Cost Control cp
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- Complete project cost control solves—status quo incremental approval fails
- Solvency (Rail)
Solvency (Generic)Increased cost control and oversight spill over into better future planningGAO 97, Investigative arm of Congress charged with examining matters relating to the receipt and payment of public funds, (Government Accountability Office, Transportation Infrastructure: Managing the Costs of Large-Dollar Highway Projects, Government Accountability Office, February 1997,http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155775.pdf)//AG Once an initial cost estimate is developed, establishing cost performance goals based on this estimate and a strategy to accomplish them would make cost awareness and cost containment an integral part of how states manage a project over time. This does not mean that an initial cost estimate cannot be increased if contingencies were not sufficient to cover increases generally expected through design changes; however, any change and reason for it should be agreed to. Strategies, such as those being used on the Central Artery/Tunnel project, have the potential to improve accountability for cost increases and create a culture where cost control is part of day-to-day activities. Increased federal oversight of state management of project costs is another way to look at a federal role. Such actions as establishing standards for cost estimates, including what elements should be included; evaluating the reasonableness of cost estimates and finance plans; and monitoring cost growth and financing could help to ensure that the large-dollar highway projects are being effectively and efficiently managed. Complete project cost control solves—status quo incremental approval failsGAO 97, Investigative arm of Congress charged with examining matters relating to the receipt and payment of public funds, (Government Accountability Office, Transportation Infrastructure: Managing the Costs of Large-Dollar Highway Projects, Government Accountability Office, February 1997,http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155775.pdf)//AG The FHWA project approval process consists of a series of incremental actions that occur over the period of years needed to plan, design, and build a project. There is no federal approval of, or agreement to, the total cost at the outset of a project; rather, FHWA approves the estimated cost of a large-dollar project in segments when those segments are ready for construction. However, by the time FHWA approves the costs of a large-dollar project, a public investment decision may have effectively been made because substantial funds will already have been spent on project design and acquiring property and much of the increases in the project’s estimated costs will have already occurred. While many factors can cause costs to increase, we found several factors that worked together to increase costs beyond the initial estimates for projects in the six states visited: (1) initial estimates are preliminary and not designed to be reliable predictors of a project’s cost, (2) initial estimates are modified to reflect more detailed plans and specifications as a project is designed, and (3) a project’s costs are affected by, among other things, inflation and changes in scope to accommodate economic development that occurs over time as a project is designed and built. FHWA approval of a project or a segment occurs incrementally throughout the planning, environmental review, design and property acquisition, and construction stages. During the planning stage, FHWA approves concepts that identify new projects that are needed. According to FHWA officials, the agency acts in partnership with the states to identify these needs. For example, FHWA may participate in a major investment study that identifies the need for additional highway capacity to relieve congestion in a particular corridor or approve a state transportation plan that identifies a proposed highway project or segment. However, FHWA officials emphasize that the agency’s participation in planning and approval of state transportation plans does not constitute approval of a specific project or segment or commitment on the part of the federal government to finance it. Solvency (Rail)Rail projects empirically fail—only institutional checks and risk assessment solvesFlyvbjerg 7, Professor of Major Programme Management at Oxford University's Saïd Business School and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management, winner of the Fulbright Scholarship, (Bent, Cost Overruns and Demand Shortfalls in Urban Rail and Other Infrastructure, Transportation Planning and Technology, February 2007 Taylor and Francis Group, 8 January 2007, Google Scholar)//AG Absent or inadequate risk assessment and management are, in themselves, an important source of risk for projects. Because, until now, no reliable measure has been available for estimating risk in urban rail projects, effective risk assessment and management have been impossible. The study described below is aimed at changing this situation. It denotes a first step toward empirically grounded and valid risk assessment and management of urban rail projects by presenting and analyzing data that allow such risk assessment and management. In addition to lack of a sound empirical basis, a main cause of absent risk assessment and management is lack of institutional checks and balances that would enforce accountability with rail project promoters towards risk. Such accountability would generate a demand for knowledge about real risks that is often absent today. The study described below documents a dire need for checks, balances, and accountability of this type. The work with developing procedures and institutional designs that, if implemented, would strengthen accountability towards risk has been begun elsewhere and will not be taken up here (Bruzelius et al., 1998; Flyvbjerg & COWI, 2004; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2003, 2005). Finally, it should be stressed that absent risk assessment is not caused by lack of relevant methods. The methods exist and are fairly well developed, technically speaking. The problem is one of application. First, if methods of risk assessment are applied at Cost Overruns and Demand Shortfalls in Urban Rail 11 all, applications are typically based on hypothetical, subjective data. This is due to the lack of empirical knowledge about risk mentioned above. Second, applications often have little or no bearing on real decision making, because of their lack of institutional grounding. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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