, 2004, Foundation of Economic Analyses of Law, Harvard University Press

  21. Shleifer, Andei and Vishy, Robert W., 1993, “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), pp. 599-617.

  22. Shleifer, Andei, Murphy. Kevin and Vishy Robert, 1989, Industrialization and the Big Push, Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago, vol. 97, no. 51

  23. Shleifer, Andei, Murphy. Kevin and Vishy Robert,Why si Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?

  24. Shleifer, Andeir and Glaeser Edward L, 2003, The Rise of the Regulatory State, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI , June, pp. 401-425

  25. Shleifer, Andei, 1996, Government in Transition, Harvard University

  26. Spiller, Pablo T. and Vogelsang Ingo, 1994, Regulation, Institution and Commitment: The British Telecommunication Sector, the World Bank, Policy Research Department, Finance and Private sector development division

  27. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1999, “Promoting Competition in Telecommunications”, Working Paper Series, Buenos Aires

  28. Stiglitz E. Joseph and Hoff Karla, 2003, After the Big Bang: Obstacles and emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies, World Bank

  29. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1994, Whiter Socialism?, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, London, England

  30. Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Charlton, Andrew, 2005, Fair Trade For All, How Trade Can Promote Development, Oxford University Press, Inc. New York

  31. Troesken Werner, Draft 2005, Regime Change and Corruption: A History of Public Utility Regulation, NBER

  32. Velkova, Emi, 2006, Integration of South-East Europe in the EU: Corruption, Foreign Direct Investment and Development, ELCR, Working Papers Forum, Harvard, University Law School

  33. Vogelsang, Ingo, Cross – Fertilization between U.S. and European Telecommunication, Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, CES info Seminar Series, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, London, England, 2003,

  34. Vogelsang, Ingo, Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks, Boston University Working Papers Forum

  35. Wells T. Louis, Ahmed Rafiq, 2006, Making Foreign Investment Safe, Property Rights and National Sovereignty, Oxford University Press

  36. Wallsten, Scott, 2002, Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunication Reforms, Policy Research Working Paper 2817, The World Bank

  37. Walden Ian and Angel John, 2005, Telecommunications Law and Regulation, Second Edition, Oxford University Press

Legislation

  1. http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm#

  2. http://ec/europa.eu

  3. europa.eu.int/information

  4. http://www.itu.int/home/index.html

  5. http://www.wto.org


1 Stiglitz E. Joseph and Hoff Karla, 2003, After the Big Bang: Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies, World Bank

2 Blanchard Oliver, Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman and Lawrence Summers, 1991, Reform in Eastern Europe, Cambridge, MIT Press.

3 Ronald Gerard, 1994, On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatization and Restructuring” The Economic Journal, 104, pp. 1158-68

4 Newbery, David, 1991, Reform in Hungary: Sequencing and Privatization, European Economic Review, 35:2-3, pp.571-80

5 Summers, Lawrence, 1994, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland; Comments and Discussion. “ BPE, pp.334-41.

6 Mc Faul, Michael, 1995, State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia, World Politics, Vol.47, No.2 pp. 210-243. The author states that the future progress in developing property rights will require not only sound economic policies but also more robust state institutions.

7 Murphy m. Kevin, Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Robert, Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?, Kraakman Renier, Black Bernard and Tarassova Ana, 2000, Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance, What Went Wrong?, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, no. 6

8 Vogelsang, Ingo, Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunication Networks see at

http://www.bu.edu/econ/workingpapers/papers/ingo/20 vogelsang/Accesssurvey_iv_jel.pdf

9 The vast literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) suggest that FDI does not necessarily leads to positive spillovers and thus contributes to growth. Atken and Harrison’s (1999) findings in Venezuela and Haddad and Harrison’s (1993) in Morocco do not support positive spillovers hypothesis.

Borensztein (1998), Xu (2000) and Alfaro (2003) suggest that educational level, development of local financial markets and other local conditions allow positive effect of FDI to materialize. Lipsey, Blomstorm and Zejan (1992) found that FDI has a positive effect on growth only when countries have reached a certain level of income to absorb new technologies and benefit of new technologies to the whole economy.



10 Energyobserver.com, Issue 24, 11/14/2005 at http://www.energyobserver.com/eng/vesti.php?b=24

11 http://www.onlinedmc.co.uk/jetoil_v_okta.htm

12The Court identified the following guiding principles:
- The use “to be agreed” in relation to an essential term is likely to prevent a contract coming into existence on grounds of uncertainty.

- However, where commercial parties familiar with their trade have acted in belief that they had a binding contract, the Courts will call for the contract to be carried out, even if an essential term is still “to be agreed”.

- This is particularly true in the case of contracts for future performance, where matters need to be adjusted over time, where one party has already received some advantage, or where one party has made a relevant investment.

- In these cases, even in the absence of explicit language or an appropriate arbitration clause, the Court will imply an obligation that a reasonable price be paid. Dispute Resolution, International Newsletter, December 2001, Issue one, Bird& Bird



13 BK Group is a powerful local industrial consortium controlled by the Karic family.

14 A group of Austrian investors are —Herbert Cordt, Josef Taus and Martin Schlaff—operating through the holding company Holdenhurst.


