Corruption in Privatization in the Public Utility Sector and Growth in South-East Europe: Contracts and Regulations in Telecommunication
Table 2 – Ownership of incumbent fixed-line operators – July 2005
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- Table 3 – Appeal Procedures against NRA decisions
- Table 4 –Licensing requirements for fixed telecommunication networks and services
- Figure 1- Mobile and fixed line penetration, recent developments
- Figure 3 – Price of fixed incumbent and alternative fixed operator for a 3-minute local in nominal eurocents
- Figure 5 – Interconnection charges for call termination on fixed network of incumbent operator – local level
- Figure 6 – Information about tariffs
Table 2 – Ownership of incumbent fixed-line operators – July 2005
Table 3 – Appeal Procedures against NRA decisions 
Table 3– Appeal procedures against NRA decisions Source: Country Comparative Report – June 26, 2006 
Table 4 –Licensing requirements for fixed telecommunication networks and services 
Source: Country Comparative Report – June, 2006 
Figure 1- Mobile and fixed line penetration, recent developments 
Figure 2 – Fixed lines penetration 
Figure 3 – Price of fixed incumbent and alternative fixed operator for a 3-minute local in nominal eurocents 
Figure 4 - Price of fixed incumbent and alternative fixed operator for a 10-minute local call in nominal eurocents 
Figure 5 – Interconnection charges for call termination on fixed network of incumbent operator – local level 
Figure 6 – Information about tariffs Bibliography
Legislation
1 Stiglitz E. Joseph and Hoff Karla, 2003, After the Big Bang: Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies, World Bank 2 Blanchard Oliver, Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman and Lawrence Summers, 1991, Reform in Eastern Europe, Cambridge, MIT Press. 3 Ronald Gerard, 1994, On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatization and Restructuring” The Economic Journal, 104, pp. 1158-68 4 Newbery, David, 1991, Reform in Hungary: Sequencing and Privatization, European Economic Review, 35:2-3, pp.571-80 5 Summers, Lawrence, 1994, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland; Comments and Discussion. “ BPE, pp.334-41. 6 Mc Faul, Michael, 1995, State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia, World Politics, Vol.47, No.2 pp. 210-243. The author states that the future progress in developing property rights will require not only sound economic policies but also more robust state institutions. 7 Murphy m. Kevin, Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Robert, Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?, Kraakman Renier, Black Bernard and Tarassova Ana, 2000, Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance, What Went Wrong?, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, no. 6 8 Vogelsang, Ingo, Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunication Networks see at http://www.bu.edu/econ/workingpapers/papers/ingo/20 vogelsang/Accesssurvey_iv_jel.pdf 9 The vast literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) suggest that FDI does not necessarily leads to positive spillovers and thus contributes to growth. Atken and Harrison’s (1999) findings in Venezuela and Haddad and Harrison’s (1993) in Morocco do not support positive spillovers hypothesis. Borensztein (1998), Xu (2000) and Alfaro (2003) suggest that educational level, development of local financial markets and other local conditions allow positive effect of FDI to materialize. Lipsey, Blomstorm and Zejan (1992) found that FDI has a positive effect on growth only when countries have reached a certain level of income to absorb new technologies and benefit of new technologies to the whole economy. 10 Energyobserver.com, Issue 24, 11/14/2005 at http://www.energyobserver.com/eng/vesti.php?b=24 11 http://www.onlinedmc.co.uk/jetoil_v_okta.htm 12The Court identified the following guiding principles: - The use “to be agreed” in relation to an essential term is likely to prevent a contract coming into existence on grounds of uncertainty. - However, where commercial parties familiar with their trade have acted in belief that they had a binding contract, the Courts will call for the contract to be carried out, even if an essential term is still “to be agreed”. - This is particularly true in the case of contracts for future performance, where matters need to be adjusted over time, where one party has already received some advantage, or where one party has made a relevant investment. - In these cases, even in the absence of explicit language or an appropriate arbitration clause, the Court will imply an obligation that a reasonable price be paid. Dispute Resolution, International Newsletter, December 2001, Issue one, Bird& Bird 13 BK Group is a powerful local industrial consortium controlled by the Karic family. 14 A group of Austrian investors are —Herbert Cordt, Josef Taus and Martin Schlaff—operating through the holding company Holdenhurst. 15 http://www.telegeography.com/article.php.article_id=6436 16 Global Corruption Report, 2006, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “How Corruption affects development,” Transparency International. 17 Id. 18 Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, March 1998, Volume 35, Number 1 (www.worldbank.org?fandd/english/0398/content.htm#FIGHT). Baumol William J., Panzar John C. and Willig Robert D., Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, Harcout, Brace Jovanovitch, NY, 1982 19 See for the Corruption Perception Index and the methodology used www.transparency.org/cpi/2006/cpi2006.en.htm. 20 The corruption has a social explanation in low wages. The economic analyses indicate a positive correlation between crime and low wages. See Caroline Van Rijckeghem and Beatrice Weder, 1997, “Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in Civil Service Cause Corruption? IMF Working Paper, WP/97/93. Vito Tanzi, 1998, Corruption Around the World, Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures, IMF Staff papers, Vol 45, No. 4, Dec. p. 572-574. 