All persons interviewed at international and domestic consulting firms complained about nepotism and corruption. Most of the local consultants interviewed consider it useless to apply for GoA-funded projects without having a special relationship with the government officials and decision-makers involved. Corruption is especially threatening to international firms or Afghans returning from overseas who do not have powerful patrons or fully understand how the local system works.
According to the interviewees negative public perceptions of widespread corruption at all levels of GoA have increased,27 threatening to undermine or even reverse the GoA’s and international community’s efforts to build functioning institutions able to attract qualified consultants. Allegations mainly concern the selection of individual consultants:
High-level officials interfere with selection processes;
Shortlists are manipulated or limited to pre-selected candidates with good relations to powerful patrons;
Evaluation criteria are changed or disregarded after submission of CVs (requiring doctoral degrees when originally a master’s would have been sufficient);
Information is leaked to preferred candidates; and
Job vacancies are not correctly advertised.
The new PPL addresses the need for transparency and accountability under a separate special chapter (Chapter X). In addition, the rules of procedure for public procurement contain appropriate provisions on enforcing transparency, fair competition and the administrative review of procurement proceedings.28 Article 108 of these recently enacted rules also effectively regulates the selection of individual consultants.
The Bank’s Anti-Corruption Study (P101117) has recommended the following steps:
Steps to be taken by Government
Clarify administrative mandates and provide political support and resources accordingly, with consideration of a small number of quick win or high profile measures to demonstrate the GoA’s commitment to addressing the problem of corruption in Afghanistan.
Accelerate efforts to reduce vulnerabilities to corruption in management of budget funds and strengthen internal and external audit of public funds.
Improve transparency and effectiveness of merit-based recruitment processes and monitor progress.
Initiate work toward developing and implementing an anti-corruption strategy, with technical support from the international community.
Steps to be taken by the Donor Community
Provide technical assistance on anti-corruption policies and programs;
Renew the international community’s efforts on transparency (through regular public disclosure of financial reports, audits, and contract awards).
In close collaboration with GoA, engage in rapid analysis of key Government sectors, functions, processes and managerial responsibilities to identify points of vulnerability to corruption and make recommendations for improvements.
Initiate analytical work on corruption to expand and strengthen the information base for effective anti-corruption policies and programs.
Start incorporating an anti-corruption dimension into key development projects and programs.
Considering the low level of capacity of PA officials and the lack of user-friendly rules of procedure and manuals, it is not surprising that corruption remains a key issue. The GoA and the Bank should ensure professional evaluations by outsourcing this task to international consulting firms at least for major Bank-funded projects (see para. 55). In addition, the low procurement capacity of the PA could be addressed by simplifying the tender process. The use of Simplified Technical Proposals (STP) for routine assignments could help to increase transparency in the evaluations of proposals (see para. 22 for details and recommendations).
This section concentrates on the national budget available for procuring consulting services. There are also local budgets available at the municipal level, and municipalities can exercise some degree of fiscal autonomy. Revenues collected at the local level are mainly used to fund municipal expenditures.
Since 2001 the focus has been on reconstruction, delivery of basic services and the development of infrastructure. In addition, revenue mobilization in Afghanistan is still among the lowest in the world and covers only 9% of total public expenditure. Therefore, only a small percentage of national funds are spent on consulting services. The lack of trust in the capacity of the domestic consulting sector further undermines efforts to successfully procure more consulting services.
According to data provided by ARDS the GoA spent approx. US$130,900,000 for contracts on goods, works and consulting services since 2004.29 Ten out of 49 contracts (8.6% of total amount for goods, works and consulting services funded by GoA) concerned the provision of consulting services. Seven consultancy contracts were awarded to international firms; 3 to NGOs. No data is available on domestic consulting firms or subcontractors that may have been associated with the implementation of the assignments. The data is summarized in the table below, with details provided in Annex 2.
Since April 2002, the Bank has committed over US$1.28 billion for 25 development and emergency reconstruction projects and two budget support operations in Afghanistan.31 This support comprises US$849.8 million in grants and US$436.4 million in interest-free credits. Two budget support operations, emergency public works, infrastructure reconstruction, and education rehabilitation projects have so far been completed. Of the US$1.28 billion the World Bank has committed to Afghanistan, approx. US$175.8 million (14%) were allocated to 63 consulting service assignments which can be grouped by sector as shown in the table below, with details provided in Annex 3.