15 http://www.telegeography.com/article.php.article_id=6436

16 Global Corruption Report, 2006, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “How Corruption affects development,” Transparency International.

17 Id.

18 Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, March 1998, Volume 35, Number 1 (www.worldbank.org?fandd/english/0398/content.htm#FIGHT). Baumol William J., Panzar John C. and Willig Robert D., Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, Harcout, Brace Jovanovitch, NY, 1982

19 See for the Corruption Perception Index and the methodology used www.transparency.org/cpi/2006/cpi2006.en.htm.

20 The corruption has a social explanation in low wages. The economic analyses indicate a positive correlation between crime and low wages. See Caroline Van Rijckeghem and Beatrice Weder, 1997, “Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in Civil Service Cause Corruption? IMF Working Paper, WP/97/93. Vito Tanzi, 1998, Corruption Around the World, Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures, IMF Staff papers, Vol 45, No. 4, Dec. p. 572-574.

21 O. Boylaud and G. Nicoletti, 2000, Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Telecommunication, OECD Economics Working Paper 237, Paris, p. 5.

22 See Wellenius, B. 1997, “Telecommunication Reform - How to Succeed, Viewpoint Note no. 130 (the World Bank.

23 The telecommunication market is divided into equipment, networks and services.

24 Ibid, p 29, 30.

25 The competitive bidding can enhance the perception of fairness and can also help maintain the political process.

26 Jose A. Gomez- Ibanez, 2006, Regulating Infrastructure, Monopoly, Contracts and Discretion, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, England and London, p. 33.

27 Richard Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 1999, (30th end, Washington, DC; Cato Institute; William Sharkey, 1982, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,).

28 See published articles on network externalities at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/biblio_hframe.html.

29 Nicolas Curien, 1991,“The Theory and Measure of Cross-Subsidies: An Application to the Telecommunication Industry, International Journal o Industrial Organization 73.

30 Alfred Kahn, 1998, The Economics of Regulation – Principles and Institutions (Boston, Mass, and London: MIT Press) vol. 2, 220.

31 Jose A. Gomez- Ibanez, 2006, Regulating Infrastructure, Monopoly, Contracts and Discretion, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, England and London, p. 22,23.

32 The Concession Contract for Public Telecommunication Services and Public Telecommunication Networks between Ministry of Transport and Connections and AD Macedonian Telecommunication,

page 5.


33 The law regulates electronic telecommunication services, the regulatory body competence, construction, maintenance and usage of communication networks, interconnection and establishment of communication services.

34 Law for Electronic Telecommunication, Part One, article 1

35 Ibid, Part 5, article 40

36 Law for Electronic Telecommunication, Part II, Article 9

37 We broadly speak of a natural monopoly if a single company can meet demand at a lower average cost than two or more companies. According to Katz and Shapiro, 1994, network externalities are present when the social value of connecting an additional individual to a network exceeds the private value of connection for the individual.

38 Bjorn Wellenius and Peter a. Stern, 1994, Implementing Reforms in the Telecommunication Sector- lessons from Experience (Washington DC: The World Bank;

Ahmed Galal, 1994, Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises-An Empirical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press)



39 Liebenstein, H., 1996,Allocative Efficiency as “X – Inefficiency”, American Economic Review, vol. 56, p. 392-415.

40 John Vickers and George K. Yarrow, 1998, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, MIT Press, John Donahue, 1989, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means.

41 Nuechterlein, E. Jonathan and Weiser, Philip J., 2005, Digital Crossroads, American Telecommunication Policy in the Internet Age, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, London, England, p.3.

42 Ibid

43 Ingo Vogelsang, 2003, Cross – Fertilization between U.S. and European Telecommunication, Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, CES info Seminar Series, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, London, England, p. 21.

44 Interconnection means that two networks are linked at the same hierarchy to provide call origination, transit and termination for each other. Access means that one network uses the other to originate or terminate calls being at different hierarchical levels.

45 Douglas C. North and Robert Thomas, 1973, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

46 Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, Douglas North initially developed the concept of transaction costs. The basic idea is that all economic activities can be broken down into a series of transactions, such as buying a good or service thus enforcing them imposes costs on the contracting parties.

Transaction costs appear because of two reasons: the parities lack of information and anticipation taking into account the limits of cognitive abilities ahead to foresee and process the information and the opportunistic behavior of the party by withholding relevant information in order to gain the advantage. The perfect information with honest contracting parties rarely occurs in the real world and therefore there is a need to draft and enforce complicated contracts which imposes high costs.



47 Ronald H. Coase, 1960, The Problem of Social Costs, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (October ): 1-44

48 Michael Kerf, Isabel Neto and Damien Geradin, 2005, Regulation and Competition, Public Policy for the Private Sector, Regulation and Competition, How Antitrust and Sector Regulation Affect Telecom Competition, the World Bank Group, No. 296, June

49 http://www.itu.int.int/home/index.html

50 Collection charge is the retail price levied on the originating customer by the originating operator (ITR 88, Article 2.9)


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