21 O. Boylaud and G. Nicoletti, 2000, Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Telecommunication, OECD Economics Working Paper 237, Paris, p. 5. 22 See Wellenius, B. 1997, “Telecommunication Reform - How to Succeed, Viewpoint Note no. 130 (the World Bank. 23 The telecommunication market is divided into equipment, networks and services. 24 Ibid, p 29, 30. 25 The competitive bidding can enhance the perception of fairness and can also help maintain the political process. 26 Jose A. Gomez- Ibanez, 2006, Regulating Infrastructure, Monopoly, Contracts and Discretion, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, England and London, p. 33. 27 Richard Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 1999, (30th end, Washington, DC; Cato Institute; William Sharkey, 1982, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,). 28 See published articles on network externalities at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/biblio_hframe.html. 29 Nicolas Curien, 1991,“The Theory and Measure of Cross-Subsidies: An Application to the Telecommunication Industry, International Journal o Industrial Organization 73. 30 Alfred Kahn, 1998, The Economics of Regulation – Principles and Institutions (Boston, Mass, and London: MIT Press) vol. 2, 220. 31 Jose A. Gomez- Ibanez, 2006, Regulating Infrastructure, Monopoly, Contracts and Discretion, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, England and London, p. 22,23. 32 The Concession Contract for Public Telecommunication Services and Public Telecommunication Networks between Ministry of Transport and Connections and AD Macedonian Telecommunication, page 5.
33 The law regulates electronic telecommunication services, the regulatory body competence, construction, maintenance and usage of communication networks, interconnection and establishment of communication services. 34 Law for Electronic Telecommunication, Part One, article 1 35 Ibid, Part 5, article 40 36 Law for Electronic Telecommunication, Part II, Article 9 37 We broadly speak of a natural monopoly if a single company can meet demand at a lower average cost than two or more companies. According to Katz and Shapiro, 1994, network externalities are present when the social value of connecting an additional individual to a network exceeds the private value of connection for the individual. 38 Bjorn Wellenius and Peter a. Stern, 1994, Implementing Reforms in the Telecommunication Sector- lessons from Experience (Washington DC: The World Bank; Ahmed Galal, 1994, Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises-An Empirical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 39 Liebenstein, H., 1996,Allocative Efficiency as “X – Inefficiency”, American Economic Review, vol. 56, p. 392-415. 40 John Vickers and George K. Yarrow, 1998, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, MIT Press, John Donahue, 1989, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means. 41 Nuechterlein, E. Jonathan and Weiser, Philip J., 2005, Digital Crossroads, American Telecommunication Policy in the Internet Age, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, London, England, p.3. 42 Ibid 43 Ingo Vogelsang, 2003, Cross – Fertilization between U.S. and European Telecommunication, Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, CES info Seminar Series, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, London, England, p. 21. 44 Interconnection means that two networks are linked at the same hierarchy to provide call origination, transit and termination for each other. Access means that one network uses the other to originate or terminate calls being at different hierarchical levels. 45 Douglas C. North and Robert Thomas, 1973, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 46 Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, Douglas North initially developed the concept of transaction costs. The basic idea is that all economic activities can be broken down into a series of transactions, such as buying a good or service thus enforcing them imposes costs on the contracting parties. Transaction costs appear because of two reasons: the parities lack of information and anticipation taking into account the limits of cognitive abilities ahead to foresee and process the information and the opportunistic behavior of the party by withholding relevant information in order to gain the advantage. The perfect information with honest contracting parties rarely occurs in the real world and therefore there is a need to draft and enforce complicated contracts which imposes high costs. 47 Ronald H. Coase, 1960, The Problem of Social Costs, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (October ): 1-44 48 Michael Kerf, Isabel Neto and Damien Geradin, 2005, Regulation and Competition, Public Policy for the Private Sector, Regulation and Competition, How Antitrust and Sector Regulation Affect Telecom Competition, the World Bank Group, No. 296, June 49 http://www.itu.int.int/home/index.html 50 Collection charge is the retail price levied on the originating customer by the originating operator (ITR 88, Article 2.9) Directory: docs docs -> Application for acem docs -> Observational Assessment of Teaching Practices Teaching Assessment Initiative Proposal Submitted to The Teachers for a New Era project docs -> Traditional British values docs -> From Warfighters to Crimefighters: The Origins of Domestic Police Militarization docs -> Borzoi Club of America Register of Merit Program I. What is a Register Of Merit docs -> Protecting the rights of the child in the context of migration docs -> United Nations E/C. 12/Esp/5 docs -> 9th May 1950 the schuman declaration docs -> Getting To Outcomes® in Services for Homeless Veterans 10 Steps for Achieving Accountability Download 352.78 Kb. Share with your friends:
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